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Abstract 
This thesis-'explores the analysis of English adjectives and 
adjectivals, in particular those which are properly translated as 
one-place predicates. The intent is both to review earlier analyses 
and to expand the fragment of English which is-accounted for in a 
Montague grammar. 
The presentation is in three parts. The first, comprising 
Chapters 1 to 4, 
, explains, and, 
defends, the analysis of some adjectives 
as predicates of individuals. Much of. the discussion is devoted to 
measure adjectives like big and to/land evaluative adjectives like 
good and skilful. The second part, comprising Chapters 5 and 6, 
introduces adjectives and other categories at, proposition level; 
these include modal adjectives like necessary and possible and 
' parenthetical. adjectives like odd and strange. Finally, Chapter 7 
presents rules, and definitions to account for predicative adjectives 
and other categories at property level; notably Tough adjectives and 
'human propensity adjectives' like wise and stupid. 
A number of other adjective classes and related phenomena are 
treated in the course of the discussion, including passive 
participles, present - participles and' 'adjectives taking various 
_complements -. _-"- 
A"-_generalised theory and- formalisation - of non- 
restrictive ' modification is also provided. 
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Chapter 0. Introduction 
0.1 Goals 
The overall goal of this thesis is to accommodate English 
adjectives within a Montague grammar and to examine the consequences 
of this analysis for the syntax, the semantics and the pragmatics of 
Montague grammar as a whole. It will be argued that the words 
-traditionally identified as 'adjectives' comprise a, very diverse 
class, both syntactically and semantically. Some adjectives, such as 
mere, former and possible, will be classed as basic ad-common nouns; 
that is, their basic -function is to apply attributively to common 
nouns to form new common nouns as in (1). 
(1) a. Lee is a mere boy. 
b. Mary is a former teacher. 
c. Nigel is a possible traitor. 
Other adjectives, such as carnivorous, , red, 
tall and good, will be 
characterised not as basic ad. -common nouns but as predicative words 
which name one-place predicates. - Such predicative words appear 
characteristically after copulas in 'predicate position'. 
(2) a. Dogs are carnivorous. 
b. Richard is tall. 
C. This play is good. 
in the case of vague adjectives such as tall and good, the analysis 
will appeal to contexts and hedges to specify comparison classes and 
criteria of application for'predicates. 
Yet other adjectives, including the Tough class and those taking 
various syntactic complements, will be taken to form complex 
'adjectival' constructions which name one-place predicates. 
(3) a. John is [hard to please]. 
b. Bob is [scared of Roger]. 
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Also included in this adjectival class are participial phrases, both 
present and passive. 
(4) a. Richard is (singing (a hymn)]. 
b. Mary is (loved (by John)]. 
As with basic predicative adjectives, derived adjectival constituents 
characteristically appear in predicate position. 
Despite the diversity of phenomena, the analysis can be unified 
by 'bumping' rules which productively map predicative adjectives and 
other adjectival constructions into attributive modifiers of common 
nouns. The adjectivals from (2) to (4), when bumped into attributive 
modifiers, can be seen to modify common nouns as in <5). For 
clarity, -the attributive modifiers are marked with italics in these 
Examples. 
(5) a. Dogs are carnivorous animals. 
b. Richard is a tall man. 
c. Last night we saw a good play. 
d. "John is a hard man to please. 
e. The only person scared of Roger is Bob. 
f.: The man singing a hymn is Richard. 
g. The woman loved by John is Mary. 
It will be shown that in a Montague grammar it is possible to 
formulate , bumping rules in place of traditional syntactic 
transformations like relative clause reduction. 
The viability of the approach is shown by its successful 
formalisation within a coordinated Montague grammar. The grammar, in 
which bumping rules are an integral part, significantly extends the 
fragment of English so far accommodated within a Montague grammar. 
0.2 Montague grammar 
I have adopted a form of Montague grammar (MG) as the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, and I assume a familiarity with 
Montague 1973 (henceforth PTQ). Until Chapter 6, where contexts are 
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introduced, the analysis employs the traditional PTQ semantics and 
follows the slightly simplified conventions for notation and 
translation given in Bennett 1975 and in Dowty et al. 1981.1 English 
expressions will be translated into expressions of intensional logic 
(IL) and will be understood as interpreted according to the 
appropriate semantics. 
The approach to syntax in MG -continues to be a moot 'issue. In 
PTQ, the output of a syntactic combination rule is defined simply as 
a string. For example, a transitive verb (TV) is combined with a 
-term (T) to-<. form an intransitive verb (IV) string. The syntactic 
rule and an example are shown below. 
(6) '(PTQ SS). If 0E PTV and ßE PT then F5(45, ß) E PIV 
where F5(6, ß) - OR if ß does not have the, form hen 
and F5(6, hen) -8 himn. 
(7) love Mary 
loveTV MaryT 
Similarly, a term is combined with an intransitive verb string to 
-form a sentence (t) string. 
(8) (PTQ S4). If aE PT and 6E P1 , then F4(a, b) E Pt 
where F4( a, 6) - ab' and 6' is the 
result of replacing the first verb in 6 by 
its third person singular present. 





It will be noted that the linear outputs of such combination rules, 
e. g. love Mary IV and 
John walkst, do not formally carry any 
information about the structure of the constituent expressions. That 
is, in the string love MaryIV there is no longer any specification 
that love is a transitive verb and Mary is a term; and in the string 
John walkst there is no longer any indication that the sentence is 
composed of a term and an intransitive verb. Such information is, of 
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course, crucial when the time comes for adding morphological markings 
for case and tense: for instance, the rule in (s) should combine 
JohnT with walkIV to form John walkst, but it should combine JohnT 
with love MaryIV to form not John love Maryst but John loves Mary t. 
In an attempt to avoid these problems, Partee (1975: 258-259; 
1976b: 63-64; see also Dowty et al. 1981: 190) has argued that the 
syntax rules build not just simple strings but labelled and bracketed 
strings as in (10). 
(10) {JohnT 
. [love Mar TI1VIt 
JohnT [loveTV MaryT]IV 
lover \ MaryT 
This approach preserves information about the internal structure of 
constituents. Also,, it allows the grammar to construct unambiguous 
hierarchical tree structures instead of simple strings, which are 
often ambiguous. When interpreted. in this way, the nodes of MG 
derivation trees become much like the linearly ordered phrase- 
structure trees of transformational grammar (TG). 
The view that syntax rules build up unambiguous tree structures 
rather than simple strings is also a return to the principles laid 
out in Montague's Universal 4Grammar (UG) (1970a; see also PTQ: 255) . 
Of course, people do not write or speak trees in the real world. In 
UG, there is ""an 'ambiguating function' called R which maps 
unambiguous hierarchical structures into the potentially ambiguous 
strings actually observed in natural language. In UG, Montague 
leaves the specification and constraint of R rather open. Dowty 
(1979a: 4-13) suggests that R can be interpreted freely to include 
traditional syntactic transformations. Partee (1979a, 1979b) has 
proposed that R be constrained to handling simple morphological 
marking and the erasing of brackets, category labels and numerical 
subscripts from labelled and bracketed strings. 
The present analysis adopts the position that the outputs of 
syntactic combination rules are labelled and hierarchical but 
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UNORDERED trees. A typical grammar rule is shown in (11), which 
should be compared to (8). 
(11) If aE PT and RE PIV then (a, 0) E Pt. 
Realisation: (a 
T' 




The first line of {11) states that the combination of aT constituent 
with an IV constituent is a set containing them both, and that set is 
a constituent of category t (a sentence). Thus the combination of 
JohnT and walk=V is the set , (JohnT, walkIV)t, which is written 
. equivalently as (walkIV, JohnT)t. The realisation clause of (11) 
states that any sentence constituent of the hierarchical form (a T' 
10 )t is to be realised (written or uttered) with the physical 
manifestation of the a constituent to the left of (or temporally 
before) the physical manifestation of the ß constituent. 
2 The 
realisation' component of the grammar, which is, the 
, 
ambiguating 
relation R of'UG,. is"generally responsible for morphological marking, 
where morphology is taken to include -tense, aspect, and case 
markings, agreement, and the gross linear order of words in a 
phonological or orthographical string. The translation clause in 
(11) states that the translation of such a sentence constituent is 
calculated by applying the translation of a, i. e. at, to the 
intension of the translation of ß, i. e. ^yß'. Whenever possible, a 
rule like (ii) will be abbreviated as in (12). 
(12) If aE PT and ßE PIV then (a, C Pt 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a, (Aß') 
In a complete grammar, the realisation rules would need to be 
much more explicit and complicated than shown above. For instance, 
the rule combining a TV with its T direct object can specify that the 
direct object is to be realised in its accusative form (Staal 
1967: 64-65,66-67; Dahl 1977a: 82; Partee 1979b: 86-87). 
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(13) If aE Pý and ßE PT then (a, ß) E PIS. 
Realisation: a^ Acc(ß ) 
Translation: a'( ß') 
Tense, agreement, and pronouns (which are marked for case) are not 
central concerns in this thesis. Therefore, in the interest of 
simplicity, such features will often be ignored, and realisation 
rules will be largely confined to specifying-linear order. As will 
be shown, even linearisation rules need to be fairly sophisticated to 
deal with cases where constituents are realised discontinuously. 
it is important to note that the present approach to syntax 
makes a rigorous distinction between the abstract, and unambiguous, 
hierarchical structures, which are not linearly ordered, and the 
concrete, often ambiguous, linear strings which are realisations of 
the hierarchical structures. In a grammar using ordered phrase- 
structure rules, linear order and hierarchy are combined in a single 
representation. Another important point is " that the present 
-realisation rules <the ambiguating relation R) are limited to 
morphological operations which code output strings from hierarchical 
trees. If- transformations are taken in their traditional sense to be 
syntactic operations which map trees into trees, then the present 
realisation rules are not transformational. 
Such a programme -for syntax is hardly new. Linguists who have 
proposed grammars with unordered hierarchical trees and realisation 
rules include Shaumyan (1965; 1971; 1977); Staal (1967); Fillmore 
(1968); Chafe (1970); L. B. Anderson (1971); Lytle (1971; 1974); 
Sanders (1972; 1975a; 1975b; 1979; 1980); Boas (1975); G. Hudson 
(1979); Schachter (1980) and Dik (1980). Most of these linguists have 
presented their grammars as direct challenges to traditional 
transformational grammar. Logicians and logico-linguists employing 
similar grammars include Curry (1961), Bartsch & Vennemann (1972), 
(see also Bartsch 1973, Vennemann 1973), J. M. Anderson (1976), S. R. 
Anderson (1976) and Dahl (1977a; 1977b). Schlesinger (1977) defends 
such a grammar with arguments from psychology. The present notation 
is most directly inspired by the MG-like systems of Dahl (1977a; 
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1977b) and. Keenan & Faltz (1978). Dowty 1980 also contains some 
specific proposals for adopting unordered constituency trees in a MG 
to better handle discontinuously realised constituents. 
3 
In common with most of the approaches just cited, the grammar in 
this thesis does not appeal to anything analogous to a traditional TG 
deep structure. The surfacy unordered trees that provide the input 
to the realisation rules are built up directly by the syntactic 
combination rules. A direct, but not necessarily obvious, feature of 
such a grammar is that it avoids not only a TG-like deep structure 
but also a TG-like surface structure. That is, the linearisation 
rules produce simple strings; there is no stage in a derivation which 
is coded as a labelled and bracketed string. Also avoided in the 
grammar are rules which syntactically quantify-in terms to give them 
wide scope. 
4 
The hierarchy-realisation approach will be shown to be a viable 
and insightful way to do MG syntax. In particular, the separation of 
hierarchical structures and linear realisations highlights the unity 
of attributive modifiers in this analysis. More generally, this 
approach makes the results of the investigation immediately available 
to the various linguists, logicians and psychologists who--often with 
very little intercommunication--have adopted remarkably similar 
formalisms to express their analyses of natural language. 
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Chapter 1. Preliminaries 
1.0 Introduction 
I shall argue that degree adjectives, such as big, tall and heavy 
and evaluative adjectives, such as good, bad, clever and skilful, are 
properly translated as one-place predicates in logical translation. 
This approach, which is basically the traditional logical treatment 
of 'absolute' adjectives, will be contrasted with the approach in 
Montague 1970b (henceforth EFL) and Parsons 1972 (also Cresswell 
1973,1976: 265-266; Thomason 1976; Keenan & Faltz 1978; Aqvist 1981) 
wherein all adjectives are translated as two-place predicates, i. e. 
as semantic attributives. The move away from the Montague-Parsons 
analysis is not new: Bartsch (1972a, 1975), McConnell-Ginet (1973), 
Kamp (1975), Siegel (1976a, 1976b, 1979), Partee (1977: 283-285) and 
Klein (1979a: 39,42; 1980a; 1980b) have similarly advocated one-place 
predicate status, at least for fairly straightforward qualities (e. g. 
red, carnivorous, stony) and even for degree adjectives. Evaluative 
adjectives, however, remain troublesome: Kamp concludes that their 
status is uncertain, and Siegel analyses them as two-place predicates 
after much argument. The present arguments are directed primarily 
-: 
-.: _ägainst-Siegel's-analysis; 
I intend to show that there are syntactic- 
'tests, -- some T- suggested by Siegel herself, which argue persuasively 
that evaluative adjectives should be interpreted as one-place 
predicates, 
1.1 Predicates in syntax and semantics 
1.1.1 ., The traditional logical analysis of adjectives 
To'avoid confusion in a field which has become a terminological 
jungle, it is important to present a few definitions and clarify a 
few usages at this point. I shall write of 'syntactic predicates', 
:, ''syntactic predicate - position', or just, 'predicate position' when 
referring to,,,, the appearance, of adjectives, without accompanying 
nouns, ; after,, copulas in strings such as The, sky Is blue. I shall 
write. ý_of 'syntactic attributives. ' or, 'attributive position' when 
referring'. toadjectives appearing in strings together with the noun 
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they modify, as in blue sky, big flea and good plumber. 
From the semantic point of view, a 'predicate' or, more 
precisely, a 'one-place predicate' will be taken to be a function 
whose domain is the set of entities in a model and whose range is the 
set (0,1). Let the predicate denoted by the noun barn be written 
barn'. This predicate barn' takes one argument' x, written barn' lx), 
and returns 1 (true) if x is a barn and 0 (false) if it is not. Less 
formally, barn' can be thought of as denoting the set of all barns in 
a, model, and barn'lx) will be true if fxE barn'. I shall write of 
'two-place predicates' or 'semantic attributives' when referring to 
analyses of the Montague-Parsons type; examples will follow shortly. 
The distinction made here is important, but that does not mean that 
there are not significant correlations between syntactic and semantic 
predicativity and attributiveness. Indeed, by arguing that 
evaluative adjectives can and should be interpreted as one-place 
predicates, I am defending a closer link between their syntax and 
semantics than is generally accepted. 
The following names of adjective classes will suffice to get the 
discussion going: 'Absolute' (sometimes called 'predicative' or 
'intersecting') adjectives are taken to include, for the time being, 
red, white, blue, carnivorous, metallic and, in their literal sense, 
pregnant, magnetic, virgin, dead and alive. The 'degree' (sometimes 
called 'measure', 'measuring' or 'scalar') adjectives include big, 
small, tall, short, high, low, tat, ' thin, ' young, old, etc. 'Evaluative' 
(also- called 'manner' ) adjectives include superb, excellent, skilful, 
beautiful, " good, fair, poor, bad and awful. 
' 
The 'relative' adjectives 
are taken" to' be 'a motley bunch including more, chief, alleged, 
`ostensible, purported, fake and Imitation. These groupings will be 
challenged, defended, subdivided and collapsed as the analysis 
progresses. 
Some elementary logics have treated adjectives as one-place 
, 
predicates,,, and this solution works nicely if one chooses. one's 
examples carefully. Red, for example, has usually been considered an 
absolute adjective, and the corresponding one-place predicate is 
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written red'. If we translate x is a red barn as in (la), then (1b) 
and (lc) will follow logically. 
(1) a. Ay (red'(y) & barn'(y)] (x) 
b. barn , (x) 
c. red'(x) 
That is, if we know that some entity is a red barn, we know 
intuitively that the entity is a barn and that the entity is red. 
Furthermore, a red barn is a red building and a red entity. It makes 
sense to speak of 'redness' or 'being red' pure and simple. 
Adjectives with this quality are called 'intersective', 'predicative' 
and 'absolute' by various authors. 
Some other, -more troublesome, adjectives seem to allow only the 
(b) entailment, and a few allow neither the (b) nor the (c) 
entailment. If we know that an entity is a big flea, for instance, 
we know that the entity. is a flea, but we can object that the entity 
is not big. A big flea can be a small animal. 
(2) a. xis a big flea 
--b. flea I (x) 
Cl- big'(x) 
If big flee were analysed using the simple conjunction analysis used 
for red barn, then (2c) would follow automatically, and to hold that 
a big flea is small' would seem to involve a contradiction, that 
something can be big and small at the same time. Similarly, if we 
know that someone is a good thief, then it appears to follow that he 
is a thief, but not that he is absolutely good. A good thief can be, 
and - usually- is, a bad man; someone can be a good mother and a 
bad 
wife simultaneously. 
(3) a. -x gis a good thief 
b. thief ; (x) 
:.. _ c..... good' (x) 
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The solution to this apparent failure -of. the. conjunction 
analysis has generally been. to treat degree adjectives like big and 
evaluative adjectives like good as relative rather than absolute 
adjectives. Size is always relative to something, a comparison 
class, and it makes no sense to ascribe bigness or smallness except 
relative to such a class. A flea can be 'big for a flea' but 'small 
for an animal'. Goodness and badness are also relative, but in a 
slightly different way. Evaluation is relative to some criterion or 
relevant function performed by the entity being evaluated. Thus, a 
woman can be 'good qua mother' but 'bad qua wife'. 
It is here that the concept of a two-place predicate is 
sometimes used. Instead of saying simply that some entity is 'tall', 
one says that that entity is 'a tall N', where N is the comparison 
class. Instead of saying that some entity is 'good', one says that 
it is 'a good N' where N indicates the relevant role. In the logic, 
both tall' and good' apply first to this N, yielding a one-place 
predicate which can then be predicated of a subject just like the 
one-place predicates barn' and red'. Simplifying a great deal, we can 
characterise the traditional analyses of the syntactically 
attributive adjectives discussed so far. Examples consisting of a 
syntactic structure with its translation occur often in this thesis; 
by convention, the translation of example (n) will be shown in (n'). 
(4) John is a blue-eyed jockey. (absolute adjective) 
(4') Xx [blue-eyed' (x) & jockey' (x) ] (John) 
The formula in (4') then reduces to blue-eyed'(John) & jockey'(John). 
(5) John is a tall jockey. (degree adjective) 
(5') Xx [(tall'(jockey'))(x)] (John) 
(5') then reduces to tall'(jockey')(John). 
(6) John-is, a good jockey. - (evaluative adjective) 
Xx [ (good (jockey'))(x) ] (John) 
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(6') reduces to good'(jockey')(John). 
In this analysis, while blue-eyed, tall and good can all be 
syntactically attributive, only tall and good correspond to semantic 
attributives, that is, to two-place predicates. Blue-eyed' turns out 
to be semantically predicative even when the surface adjective 
appears as a syntactic attributive. Conversely, these same 
adjectives can all appear in syntactic predicate position, but 
sentences like (ea) and (9a) must be taken as elliptical versions of 
the more complete sentences (8b) and (9b). 
(7) John is blue-eyed. 
(8) a. John is tall. 
b. John is a tall N. (where N is a noun) 
(9) a. John is good. 
b. John is a good N. (where N is a noun) 
1.1.2 The early Montague grammar analysis of adjectives 
The early MG analysis of adjectives was motivated by classes of 
adjectives (the 'non-standard modifiers' of Parsons 1972: 130) which 
are even more troublesome than good and tall. If we know that person 
x is a good thief, then we at least know that x is a thief. But if 
we know that x is an alleged thief, then we cannot even conclude that 
x is a thief, let alone that he is ' alleged'. And if x is a phony 
thief, then it seems that he is not a thief at all. Anxious to avoid 
any spurious logical consequences arising from a conjunction analysis 
for such adjectives, Montague (EFL: 211-13) goes to the extreme of 
denying a conjunction analysis, and so one-place predicate status, to 
all adjectives. The result is an analysis where all adjectives 
correspond to semantic attributives much as in (5) and (6) above. 
Montague rejects the idea of defining multiple syntactic classes 
of adjective, some of which, the 'intersectives', would translate to 
allow-(b) and (c) logical consequences as in (1), others of -which, 
the 'subsectives', would translate to allow the (b) logical 
`consequences as, '-'in, (2) and. (3), and still others of which, like 
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phony, reputed and alleged, would allow neither; he felt such a 
solution would detract from the 'conceptual simplicity' of his 
uniform treatment. As a result, all adjectives in EFL are treated as 
two-place predicates, ad-common nouns denoting functions from 
intensions of predicates to predicates. (10) and (11) show typical 
syntactic and semantic trees. 




(10') big'( flea') 
big' 
/ `flea' 




This blanket solution avoids invalid logical consequences; in fact it 
leaves Montague with no logical consequences at all. He cannot even 
show that a red barn Is red and a red barn is a barn are valid 
sentences. To patch up this obvious deficiency, Montague introduces 
meaning postulates such as (12) and (13). 
(12) revery 6C is a C' 
where 0 is an intersective or subsective adjective 
and C is a common noun 
(13) revery öC is ö' 
where b is an intersective adjective 
and C is a common noun 
By. way of example, red is an intersective adjective and tall is a 
subsective adjective in Montague's terminology. Meaning postulate 
(12) allows one to show that a red barn is a barn and a big flea Is .a 
flea are valid sentences. -Similarly, (13) supports the validity of a 
red barn Is, red but not, a big flea Is big. These rules allow Montague 
to assign, all. adjectives the same syntactic category and logical 
translation while still getting out -just the right consequences. 
However, t.:. this: ` apparent simplicity has its hidden complexitiess 
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Montague avoids adjective subclasses in the grammar, but the meaning 
postulates depend crucially on such subclasses in the end. 
In spite of Montague's example, a number of writers in the 
general field of Montague grammar, e. g. Dowty (1976: 209-210), 
continued to treat at least some adjectives as simple one-place 
predicates. Others like Kamp (1975), Bartsch (1973) and Klein 
(1980a) have argued that the Montague-Parsons analysis cannot be 
generalised to handle comparatives correctly; they claim that even 
degree adjectives should be translated as one-place predicates. Kamp 
ends his paper (1975: 153-4) wondering just how many other types of 
adjective could be given predicate status; noting that alleged seemed 
a hopeless case, he continues: 
The same can be said to be true, to an almost equal 
degree, of adjectives such as fake, skilful, or good. Where 
precisely we should draw the boundaries of the class of 
adjectives [which are one-place predicates] I do not 
know. For example, does skilful belong to this class? 
Surely we must always ask 'skilful- what? ' before we can 
answer the question whether a certain thing or person is 
indeed skilful; this suggests that the theory is not 
applicable to the word skilful. Yet there appears to be 
some plausibility in. the view that having a good deal of 
skill does function as a predicate-be it a -highly 
ambiguous one as there are so many skills. 
Siegel (1976a, 1979) argues forcefully for treating degree adjectives 
as a subset of the class of absolute adjectives, but she draws the 
line firmly at the evaluative adjectives, which remain two-place 
predicates as in EFL. 
I shall proceed by first examining the way in which degree 
adjectives have been elevated to absolute status. The challenge is 
to do this without causing undue problems for logical consequence. I 
shall then show that evaluative adjectives can be handled in much-the 
same way. Some new tests involving adverbial modification of 
adjectives will lend support to my claims. In the end, it will be 
shown that extending one-place predicate status to evaluative 
adjectives results in more consistent syntax and semantics, with a 
closer mapping between the two. 
. s. : ýý, 
1ý^ 
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Chapter 2. Degree and evaluative adjectives as one-place predicates 
2.1 Degree adjectives 
2.1.1 The traditional analysis of degree adjectives as two-place 
predicates 
We may take Wheeler (1972) as a typical analysis of degree 
adjectives as semantic attributives. Wheeler translates (1) as (1'). 
(1) John is a tall man. 
(1') Tall(John, Xx(x is a man)) & John c Xx(x is a man) 
The translation in (1') contains two conjoined clauses. In the 
first, tall is shown to translate as a two-place predicate holding 
between an entity and a set of entities. The set of entities, in 
this case the set of men, is the comparison class by which John's 
tallness is to be judged. This first clause is meant to be read as 
'John is tall compared to men' rather than as 'John is tall for a 
man'. The second paraphrase presupposes that John is a man, and 
Wheeler feels that it is important to preserve a notation for 
representing a comparison between an entity and a set of which it is 
not a member. 
'-The 
second clause in (1') supports the intuition that 
if John Is a "tall man is true, then John Is a man is also true, by 
making the latter follow as a logical consequence. As we saw in 
Section 1.1.2, the less abstract Montague-Parsons analysis of tall 
man does not produce this logical consequence; meaning postulates 
must be invoked. 
In wheeler's analysis, the relativity of'tall is captured in the 
variability of the comparison class. John Is a tall dwarf receives 
the interpretation in (2), which indicates that John's height is now 
to be considered relative to the set of dwarves. 
(2) Tall(John, Xx(x is a dwarf)) & John e Xx(x is a dwarf) 
Any syntactically attributive construction AN, where A is a degree 
adjective and N is a noun, will be translated with N representing the 
-, 
e 
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relevant comparison class. There are, however, two reasons why this 
translation is inadequate. First, I shall show that the translation 
is too rigid to account for the data, and second, I shall show that 
the relativity of degree adjectives can be better handled by 
appealing to vagueness and context. 
2.1.2 Deriving the comparison class 
2.1.2.1 Syntactic attributive constructions 
The problem with the Wheeler analysis is that it is not so easy 
to derive the relevant comparison class mechanically from the syntax, 
especially with more complicated examples. Wheeler himself 
(1972: 314) claims that (3) has two readings, one ascribing tallness 
to Jones relative to the set of old men and the other ascribing both 
tallness and age to him relative to the set of men. 
(3) Jones is a tall old man. 
These two readings, which involve, presumably, different bracketings 
of the noun phrase elements following tall, are representable in 
Wheeler's system as (4) and (5). 
2 
(4) Tall(John, Xx(old(x, Xy(y is. ;a man)) &xc Xy(y is ä man)) ) 
& John E Xx(old(x, Xy(y is a man)) &xc Xy(y is a man)) 
(5) Tall(John, Xx(x is a man)) & John E Xx(x is a man) 
& Old(John, Xx(x is a man)) & John c )x(x is a man) 
The formalisms start getting unmanageable, and the intuitions start 
failing, however, as the noun phrases get more complicated. A 
sentence like 'John is a tall old fat man' has one reading, for 
Wheeler, where the tallness is relative to old fat men, and, ' given 
the present order of its attributives, the sentence can be understood 
in at least two other ways' (Wheeler 1972: 321), which again appear to 
involve different surface bracketings. It is common practice to cite 
the simplest cases where 'it will generally be understood that the 
relevant class for grading is that specified by the noun' 
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(McConnell-Ginet 1973: 89; emphasis mine) and 
nastier. There is some uneasiness in the 
comparison classes are derived mechanical] 
structures, then it should always be possible to 
many readings are possible for any finite noun 
involving degree adjectives. 
to avoid anything 
observations. If 
.y from syntactic 
predict exactly how 
phrase construction 
Siegel (1976as129-135; 1979: 247-248) goes further than most in 
discussing the problems of interpretation of double degree adjectives 
in her examples (6) and (7). 
(6) Billy is a heavy fast runner. 
(7) Billy is a tall little red-headed basketball player. 
Noting that (7) seems to allow a reading where tallness is measured 
in comparison to little basketball players, skipping over red-headed 
altogether, Siegel concludes, as did McConnell-Ginet, that context 
rather than syntax must pick out the comparison class. 
Presumably, it is the context of utterance that 
allows us to understand how much is included in the 
comparison class. 
It would appear that with prenominal measure [i. e. 
degree] adjectives, the comparison class may be taken as 
being either the set picked out by the basic common noun 
modified, or by another, more complex common noun to the 
right of the measure adjective. 
Going a step beyond Siegel, I claim that the comparison class, 
even in the simplest AN constructions, may not be the set denoted by 
the noun at all. Consider the following conversation. 
(8) Q: Which of the women over there is Barbara? 
A: Barbara is the tall fashion-model. 
Now there. is a perfectly good, even preferable reading of tall 
fashion-model in (8) which involves women' -rather than fashion-model' 
as , the " comparison class for. tall. That is, tall feshlon=model can be 
fashion-model)' as '(tall' compared 'to women) and (a -model)' 
.. RN ... ,.. r .-,. -. r 
w., .... c. A _. c T .... _ .... 
ý 
.. 
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rather than as '(tall compared to fashion-models) and (a fashion- 
model)'. It is therefore perfectly possible to hold that Barbara is 
a tall fashion-model but that she is not tall for a fashion-model or 
tall compared to fashion-models. similarly, one can utter Quang is 
the short Vietnamese without meaning that Quang is short for a 
Vietnamese. In certain contexts, the sentence can be true if Quang 
is a Vietnamese and Quang is short (for a man). One can, 
conceivably, consistently assert both that Quang is 'a short 
Vietnamese and that Quang is tall for a Vietnamese. Once again, the 
comparison class can be -different from the set denoted by the 
modified common noun, and only context seems able to pin it down. 
Wheeler's analysis, which mechanically derives. the comparison class 
from the syntax, is incapable of capturing such usages. 
2.1.2.2 Syntactic predicate constructions 
Another problem for any Wheeler-like theory is to account for 
degree adjectives in syntactic predicate position. 
(9) John is tall. 
If such adjectives are taken to be semantically attributive, then the 
noun (or`predicate or set_) used for comparison must be slipped into 
the translation by some means. There are basically two ways of doing 
this, both of which amount to the same thing for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
(10) 
_ a. , 
An adjective like tall can be taken to 
apply to a noun as usual, yielding strings like John Is e 
tell boy. Then a transformation can apply, deleting the 
noun (and deleting or suppressing the indefinite article) 
yielding John is tall. The predicate boy', or whatever,. 
will remain in the semantic translation. 
(10) b. Tall can be taken to apply to a dummy noun, 
call it A, which never receives phonological form and so 
never has to be deleted. In the. semantics, A is 
instantiated-with a nominal predicate by the context. 
For convenience, I shall call such a process 'dummy noun deletion' 
regardless of the' actual mechanism involved. Neither of these 
. .ý 
jýr ..,., 
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solutions is very attractive from a syntactic point of view, and 
semantically they fall prey to the objections already cited above. 
If the overt modified common nouns in tell fashion-model and short 
Vietnamese cannot be taken automatically to provide the relevant 
comparison class, then the deleted (or dummy) modified common noun in 
tall (boy) is no more helpful. 
Any actual attempt to interpret a degree adjective in predicate 
position would seem to involve something like (10b), which ultimately 
relies on context. There have been claims, however, that the 
comparison class in such cases can be derived in an orderly way from 
semantic codings in the lexicon. Katz (1967) presents the examples 
in (11), where the comparison classes are claimed to be named by the 
nouns in square brackets. 
(11) skyscraper [buildings] 
man [humans] 
The flea is big. [insects] 
United States (countries] 
tarantula [spiders] 
In.. general, 'the_ class-, of entities with which something is compared 
is a category to which that thing belongs' (Katz 1967: 186-187). 
Katz even claims that 'we cannot render "The skyscraper is big" as 
"The skyscraper is big for a physical object" or in a more extreme 
case, "The flea is big", as "The flea is big for an animal"'. The 
choice of comparison class is taken to be limited to the next highest 
concept in the great semantic chain of being, 
3 
Although Katz's claims include interesting observations about 
default comparison classes, they are ultimately untenable. 
Comparison. classes cannot be taken automatically from semantic 
codings in the lexicon any more than they can be taken automatically 
from a modified common noun. For instance, it is clearly possible, 
Katz's claims to the contrary notwithstanding, to interpret The flea 
is big' as 'The flea is big for an animal', and such a reading can be 
..,. .. _ 
3`-. aw': 
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useful and natural in the context of science fiction. 
The key point of these observations is that context must 
ultimately provide the relevant comparison class for degree 
adjectives. Context must also do more than simply provide suppressed 
or deleted common - noun arguments for adjectives appearing in 
predicate position; in fact, it seems unlikely that comparison 
classes can be incorporated in the theory as syntactic arguments at 
all. Klein (1979a: ll-14; 1900a: 14-16), for instance, has argued that 
treating contextually supplied variables (such as worlds, times, and 
comparison classes) as syntactic arguments leads to unreasonably 
abstract translations. The treatment of contexts within a MG 
requires significant modifications to the semantics, and the subject 
will be taken up in Section 6.2.4. 
2.2 Evaluative adjectives as one-place predicates 
2.2.0 Introduction 
Given that degree and evaluative adjectives have traditionally 
been characterised together as relative adjectives (Geach 1956), a 
demonstration that one of these. groups is really a subtype of 
absolute adjectives would tend to argue that the other is too. 
Nevertheless, there are differences between the classes, and I have 
already cited Kamp (Section 1.1.2) on the doubts over extending one- 
place predicate status to adjectives like good and skilful. I 
maintain that evaluative adjectives can indeed be analysed as one- 
place predicates. As Siegel addresses herself specifically to this 
question, concluding that evaluative adjectives could not be 
interpreted as one-place predicates, my remarks will be addressed 
mainly to her work. 
2.2.1 Preliminaries 
Before going on, it is important to explain some terminology 
used . in previous analyses. The reader is warned that many of 
the 
following definitions and distinctions will prove unhelpful in a 
grammar-; that- accommodates vagueness and contexts. In, grammars where 
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all adjectives are treated as basic common-noun modifiers, both 
degree and evaluative adjectives have been traditionally labelled 
'subsective' (also called 'restrictive' (Keenan & Faltz 1978: 68,16, 
225) or 'affirmative' (Kamp 1975: 125)). This means simply that the 
set denoted by the result of applying one of these adjectives to a 
common noun is always a subset of, the set denoted by the common noun 
alone. That is, A(N) C_ N. 
(14) Q tall men jj 9Q irren jJ 
(15) E bad plumbers j] 9Q plumbers jJ 
Another way of expressing this quality is to say that subsective 
adjectives are compatible with the following Montaguvian meaning 
postulate (see Section 1.1.2). 
revery S( is a C' 
where b is an intersective or subsective adjective 
and C is a common noun 
'Absolute' or 'intersective' adjectives are also compatible with the 
stronger meaning postulate below. All absolute adjectives are 
subsective. 
revery SC is 8' 
where b is an intersective adjective 
and C is'a common noun 
It has also been claimed that degree adjectives are 'extensional' 
modifiers, 'whereas evaluative adjectives are 'intensional' modifiers 
(Wheeler '1972012; Kamp 1975: 124-125; Bartsch 1975: 176; Siegel 
1976a: 232-234; Keenan & Faltz 1978: 162-163,219,249). Formally, 
extensional functions are those whose values depend solely on the 
extensions of their arguments. Informally, we may say that any 
extensional function, e. g. blue-eyed, 'will pick out the same members 
of the set 'denoted by its argument, say basketball players, no matter 
how that set is named. If the set of basketball players happens to 
be; identical to`the` set of trombone players in a model m, then it 
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will, be the case that [blue-eyed basketball players l- [blue-eyed 
trombone players]) in M. Evaluative adjectives are apparently not 
extensional: in the same model M it may well be the case that E good 
basketball players]] 7A ff good trombone players] . 
Although degree adjectives are usually assumed to be extensional 
modifiers, the matter has been debated somewhat (Kamp 1975: 126-127; 
Siegel 1976a: 112-116,231-232). Is it the case, for example, that in 
our world where all and only basketball players are trombone players 
that it will always be the case that [tall basketball players]j 
([tall trombone playersjj? Such an assumption underlies any analysis 
where the modified common noun is taken automatically to denote the 
comparison class (see Section 2.1.1). Yet some people have the 
intuition that tallness for a basketball player might be assigned 
differently, probably more conservatively, than tallness for a 
trombone player, even if the two classes happen to be extensionally 
identical. 
Also interesting to consider are the disaster scenarios of 
Zwicky (1969). Assume a world much like ours in which basketball 
players are an exceptionally tall group. If John is a basketball 
player who is 6'2" tall in this world, then he_is tall for a man but 
not tall for a basketball player. Now if a sudden epidemic were to 
wipe out the entire population of basketball players over 6'2" tall 
and if no other basketball players are 6'2" tall, then John would be 
the tallest basketball player in the world. Some might still refuse, 
however, to say that he is tall for a basketball player. 
4 
The questions concerning the status of degree adjectives as 
'extensional' modifiers are rendered inappropriate in the present 
context-dependent semantics. First, the new semantics depends on 
context to select comparison classes for degree adjectives from the 
universe of discourse. Thus the extension of basketball-player' may 
be "`irrelevant to the interpretation of tell in tall basketball player. 
Second, by translating degree adjectives as one-place predicates of 
they cease to be, in their basic form, functions on 
-'. '' common-noun arguments at all. It is therefore inappropriate to ask 
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if tall' is an intensional or extensional function on a head noun 
argument like basketball player. I shall argue that evaluative 
adjectives are basic predicates as well, and that their 'intensional' 
effects can and must be explained by suitable appeals to context. 
2.2.2 History of analyses 
The fact that evaluative adjectives modify 'intensionally' was 
recognised by Plato and Aristotle, who cited examples like good lyre 
player, and worried about the way that a good thief could be a bad 
man. Both concluded that good and bad modify relative to the 
functions of their arguments, and this kind of analysis continues 
little modified to the present day. Aristotle noted that if the 
function of a lyre player is to play the lyre, then the function of a 
good lyre player is to play the lyre well. The very same rule, 
sprinkled with varying degrees of sanctifying formalism, turns-up in 
even the most modern discussions of adjectives and adverbs. 
5 
W. D. Ross (1930: 65-66) proposes that there are two very separate 
readings of good. The first is what he calls the 'attributive' type 
seen in the usual readings of good knife, good liar, good lyre player or 
anything else 'good of its kind'. The second is what he calls the 
'predicative' (absolute) reading having the sense of 'moral 
excellence', as seen in one reading of good man and in constructions 
like courage Is good. It soon becomes obvious that nouns indicating 
fairly obvious roles and functions (such as liar, baker and knife) 
will be most susceptible to Ross's 'attributive' good and that 
relatively 'empty' nouns like man will be most easily modified by 
the 'predicative' good. Researchers influenced by Ross's theory 
include Katz (1966: 289-290,311), Berman (1973a: 198-199) and, as we 
_ :.;. _.. shall see, 
Siegel. 
Against this view, Geach (1956: 33-34,39) claims that good and 
- bad are always 'attributive', even when they appear in predicate 
position. John Is good, for instance, has to be interpreted as 'John 
is a good so-and-so', implicitly involving dummy noun deletion. 
While admitting that it is hard to explain the meaning of good man 
in terms of the meaning of man, he rejects the idea that a separate 
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kind of adjective is involved. 
Hare (1957: 107-108), criticising Geach, agrees that good and 
bad are 'attributives' but attacks the idea that the meaning of any 
AN construction, where A is an evaluative adjective, can be explained 
simply by knowing the meaning of N. Pointing out the distinction 
between 'functional words' like knife and 'non-functional' words like 
man, he writes: 
'Good' often precedes words which are not 
functional. In such cases, in order to know what traits 
the thing in question would have to have in order to be 
called good, it is not sufficient to know the meaning of 
the word. We have also to know what standard is to be 
adopted for judging the goodness of this sort of things 
and this standard is not even partly (as in the case of 
functional words) revealed to us by the meaning of the 
word which follows 'good'. 
It must be emphasised that this difference between the 
behaviour of 'good' when it precedes a functional word, 
and its behaviour when it precedes a non-functional word, 
is not due to any difference in the meaning of 'good' 
itself. We may say, roughly, that it means in both cases 
'having the characteristic qualities (whatever they are) 
which are commendable in the kind of object in question'. 
The difference between the two cases is that the 
functional word does, and the non-functional word does 
not, give us clues as to what these qualities are. 
Hare's comments, are particularly astute, and we, shall have 
occasion, to refer back to his concept of 'standards' of evaluation. 
For_ now it is important to note how Hare challenged the notion that 
there is a self-evident standard for any common noun. For example, 
even if we know the meaning and function of a teacher, Hare claims 
quite. correctly that there are still innumerable standards by which a 
good teacher might be judged. -Even if we, paraphrase good teacher as 
good qua. teacher, we may still have to choose between standards of 
;, intelligence, - clarity, elocution, 
legibility of, handwriting on the 
blackboard,,, discipline, etc. (see also Berman 1973a: 218). Context 
must.. be the-, final,, arbiter, and. the standards, suggested by the 
Beesley - zs - 
function of-the modified noun may be overridden altogether. 
Adjectives 
In Hare's account, the standard of 'moral excellence' or 
'ethical goodness' is only one possible standard among many. There 
is no need (and no justification) for a separate 'predicative' good. 
When good modifies a word like -man, there are fewer natural 
suggestions for a standard, but context could force a good man to be 
evaluated according to the standards appropriate for a soldier, a 
lover, a politician, a moral being, etc. Similar arguments are 
offered by Keene (1961: 25-26). 
The distinction between 'functional' and 'non-functional' words 
has been noted by a number of researchers. Vendler (1968: 91-94) 
notes that his A3 class of adjectives, which corresponds to what are 
here called evaluative adjectives, have a special affinity for nouns 
denoting 'certain functions'. Katz (1966: 292-293) argues that only 
function words can be meaningfully modified by evaluative adjectives. 
For each of Katz's function words, such as knife, there is an 
'evaluation semantic marker' built right into the lexical coding. 
(16) shows the coding for knife. 
(16) (Eval: (ease of dividing substances softer than its blade)) 
The function of good or bad, for Katz, is simply to set evaluation 
semantic markers such as (16) to plus (+) or minus (-). The claim 
that evaluation standards are automatically derivable from lexical 
codings parallels Katz's claims about the derivation of comparison 
classes (see Section 2.1.2.2), and it is open to all the same 
objections. Derived nouns, of course, have no lexical coding and so 
no evaluation semantic marker. Non-function nouns like man, which 
also- lack such a marker, can alsoI be evaluated in many contexts. 
And, above all, there is simply no way to defend the notion that 
there exists a simple, self-evident'and invariable criterion by which 
. ; anything, even the most functional noun, is evaluated. A knife which 
,., is,, to. be, given ' to a child, for instance, may be good only if the 
opposite of,, . 
(16), -applies (Sampson- 1970; Berman:, 1973a: 217-218 ). 
. -. _ 
ICatz's theory j 
, 
',., s, perhaps the most explicit examples of the kind of 
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theory shown to be unworkable by Hare (1957) and Keene (1961). 
Berman (1973a: 198-199) presents an analysis of good which is 
remarkably close to that of Ross (1930). That is, she takes good to 
be a doublet with semantically attributive and semantically 
predicative readings. The semantic attributive is called 'bound', 
indicating the claimed dependency of the meaning of good on the 
meaning of the noun it modifies, and the semantic predicate is called 
'unbound', supposedly indicating its absoluteness. 
The analysis of Siegel (1976a, 1979) differs in no important 
ways from=Berman's, but it is formally elaborated and defended at 
`length. Whereas Montague (EFL) analyses all adjectives as semantic 
attributives and Kamp (1975) argues for analysing as many adjectives 
as possible as one-place predicates, Siegel steers a middle course by 
adopting both solutions. For Siegel, 'absolute' adjectives, including 
degree adjectives, are interpreted as one-place predicates, and 
'relative' adjectives, including evaluative adjectives, are 
interpreted as semantic attributives. 
Siegel assigns relative adjectives to the category CN/CN. This 
-simply indicates that they are syntactic functions which take a 
-common noun and yield another common noun as the result. Relative 
adjectives are applied and ordered with rule (17). 
(17) If aC PCN/CN and ßE PCN then 
F6(a, ß) c PCN where F6(a, ß)s alb. 
Semantically, relative adjectives correspond to functions from 
intensions"of one-place predicates into one-place predicates. Their 
type is therefore - «s, <e, t» , <e, t» . 
6 
(17') If at CP ICN and iB E PCN and a and 
.8 have translations a' and ß' respectively, 
.: -.. then F6(a, ýB) translates as a' ("ýB' ). 
"(18) is a tree showing a typical Siegel analysis including mere, a 
i relative adjective. 
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(18) A mere boy led the battlet 
a mere 
I 





A one-place predicate within Montague grammar will be of type <e, t>. 
7 
There are two such predicate classes in PTQ: syntactic predicates 
(IVs) and common nouns (CNs). To preserve the syntactic distinctions 
between them, syntactic predicates are assigned the category t/e and 
common nouns t//e. As Siegel proposes to treat some adjectives as 
one-place predicates, and as their syntactic behaviour is different 
from both syntactic predicates and common nouns, she assigns them the 
category t///e. Siegel uses a rule like (19) to form a syntactic 
predicate from an adjectival predicate by syncategorematically adding 
a copula be. 
(19) If ac Pt///e then F20(a) E PIV where 
F20(a) - be a. 
For our purposes, the corresponding semantic interpretation rule may 
be taken to simply preserve the interpretation of a. 
As carnivorous and tall are both, assigned to the category t///e, 
rule (19) will allow Siegel to generate strings such as (20) and 
(21), but (22) will not be generated by this rule because mere is 
not of category t///e. 
(20) John is carnivorous. 
(21) John is tall. 
(22) *John is mere. 
To generate absolute adjectives in syntactic attributive position, ' 
Siegel resorts to an awkward version of the old relative clause 
reduction transformation. The reduction rule is shown in (23) and an 
example using it in (24). 
A 
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(23) If aE PCN and a is of the form "Q such 
- that 
hen be y" where ßE PCN and 
yE Pt///e then F22(a) E PCN 
where F22(a) = yß . 
(24) The old barn collapsed 
the o]d barnT collapsedIV 
old barnCN 










As we have seen, Siegel includes degree adjectives in the t///e or 
absolute class. By using rules (19) and (23) she successfully 
generates the strings in (25) and (26) without any recourse to dummy 
noun deletion. 
(25) The basketball player is tall. 
(26) The tall basketball player sat down. 
-When taken to its full conclusion, this analysis makes some 
interesting predictions about possible readings for adjectives in 
attributive versus predicative position. If there are adjective 
forms which have both a CN/CN and a t///e reading, then only the 
t///e reading should be possible when the adjective appears in 
predicate position. Such an adjective in attributive position should 
be ambiguous: absolute if derived by way of relative clause reduction 
and relative if derived directly. Consider the case of moral in 
moral philosopher. A moral philosopher is either a practicioner of 
moral-philosophy (Siegel's 'relative' or CN/CN reading), or he is a 
philosopher who is moral (Siegel's 'absolute' or t///e reading). But 
moral has only the absolute reading when it appears in syntactic 
predicate positions The philosopher Is moral. So 
fart the predictions are borne out. This test works for moral 
philosopher, plastic, surgeon, abnormal psychologist, fuzzy logician, legal 
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secretary, deviant logician, Chinese restaurateur, mediaeval scholar and a 
number of similar examples discussed by Bolinger (1967). " 'In fact, 
Siegel's absolute and relative classes correspond nicely with 
Bolinger's '-referent modifiers' and 'reference modifiers' or with the 
traditional distinction between 'inherent' and 'non-inherent' 
modifiers (Quirk et al. 1972: 259ff). 
Unfortunately for Siegel's analysis, evaluative adjectives 
refuse to act as her primary classification would predict. Good is 
taken to be a doublet, but unlike other doublets like moral, good in 
predicate position can still have what Siegel calls a relative 
reading. 
(27) John is good. 
Since Siegel's 'relative' readings come only from semantic 
attributives, any 'relative' reading of (27) must be derived from 
John 1s a good A, where A is a common noun. This forces Siegel to 
retain dummy noun deletion. 
2.2.3 On arguments against translating evaluative adjectives as 
one-place predicates 
Siegel has -- twoarguments, both of which I must counter, for 
analysing such 'relative' readings of evaluative adjectives as 
semantic attributives. The first argument is based on the 
distinction between intensional and extensional modifiers which was 
discussed in Section 2.2.1. Siegel claims that to evaluate an 
expression like good car, which involves a 'relative' adjective, one 
must have a grasp of the intension of car; one must know what it 
means to be a car. Conversely, she claims that to evaluate 
'expressions like red car or fast car, which involve absolute 
adjectives, one does not have to have a grasp of the intension of 
car; one needs simply to be able to identify car things and red- 
things or car things and things which move as fast as a car. 
Similarly, to know what a bad library is, Siegel claims that one must 
have a grasp of the intension of library--a bad library could be 
,, -poorlystocked, difficult to use, badly designed in general for 
.ka. , v,. y ., - 
'i",. ..... a .. 
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finding information, etc. But a tall library, by this argument, can be 
understood with no reference to the characteristic functioning of a 
library at all (1979: 231-232; 1976a: 109ff). 
Siegel's analysis appeals to the form of the logical translation 
to explain the alleged relativity (semantic attributiveness) of her 
CN/CN adjectives and the alleged absoluteness of her- t///e 
adjectives. When bad has its CN/CN reading, it is translated as in 
(28). 
(28) x is a bad library 
(28') (bad'( library')) (x) 
That is, bad' applies to the intension of its argument library' to 
form a new predicate bad"( library)', which is predicated of x. Such a 
logical form is taken to indicate, in itself, that badness is being 
predicated of x relative to the meaning (intension) of library'. 
Conversely, the translation of an absolute adjective like tall as a 
one place predicate of individuals is taken to show how tall is 
applied independent of the 'meaning' of the common noun it precedes 
in the syntax. For Siegel, tall reaches prenominal position only by 
relative clause reduction, and a common noun like tall library receives 
a conjunction analysis. 
(29) x is a tall library 
(29') ly[ tall' (y) & library' (y) ] (x ) 
In reality, the logical form of (28') explains very little in itself. 
Without a semantics for bad', there is no set-theoretic account of 
= how the extension of the new predicate bad'( library') is formed from 
its parts. The equation of intensions with pretheoretical notions of 
meaning has been strongly. criticised by McConnell-Ginet (1979: 141- 
ý 1982: 162 ), who also emphasises _ 
that context, rather than the 
-, --, intension of, library', must be allowed to specify the criteria of 
evaluation. Finally, a CN/CN could denote an extensional function, 
in the-,, technical sense, even though, it applied to the intension of 
=ý=-its argument in the intensional logic; the, intensionality or 
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extensionality of a function depends on its behaviour in the 
interpreting semantics, not on its logical form. 
Siegel's argument that good in good car is interpreted relative 
to the intension of car while fast in fast car is not is simply 
confused. She points out that a car can still be a car even if it 
does not run at all, and concludes from this that speed is not part 
of the intension of car--i. e. it is not a necessary attribute of 
car-hood. A fast car, therefore, can supposedly be characterised 
without recourse to the Intension of car. She claims that good car, 
however, must be characterised relative to the intension of car. 
This argument simply does not hold. I may call my car a 'good car' 
in the relative sense that it looks good. But certainly beauty is 
not a necessary property of cars any more than speed is. By Siegel's 
argument, beauty is therefore not part of the intension car', and my 
usage of good to describe the beauty of my car is not intensional. 
Yet my usage of good is certainly 'relative', by Siegel's standards, 
and intensional modification is the only way that relative readings 
can arise in her system. When the relativity (vagueness) of 
adjectives like good is properly ascribed to context rather than to 
: intensional modification, such paradoxes do not arise. 
Siegel's 
second argument for treating 'relative' readings of 
goodiand bad as semantic attributives is based on the possibilities 
of vague readings in sentences such as (30) and (31). 
(30) That lutist is good. 
(31) That man is a good lutist. 
Siegel claims ., that good in a sentence 
like (30) can be both 
ambiguous . and- vague. The claimed ambiguity 
is between being 
'absolutely good' (derived from a t///e) and being 'good as a 
something' (derived from a CN/CN). In the case where (30) is derived 
from'; a `CN/CN, 
~lthe 
.; 
sentence 'is vague: the something that the person is 
good asVcan be any noun in the, lexicon. Thus (30) might turn out, in 
the-"right4. context, to mean that 'That lutist is good as a chess 
player'. On the-'other hand, the good in (31) is claimed to be 
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ambiguous but not vague (1976a: 55-56,63-72). That is, the lutist 
might still be absolutely (i. e. morally) good or relatively good, but 
the relative goodness is limited to goodness as a lutist. It is 
impossible, claims Siegel, for (31) to be read as 'That man is a good 
as a chess player lutist'. 
Siegel believes that her analysis of (30) and (31) as (30') and 
(31'), respectively, captures these observations about vagueness. 
(30'b) has a variable A ranging over common nouns. The same slot in 
(31'b) is filled by lutist', blocking a similar kind of vagueness. 
(30') a. good'(that lutist) 
absolute reading 
b. good'( A) (that lutist) 
vague relative reading 
(31') a. Xy[good'(y) & lutist'(y)] (that man) 
absolute reading 
A 
b. good'( lutist') (that man) 
non-vague relative reading 
It is, however, possible, pace Siegel, to read the good in 
sentence (31) as -'good as a chess player'. Hare (1957), Sampson 
(1970) and Keene (1961) have shown the futility of trying to derive 
standards of evaluation mechanically from the meaning of modified 
nouns, and they have shown how context can override even the 
strongest hints of functional nouns. Consider the hypothetical case 
of a chess school which specialises in teaching musicians. When 
asked how lutists, as opposed to oboists, take to chess, an 
instructor might say, 'We get some good lutists and some bad 
lutists'. In this context, the goodness will be ascribed relative 
not to lute playing but to chess playing. Siegel's rejected reading 
'good as a, chess player lutist', is ungrammatical rather than 
incoherent or impossible. It happens that English adjectives with 
overt complements cannot be preposed attributive modifiers of common 
-W! "" nouns. The reading becomes more clear and acceptable when the phrase 
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is postposed s That is a lutist good as a. chess player. 
Siegel also flaws her arguments by using only functional words 
in her examples showing the possibilities of vagueness. In practice, 
there is usually strong pragmatic pressure to evaluate goodness 
relative to' lutist-like qualities in any construction like good 
lutist, just as there is strong pragmatic pressure to evaluate 
shortness relative to Vietnamese in a construction like short 
Vietnamese. It is easy to be led into thinking that the usual 
default readings for such constructions are the only readings 
available. It has, however, long been recognised that examples 
involving more general words like man, woman and person are much 
harder to explain (Bolinger 1967: 26-30,14,20; Vendler 1968: 21-22, 
90-94; Hare 1957: 107-109; Katz 1966: 292-293; Berman 1973a: 198-199). 
(32) John is a good man. 
It is much easier to get a range of vague readings for (32) than it 
is for Siegel's-example in (31). The sentence might be uttered, for 
example, by John's sergeant, his drinking buddy, his wife, the 
president of his chess club or even his religious leader, and each 
utterance could imply goodness according to a different standard. 
Yet for- Siegel, any reading other than that of absolute- moral 
goodness must be derived from a semantic attributive. Her 
translation in (32'), with man' plugging up the vagueness slot, is 
completely inadequate. 
(32') good'( man') (John) 
That is, Siegel postulates that evaluative adjectives are vague 
because they can apply to many different property arguments. 
Resolving the ambiguity of an example like (30'b) is, for Seigel, a 
matter of finding out what predicate fills the A slot. But even 
when the slot is filled, as with man in (32'), the sentence is 
still intuitively vague= and Siegel's system provides no way to 
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resolve, or even to represent, this ambiguity. 
2.3 Syntactic tests 
2.3.0 Introduction 
Along with the semantic arguments, a number of syntactic tests 
have been proposed to defend the translation of certain adjectives as 
one-place predicates. Basically, it is assumed that certain 
straightforward adjectives like carnivorous, pregnant and red name 
one-place predicates and that certain unredeemably relative 
adjectives like alleged, mere and ostensible do not. Then if disputed 
adjectives can be shown to behave syntactically like pregnant and 
red, they are claimed, by analogy, to name one-place predicates as 
well. 
Siegel uses such tests to defend her analysis of degree 
adjectives. She also claims that evaluative adjectives, on the 
whole, fail the tests, requiring that they be treated as relative 
adjectives. I shall argue that the tests, though not perfect, are 
generally valid, and that they show that both degree and evaluative 
adjectives behave syntactically like absolute adjectives. 
2.3.1 The predicate position test 
Siegel (1976a: 52-54; 1979: 228) argues that there is, in most 
languages,, a strong correlation between predicate position and one- 
place predicate, status for adjectives. Degree adjectives are like 
absolute adjectives, and unlike many of her relative adjectives, in 
their ability to appear grammatically in predicate position. 
(33) Mary is pregnant. (absolute) 
,. (34) Mary 
is tall. (degree) 
(35) *Mary is mere/alleged/ostensible. (relative). 
There are two advantages to"classifying tall as an absolute adjective. 
First, it allows a less abstract analysis of (34) as tell' (Mary) i4A 
rather than as tall'( t)(Mary ), where t is a dummy noun. No dummy 
noun deletion transformation is necessary. Second, this 
4 
~rt 
r . F- r. c .. t --e 
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classification is consistent, with the ungrammaticality of the strings 
in (35). If tall were a relative adjective and if Mary Is tall were 
generated using dummy noun deletion, then there would be nothing to 
prevent the grammar from generating 'Mary Is mere and giving - it the 
perfectly coherent translation mere'( L) (Mary) . The correct 
classification of tall allows (33) and (34) to be generated directly 
by a rule which forms IVs from absolute adjectives; the strings of 
(35) will not be generated by such a rule. 
Unfortunately for Siegel, evaluative adjectives also . appear 
freely in predicate position. 
(36) Mary is good/bad/skilful/wonderful/awful. 
By classifying evaluative adjectives as relative, Siegel is forced to 
derive the strings in (36) by using the otherwise unnecessary dummy 
noun deletion transformation (1976a: 54; 1979: 230). To avoid 
generating the strings in (35), Siegel is then forced to patch up the 
analysis by placing the ad-hoc feature [±dummy deletion] on every 
relative adjective (1976a: 181). If evaluative adjectives are treated 
as absolute adjectives, the need for both the suspicious 
transformation and the ad-hoc feature disappears. 
2.3.2 The very test 
The use of very and other extent adverbs as a syntactic test for 
adjectives is problematic. Because *very alleged and *very more are 
so grossly ungrammatical while very red and very tall are so natural, 
one is tempted to advance modification by very as a test for one- 
place predicates. But some adjectives usually classified as absolute 
adjectives par excellence do not allow modification by very without 
taking on secondary meanings (Sapir 1944; Quirk et 81.1972: 234, 
289; Kiefer 1978: 144,. 150; Levi 1978: 20; Keenan & Faltz 1978: 164, 
: 209; Bartning 1976: 9-11,58-59; Vendler 1968: 109; Bolinger 1972: 15). 
That is, pregnant, ' carnivorous, virgin and other such all-or-nothing 
adjectives must take on secondary readings in very pregnant, very 
carnivorous and very virgin. A woman either is pregnant or isn't 
pregnant, but very pregnant might convey something about a woman's 
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size, degree of morning sickness, craving for pickles, etc. Lees 
(1963: 180-181) suggests that all 'bone-fide' adjectives can be 
modified by very, and Levi (1973: 335,340-341,3441 1976: 9-17; 
1978: 255) goes so far as to say that words like pregnant and virgin, 
by virtue of their resistance to very, are not adjectives at all but 
rather nouns. 
It seems clear that if the present class of absolute adjectives 
is to be retained, then an internal distinction must be made between 
gradagiles and non-gradables. The gradables will allow modification by 
very, extremely, remarkably, quite and other such words (Ljung 1970: 63; 
Quirk et al. 1972: 265-266; Bolinger 1972). Semantically, the 
difference lies in the way'an adjective divides up the universe of a 
model. A predicate like pregnant' sharply divides all entities into 
the pregnant and the non-pregnant, with nothing left over. The 
boundaries of a vague predicate like tall', on the other hand, will be 
a bit fuzzy, and the boundaries can be manipulated by modification 
with, extent adverbs. If we postulate that very can modify any 
suitably vague one-place predicate then we can show once again that 




(37) The very red woman finally left the beach. 
(38) The very tall woman got the job. 
(39) *They sent me a very mere boy. 
(40) *The very alleged thief was freed. 
Because evaluative adjectives occur freely with very and other 
= extent adverbs, Siegel has to argue that very is not a , reliable 
positive test for t///e status (1976a: 146; 1979: 256ff). 
2.3.3-"The-non-restrictive modifier test 
Yet another test proposed by Siegel (1976a: 52,123; see also 
,.., Bennett 1975: 44) is that only one-place predicates can function as 
---non-restrictive modifiers of noun phrases. 
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(41) We all know naughty Nancy. (absolute) 
(42) We all know big Bertha. (degree) 
(43) *We all know mere Jonathan. (relative) 
(44) *Ostensible. Jonathan went home. (relative) 
(45), *Say hello to alleged Bill. (relative) 
Evaluative adjectives work well here too. 
(46) The crowd cheered for Good King John. 
(47) The king, skilful at warfare, suspected the 
abilities of his general. 
2.3.4 The, see-catch-find test 
Siegel argues (1979: 237-239; 1976a: 76ff, 92) that the see- 
catch-find and there constructions in (48) and (49) select unerringly 
for one-place predicates, and she uses these tests as a key tool in 
motivating her classification. Her examples again show degree 
adjectives behaving like absolute adjectives. 
(48) a. The warden saw the swimmers nude. (absolute) 
b. I've often seen the grass tall around that house. 
(degree) 
c. *The warden saw the swimmers veteran/mere/alleged. 
(relative) 
(49) a. There is a bat asleep in the bathroom. (absolute) 
-"` b. There were two pigs clean in the whole pen. (degree) 
:"'.. "-C., *There are several crimes actual/ostensible/mere 
in the story. (relative) 
In fact, Siegel misunderstands these tests, which select not for 
one-place predicates as awhole, but rather for one-place predicates 
which, are, temporary'. in the carefully defined technical sense of 
Bolinger (1952: 42-43; 1967: 9-14), Bauer (1975: 113,119) and Dowty 
; (1975: 582-583). Dowty prefers to use 'temporary' and 'permanent' 
than' Bolinger's terms 'accident' and ' essence' ( Bolinger rather"" 
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1972: 38-39,47-48= 1973) because he thinks the latter terms to have 
inappropriate, misleading connotations from their other uses in 
philosophy. Ironically, Bolinger adopts the terms 'accident' and 
'essence' because of a similar concern about the connotations of 
'temporary' and 'permanent'. In Siegel's case, Bolinger's fears are 
justified; she misinterprets temporary, and 'permanent' in literal, 
everyday senses, and goes to great lengths to demonstrate that some 
adjectives appearing in see-catch-find sentences are not temporary at 
all. This misunderstanding seriously flaws Siegel's analysis, for 
English as well as for other languages she considers. 
Because she analyses evaluative adjectives as relative, Siegel 
has to explain away her own example (50), wherein good appears-in a 
'see' sentence; she calls (50) an 'idiomatic' usage. In fact, the 
sentence is. a counterexample to her theory and merely shows the 
absolute adjective good in one of its possible vague senses. 
(50) I've seen the children good, but not very often. 
Other similar examples with- evaluative adjectives are easy to 
construct. - 
(51) Nureyev was bad last night; it's been a long time 
since we've seen him (so) bad. 
The fact that many uses of evaluative adjectives fail the see- 
_. catch-find; tests shows only that they are being used -for 'permanent' 
rather than 'temporary' ascription. - Even degree adjectives, 
interestingly, can fail the see-catch-find test; Siegel has simply 
chosen her examples well. 
(48b)_, I've often seen the grass tall around that house. 
_., (52) ? I've often seen Bill tall. 
In our world, grass is a type of thing which is constantly changing 
ý,.. in. -height---it gets cut short and grows right back again. The height 
t 
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of grass, therefore, is a 'temporary, "or 'accident' state. Humans, 
however, although they grow and change over time, have a 
characteristic 'permanent' or 'essence' height. We don't expect 
people to be 6' tall one day, 5'6" tall the next, 6'2" tall the next, 
etc. in a world like Wonderland, however, where Alice constantly 
grows and shrinks by eating and drinking magic cakes, mushrooms and 
liquids, the Mad Hatter could utter a perfectly acceptable sentence 
parallel to (52). 
(53) I've often seen Alice tall. 
In conclusion, the see-catch-find test supports the 
classification of evaluative adjectives together with degree and 
other absolute adjectives. 
2.3.5 Nominalisation and verbalisation tests 
Some people working on relative adjectives (e. g. Schmidt 
1972: 13,112-113; Bartning 1976: 10) have claimed that only those 
adjectives which are one-place predicates have meaningful 
nominalisations or corresponding nominal forms. Allowing some 
slightly abstract, stilted nouns, the results of this test seem to 
support the others. 
(54) Adjective Noun 
red redness (absolute) 
tall tallness, height (degree) 
big bigness, size (degree) 
intelligent intelligence (evaluative) 
good goodness (evaluative) 
bad badness (evaluative) 
skilful skill (evaluative) 
mere *mereness, *merity (relative) 
alleged *allegedness (relative) 
ostensible *ostensibility (relative) 
The, general intuition is this: being red or tall involves partaking 
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of the qualities of redness or height respectively. But there is no 
way to make sense of a property of -*mereness or '*allegedness in the 
same way. The nouns allegation and ostentation are, of course, related 
to alleged and ostensible, but these are obviously not related in the 
same way as are red and redness or big and size. 
Similarly, transitive verbalisations, verbs with rough 'make 
Adjective' readings, and actual 'make Adjective' phrases appear to 
correspond only to one-place predicates and never to relative 
'. - adjectives. 
(55) Adjective Verb 
red redden, make red, rubrify 
tall make tall 
old make old, age 
big make big, increase, augment. 
small make small, decrease 
dead kill, cause to become dead 
pregnant impregnate, make pregnant 
good make good, make better, improve, 
reform, ameliorate 
bad make bad, ruin, harm, corrupt 
mere *make mere, *merify 
alleged *make alleged, *allegify 
Allege, of course, is a verb related to alleged but this verb is not 
related to an adjective in the same way that impregnate and age are. 
2.3.6 The all-or-part relativity test 
Siegel argues that CN/CN modifiers have the quality of applying 
necessarily to the entire common noun following them, and that 
therefore" such adjectives are always interpreted relative to the 
translation of that whole common noun. Degree adjectives, on the 
other hand, are not similarly relative, for their comparison classes 
are not necessarily the class denoted by the full CN following them 
.;. 
(see Section 2.1.2.1). Siegel' s key examples are (56) and (57) 
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(1976a: 132-134,79; 1979: 248). 
(56) Bill is a tall little red-headed basketball player. 
(57) Bill is a. former little red-headed basketball player. 
Quite rightly, Siegel points out that the comparison class for 
tallness in (56) may well be the set of little basketball players, 
with red-headed missed out altogether. Quite rightly again, Siegel 
points out that no such skipping is allowed in (57), which has the 
CN/CN former. However,, she does not apply the same test to 
evaluative adjectives. 
(58) Billy is a good little red-headed basketball player. 
In (56) also, the goodness may very well be evaluated relative to 
some standard for little basketball players, with red-headed skipped 
over. In this and all other syntactic tests, evaluative adjectives 
behave like absolute adjectives and unlike relative adjectives. An 
additional syntactic test involving sentence adverbs which supports 
this conclusion will be presented in Section 6.3.3. 
2.4 Rescuing the conjunction analysis 
2.4.0 Introduction 
In summary, I have shown some of the history of the analysis of 
degree and- evaluative adjectives, which shows an increasing trend 
toward', interpreting them as one-place predicates. I have shown how 
syntactic computation of comparison classes and criteria is 
inadequate, and how an appeal to context is both necessary and 
natural. I have also outlined a number of arguments designed to show 
that degree and evaluative adjectives behave syntactically like 
absolute adjectives, which lends support to a common translation. 
major problem remains for the semantics. As common nouns and 
absolute adjectives both name one-place predicates, the most natural 
way-to'- translate attributive constructions like carnivorous beast is 
with"`'the = traditional conjunction ', analysis A x[ carnivorous' (x )& 
The decision 'to, - treat degree and evaluative adjectives 
E' 
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as absolute adjectives therefore suggests that they too will receive 
a conjunction analysis when they appear in attributive position. Yet 
it was the apparent failure of these adjectives to support a 
conjunction analysis which originally led to their classification as 
semantic attributives. Let us'look once again at the claims. 
2.4.1 Degree adjectives and the conjunction analysis 
2.4.1.1 Covert contexts 
On the analysis of degree adjectives, Geach (1956: 33) wrote 
'Big' and 'Small' are attributive; 'x is a big flea' does 
not split up into 'x is a flea' and 'x is big', nor 'x is 
a'small elephant' into 'x is an elephant' and 'x is 
small'; for if these analyses were legitimate, a simple 
argument would show that a big flea is a big animal and a 
small elephant a small animal. 
In fact, a proper appreciation of context clears up this 
problem. Geach assumes that for a sentence like 'x is a big flea', 
the comparison class must necessarily be the set of fleas. This is 
the same assumption which was shown to be inadequate in Section 
2.1.2.1. Even for simple AN constructions like tall fashion-model, 
short Vietnamese and big flea, context can force comparison classes 
different from N altogether. Also, Geach assumes that 'x is big', 
where x is a flea, will necessarily have the comparison class of 
animal'. This is an implicit statement of the Katz (1967) method for 
automatic computation of comparison classes from lexical codings, 
which is similarly inadequate (see Section 2.1.2.2). 
If degree adjectives translate as one-place predicates, then a 
sentence like Nat Is big will translate simply as big' (Net) . Context 
must then -provide a comparison class 
before a truth value can be 
assigned. If Nat is a flea, then it is most likely the case that the 
speaker intends big' to_" be evaluated relative to the comparison class 
of fleas., or perhaps insects. This is, however, a pragmatic 
-consideration rather than an absolute constraint. In a science 
fiction movie entitled 'The Flea that Ate Edinburgh', Nat is big 
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fleas'. It is not the. 
_ 
job of_ the syntax or intensional logic to 
reflect the fact that people usually compare fleas to other fleas, 
humans to other humans, and elephants to other elephants. 
Attributive constructions like big flea can now be given a 
conjunction analysis without the difficulties cited by Geach. 
(59) Nat is a big flea. 
(59') Xx[big' (x) & flea' (x) ] (Nat ) 
The comparison class for big' will again be set by context. Again, 
being that Nat is a flea, the most likely comparison class is the set 
of fleas. However, in the context of 'The Flea that Ate Edinburgh', 
an utterance of (59) could ascribe bigness of Nat relative to people, 
houses, trees, etc. 
I therefore reject Geach's claim that '"x is a big flea" does 
not split up into "x is a flea" and "x is big, "; such a splitting up, 
as in a conjunction analysis, does indeed hold IF THE CONTEXT REMAINS 
CONSTANT and so supplies the same comparison class for big' in both 
cases. - It is, of course, possible for 'x is a big flea' and 'x is 
big., and x is a flea' to have different truth values, but this 
requires contextual- equivocation. For that matter, even 'x is big' 
and. a-superficially identical utterance 'x is big' can have different 
truth values if they are evaluated at different contexts. 
2.4.1.2 Hedges as overt specifiers of context 
So, far-we have considered cases where covert context alone 
selects comparison classes. There are, however, a variety of ways in 
which comparison classes can be specified syntactically, as in the 





`' (60) a. John is tall for a Pygmy. 
b. For a Pygmy, John is tall. 
c. John is tall for a Pygmy but short for a European. 
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(61) a. John is tall as Pygmies go/run. 
b. As Pygmies go, John is tall. 
(62) John is tall compared with 
in comparison to ygmies. 
in relation to a Pygmy. 
(63) John is tall when considered as a Pygmy. 
if 
while 
(64) John is tall by Pygmy standards. 
(65) John is tall from a Pygmy point of view. 
Adverbials such as for a Pygmy are a kind of hedge (Lakoff 
1972), and they function to specify contexts much as time adverbials 
specify intervals. Hedges will be treated formally in Chapter 6. 
2.4.2 The conjunction analysis and hedges for evaluative adjectives 
As evaluative adjectives, like degree adjectives, are here 
translated as one-place predicates, Nat Is good will receive the 
translation good' (Nat) . Whereas tall', heavy' and other one- 
dimensionally vague- predicates can be made more-- precise just by- 
considering comparison classes, multi-dimensionally vague predicates 
like good' and bad' require something_more: 
10 Before a-truth value 
can-be-assigned to good'(Nat), a context must specify a-standard of 
evaluation as well as a comparison class. Goodness can be ascribed 
by various standards including moral virtue, obedience'to law, skill 
-in'activities like sewing, picking pockets, bowling, ' high-jumping, 
etc. Once the criterion of 'evaluation has been set, e. g. high - 
jumping, then'a contextually supplied comparison class can indicate 
how-good at high jumping one needs to be to qualify as 'good'. 
Attributive constructions with evaluative adjectives, as with 
-. degree adjectives, are given a conjunction analysis. 
fide yk 
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(66) good man 
(66') Xx[ good' (x) & man' (x) ] 
As with degree adjectives, hedges can designate the criteria to use 
in applying the vague predicates. 
(67) Manually, 
Mentally, John is skilful. 
Musically, 
(68) As far as photography 
is concerned, 




Regarding petrol, this car is good/bad/excellent. 
When appearance is the 
Lýmain criterion, 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the treatment of'evaluative and degree adjectives 
as' semantic attributives fails both syntactically and semantically. 
Translating these adjectives as basic one-place predicates of 
individuals causes no insurmountable problems if context and 
syntactic, hedges are properly considered. The formal analysis of 
hedges and context requires an important addition to the PTQ semantic 
model, which will be presented in' Chapter 6 Until then, the 
discussion will avoid contextual complications while formalising the 
analysis presented so far. 
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Chapter 3. A basic grammar for individual-level adjectives 
3.0 Introduction 
The grammar to be presented in this chapter generates a fragment 
of English that includes the varieties of adjective discussed so far. 
'Individual-level' adjectives are those which translate as predicates 
of individuals; i. e. they do not involve infinitives or nominalised 
sentences, which will be introduced in later chapters. This basic 
grammar will also serve to demonstrate the formalism and lay the 
foundation for further work. In subsequent chapters, many categories 
and rules will be added to the grammar, but existing rules will only 
rarely be modified. For convenience of reference, a full listing of 
the grammar rules in their final form is supplied in the Appendix. 
See Section 0.2 for an explanation of the rule formats. 
3_1 Categories and types 
The following table lists a number of syntactic categories with 
their abbreviations and, where appropriate, some sample basic 
expressions. As in PTQ, the basic categories of the grammar are e 
(entities) and t (sentences). Categories which are semantically 
---alike but syntactically distinct will be differentiated by giving 
them different numbers of slashes. Thus where a and Q are 
categories, a/ß, a//ß, a///ß, etc. all also categories. For 
improved readability, multiple slashes will be shown with numerical 
superscripts: thus a///ß will be written at/38.1 Let Bn denote the 
set of basic expressions of a category n. Similarly, let Pn denote 
,'- 
the set containing both the basic and the derived expressions of 
category n. A number of categories have no basic expressions. For 
any category n, BP nn 




e IV run, walk, swim, escape, ... 
CN man, woman, dog, cat, barn, ... 
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t/3e ADJ pregnant, carnivorous, big, tall, 
good, bad, metallic... 
t/4e PNOM (none) 
t/5e PART (none) 
t/6e REL (none) 
PNOM is the category of predicate nominals, and PART is the category 
of derived verbal part iciples. REL is the category of relative 
clauses. Let PRED be a cover category including Pt 3 UP 4 U / e t/ e 
P . Let 5 ADJVL be a cover category including Pt 5 3 U Pt U t/ e / e e / 
Pt/6e 
t/IV T John, Mary, Bill, Susan, ..., 
hel, het. ..., he , ... n 
T/CN DET a(n), the, every 
IV/T TV find, love, kill, date, ... 
TV/ADJ make, render, turn, keep, paint, 





t/2IV PP-TO (none) 
=ý-'^^ -t/3IV PP-BY universally, widely, well 
t/4IV PP-OF (none) 
t/5 IV' PP-FOR (none) 
PP-TO/T to 
PP-BY/T by 
-, pp-OF/T of 
pp-FOR/T, for 
TV/PP-TO DTV give, send, read, ship, hand, throw 
TV/T TTV allow, refuse, spare 
ADJ/ADJ'- EXT very, rather, somewhat, extremely, ... 
3 
CN/CN mere, alleged, past, present, future, ... 
CN/ZCN (none) 
(t/5e)/PP-BY (see text below) 
. ADJ/PP-BY (see text below) 
ADJ/PP-FOR (see text below) 





(see text below) 




Let f be a function from syntactic categories to semantic types. 
Where /n represents any natural number of slashes and a and ß are 
categories, 
f(e) -s <e> 
f(t) - <t), 
If a is category t and Q is category e, then 
f(a/nß) a <e, t> 
else f(a/nß) < <s, f(Q)>, f(a )> .4 
Variables of type <e>, which range over entities, are x, y and 
z, supplemented by the subscripted variables xn, yn and zn, where n 
is a natural number. Whenever practical, unsubscripted variables 
will be used in examples because they are easier to tell apart. The 
variables P, Q, Pn and Qn (where n is a natural number) are of type 
csthey range over properties of individuals. _P, Q, Pn and 
VQn (where n is a natural number) are of type <s, c<s, <e, t>>, t>>; they 
range over properties of properties of individuals. G, a two-place 
relation between individuals and individuals, is of type <e, <e, t ». 
H, a three-place relation between individuals, individuals and 
individuals, is of type <e, <e, <e, t>>>. 
The following first-order reduction rules follow traditional 
Montaguvian conventions. 
AxAPVGO[8(x. P) P( ly[G(x, y)])] 
where'Ö translates any member of P5 ß 
AxAPAQVHO[ö(x. P. Q) -> Q(Xz[P(AIY[H(x. Y, Z)])])] 
where 0 translates any member of Pte 
"= = By convention, if 6 is a two-place relation between individuals and 
4r 
us 
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intentions of sets of properties of individuals, then ö, is the name 
of the corresponding two-place relation between individuals and 
individuals. Thus, by first-order reduction, the formula love'(j, 
w 
XPP(m)) will reduce to love*(j, m). Similarly, if 6 is a three- 
place relation between individuals, intensions of sets of properties 
of individuals, and intensions of sets of properties of individuals; 
then 8R is the name of the corresponding three-place relation 
between individuals, individuals and individuals. 
The following lexical items are explicitly given the complex 
translations shown. Suggestions for expanding this list of 'semantic 
primitives' or words having a 'standard interpretation' (Dowty 












translates as ). P["P] 





XPXQVy(P(y) & Qty)] 
XPXQVy[Az(P(z) H y=z] & Qiy)] 
XPXQAY[P(y) -' Q(y)] 
3.2 Combination rules and examples 
The basic grammar is designed to illustrate the most 
straightforward uses of adjectives in English. In the interests of 
simplicity, tense and aspect are ignored. The copula be of category 
IV/PRED is translated here as 1P[vP], a function which merely 
preserves the original translation of its argument. Syntactically 
speaking, tenses and aspects could naturally be added at such a 
r`. point, perhaps creating tensed intransitive verbs of category t/T 
which would map term subjects into sentences (see Thomason 1976: 79; 
Keenan & Faltz 1978: 23; Bach 1979a). Nothing in the present analysis 
would be substantially affected by such a variation; by avoiding 
these questions I stay closer to the familiar syntax of PTQ and save 
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a few steps in semantic derivations. For the sake of readability, 
tense will be made to appear magically in realised strings. Explicit 
complex semantic translations for some basic CN/CN adjectives will be 
explored in later chapters. Proper names are translated as in PTQ, 
but with Bennett's simplification: e. g. John -4 XPP(j). 
6 
Wherever possible, syntactic combination rules will be presented 
shortly before they are first used in any examples. For ease of 
subsequent reference, a complete listing of the rules is given in 
the Appendix. 
In categorial combination trees, derived constituents (complex 
nodes) will be labelled with the name of the rule justifying the 
combination. R1, for instance, joins Ts and IVs to form sentences, 
as in the simple example below. 
Ri. if ac PT and RE PIV then (a, Q} E Pt 
Realisations a^ß 
A 
Translations a'( Q') 
(1) (John 
T' swim IV)t, Rl 
Realisation: John swims. 
Trýwnlý4-4'r.. 
JothnT aX PP (j ) 
swimIV swim' 
(John, swim) t XPP(j)( swim') 
( swim, M) 
VA swim' (j ) 
swim' (j ) 
Proper noun 
Basic 




The following rules generate more complex structures as in (2) and 
(3)R2. 
If aE BIV/PRED and ßE PPRED then (a, ß} F PIV' 
Realisation: a^Q 
Translation: a'( ýB') 
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7^Q rn ö 




else a^ ,ß 
A Translation: a' ( ß' ) 
R4. if ac pDET and ßc PCN then (a, ß} E PT 
Realisation: a f-1.8 
') Translation: a'( 8 
(2) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED' good J J}IV, R2}t, R1 
Realisation: John is good. 
Translation: 
1. beIV/PRED 1P['P] Basic 
2. goodADJ good' Basic 
3. (be, good) IV 
XP( VP](Agood') From 1, 2 by R2 
4. 
A 
good' Lambda conversion 
5. good' Down-up cancellation 
6. JohnT 4 XPP(j) Proper name 
7. (John, (be, good)}t A - XPP(j)( good') From 5, 6 by R1 
8. ( good')(j) Lambda conversion 
-9. 
VAgood' (j ) Brace c onvention 
µ ^ý 10. good'(j) Down-up cancellation 
(3) ((theDET' manCN)T, R4' 
(loveTV, MaryT)IV, 
R3)t, Rl 
Realisation: The man loves Mary. 
Translation: 
1. theDET XPXQVy[Az[P(z) H y-z] & Q(y)] 
Basic 
2. manCN man' Basic 
3. (the, man)T ' XPXQVy[Az[P(z) H y-z] & Q(y) ]'(*man') 
From 1,2 by R4 
4. XQVy[Az[Aman'(z) H y-z] & Q(y)] Lambda conversion 
5. XQVy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & Q(y)] Brace convention 
6. XQVy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & Q(y)] Down-up cancellation 
-- 
Beesley - sz - Adjectives 
7.1oveTV love' Basic 
8. MaryT XPP(m) - Proper name, - - 
9. (love, Mary) IV 
love'( XPP(m)) From 7,8 by R3 
10. ((the, man), (love, Mary)) t 
XQVy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & Q(y)] ("[love'( XPP(m))]) 
From 6,9 by Rl 
U. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & [love'("XPP(m))](y)] 
Lambda conversion 
12. Vy[Az[man'(z) H yaz] & vA[love'("AXPP(m) )](Y)] 
Brace convention 
13. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & love '("XPP(m))(y)] 
Down-up cancellation 
14. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & love'(y, "XPP(m))] 
Relation notation 
15. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & XPP(m)( Xx[love*(y, x)])] 
First-order reduction 
16. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & VA XPP(m)Xx[love *(y, x)])] 
Brace convention 
17. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y=z] & XPP(m)('Xx[love *(y, x)] )] 
Down-up cancellation 
"ý - 18. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & Xx[love*(yx)](m)] 
Lambda conversion 
19. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & v"Xx[love*(y, x)](m)] 
Brace convention 
20. Vy[Az[man'(z) H y-z] & Xx[love*(y, x)](m)] 
Down-up cancellation 
21. Vy[ Az [man' (z) H y-z ]& love * (y, m) ] 
Lambda conversion 
obviously, not all rules can be illustrated in such detail. In the 
interests of space, the brace convention and down-up cancellation 
will be assumed to work automatically with any instance of lambda 
conversion. Also, multiple instances of lambda conversion will 
usually be condensed into a single step. Some examples will list 
only the final translation instead of a complete worked-out 
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derivation. 
yýLL The basic fragment provides for predicate nominals, which, 
despite their apparent indefinite articles in surface form, are 
translated as simple predicates (see note 2). The copula beIV/2T' 
which maps true terms into IVs, is illustrated in (5). 
R5. If aE BIV12T and ße PT then (a, ß) s Piw. 
Realisations a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R6. If ac PCN then (a(n), a) E ppNOH* 
Realisation: a(n) ^a 
Translation: a' 
(4) (MaryT, (beIV/PRED, (a, womanCN)PNOM, R6)IV, R2)t, R1 
- Realisation:. Mary 
isa woman. 
Translations 
1. womanCN * woman' Basic 
2. (a, woman)PNOM -* woman' From 1 by R6 
3. belt//PRED XP["P] Basic 
4. (be, (a, woman)}IV XP[VP](*woman') From 2,3 by R2 
5. woman' Lambda conversion 
6. MaryT . '+ XPP(m} Proper name 
7. (Mary, (be, (a, woman))) t XPP{m)("woman') 
From 5,6 by Rl 
8. woman'(m) Lambda conversion 
(5) (JohnT, (beIV/ 2T, (theDET' man COT, R4)IV, R5)t, Rl 
Realisation: John is the man. 
Translation: VyAx[man'(x) H x=y] & j-y] 
Rules R7, to R10 should by now be self-explanatory. 
8 
R7. Ifac PDTV and Q6 PPP_TO then (a, 8) -E PT. 
Realisation: a"ß 
w 
Translation: a'( , B') 
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-- - `Re. (-lexical-) If a E"PDT then (a) E Pte 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPXQXx[a'(Q)(P)(x)) 
R9. If acp and ß. E PT then (a, ß) e P. TTV 
Realisation: a f-1.8 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R10. if aE BPP_TO/T and ßE PT then (a, ß) E PpP_TO. 
9 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( ß, ) 
These rules are used in the generation and translation of 'Dative' 
sentences like (6) and (7). There is no transformational 
relationship between these sentences, but the lexical rule R8 ensures 
that they are assigned the same reading. Note that R3 provides for 
the discontinuous realisation of ((give, '(to, Mary)), (the, book)) in 
(6) as give the book to Mary and (((give), (the, book) ), Mary) in (7) 













R4]IV, R3)t, R1 
Realisation: John gave the book to Mary. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[book'(x) H x-y] & give*(j, y, m)] 
(7) (John, {{(give (the book 
T DTV TTV, Re' DET CN)T, R4)TV, R9' 
MaryT)IV, R31t, R1 
Realisation: John gave Mary the book. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[book'(x) H x-y] & give*(j, y, m)] 
Along with R2, the basic rules for manipulating adjectives are 
R11 to R13. R11 allows for extent modification of ADJs; it can, for 
example, combine veryEXT and good to form very good. (The rule is 
also generalised to accommodate other adjective modifiers to be 
discussed later. ) R12 is a rule which maps ADJs into attributive 
. ".,. modifiers of common nouns (CN/ZCNs). Adjectives which cannot appear 
in predicate position are basic CN/CNs rather than basic ADJS. For 
-ý 
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the time .. being, any basic CN/CN 
6 will be translated simply as 8', a 
JY basic semantic attributive. Some will be given a more complex 
translation in Chapters 5 and 6. - 
Rll. If aE P(t/ne)/(t/ne) and ßE Pt/ne thin (a, ß) E Pt/ne 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5)). 
Realisation: ß"a if a has a complement 
else a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R12. If aE PADS then (a) E PCN/2CN 
Realisations a 
Translation: XPay[P(y) & a'(y)] 
R13. If aC PCN/nCN and QC PCN then (a, ß) E PCN 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: ß^a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^Q 
Translation: a' ( ß' ) 
Derivations with basic CN/CN adjectives in syntactic attributive 
position are straightforward. 
(7) (John 
T, 
(beIV/PRED, (a, (mereCN/CN, 
boyCN) 
CN R6)IV, R2)t, R1 R13)PNOM , , 
Realisation: John is a mere boy. 
Translation: 
1. mere CN/CN 
--> mere' Basic 
* boy' 2. boy Basic CN 
3. (mere, boy)CN 4 mere'( boy') From 1,2 by R13 
4. (a, (mere, boy))PNOM -' mere'( boy') From 3 by R6 
5. be ' AP["P] Basic IV/PRED 
-Y - 6. (be, (a, (mere, boy))) IV 
XP[ P]( [mere'(Aboy')]) 
From 4,5 by R2 
7'. mere, ( boy') Lambda conversion 
8. JohnT + XPP(j) Proper name 
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AA 
(John, (be, (a, (mere, boy))))t APP(j)( (mere'( boy')]-) 
From 7,8 by Rl 
A 
10. mere'( boy')(j) Lambda conversion 
R12 allows us to generate absolute adjectives in attributive 
position with no recourse to a relative clause reduction 
transformation. The proper conjunction analysis falls out in the 
semantics. 
(8) (John,,,, (be,, ____, (a, ((bad_ _ _),.. _ , 
2, 









i v/ rtcru aihJ - L. V/ c N, MLZ 
thief ) 
CN, Rl3)PNOM, R6)IV, R2)t, Rl 
Realisation: John is a bad thief. 
Translation: 
badA "* bad' Basic 
(bad)CN, 2CN XPXy[P(y) & badl(y)] From 1 by R12 
thief --> thief' Basic 
((bad), thief) 
CN 
XPXy[P(y) & badl(y)]( thief') 
From 2,3 by R13 
Xy(thief'(y) & bad'(y)] Lambda conversion 
(a, ((bad), thief))PNOM ' Xy[thief'f(y) & badl(y)] 








tv/rxr: u -- 
(be, (a, ((bad), thief))) IV 
XP[vP](. ). y[thief'(y) & badl(y)]) From 6,7 by R2 
Ay[thief'(y) & badl(y)] Lambda conversion 
JohnT -> APP(j} Proper name 
(John, (be, (a, ((bad), thief)}})t ' 
XPP(j)( Ay(thief'(y) & badl(y)]) From 9,10 by Rl 
thief'(j) & bad'(j) Lambda conversion 
Note that the rules defined, above provide no way to generate the 
ungrammatical strings of (9). 
(9) *John is mere/present/past/future/alleged., 
As the grammar implicitly predicts, an ADJ modified by an extent 
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__adverb 




clever )am, Rl1}iV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: Mary is extremely clever. 
Translation: extremely'( clever")(m) 
(11) (Mary 
T, 
(beIV/PRED' (a(n), (((extremelyEXT, 
clever )A, RI1)CN/2CN, R12' 
womanCN) CN, R13) PNOM, Rd IV, R2) t, Rl 
Realisation: Mary is an extremely clever woman. 
Translations woman'(m) & extremely'(Aclever')(m) 
A rule similar to 1212 which maps or 'bumps' ADJVLs into ad- 
common nouns appears in Bartsch 1975: 179.12 In English, a rule R12X 
could combine an ADJVL and a CN more directly (see e. g. Chierchia 
1982: 340,344). 
(12) R12X. If aE PADS and GE PCN then (a, ß) E PCN 
Realisation: ß^a if a has a complement 
else a^ß 
Translation: ly(a' (y) & 01(y)] - 
In English the choice of analysis does not seem to be particularly 
significant. 
However, there is compelling morphological evidence that a rule 
promoting ADJVL constituents into CN/2CNs operates in Russian. 
working in a TG framework, Sussex (1972: Chapter 3) and Babby 
(1973: 359; 1975: 9-10,168-170,200-209) are in essential agreement 
that deep structure adjectives (or 'verbs' with a [+ADJ] feature) 
underly both short form (SF) and long form (LF) Russian adjectivals. 
The SF, which appears only in predicate position, is held to be 
identical to or closer to the deep adjective. Only the IF, which is 
indeed a longer, case-marked adjective, can appear in attributive 
position. (The LF can also appear alone in predicate position, but 
and both Sussex and flabby show that such adjectives behave, must be 
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analysed, like predicate nominals with- a suppressed head noun. ) The 
key -differenceTbetween" LF- and -S' is- that a LF adjectival is always 
dominated by a noun phrase whereas a SF adjectival never is (barring 
a listable class of exceptions). 
This pattern is easily accounted for in the present analysis. 
The only adjectives which are dominated by a noun phrase (term) are 
those which apply directly to common nouns; a LF adjective is 
therefore the realisation of a CN/2CN or a CN/CN. A SF adjective is 
simply the realisation of an ADJVL which has not been promoted to a 
CN/2CN. A rule R12X for Russian therefore has a morphological as 
well as a syntactic change. 
13 
(13) R12X (Russian). If ac PADS then (a) E PCN/2CN. 
Realisation: a '', where all is the LF of a 
Translation: XPXy[P(y) & a'(y)] 
Alternatively, we might propose a LF morpheme, call it LFSUF, which 
maps the SF into the LF. Let LFSUF be of category (CN/2CN)/ADJVL 
with translation XQXPXy[P(y) & Q(y)]. 
(14) R12XX (Russian). If aE PL, SUF and 
QE PADS 
then (a, 0) E PCNI2CN. 
Realisation: ,ß^a 
Translation: a"( ß") 
The following outline examples use R12X and data from Babby 1973. 
The categories and syntactic combination rules implied are only 
conjectures. Umna is the SF of 'smart', and umnaje is the LF. 
(15) umnaja devuvsca cN 
'smart girl' 
umi aja , 2CN 
devuscaCN 
umnah 
(15') Xy[devuäka'(y) & umna'(y)] 
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(16) devAca umna t' 
(the j-' girl (is) smart' 





(16') Vy[Az[devu&a'(z) E-> y-z] & umna'(y)] 
Morphological evidence from Russian is not, of course, necessarily 
relevant in choosing an adjective analysis for English; but in the 
absence of other arguments, a parallel analysis is attractive. 
3.3 Issues in adjective ordering 
smith (1961: 343) and Green (1970: 273) note that certain 
'indefinite' nouns always have postposed modifiers: someone special, 
something different, somewhere new. Romance languages, where postposed 
adjectives are the rule, tend to have'small groups of adjectives 
which prepose, as in the French pauvre, anclen, grand, brave, and petit 
(Gougenheim 1973; Bartning 1976: 11,157). As these exceptions 
involve a very finite number of words, they can be reflected with 
specific ordering exception rules. For English we could add rules as 
in (17). 
_ 
(17) a. (a, '2CN, someone) someone ^a CNI 
b. (aCN/2CN' somewhere) => somewhere ^a 
If a useful syntactic feature is common to all and only the members 
of this set of 'indefinite' nouns, then a more parsimonious rule 
schema referring to that feature could be defined. For French, where 
the preposed anclen has the reading 'former', we could define similar 
rules (Sanders 1975b: 422-423). 
(1s) (ancienCN/CN' QCN)CN = ancien 
Rule R13 indicates that attributive adjectives 'with a syntactic 
complement' are to be ordered after the common noun they modify. 
'Having a complement', in this context, means that, when linearised, 
the adjective constituent does not end in the main adjectival word of 
the constituent. The adjective ordering rule defined in EFL, which 
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postposes all multi-word adjectivals, is totally inadequate; it--would 
even postpose very good (see also Hamblin 1976: 249; Thomason 
1976: 81-82). Bartsch's (1973: 57) slightly better rule, which 
preposes those adjectivals which end in an adjective, will still 
incorrectly order examples such as "theteeger to help you become 
lamoustman. The present solution, based on 'having a complement' or 
ending in the main adjectival word of the constituent, is hinted at 
by Montague himself (EFL: 220). . 
Perhaps most troublesome are adjectives whose 'accident' 
(sometimes termed 'temporary') readings make them awkward or 
ungrammatical in preposed attributive position. Accident properties 
are roughly those which cannot be used to characterise an individual. 
one class of adjectives which are usually confined to accident 
readings begin with the letter 'a'; the class includes awake, agog, 
abroad, aboard, afire, awry and several others. Other typical accident 
adjectives include ready, handy, faint and dizzy (Bolinger 1967) Quirk 
et a1.1972: 232,236,248). Such ADJs appear normally in predicate 
position, but as attributive common-noun modifiers they must be 
postposed. 
(19) a. The man is-asleep. 
b. *the asleep man 
c. The man asleep is John. 
(20) a. The house was ablaze. 
b. *the ablaze house 
c. The house ablaze at that moment exploded. 
(21) a. The woman is ready. 
b. *the ready woman 
c. - The woman ready to go is Jane. 
In some cases, 'a'-marked adjectives are 'sneaking' into preposed 
attributive position. 
(22) The alert sailor spotted the submarine. 
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The opposite of an accident property is an 'essence' property, which 
is generally more permanent and is useful for characterising an 
individual. Sometimes what appears to be a single adjective can 
appear prenominally or postnominally with the 'essence' and 
'accident' readings respectively. These data are adapted from 
Bolinger 1967: 3. 
(23) The only navigable river is the Zambongo. 
(24) The only river navigable is the Zambongo. 
ý., _ý . 
Example (23) invites an essence reading of navigable; i. e. the 
Zambongo is being called characteristically (or essentially) 
navigable. The classification of a river as navigable is not 
affected, for example, by temporary un-navigability caused by 
transitory floods or a freak-drought. Example (24), however, invites 
an accident reading wherein the Zambongo is asserted to be navigable 
AT THE MOMENT, and nothing is conveyed about whether it is navigable 
as a rule. It is 'hard enough to capture the syntax of accident 
adjectives-the class of adjectives in question which begin with 'a" 
are historically descended from prepositional phrases, and their 
preferred postnominal position may still reflect that history. 
Semantically, essence and accident are closely connected with aspect, 
disposition, psychological characterisation, or perhaps even the 
'realisations' of Carlson (1982). For further discussion of 
essence/accident phenomena and adjectives see Section 
2.3.4. 
3.4 Two-place adjectives and adjectivals 
So far we have considered adjectives which are translated as 
one-place predicates. In the remainder of the chapter, we shall 
consider mainly two-place or, transitive adjectivals which name 
relations between two individuals. 'T'hese are not to be confused with 
the two-place semantic attributives of Montague and Parsons which 
allegedly name relations between an individual and a property (see 
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Section 1.1.2). 
Adjectivals will be taken to include adjective-like words which, 
for various reasons, cannot conveniently be labelled simply as ADJ; 
they are formally grouped. under the cover class ADJVL. The key ADJVL 
qualities are the ability to appear after be in predicate position 
and the ability to modify a common noun attributively. I shall first 
look at passive participles, adopting a variation of the non- 
transformational analysis of Thomason 1976. I shall then apply 
similar principles to adjectivals in -able and -Ing and other forms 
based on TVs. Finally I shall look at true present participles which 
are used adjectivally. 
3.4.1 Passive participles of TVs 
Although there have been attempts to impose a Chomsky-style 
passive transformation in MG (Partee 1975: 254-255,261; 1976b: 66; 
also, for doubts, 1979b: 91), the direct generation of passive 
constructions proposed in Thomason 1976 has been most influential. 
The key features of Thomason's approach are these: First, no 
structural transformations are used; second, the 'sameness' of active 
and passive sentences is shown in the semantics rather than in the 
syntax; -third,. the passive rule applies to transitive verbs; and, 
fourth, provision is made for both agentive and agentless passive 
constructions. The treatment of passive shown here is much like that 
in Bach 1980, the difference being that here the syntactic integrity 
of PP-BY phrases is respected. 
. _ý -ý - vom, _s ý_. ý. ý, ý.; ý_ 
s. ý'. 
r.. ý-'.  
R14. If aE PTV then (a, PASS) EP (t/5e)/PP-BY' 
Realisation: a,, , where a '' is a with the main verb in 
the past participle form 
Translation: XPXxP(%y[a'(%PP(x))(y)]) 
R15. if ac P(t/5e)/PP-BY then (a) c Pt/5e. 
Realisations a 
A 
Translation: a"( XPVz[P{z}]) 
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R16. If aE BPP-BY/T and ßE PT then (a, ß} EP PP-BY' 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R17. If aE P(t/ ne)/PP-BY and 8E PPP_$Y then 
(a, Q) e Pt/ ne (where n ranges over the set (3,5)). 
Realisation: ß^a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^Q 
Translation: a'( ß') 
(25) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED, ((love, PASS) (t/5e)/PP-BY, R14' 
(byPP-BY/T' MarYT)PP-BY, 
R16yt/Se, R17)IV, R21t, RI 
Realisation: John is loved by Mary. 
Translation: 
1. byPP-BY/T s' XP[VP] Basic 
2. MaryT * XPP(m) Proper name 
3. (by, Mary) PP-BY -> 
XP[VP](% PP(m) 
From 1,2 by R16 
4. APP(m) Lambda conversion 
5. love ,- 
love' Basic 
6. (love, PASS) (t/5e)/PP-BY =0 
XP1xP( Xy[love'(AXQQ(x))(y))) 
From 5 by R14 
7. ((love, PASS), (by, Mary))t/5 
e 
XPXxP("Xy[love ' (ýXQQ(x), )(Y)])CXPP(m) ) 
From 4,6 by R17 
8. Xx[XPP(m)( Xy[love'( IýQQ(x})(y)])] Lambda conversion 
9. lx(Xy[love'(A1QQ(x))(y)](m)] Lambda conversion 
10. Xx[love'( XQQ(x))(m)] Lambda conversion 
11. beIV/PRED 1P[VP] Basic 
12. (be, ((love, PASS), (by, Mary))) 
IV 
XP["P]( Xx[love' ( XQQ(x))(m)]) From 10,11 by R2 
13. Xx[love '( XQQ(x))(m)] Lambda conversion 
14. JohnT -+ XPP(j) Proper name 
15. (John, (be, ((love, PASS), (by, Mary)))) t '* 
XPP(j)(AXx[love'( XQQ(x))(m)]) From 13,14 by R1 
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16. love'(^ 1QQ(j))(m) Lambda conversion 
17. love*(m, j) First-order reduction 
The derivation for the agentless passive is quite similar; the slot 
of the missing argument is filled with an existentially-quantified 
variable. R15 acts as a relation-reducing rule. 
(26) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED, ((murder,,, 
PASS 
(t/5e)/PP-BY, R14)t/5e, R15)IV, R2}t, R1 
Realisation: John was murdered. 
Translation: Vx[murder*(x, j)] 
Passive participles (t/5 es) are in the cover category ADJVL, allowing 
R12 to bump them into attributive modifiers of common nouns. On the 
ordering of attributive past participles see Lakoff 1970a: 46; Barkai 
1972 and Quirk et al. 1972: 904-911. 




R12]CN, R13)T, R4' 
(belV/2T' MarYT)IV, 
R5)t, R1 
Realisation: The woman loved by John is Mary. 
Translation: 
_V y[Ax[(woman'(x) 
& love*(j, x)) E-> x-y] & y=m] 
(28) ((theDET' (manCN, (((murderTV , PASS) (t/5e)/PP-BY, R14 
)t/ 5 
e, 
R15)CN/2CN, R12)CN, R13)T, R4' collapse IV)t, R1 
Realisation: The murdered man collapsed. 
Translations Vy[Ax[(man(x) & Vz[murder*(z, x)]) 
H x-yJ & collapse"(y)] 
All the passives described so far are syntactically derived. No 
attempt will be made here to account for lexical passives. 
14 
Finally, the present grammar recognises widely, universally and 
well as basic expressions of category PP-BY. Assuming that there 
exists a quantifier Many, the PP-BY readings of these adverbs can be 
given the explicit readings in (29). 




XP Many z[P(z)] 
AP Many z[P(z)] 
XPAz(P(z)] 
Treating these adverbs as basic agentive 'prepositional phrases' was 
suggested by McConnell-Ginet (1982: 179; see also Postal 1972a: 72). 
Example (30) is typical. 
(30) (NigelT, (beIV/PRED, (universallyPP-BY, 
(admireTV, PASS)(t/5e)/PP-BY,, 
R14)t/5e, R17)IV, R2}t, R1 
Realisation: Nigel is universally admired. 
Translation: Az[admire*(z, n)] 
3.4.2 Adjectivals in -able 
It is generally conceded that adjectives in -able must be 
produced by lexical rule (Dowty 1978: 408-411; Wasow 1977: 333-336). 
Most examples seem to be fairly transparently derived from basic TVs, 
e. g. breakable, workable and lockable; but many basic TVs seem to take 
-able only with difficulty, the resulting adjective having the taste 
of a neologism: --climbable, killable, stranglable, buildable, hitable. 
Derived TVs take -able even less happily, though it is difficult to 
call__ the resulting adjectives ungrammatical: ? glvable to Mary, 
? persuadable to go, ? pelntable red. Also, although breakable is 
paraphrased-as 'capable of being broken', a word like changeable can 
often mean 'capable of changing' rather than 'capable of being 
changed'. 
3.5 
Despite these caveats, the -able adjectival formation rule is 
highly, productive, given suitable contexts, and real discourse can 
exhibit some surprising -virtuoso formations. The following rules 
follow Dowty (1978) in translating a word like breakable in terms of 
break' and the possibility operator 0.16 
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R18. 
- 
If aE BTV then (a, ABLE) c PADJ/PP-BY 
--- Realisation: a" where a"- is a with the main verb 
in the -able form 
Translations XPXxO[P{"Xy[a'( XPP(x))(y)])J 
R19. If aE PJJ/PP-BY then (a) E PADJ. 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: a'( APVz[P(z)]) 
(31) {(theDET, antiqueCN)T, R4' 
(beIV/PRED' 
((break., ABLE) 
ADJ/PP-BY, R18)ADJ, R19)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: The antique is breakable. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[ antique I (x) H xay] & OVz[break*(z, y)]] 
As expected of all adjectivals, derived -able adjectives can modify a 
noun attributively. 
(32) The breakable antique was carefully packed away. 
3.4.3 Adjectivals in k 
Yet another class of adjectivals lexically related to TVs are 
adjectives with -Ing suffixes. 
(33) John is interesting. 
(34) The book is disgusting. 
(35) The boring lecturer screamed. 
The arguments that these are adjectives and not present participles 
are well known and will not be repeated here (Quirk 1972: 242-246; 
Bolinger 1972: 44; Chomsky 1957: 73; 1965: 151). The class of TVs which 
commonly have corresponding -ing adjectives are those which indicate 
that an agent produces a certain psychological or physiological state 
in a patient: Interest, bore, annoy, disgust, " amuse, sicken, madden, 
soothe, calm, disappoint, relax, hearten, stimulate, enervate, depress, 
terrify, horrify, excite, thrill etc. Other examples like sobering, revolting, 
cheering and trying, are perhaps more commonly found now than the TVs 
hJs 
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to which they are related. 
About the closest that MG can approach to giving a reading, for 
John Is Interesting is 'John interests someone',, or 'there is someonei 
such that John interests himi'. The translation of (33) in 
intensional logic would therefore be (33'). 
(33') Vx[interest*(j, x)] 
Translation (33') is much like that for agentless passives, 
except in this case it is the PATIENT slot which is filled by an 
existentially quantified variable. Let us call bare constructions 
like (33) to (35) 'patientless' -Ing adjectives. Just as agents are 
optionally supplied for passives in PP-BY phrases, so patients are 
optionally supplied for 'patientive' -Ing adjectives in PP-TO or PP- 
FOR phrases. 
(36) John is interesting to Mary. 
(IE John interests Mary. ) 
(37) This book is stimulating to John. 
(a This book stimulates John. ) 
(38) The city disappointing to/for Susan was Paris. 
(E The city such that it disappointed Susan was Paris. ), 
(39) John is boring for Mary. 
(a John bores Mary. ) 
(40) This news is depressing for John. 
(9 This news depresses John. ) 
The choice of PP complement appears to be lexically governed, 
suggesting that -Ing adverbials might well be just listed in the 
lexicon to 
-begin 
with. R20 and R21 are included in the fragment as 
lexical rules to reflect the reasonable productiveness of the class. 
The translations provided, though not completely satisfactory, do 
semantically relate Interesting to Interest by translating them both in 
terms of the same semantic relation Interest'. 
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R20. (lexical). If aE BTV then 
(a,, ING) 'E Pn (where n ranges over ADJ/(t/ IV) 
the set (2,5); t/2IV is PP-TO and t/5IV is PP-FOR). 
Realisation: a' where a' is a with the main verb 
in the present participle (-Ing) form 
Translation: XPXxP(Xy(a'( XPP(y))(x)]) 
RZ1. If aE PADJ/(t/nIV) then 
(a) E PA , DJ 
(where n ranges over the set (2,5)). 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'( XPVz[P(z)]) 
R22. If ae PADJ/PP-TO and ßE PPP-TO then (a, ß) E PADJ. 
Realisation: a"ß 
w 
Translation: a'( , Q') 
R23. If aC BPP_FOR/T and ßE PT then (a, ß) E PPP-FOR' 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( Q') 
R24. If ac PADJ/PP-FOR and ßE PPP-FOR then (a, ß) E PADJ. 
Realisation: a^ß 
A- Translation: 
(41) (MaryT, (belt//PRED, ((interest,., ING) 
ADJ/PP-TO, R20)ADJ, 
R21)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: Mary is interesting. 
Translation: Vy[interest*(m, y)], 
The patientive form of interesting has a similar derivation. 
(42) (Mary 
T, 





R10)ADJ, R22)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: Mary is interesting to John. 
Translation: interestl(m, j) 
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3.4.4 Other transitive adjectivals 
Jackendoff (1977: 77) lists a number of adjectives which are 
related to TVs and which take PP-OF complements= these include 
fearful, considerate, desirous and solicitous. The PP-OF phrase introduces 
the patient of the underlying TV. The following adjective examples 
are paired with examples illustrating a parallel transitive verb. 
The relationship between adjective and verb is often highly 
idiosyncratic. 
(43) a. John is fearful/afraid/frightened/scared of Mary 
b. Mary frightens/scares John. 
(44) a. John is considerate/inconsiderate of Mary. 
b. John (does not) consider/take-account-of Mary. 
(45) a. Keith is desirous of a woman. 
b. Keith desires/wants a woman. 
(46) a. Roger is solicitous of Mary. 
b. ? Roger solicits Mary. 
Note that scared and frightened can also appear with PP-BY 
complements. This and the historical link between pairs like afraid 
and the now obscure verb affray ('to frighten') suggest that these are 
relics of an older passive rule. One way to handle these adjectivals 
is to give them explicit readings such as the following. However, 
considering the idiosyncrasies of these examples, such a 'generative 





xpxxp (xy[ fear'(x, y) ]) 
fearfulADJ/PP-OF 
frightened 
ADJ/P)F XPXxP(AXy[frighten*(y, x)]) 
scaredADJ/PP-OF XPXxP(Xy[scare*(y, x)I) 
considerate) 1xVy[treat-well*(x, y)] 
considerateADJ/PP-OF XP Xxp {' Ay [treat-well * (x, y )'] ) 
If afraid is overtly translated in terms of fear', then (48a) will 
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translate as (48c). If afraid is translated simply as afraid', the 
result will be (48b); a meaning postulate' could then ensure that 
AxAyD(afraid *(x, y) -), fear*(x, y)]. 
R25. If aE HPP-OF/T and ßE PT then (a, ß) E PPP-OF 
Realisation: a r". 0 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R26. if aE BADJ/PP-OF and ßE PPP-OF then (a, 0) EP. ADJ 
Realisation: 1,8 
Translation: a'("#, ) 
(48) a. John is afraid of Mary. 
b. afraid*(j, m) 
c. fear*(j, m) 
It is not vital here to choose between these competing approaches. 
Meaning postulates are no doubt the safer method for these examples. 
For a general discussion on the choice between using meaning 
postulates or complex translations of lexical items see Dowty 
1979a: 35-36,194-199. Other adjectives with PP-OF complements 
include aware (of), ashamed (of), proud (of), beloved (of) and tired 
(of).. 
Wasow (1977: 349) lists a number of other lexical passive 
participles (i. e. adjectives) which can take prepositions other than 
by or of. 
annoyed (at) known (to) 
bored (with) overjoyed (at) 
contained (in) pissed off (at) 
disappointed (with) pleased (with) 
elated (at) relieved (at) 
frightened (at) surprised (at) 
horrified (at) upset (with) 
interested (in) 
Again, many of these can take PP-BY phrases as well, and their syntax 
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can be accommodated with rules_ parallel to 
R25 and R26. 
Semantically, either generative semantics-like translations or 
meaning postulates could be used to capture 
intuitions about 
entailments and lexical relations. An added complication 
is the 
tendency of these lexical adjectives to take PPs with abstract or 
higher-type term constituents. 
3.4.5 Adjectival present participles 
True present participles derived from IVs are to be 
distinguished from -Ing adjectives, which they superficially resemble 
(see Section 3.4.3). Present participles, for instance, resist 
modification by very, cannot appear after seem, act or appear, and 
cannot take an un- prefix. 
T 
(very) (un-) amusing. (Adjective) 
(49) John is 
(*very) (*un-) amusing Mary. (Present participle) 
disgusting. (Adjective) 
(50) John seems 
*disgusting her. (Present participle) 
On the other hand, present participle phrases-are predicative, in the 
sense that they name one-place predicates and appear syntactically 
after a copula be. A rough translation for (51), ignoring tense and 
aspect as usual, is (51'). 
(51) John is singing. 
(51') sing'(j) 
Finally, present participles are adjectival in the sense that they 
can modify a common noun attributively. 
(52) The boy amusing Mary is John 
These features justify the assignment of present participles to t/5e. 
By definition any member, of t/5e is also -a member of the cover 
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categories ADJVL and PRED. 
Syntactically, a present participle appears to be quite simply 
an IV, or at least an untensed IV with no complicating auxiliary 
verbs, with its main verb in the present participle (or -Ing) form. 
The original arguments, complements and adverbs of the IV remain 
intact. 
(53) a. sing badly singing badly 
b. beat him/the dog -* beating him/the dog 
c. give the book to Mary giving the book to Mary 
d. give Mary the book 4 giving Mary the book 
e. paint the fence red painting the fence red 
The rule for present participle formation, ignoring tense and aspect, 
is therefore a straightforward mapping from IVs to t/yes. On the 
ordering of attributive present participles relative to head nouns 
see Lees 1963: 33,97; Bolinger 1967: 6-9; Dowty 1979b: 206. 
R27. If aE PIV then (a, ING) E Pt/Se. 
Realisation: a '', where all is a with the main verb in 
the present participle form 
Translation: a' [ignoring aspect and tense] 
(54) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED' (singIV, ING)t/5e, 
R27)IV, R2)t, Rl 
Realisation: John is singing. 
Translation: sing'(j) 
Attributive usages fall out naturally with the existing rules. 
(55) ((theDET' (manCN, (((kissTV , MaryT)IV, R3' 
ING)t/5 
e, R27)CN/2CN, R12)CN, R13)T, R4' 
(loveTV, Susan 
T)IV R3)t, R1 
Realisation: The man kissing Mary loves Susan. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[(man'(x) & kiss*(x, m)) H x-y) & love*(y, s)] 
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3.4.6 Make-ADJ and related constructions 
ar 
Arguments that make John angry is formed by combining a TV make 
angry with a direct object John are of long standing (see e. g. Dowty 
1976). Such an analysis is very easy to capture, without 
transformations, in the present formalism. Related constructions 
with a similar analysis are shown in (56). 
(56) a. render him unconscious/harmless/helpless 
b. paint the barn red/white/blue 
c. hammer the bar flat/round/square 
d. iron the shirt smooth/all wrinkly 
The tentative rule to accommodate all such constructions is R27X, and 
(57) is a typical example. 
R27X. If aE BTV/ADJ and GE PADJ then (a, ß) c PT. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( ß') 




Realisation: Nigel makes John angry. 
Translations make'( angry')( XPP(j))(n) 
The realisation component of R3, which joins TVs and their T objects, 
specifies that ((1 /ADJ, aADJ), 
ßT)IV y^ß^g, which means 
that ((make, angry), John) is realised as the string make John 
angry. 
In the spirit of Dowty 1976 and 1979a: 223, where 'lexical 
decomposition' is pursued, make (also turn and render) could be 
translated overtly as XQX PXyVP[CAUSE(P(y), P(Q))3.17 The 
translation of (57) would then be VP[CAUSE(P(n), angry'(j))], which 
indicates roughly that something that Nigel does causes John to be 
angry. Alternatively, a meaning postulate like the following could 
be invoked. 
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-_; - (58) AQXPXxO[make '(Q)(P)(X) -) VP[CAUSE(P(X), 
P(Q) )7l 
The examples in (56) need similar treatment. 
Examples with see, catch and find have a similar syntax but 
present more challenges in the semantic interpretation. If these 
words are assigned to category TV/ADJ and translated simply as see', 
catch' and find', R27X will generate examples such as (59). 
(59) Mary saw John nude. 
AA 
(59') see'( nude')( XPP(j))(m) 
A full examination of adjective complement ('object complement') 
constructions and 'pseudo-appositive adjectives' (Green 1970; 1973; 
Dowty 1972; Quirk et a/. 1972: 240-257; Live 1977) would require a 
full thesis in itself. 18 One way of handling translations like 
(59'), which are based on three-place relations like see', is to 
define a meaning postulate to relate them to formulas based on more 
common two-place relations. Let see2' be the two-place relation 
which translates the TV see as in John saw Mary. 
APAPAx[see'(P)(P)(x) -> (see2'(P)(x) & P(P) )] 
As such examples involve accident readings (see section 2.3.4), a 
semantic characterisation of the essence/accident distinction will be 
needed before a completely satisfactory explanation can be given. 
Think and consider also appear to have TV/ADJ (or perhaps 
TV/PRED) readings, so R27X can also generate sentences like (60) to 







thought Mary gorgeous. 
considered John sweet. 
considers Joe a pest. 
translates directly as the three-place relation thlnk3', 
L translate as (60'). 
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A 
(60') think3I( A"gorgeous')( XPP(m))(7) 
We can then appeal to a meaning postulate like (63) to relate such 
constructions to others based on thlnkk, a two-place relation between 
individuals and propositions. 
(63) APAPAx[think3'(P)(P)(x) -> P( Xz[thin)c (x, 
A[P{z)] )])] 
Alternatively, thlnkTV,. A could 
be translated directly as 
XPkPkyP( Az[think, t(y, [P(z)])]). These constructions are closely 
related to similar sentences with to be infinitives, which will be 
treated in Chapter 7. 
(64) a. John thinks Bill silly. 
b. John thinks Bill to be silly. 
Other words in this class include judge, decree, believe, deem, 
suppose, prove, one reading of find, and perhaps want, wish, prefer and 
like. 
Derived TV constituents such as (make, angry), (think, silly), 
(palnt, blue) and (see, nude) can be passivised in the usual way to 
produce strings like (65). 
(65) a. John was made angry (by Bill). 
b. The barn painted blue looked ridiculous. 
c. John was seen nude by Mary. 




In this chapter I have shown how various adjectives and 
adjectivals can be handled in a non-transformational MG. Basic 
adjectives, passive participles, present participles, and various 
lexical classes turn out to display remarkably similar syntactic 
behaviour, and this behaviour is more easily appreciated when the 
categorial analysis abstracts away from linear representations. The 
account is far from complete= the intent is to let the basic fragment 
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serve as a blueprint for further analysis. This will be"the plan for 
the remainder of the thesis. 
"" "- " "" -""" 
U 
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Chapter 4. Non-restrictive modification of terms 
4.0 Introduction 
The aim in this chapter is to present and defend a new approach 
to the analysis of non-restrictive modification in MG. The key 
innovation is the adoption ofa 'subroutine"mechanism to reflect the 
intuition that non-restrictive modifiers are assertions which' are 
'smuggled' into' the stream of a superordinate speech act. The 
analysis in this chapter will later. serve'' as 'a blueprint for non- 
restrictive'modification'at the proposition and property levels, and 
will suggest similar analyses for appositives and referring 
expressions. 
4.1 An overview of the problem 
-- I shall argue that non-restrictive modifiers are akin to 







John, who is handsome, loves Mary. 
John--he is handsome--loves Mary. 
My brother, whom you met yesterday, is a lion-tamer. 
My. brother-you met him yesterday--is a lion-tamer. 
Your charming wife throws delightful parties. 
Your wife--she is charming--throws delightful parties. 
Appealing to the vocabulary of computer science, a non-restrictive 
modifier is much like a subroutine which '"is" called " from a 
superordinate program, performs its task and then passes control'back 
to the calling program. Loosely speaking, a speaker uttering a 
sentence containing a non-restrictive modifier can be thought of as 
performing two speech acts in parallel, ' or, more accurately, in 
'pseudo-parallel'. 
Traditionally, non-restrictive modifiers have been analysed not 
as subroutines but as conjoined utterances; thus (la) would be 
transformed from orýtranslated into something of the rough form 'John 
`loves' Mary , AND 'John is handsome'. The distinction between the 
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subroutine view and the conjunction view, is relatively trivial, for 
most textbook examples.. However, I intend to show that the 
conjunction analysis. fails in opaque contexts and is inappropriate 
for analysing non-restrictive modifiers appearing within question and 
commands. 
The chapter will proceed with an "introduction to relative 
clauses and then a detailed examination of non-restrictive phenomena 
and the conjunction-' analysis as it has been proposed in Montague 
grammars., The subroutine analysis will then be proposed and tested 
with non-restrictive adjectives, relative clauses and appositives. 
4.1.1 Relative clauses 
It has long been appreciated that relative clauses-can be either 
restrictive or "no n-re strict ive in their manner of modification. 
1 The 
classic examples are on the pattern of (4) and (5). 
(4) The man, who was tired, left. 
(5) 
, 
The man who was tired left. 
In a- non-restrictive - example like (4), ' who is tired - provides an 
incidental characterisation of the man, whom the speaker assumes. to 
-----, be'  -'be already --specified or distinguished sufficiently for the purposes 
of 'the" utterance. If the non-restrictive relative clause in (4) is 
removed, the main' thrust of the sentence is not affected. On the 
other hand, the restrictive relative clause in (5) functions 
centrally to" help'' specify or determine just which man is intended; 
whoils tired restricts' the class of possible referents. Removing a 
restrictive modifier can have grave effects on the success of 
communication. Logically speaking, (4) and (5) have different truth 
conditions (Montague EFL: 213-214); for instance, while (4) conveys 
the assertion that there is one and only one man (and that he was 
tired, and left), (5) conveys the assertion that there is one and only 
one tired man (and that he left). 
While - restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses share 
many'syntacticqualities, a'number of differences are commonly cited. 
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For instance, non-restrictive relative clauses are typically said to 
be set off by pauses and a distinct pitch contour (Lees 1963: 85ff); 
it is also claimed that relative WH words appear in both restrictive 
and non-restrictive relative clauses, but that that relative clauses 
are limited to the restrictive. reading (Jespersen 1924: 112; Vendler 
1968: 13; Rodman 1972: 91; Quirk et 8l. 1972: 871). Such claims do not 
always hold up, especially in Scots dialect. 
2 Z shall proceed under 
the assumption. that the traditional semantic distinctions, if not the 
syntactic ones, are genuine. 
4.1.2 PREDs and ADJVLs 
While relative clauses provide the clearest examples, 
attributive ADJVLs and PREDs can also modify restrictively or non- 
restrictively. Jespersen (1924: lO8ff) cites examples like (6), 
pointing out their ambiguity. 
3 
-, (6)- The industrious Japanese succeed. 
(6) may refer to an industrious subset of the Japanese (the Japanese 
who are Industrious) or it may refer to all Japanese, with a non- 
restrictive characterisation of them as being industrious (the 
Japanese, who are Industrious). Such 'ornamental' or 'parenthetical' 
adjectives are-sometimes used with proper names, as in titles, gushy 
addresses and Homeric epithets (Jespersen 1924: 111-112; Vendler 
1968: 87; Chomsky 1965: 217). 
(7) My dear little Ann 
(8) Brave Ulysses 
(9)- The honourable John Smith 
Care must be taken with preposed adjective examples because ' mast' are 
ambiguous between restrictive and non-restrictive readings. The 
adjective in (10), for instance, may be used to pick out one of a set 
of brothers, the stupid one, from the rest of the brothers, who are, 
presumably, not stupid. But in a context where only one brother is 
involved, stupid may be added non-restrictively as the speaker's 
assessment of the brother in question. Care must also be taken with 
Beesley -so- Adjectives 
examples like (11), which may appear to exclude a restrictive reading 
for beautiful. 
, 
(10) Your stupid brother 
(11) My beautiful wife 
Such a restrictive reading is, however, quite possible,. and would be 
useful in a polygamous society. 
The syntactic ambiguity of (10 ), at least in the written form, 
is an accident of the relatively inflexible syntactic order of 
English. Languages like Spanish and Portuguese, which allow more 
freedom in the placement of adjectives, often put non-restrictive 
adjectives before nouns, while the usual'position for restrictive 
adjectives is after nouns. 
4 
Postposition of non-restrictive adjectivals in English is 
necessary when they have syntactic complements. 
5 Non-restrictive 
PNOMs must also be postposed. 
"K, 
(12) t/5e--past participle 
,, - 
The foreign minister, rebuked by the prime minister, resigned. 
(13),, t/5q--adjectival present participle 
John, being the supervisor, was blamed. 
(14) PNOM 
Lee, a postgraduate student, drank only Dutch gin. 
Thus any member of PRED or ADJVL, the cover classes of t/ne 
constituents which appear in predicate and attributive position, can 
also be a non-restrictive modifier. 
True terms which-appear to be non-restrictive modifiers, as in 
(15), require a slightly different analysis, and will be discussed in 
Section 4.6. 
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4.2 Formal observations on non-restrictive modifiers 
4.2.1 One-place predicates 
It is generally agreed that only constituents naming one-place 
predicates can be used as non-restrictive modifiers (Siegel 1976a: 521 
Bennett 1975: 44). Indeed the ability to act as a non-restrictive 
modifier was cited as a test of one-place predicate-hood in Section 
2.3.3. Examples with non-restrictive readings thus include absolute 
adjectives like red, degree adjectives like tall and evaluative 
adjectives like worthless. 
(16) The officer's red face betrayed his embarrassment. 
(17)" The tall movie star signed autographs. 
(18) Your -worthless 'secretary should have' this' 
finished in a couple of hours. 
- ,Y'. 
Non-predicative adjectives like more,, former and sheer cannot have 
non-restrictive readings. .I 
Relative clauses intuitively translate as sentences with an 
argument slot abstracted out; they too are one-place predicates and 
so can be expected to modify non-restrictively. 
(19) a. which is red 
b. who is tä11 
C. who is worthless 
d. who loves Bob 






4.2.2 Terms modified non-restrictive modifiers 
Smith (1964: 38) notes that bare proper names in English' can be 
modified only by non-restrictive relative clauses (see also Arnauld & 
Nicole 1662: 60; Chomsky 1965: 217; Vendler 1968: 14,86-87). 
41k 
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(20) Nigel, ' whom I know well, ' would never pickup a check. 
(21) *Nigel that I know well would never pick up a check. 
Homeric epithets as in Brave Ulysses are similarly non-restrictive. 
By treating Nigel overtly as a common noun and adding a definite 
article, restrictive modifiers become"perfectly acceptable. 
(22)' The Nigel that I'know would, never pick up a check. 
The analysis of proper names as predicates will be taken up in 
Section 4.6.1.2., 
While definite noun phrases can be modified either restrictively 
or non-restrictively, the possibilities for modifying indefinite 
terms are more controversial. It has even been claimed that non- 
restrictive modifiers on indefinite terms are ungrammatical (Rohrer 
1973: 412) or at least different from other non-restrictives (Thompson 
1971: 82; Fairclough 
. 
1973: 530). Though I disagree with many of her 
specific examples, Smith (1964: 47-48) is right in claiming that 
'vacuous' indefinite terms cannot take non-restrictive modifiers (see 
also Rohrer--- 1973: 411-412). One kind of vacuous indefinite term is 
one for which the corresponding 'referent's' existence is being 
-. 
denied. Another"purportedly vacuous example is the English-predicate 
nominal; these are properly translated as simple predicates and so 
are not really terms at all (see Section 3.2 example (4))., The 
following examples from Smith 1964 are ungrammatical or, incoherent 
where"the 'indefinite terms are vacuous and the'relative clauses are 
non-restrictive., 
, (23)- *He never wrote [a novel, which was published by McGraw-Hill]. 
, --(24) *He is Can anthropologist, who studies Indian tribes]. 
For indefinite terms which are, in some sense, referring expressions, 
non-restrictive modifiers are perfectly acceptable. 
(25) An anthropologist, who studies Indian tribes, gave an 
excellent talk. 
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(26) They finally gave some food to a dog, which had been 
following them around for hours. 
(27) A beggar, who had been begging here for 30 years, turned 
out to be rich. 
In all these cases, the non-vacuous indefinite terms can be fortified 
with particular, ! certain or specific (e. g. a certain ý anthropologist); each 
could be replaced, given the right context and shared knowledge, with 
more definite naming expressions such as Dr Bloggs or the 
anthropologist for an anthropologist, Fido or the hungry dog for a dog, 
and Lazarus or the town beggar for a beggar. 
Other determiners yielding vacuous terms include 'generic' 
indefinite articles and no, any, few and every. ', True non-restrictive 
readings for the relative clauses in the following sentences are 
therefore anomalous. * 
(28) *A child, who is polite, should be seen and not heard. 
(29) *Any book, which is amusing, will do. 
(30) *No antique dealer, who has any sense, would buy that. 
(31) *Every dealer, who sells at that price, goes broke. 
These restrictions have been noted by a number of researchers_ . (Smith 
1964: 38,48; Thorne 1972: 553; Aissen 1972: 188; Cooper 1975: 229; 
1979: 73; Rodman 1972: 175; 'Bartsch 1979: 37-40). In actual discourse, 
therefore, the presence of a true non-restrictive modifier is a clue 
to the hearer to interpret the modified term as specific or 
referring, in some sense, to a potentially identifiable individual.? 
Because of this there is a certain amount of pressure to interpret a 
sentence like (23) as (32), a possible but somewhat improbable 
reading.. 
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'Note" that if we adopt an'explicit 'existential 'quantifier on the 
lines of Bennett': "(1975': 106-107) at least n quantifier, the 
indefinite 
_ 
terms taking non-restrictive 
, 
modifiers cannot be 
paraphrased as 'at least, one CN'. 
(33) *At least one anthropologist, who studies Indian, tribes, 
gave an excellent talk. 
Also the expressions any old or an arbitrary, which characterise non- 
specific indefinite terms, preclude non-restrictive modification (see 
note 7) . 
(34) *They finally gave some food to any old dog, who had been 
following them around for hours. 
(35) *An arbitrary beggar, who had been begging here for 30 
years, turned out to be rich. 
These facts tend to argue against translating 'specific' indefinite 
terms with existential quantifiers. We shall return to the referring 
status of indefinite terms in the discussion of Bartsch's analysis of 
non-restrictive modifiers in Section 4.4.2. 
Non-restrictive modifiers as independent speech acts 
4.2.3.1 Performative adverbs and tags 
There is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that 
non-restrictive modifiers are speech acts, separate from, the 
superordinate speech acts in which they appear. Thorne (1972; see 
also McCawley 1978: 163) has shown that non-restrictive relative 
clauses may have their own separate 'performative, adverbs like 
frankly and, honestly; and Seuren (1969: 190-191) has shown that they can 
have their own tags. 
(36) John,. who frankly is a bore, talked all night. 
(37) John,,, who. is, a bore, isn't he?, talked all night. 
As both tags and performative adverbs are usually associated with 
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discrete speech acts, -these facts., suggest that the non-restrictive 
clause constitutes ,a speech act separate from the main clause. 
9- 
Keith Brown has also pointed out to me that non-restrictive 
modifiers can be interjected not only by the speaker himself but by 
his interlocutors. 'Thus in example (36), speaker A could say John, 
and then speaker B could burst in with who frankly Is a bore before A 
had a chance to finish the sentence with talked all night. In such a 
case, two speech acts are clearly involved, and each assertion would 
be ascribed to its respective speaker. 
It Is also possible, even-- in, -written text, to- find non- 
restrictive modifiers isolated off in separate sentences. 
Unlike James, [Mary of Guise] had one small son, Francis, 
the new- duke of Longueville, and gave birth to another 
son , shortly 
after her husband's death. Who died. 
(Fraser, A., ' Mary Queen of Scots, 1970, London: Panther. ) 
Who died in this extract appears to contain an anaphoric reference 
back to Mary of Guise's second son, who is introduced in the 
preceding sentence. Such separability, though it might be' explained 
as only a strong pause, is consistent with the view 'that' non- 
restrictive modifiers convey a separate speech act. 
4.2.3.2- Questions and commands 
Although most examples of non-restrictive modifiers in the 
literature show them appearing inside assertions, non-restrictive 
relative clauses appear to attach to any suitable (i. e. 'referring' 
or 'specific') terms in any kind of sentence. 
(38) Tell your father, who is outside, that I dinner is ready. 
(39) Who told John, who shouldn't know about it, that Mary left? 
(40) I-wish that Bruno, who is very strong, were here now. 
(41) May your business, which has hitherto been a disaster, turn 
into a great success! 
(42) 1 name this ship, which is the biggest ever made, the Titanic. 
In each case; no'matter what kind of superordinate speech act is 
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involved, .. the non-restrictive clause expresses an assertion. This 
assertion-is somehow subordinate, parenthetical or-incidental, having 
the status ofýan-interpolation, an. afterthought-or an aside (Arnauld 
& Nicole 1662: 115,122). - I- - 
4.2.3.3 Conjunction paraphrases 
Almost everyone studying non-restrictive modifiers proposes 'that 
they derive from or translate into assertions which are conjoined to 
the main sentence at the highest level. 
10 The top-level conjunction 
analysis: is only' roughly compatible with the observations above, 
which indicate that non-restrictive assertions are independent speech 
acts. 
The problem is that such an analysis requires the extremely 
suspicious conjunction of questions and assertions and also commands 
(or optative sentences) with assertions. Ross (1967: 434-437) 
therefore resorts to transformationally deriving sentences with non- 
restrictive modifiers not from conjunctions of sentences but from 
SEQUENCES of sentences in: a discourse, a solution which may be what 
the Port-Royal-grammarians and logicians had in mind. 
11 Ross's 
solution, divorced from the old Chomskyan assumptions of linear 
-sequence , _ýand_,. -transformational derivation, ----- is in line with the 
speech-act observations and will form the basis of the present 
analysis. That is, a sentence with a non-restrictive modifier will 
not be translated as a conjunction, but as two separate sentences in 
the discourse. To do this, non-restrictive modifiers will be 
translated as independent assertions which are smuggled into the 
stream of a superordinate sentence. Non-restrictive modification is 
a way to perform two or more separate speech acts, not conjoined or 
in sequence, but rather in (pseudo-)parallel fashion. 
4.3 Relative clauses 
4.3.1 Restrictive relative clauses 
Although relative clause 'analysis has long been a contentious 
issue in linguistics, there is now wide agreement that 
Beesley - B? - - Adjectives 
restrictive relative clauses and adjectives attach in some way to CNs 
(the so-called Nom-S analysis) while non-restrictives attach to terms 
(the NP-S analysis). 
12 
Restrictive relative clauses therefore 
function in a way quite parallel to attributive adjectives, and some 
researchers have gone to far as to include them under the adjective 
label (Quine 1960: 110; Cresswell 1973: 158; Thomason 1976: 79; Keenan & 
Faltz 1978: 51', 165). The full analysis of relative clauses is 
complicated by problems of allowable complementisers and scope 
restrictions (see Rodman 1976, Thomason 1976), which are not at issue 
here and which lead far astray from adjectives. The following 
categorisation and rule will suffice for the simple examples used 
herein, 13 
Category Abbreviation Basic expressions 
t/se REL none 
R28. If ac Pt and a is of the form {... hen... },.,. 
then (a) e PAL (where n is a natural number). 
Realisation: THAT ^ (... {henI " . )t 
.' 
Translätion: Xxn[a, ]' 
The rule states simply that a sentence with an indexed pronoun can be 
y turned into a REL by abstracting out the indexed pronoun. Relativised 
sentences herein will be restricted to examples containing a single 
indexed variable for the sake of simple rules and easy exposition. 
The notation THAT ̂  {... ýhen ý... } indicates that the REL is realised 
as a THAT followed by the normal realisation of the sentence, minus 
the indexed variable, which has a null realisation. Alternatively, 
THAT can- itself be, considered the realisation of the indexed 
variable., - THAT is an abbreviation for words like that, who, whom and 
which; these words are + selected by non-trivial , morphological rules 
sensitive to grammatical relations and features -such as (±human). 
such morphological rules, will be assumed to operate, though no 
formalisation will be provided here. 
We can now show, ignoring tense and aspect, that the barn that Is 
red has the same translation as the restrictive reading 'of the red 
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(43) (theDET' ((redaDJ)CN/2CN, R12' 
barnCN)CN, 
R13)T, R4 
Realisation; the red barn 
Translation: 
1. reds -> red' Basic 
2. (red)CN/2- --> XPly[P(y) & red'(y)] From 1 by R12 
3. barnCN -+ barn' Basic 
A 
4. ((red), barn) CN 
- XPXy[P(y) & red'(y)] ( barn') 
From 2,3 by R13 
5. Ay(barn'(y) & red'(y)] Lambda conversion 
6. theDET ='TXPXQVZ[Ax[P(x) <->x-z] & Q(z)] 
Basic 
7. (the, ((red), barn)}T XPXQVz[AX[P(x) E-- x-z] & Q(Z)) 
( Xy[barn'(y) & red'(y)]) From 5,6 by R4 




(barn CN, (((he1T; (beIV/PRED' 
redAw)IV R2) t, R1)REL, R28)CN/2CN, R126, R13)T, R4 
Realisation: the barn that is red 
Translation: 
1. y{fiei, (be, red)}t ' red'(xl) See previous examples 
2. ((hel, (be, red))) L4 
Xx1[red'(xl)] 
From 1 by R28 
3. (((he1, (be, red))))CN, 2C -+ XPXy[P(y) & 
X x1(red' (x1) ] (Y) ] From 2 by R12 
4. XPay[P(y) & red'(y)] -Lambda conversion 
5. - barnCN -> barn' Basic 
6. (barn, (((hei, (be, red)))))C 
XPXy[P(y) & red'(y)] ( barn') From 4,5 by P. 13 
7. - Xy[barn' (y) & red' (y) ] Lambda conversion 
8. " theDET ' XPXQVz[Ax[P(x) H x-z] & Q(z)] 
Basic 
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9. (the, (barn, (((he1, (be, red)))))) T a> ry 
XPAQVz[Ax[P(x) H x-z] & Q(z)](*ay[barn'(y) & red'(y)]) 
From 7,8 by R4 
10. XQVz[Ax[(barn(x) & red'(x)) H x-z] & Q(z)] 
Lambda conversion 
4.3.2 Non-restrictive relative clauses 
While restrictive relative clauses function almost identically 
to intersective attributive adjectives, non-restrictive relative 
clauses require a completely different translation. If Quine and the 
others cited in note 10 are correct in claiming that sentences with 
non-restrictive modifiers are merely stylistic variations of 
conjoined sentences, then the goal is to analyse examples like (45) 
and (46) as (45') and (46') respectively. 
(45) John, who is handsome, ' walked away. 
(45') [John walked away] and [John is handsome] 
(46) John loves Mary, who is pretty. 
(46') [John loves Mary] and [Mary is pretty) 
The challenge for a surfacy'MG would be to provide a syntax which 
--directly- 
generates- complex terms . like -John,, who Is handsome, with a 
semantics -which allows the translation of the non-restrictive 
modifier to appear at the- top of the derivation as a conjoined 
sentence. 
Rodman (1972: 174-175) presents an analysis designed to do just 
that. Translated into the present notation (and adding Bennett's 
simplification), Rodman's Rule, abbreviated RR, is shown below. 
Rodman's Rule: If ae PADS then (a) E pT/T* 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPXQ[P(Xy(a'(y) &ýQ(y)])]: 
We shall also need R29 for joining a non-restrictive modifier to a 
term. 
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R29. If a e- PT/T and ßE PT then (a, ß) E -PT. - 
Realisation: Or-' a, if a has a complement 
ar "", B if a is a simple adjective and ß is a proper name 
else ( (YDET' ÖCN)T' aT, T)T y^a^. 
ö 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
The following example shows how Rodman's Rule produces a 
'conjunction' analysis for a non-restrictive modifier. The example 
is for comparison only; it does not represent the present 
'subroutine' analysis. 
(47) ((JohnT' (((he1T' (beIV/PRED, handsomeADJ)IV, 
R2)t, R1}REL, R28 T/T, RR}T, R29' swimlV)t, R1 
. Realisation: John, who is-handsome, swims. 
Translation: 
1. ((hel, (be, handsome))) L* 
Xxl[handsome'(xl)] 
See previous examples 
2. (((he-, (be, 
A 
handsome)))}T/T _0 
XPXQ[P( Xy[Xx1[handsome'(x1)](y) & Qiy}])] 
From 1 by Rodman's Rule 
3. XPXQ[P( Xy[handsome'(y) & Q(y)])] Lambda conversion 
4. John APP(j) Proper - name 
5. _> (John, (((he , (be, handsome) )))) , T 
XPAQ[P{AXy[handsome'(y) & Q(y)])] (A IPP(j)) 
From 3,4 by R29 
6. 
A 
XQ[XPP(j)( ly[handsome'(y) & Q(y)])] Lambda conversion 
7. XQ[handsome'(j) & Q(j)] Lambda conversion 
8. swim1V * swim' Basic 
j9. ((John, (((hel, (be, handsome))))), sw im) _0 t 
XQ[handsome' (]) & Q(j)] (Aswim'. ) From 7,8 by R1 
10. handsome'(j) & swim'(j) Lambda conversion 
As shown in step 10, the non-restrictive modifier who Is handsome 
translates as a conjunct of the main sentence. We can now contrast 
restrictive' and non-restrictive readings invo lving relative clauses. 
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(48) Restrictive 
((theDET'j(barnCN, _"({hell, (belt//PRED' 
redADJ)IV, R2)t, Rl}REL, R28)CN/2CN, 
R12)CN, R13)T, R4' collapse1V)t, R1 
Realisation: The barn which is red collapsed. 
Translations Vy[Ax[ (barn' (x) & red' (x)) H x-y] & collapse' (y) ] 
(49) Non-restrictive (with Rodman's Rule) 
(((theDET' barn 
CN)Tj R4 
(((he1T' (beIV/PRED, redADJ)IV, 
R2]t, R1)REL, R28]T/T, RR)T, R29' collapseIV)t R 
" Realisation: The barn, which is red, collapsed. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[barn' (x) H x-y] & red' (y) & collapse' (y) ] 
As has already been pointed out, these two sentences have different 
truth conditions. 
4.4 Non-restrictive PREDs and ADJVLs 
4.4.1' A, Rodman-like analysis 
All attributive modifiers in previous chapters have been 
restrictive. The semantics of non-restrictive attributive PREDs and 
ADJVLs in general should be identical to that for non-restrictive 
relative-- clauses. Syntactically, however, simple adjectives in 
English typically come before nouns and after any articles. This 
causes little trouble with epithets on proper names, but simple non- 
restrictive adjectives which modify definite terms require 
discontinuous realisation to get them into their prenominal slot (see 
Chapter 3 note 10). For instance, if white non-restrictively 
modifies the term the snow, then the constituent ((the, snow)T, 
(white) } will be realised as the string the white snow. These T/T T- 
complications are dealt with in the realisation component of R29. 
- The,, solution for Homeric epithets and postposed-non-restrictive 
PREDs andADJVLs is fairly straightforward, both syntactically and 
semantically. Again, the Rodman analysis is being used in the 
following examples. 
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(50) (((braveADJ)T/T, 
RR, UlyssesT)T, R29, escapeZV)t, Rl 
Realisation: Brave Ulysses escaped. 
Translation: 
1. - brave => brave' Basic 
2. (brave) 
T/T -> 
X PAQ[P(Aly[brave'(y) & Q(y)]}] 
From 1 by Rodman's Rule 
3- Ulysses -> XPP(u) Proper name 
AA 
4. ((brave), Ulysses) 
T*X 
PXQ[P( Xy[brave'(y) & Q(y)])] ( 1PP(u)) 
From 2,3 by R29 
5. AQ[brave'(u) & Q(u)] Lambda conversion 
6. escapeIV escape' Basic 
7. (((brave), Ulysses), escape)( _> 
1Q[brave'(u) & Q(u)] (Aescape') From 5,6 by R1 
8. brave'(u) & escape'(u) Lambda conversion 
(51) ((John 
T'-(((reject TV , 
PASS) (t/5e)/PP-BY, R14' 
(byPP-BY/T' MarYT)PP-BY, 
R16}t/5e, 
R17)T/T, RR)T, R29, 
despair1V)t, 
R1 
Realisation: John, rejected by Mary, despaired. 
Translation: 
1. ((reject, PASS), (by, Mary))t/5e Xx[reject*(m, x)] 
See previous examples 
2. (((reject, PASS), (by, Mary)}}T/T 
XPXQ[P(%y[Xx[reject*(m, x)](y) & Q(y)])] 
From 1 by Rodman's rule 
3. XPXQ[P( Xy[reject*(m, y) & Q(y)]}] 
Lambda conversion 
4. JohnT XPP{j} Proper name 
5. (John, (((reject, PASS), (by, Mary))})T 
XPXQ[P(*Xy[reject*(m, y) & Q(y)])] (*XPP(j)) 
From 3,4 by R29 
6. XQ[reject*(m, 'j) & Q(j)] Lambda conversion 
1-1 1 l- - 7. despairIV - despair' Basic 
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8. ((John, (((reject, PASS), (by, Mary)))), despair)t 
XQ[reject*(m, j)& Q(j) ] (despair') From 6,7 by Ri 
9. reject*(m, j) & despair'(j) Lambda conversion 
The two readings of The stupid president resigned are shown in (52) and 
(53)x_ 
(52) Restrictive 
. ((theDET' ((stupidADJ)CN/2CN, R12' 
presidentCN)CN, R13}T, R4' resignIV)t, R, 
Realisation: The stupid president resigned. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[(president '(x) & stupid'(x)) H x-y] & 
resign'(y)] 





RR)T, R29' resignlV)t, Rl 
Realisation: The stupid president resigned. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[president'(x) x-y] & stüpid'(y) & 
resign'(y)]' 
In the restrictive reading, stupid', functions as a restricting 
quality; the intended referent is that president such that he is"also, _ 
stupid. In. 
ythe 
non-restrictive reading, the president functions as 
the referring expression, and stupid' is predicated incidentally of 
the entity who is the, unique president. Note that the non- 
restrictive assertion stupid'(y) in (53) is tied to the main assertion 
resign' (y) by the sharing of a common bound variable. In the non- 
restrictive reading, the adjective must be syntactically wedged 
between the determiner and the. common noun of .. the modified term. 
This step is illustrated in (54). 
(54) ((stupidM, )T, 
T, 
(theDET' presidentCN}T)T °ý- 
the, ^, stupid ^ president By R29 
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So far we have only looked at non-restrictive modifiers on 
subjects. Example (55), still using Rodman's rule, shows one 
modifying-a direct object. 






R2)t, -Rl}REL, R28}T/T, RR}T, R29}IV, R3}t, R1 
Realisation: John likes the dancer, who is pretty. 
Translation: 
1. (((he1, (be, pretty)))}T/T 
XPXP[P(%y[pretty'(y) & P(y)])] See previous examples 
2. (the, dancer)T -> XQVz[Ax[dancer'(x) H x=z] & Q(z)] 
See previous examples 
3. ({the, dancer), (((hel, (be, pretty))))) T 
Xy[Pretty'(y) & P(y)]}] 
A 
( XQVz[Ax[dancer'(x) E- x=z] & Q{z)]) 
From 1,2-by R29 
4. XP(XQVz[Ax[dancer'(x) E-) x-z] & Q(z)] 
A 
( Xy[pretty'(y) & P(y)])] Lambda conversion 
5. XPVz[Ax[dancer '(x) E+ x-z] & pretty'(z)"& P(z)] 
Lambda conversion 
6. likeTV like' Basic 
7. (like, ((the, dancer), (((hei, (be, pretty)))))) IV A 
like'( XPVz[Ax[dancer'(x) E-> xaz] & pretty'(z) & P(z)]) 
From 5,6-by R3 11 
8. John,, -> XQQ(j) Basic 
9. (John, (like, ((the, dancer), (((hel, (be, pretty)))))})t -> 
XQQ(j) (A[like I(AXPVz[Ax[dancer'(x) H x' z] & pretty'(z) - 
& P{z}])j) From 7,8 by Rl 
A 
10. like'( XPVz[Ax[dancer'(x) -> xsz] & pretty'(z) & P(z)])-(j) 
Lambda conversion 
A 
11. "XPVz[Ax[dancer'(x) E-> x-z] & pretty'(z) & P(z)] 
(%y[like*(j, y)]) First-order reduction 
12. Vz[Ax[dancer'(x) H x-z] & pretty'(z) & like*(j, z)] 
" Lambda conversion 
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The Rodman analysis appears satisfactory in a number of 
respects. Non-restrictive modifiers combine straightforwardly with 
terms in the syntax, and the conjunction which is so often appealed 
to in -explaining non-restrictive modification is built into the 
semantics. ' There are, however, some problems. First, as examples 
(50) and (51) show, the clause representing the non-restrictive 
assertion, which. is. intuitively subordinate or parenthetical, is 
fully as prominent as the main assertion of the sentence. In a 
truth-conditional, semantics, this objection is . not terribly worrying. 
Second, although the analysis has the virtue, of applying-equally well 
to, proper names -and appropriate. terms of the form the CN and e 
CN, 
it ., also applies . inappropriately . to ,, terms like -, every 
CN, no CN, any 
CN and the so-called, 'vacuous '-=indefinite., terms,. none of, which can 
take non-restrictive modifiers. 
14 
Third, Rodman's rule translates 
non-restrictive assertions as conjuncts to the main clause, but these 
conjuncts are, in the case of definite and indefinite terms, tied 
together by an existential quantifier. 




R2) t, R1)REL, 
- R28 
}TAT, 
RR)T, ý9, - 
fall 
V)t, R, 
Realisation: A man, who was ill, fell. 
Translation: Vx[man' (x) & 'ill' (x) & fall' (x) ] 
This clashes with the evidence that non-restrictive assertions, which 
can take'their own-performative adverbs and tags, are separate speech 
acts. The mechanism of linking variables across clauses with 
quantifiers has recently faced some `general criticism (Cooper 
1979: 72); and even if such translations were allowed for sentences 
like'(56), where the non-restrictive relative clause translates as an 
assertion within an assertion, it is much harder to justify in those 
cases 'where-'non-restrictive modifiers appear within -questions and 
commands'. That 'is, " a 'Rodman-like analysis would have to analyse 
sentences 'like (38) and (39), reprinted here, roughly as (38' ) and 
(39') respectively. 
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(38) Tell your father, who is outside, that dinner is ready 
(38')" (tell your father that dinner is ready) & 
(your father is outside) 
(39) Who told John, who shouldn't know about it, that Mary left? 
(39') (who told John that Mary left? ) & 
(John shouldn't know about it) 
Conjoining questions with assertions is already decidedly odd even in 
syntax, and Ross (1967: 434-437) abandoned the conjunction analysis 
for just this reason. Even worse,. the, Rodman analysis- requires 
variables be bound across such conjunctions, for that is the only way 
that the coreference between the two clauses is enforced. As a 
question or a command does not have a truth value in the usual sense, 
the-logical conjunction of a question or command with an assertion is 
not even well-formed. 
Another source of worry or comfort, depending on one's point of 
view, is the fact that the translation in (56) is identical to that 
for the sentence A man who was 111 fell where who was ill is 
translated-as a restrictive modifier of man. If Rodman's analysis is 
correct, we must conclude that what appear to be restrictive and 
non-restrictive modes of modification on indefinite terms do not 
differ in truth value. If a difference must be captured, as I 
believe, then something is wrong with the analysis of indefinite 
terms or with Rodman's analysis of non-restrictive modifiers. 
A further cause for concern is the increasing complexity of the 
semantic derivations as non-restrictive modifiers apply to terms in 
deeper and deeper parts of trees. Example (51) shows a non- 
restrictive modifier applying to the subject term, of the sentence. 
The fact that the conjoined clause pops up so easily in such cases is 
a direct reflection of the MG analysis, where subject terms map IVs 
into sentences. When the non-restrictive applies to the direct 
object of a sentence, as in (55), several extra derivation steps 
involving first-order reduction are necessary to make the., conjunct 
pop up. Writing out the derivations becomes very tedious indeed when 
the non-restrictives are further embedded, and one must eventually go 
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beyond syntactic simplifications to get the conjuncts to appear at 
the highest level. Consider sentence (57), where the non-restrictive 
relative clause who Is pretty is read as applying to Mary. 
(57) ((theDET' (manCN, {((he1T' (loveTV, 
(MaryT, (((he2T, (beIV/PRED' 
prettyADJ)IV, 
R2)t, R1)REL, R28}T/T, 
RR T, R29 IV, R3 t, R1}REL, 
R28)CN/2CN, R12) CN, R13)T, R4' resign1V)t, R1 
Realisation: The man who loves Mary, who is pretty, resigned. 
Translations 
1. (Mary, (((he2, (be, pretty))))) T 
XQ[pretty'(m) & Q(m)] See previous examples 
2. loveTV '* love' Basic 
3. (love, (Mary, (((he2, (be, pretty))))))IV 
love'( XQ[pretty'(m) & Q(m)]) From 1,2 by R3 
4. het ' XPP(x1} Pronoun 
5. (het, (love, (Mary, (((he2, (be, pretty)))))})t -> 
XPP(x1) (A(love'(AXQ[pretty'(m) & Q(m)])]) 
From 3,4 by R1 
"A 
6. love'( AQ[pretty'(m) & Q(m)]) (x1) Lambda conversion 
7. XQ[pretty'(m) & Q(m)] (AXy(love; (xl, y)]} 
First-order reduction 
8. (pretty' (m) & Xy[ love *, (x1, y) ] (m) ) 
Lambda conversion 
9 :'- (pretty' (m) & love (x1, m)) Lambda conversion"" 
-- lo, --° ((he1, (love, (Mary, (((he2, (be, pretty))))))) )REL 
Xx1[pretty'(m) & love*(x1, m)] 
From 9, by R28 
11. (((he 
I , 
(love, (Mary, (((he2, 
(be, -pretty))))))))JCN/2CN -0 
XPXy[P(y), & Xxl[pretty'(m) & love (x1, m)) (y)] 
From lo by R12 
12. XPky[P(y) & pretty'(m) &"love*(y,, m)] Lambda conversion 
-13. manCN , man' Basic 
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14.. (man, (((hei, (love, (Mary, (((he2, 
(be, pretty)))))))))) CN 
XPXy[P(y) & Pretty'(m) & love*(y, m)] ("man') 
-I- From 12,13 by R13 
15. Xy[man'(y)-& pretty'(m) & love*(y, m)] Lambda conversion 
-16. theDET ' XPXQVX[Az[P(z) E-> ! z-x] & Q(x)] 
Basic 
17. (the, -(man, (((hei, "(love , (Mary, (((he2, 
(be, pretty)}}}}}}}}}}T <. ' 
-XPXQVx[Az[P(z) H z-x] .& Q(x)] ( Xy[man'(y) 
& 
pretty' (m) & love * (y, m)]), --, From-15,16 by R4 
18. XQVx[Az[Xy[man'(y) &-pretty'(m) &-love*(y, m)] (z) H 
z-x] &-Q(X)] Lambda conversion 
= 19. , XQVx[ Az [ (man' (z) &, pretty' (m)- & love *(z, m)) H 
-z-x] & Q(x)]:. Lambda conversion 
20, resign1V resign' Basic 
21. ((the, (man, (((hei, (love, (Mary, (((he2, 
(be, -pretty))))))}}}}), resign)t => 
XQVx[Az[(man'(z) & pretty'(m) & 
love*(z, m)) H z-x] & Q(x)] ( resign') 
20 by Rl 
22. Vx[ Az [ (man' (z) & pretty' (m) & love * (z, . m)) 
H z=x] _: 
& 
resign'(x)] Lambda conversion 
Rodman's conjunction approach leads to more and more complicated 
derivations for carrying along non-restrictive assertions from deeper 
and deeper in the tree. This results in a lot of tedium but is not 
in itself a serious criticism. However, note in line 22 that the 
non-restrictive assertion pretty'(m) does not emerge as a conjunct of 
the main sentence as a whole but rather is locked deep down in the 
formula among the limiting clauses of the definite description. 
4.4.2 The 
. Bartsch analysis 
Bartsch (1979) provides an analysis of non-restrictive modifiers 
which solves some of these problems. The solution must be understood 
in the context of her theory of pronominal coreference. Bartsch 
i 
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translates proper names as in PTQ, so John -translates as the set of 
all properties of the intension of some individual constants 
XPP(- j). From here 
-on 
I shall adapt Bartsch Is translations to' 
conform to Bennett's simplification, though the issue is not crucial 
to the discussion. Thus John will translate as XPP(j). Unlike PTQ, 
Bartsch's theory allows individual constants to be introduced into 
translations not only by proper names but by any term having a 
'specific' reading. In the specific reading, for instance, the 
indefinite article translates as XQXP[Q(v) & P(v)], where v is a 
newly introduced. constant; ' that is,. v is of,, the same 
type and nature 
as the constant j -in, the. translation of. John. Such a translation is 
used when the indefinite term names. or refers, in some sense, to a 
specific entity in the mind, of the speaker.,; - Example (58), -uses 
Bartsch's, analysis of the specific indefinite , 
article (with-Bennett's 
simplification added). Let vl be the constant corresponding to the 
car John bought, and, in general, let v, where n in a natural 
n 
number, ` be a set of individual constants. 
(58) (John , (buy, (a , car )} '} T TV DET CN T, R4 IV, R3 t, R1 
Realisation: John bought a car. 
Translation: 
l. __; -aDET'- =0 XPXQ[P(v1} & Q(v1)], 
-, -Bartsch's 
translation of a specific indefinite article 
2. -carCN - , 
car' Basic 
3. (a, car) T 
"- XPAQ[P(v1) & Q(v1}] ("car') 
From 1,2 by R4 
4. AQ[car'(v1) & Q(v1)] Lambda conversion 
5. buy buy' Basic 
6. (buy, (a, car)) IV 
= buy'( X Q[car'(v1) & Q(v1}]) 
From 4,5, by R3 
7. John -+ XPP(j) Proper name 
T 
t 
8. (John, (buy, (a, car)}) 
XPP(j) ([buy'( XQ[car'(v1) & Q(vl}])]) 
From '6 ,7 
by Rl 
9. buy'( XQ[car'(vl) & Q(v1}])(j) Lambda conversion 
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10. XQ[car'(vl) &., Q(v1)] { XY[buY*(], Y)]) 
I First-order reduction 
11. car'(v1) & buy*(j, v1) Lambda conversion 
If the sentence John bought a car were followed by the sentence' It is 
red, Bartsch's rules of anaphoric resolution would search the context 
for the constant referred to by it. Assuming that this is the car 
bought by John, lt would be translated as X'PP(vl), and It Is red would 
translate as red'(vl). 
Definite, terms in Bartsch's system are also specific and-have 
the, same kind of_ translation as specific indefinite terms. In 
contrast, the translation of, every,. no,, any, and, non-specific a or. an 
does not cause the, introduction, of entity constants but rather of 
, 'blocked variables', which are eventually bound by quantifiers. 
to the present The following are Bartsch's rules, d' 
I 






li If ac PAD3 then (a) E PT/T' 
a 
RELT(a' ) 
: 2s If a-. E"-PT/T and--ß E-PT-then (a; - ß) E PT 
ß^a 
Translation: where ß' is of. the form XP[... P(v)... ] and a' 
is of the form RELT(Xx[y'(x)] ), then (ca,, Q) . 
. 
translates as XP[... y'(v) & P(v)... ] 
Janssen (1978: 221-223). has shown that Bartsch's reference.,, to the 
internal,, logical., forms of constituents is awkward at the. least. His 
alternative, is to let RELT(a') translate , as 
X PXQP{ý}Y(Q(Y) $ 
a'(y)]), and, let it. apply to the translation of the term it modifies. 
This, of course, is-,, entirely equivalent, to, Rodman's account, and 
Janssen concludes that their semantic approaches , are. 
the same. There 
is, nonetheless, a, subtle but, important difference in Bartsch's rule. 
By specifying.. that. translation of the non-restrictively modified 
term be of the form XP(... P(v)... ], Bartsch is specifying that the 
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term,,, must translate as the set of properties of an individual 
CONSTANT; Bartsch uses v as an individual constant, just like j, m, b 
and s (for John, Mary, Bill and Sue), as opposed to bindable 
variables such as xv y and z. Within . 
her theory, this . explains why 
terms with. the articles every,, any, no. and vacuous a can never. have 
non-restrictive modifiers--they. are, always,. translated with., variables 
and will never satisfy the,, semantic constraints, of Bartsch's Rule 2. 
In., addition, terms which translate as property sets of constants are 
the only ones which can be linked to anaphoric pronouns like he, she 
and it in subsequent sentences. The theory therefore predicts a 
strong; correspondence, between discourse anaphora and non-restrictive 
modification: all and, only, those terms which can be non-restrictively 
modified can support. subsequent anaphoric pronouns. This prediction 
appears to hold (see note 8). Consider the pairs in (59) and (60), 
where the (a) sentences involve a specific indefinite term and the 
(b) sentences involve a non-specific indefinite term. 
(59) a. John wants to marry Ia (s'pecific) Norwegians who1 
is very pretty). Shei is a blonde. 
b. John wants to marry a (any old)'Norwegiani *who 
is very pretty). *Shei"is a blonde. 
(60) a. A (specific) businessman,. -(, whom I met on the 
plane, ) was very aggressive. Hei offered me a job. 
b. A (any old) businessman] (, *whom. I 'met on 
the plane, ) should create new jobs. *He offered 
me a job. 
Despite these advantages, a few reservations about Rodman's solution 
carry over to Bartsch's. ' Though Bartsch does"not' link main clauses 
and parenthetical clauses with quantified variables (her specific 
terms are not translated with quantifiers at all), the two clauses 
still appear as logical conjuncts in translation. The parenthetical 
nature of non-restrictive modification is not reflected. In complex 
embedded constructions, non-restrictive assertions still tend to get 
buried in layers of semantic embedding instead of popping up to the 
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highest level as conjuncts. 
4.4.3 Opaque contexts 
Belief contexts. provide examples where both Rodman's and 
Bartsch's analyses fail dramatically. Let us temporarily adopt the 
belief analysis of PTQ, where believe-thet'is a verb of category IV/t. 
A revised analysis will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. Belief 
translates as a relation between an individual and a proposition, as 
in the following simplified example. 
(61) John believes that Mary runst 
JohnT believe that 
Mary 
runsIV 
belie ve-thatIV/t Ma runs 
MaryT univ 
(61') 1. MaryT XPP(m) 
2. runt => run' 
A 
3. Mary runst -> XPP(m)( run') 
4. run' (m) 
_ 
5. believe-thatIV/t believe-that' 
6. ''believe that Mary, runs IV 
^-> believe-that'(A[rün'(m)]) 
... 
76 JohnT -> XPP (j) 
8: =''John believes that Mary runst 
XPP(j)((believe-that'([run'(m)])]) 
9. believe-that' (A [run' (m) ]) (j) 
A 
10. believe-that'(j, [run'(m)]) 
When non-restrictive 'modifiers occur within the belief context, the 
analyses considered so 'far give the wrong readings. 'Consider the 
following example', where who 'Is pretty" non-restrictively characterises 
Mary. 
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(62) John believes that Mary, who is pretty, loves Billt 
John believes that Mary, who is-pretty, loves BillIV 
t believes that 1V t Mary, who 
is pretty, loves Bill 
Mary, who is 
prettyT 







(62') 1. love Bi11IV -> love'( XPP(b)) 
2. Mary, who is prettyT *>, XQ[Q(m) & pretty'(m)] 
By Rodman's Rule or Bartsch's Rule 
3. Mary, who is pretty, loves Billt -> 
XQ[Q(m) & pretty'(m)] (A[love'(AXPP(b))]) 
A 
4. love'( XPP(b))(m) & pretty'(m) 
S. love * (m, b) & pretty' (m ) 
6. believe-that1V/t ->, believe-that' . 
7, believe that Mary, who is pretty,. loves-BillIV 
believe-that'(([love*(m, b) & pretty'(m)]) 
8. JohnT XPP(j) 
9., John believes that Mary, who-is pretty, loves Billt 
1PP (j )([believe-that' (A [ love *(m, b) & pretty' (m) ]) ]) 
10. believe-that' (j ,A [love * (m, b) & pretty' (m) ]) 
-Thee resulting reading is equivalent to that for John, believes that 
Mary Is pretty, and that- Mary_ loves. 8111. Unfortunately'_ this- is not, a 
possible reading of (62); pretty'(m) is properly- analysed as an 
assertion of the speaker-rather than as. a belief of-John. of course, 
John may indeed believe that Mary is pretty, but that is, not what the 
sentence conveys. 
One's first reaction is to try a fancier analysis of belief 
sentences, employing the mechanism of quantifying-in to allow non- 
restrictively modified terms to be evaluated with wide scope. 
Something like the following will be necessary. 
(63) John believes that Mary, who is pretty, loves Billt 
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John believes that hel loves Billt 
believe-that'(j, [love*(xl, b)]) 
Mary, who is prettyT => XQ[pretty'(m) & Q(m)] 
By Rodman's Rule or Bartsch's Rule 
John believes that Mary, who is pretty, loves Billt 
1Q[pretty'(m) & Q(m)] 
(AaxI[believe-that'(j, [love*(xl, b)])]) 
pretty' (m) & J1x1 [believe-that' (j ,A [love *(xl, b)])] (m) 
We might paraphrase this reading as 'Marys is, pretty and John 
believes that she. loves Bill'. 
While this might appear to solve the problem, there are at least 
three reasons for not resorting to quantifying-in. First, the 
mechanism of quantifying-in is itself highly controversial. 'Second, 
wide scope do re readings should normally be contrasted` with narrow 
scope do dicto readings; but no, such reading is valid -in 162). 
Third,, this analysis forces a do re reading of some terms which are 
demonstrably do dicto. 
On the first point, work by Heny (1973: 232-234), Kasher & Gabbay 
(1976) and Shadbolt (1983) has seriously put in question the use of 
logical, 
_-. 
scope to account -for ambiguities : and the failure of, 
. substitution 
in opaque contexts. They claim that the notion of scope 
has been much over-loaded in logical notation, made to distinguish 
all kinds of readings that are really not connected with scope at 
all. When scope is called upon to explain opacity, specific/non- 
specific, de re/de ditto, and similar distinctions, the analyses lead 
to clashes and paradoxes. From another point of view, the syntactic 
mechanism of quantifying-in is a very powerful transformation, and 
some may want to avoid using it for that reason alone. Cooper 
(1975: 145-160) has argued persuasively that there is no syntactic 
evidence justifying so violent an operation as quantifying-in, and 
both he and Bartsch (1979: 26) have offered ways to do away with it 
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(see Chapter O note 4). 
on the second point, it is enough to note that there is no 
attractive way to exclude the analysis in (62) as ungrammatical. The 
reading represented in (621) is neither ill-formed nor incoherent--it 
is simply not a possible reading of the sentence it parallels. 
Appealing to quantifying-in is therefore a-simple act of desperation. 
Finally, I claim that one can non-restrictively modify terms 
which in PTQ would have to have narrow scope This should be 
impossible if non-restrictively modified terms must be quantified-in. 
Consider the following sentence. 
(64) Bill believes that a unicorn lives in his garden. 
When a unicorn in. (64), is given a de dicto (narrow _ scope) reading 
in 
PTQ, the speaker is. not committed to the real-world-existence of the 
unicorn--it is rather part of the belief of Bill 
that the unicorn 
exists. Roughly, 
(65) believe-that'(b, ý[Vx[unicorn'(x) & 
live-in-Bill's-garden'(x)]]) 
On the de re reading, however, the speaker is committed , to the 
real-world existence of the unicorn.. 
(66) Vx[unicorn'(x) & 
believe-that'(b, A[live-in-Bill's-garden'(x)])] 
If non-restrictive relative clauses force de re readings, then the 
following sentence, on its most natural reading, produces 
contradictions. 
(67) Bill believes that a, unicorn, which doesn't exist, 
-, 
lives in his garden. 
If a' unicorn, which doesn't exist is given wide scope ' by quantifying- 
in, then the speaker of the sentence is committed 
to the 
contradiction that Ia unicorn both does and does 
I not; exist. If the 
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term, is given 
contradiction. 
narrow scope, then Bill is committed to . 
the same 
The sentence,. however, , 
has as, its most natural 
reading a perfectly coherent proposition: that Bill believes that a 
particular unicorn exists and the speaker of the sentence does not 
believe that the unicorn exists. 
The PTQ use of wide scope for do re readings versus narrow scope 
for de dicto readings has been challenged by. Bennett, (1975: 49-69). 
In short, Bennett argues that a broad sense of existence must include 
things like unicorns and Greek gods; a wide scope existential 
quantifier must indicate this broader-*existence rather', than"real- 
world existence. In other words, quantifiers quantify over possible 
objects. '' This leaves the predicate exist' to indicate real-world 
existence. Such a "programme' is`actually laid out' by' Montague himself 
in his paper Pragmatics and Intensional logic 4(1970c: 120-124). Under 
these interpretations,, ' the wide scope reading in (68) is both 
coherent and intuitively reasonable. 
(68) Vx[unicorn'(x) & -iexist'(x) & 
believe-that'(b, A[lives-in Bill's-garden'(x)])] 
We might'read (68) 1 as 'there is a (possible)"entity such that it is a 
--unicorn. -and-it does not -'-'exist" (i. e. - it does =not have a counterpart 
in the present world) and Bill believes that it lives in his (Bill's) 
garden'. Unfortunately, this turns out to be' another case of 
quantifying-in out. of desperation. There is no satisfying,, way to 
rule out a narrow scope derivation, which yields the, impossible 
reading in (69). 
(69) believe-that'(b, "[Vx[unicorn'(x) & "]exist'(x) 
& lives-in-Bill's-garden'(x)]]) 
The formula in (69) is, of course, logically coherent. but it is. not, _a 
possible reading of (67). We must conclude, even, under, Bennett's 
interpretation, that 
.a 
term can be non-restrictively modified only if 
it is about to be quantified-in. To, enforce this constraint, it 
would be necessary, -to invoke a. global rule or 
to formally-. distinguish 
Beesley - 
10% Adjectives 
non-restrictively modified terms from unmodified ones, say, with a 
feature. Neither of these options is at all compelling. 
It may be objected that exist' is a troublesome predicate and may 
invalidate the argument used above. The same observations, however, 
hold for (70). 
(70) Billi believes that a unicorn, which hei calls 
Fred, lives in hiss garden. 
one- natural reading for (70) is the one where Bill believes that 
there is a unicorn which lives, in his garden but which says nothing 
about-the speaker having any such beliefs in unicorns. In a PTQ 
analysis, this, - requires narrow . scope . for a. unicorn, _ , 
which he calls 
Fred,. relative to believe... At the same, time, -the,, non-restrictive 
modifier which he calls Fred is an assertion, by the speaker.,, of. the 
sentence; this requires that the term have wide scope. Thus the-most 
natural reading, of, the sentence requires that the term a unicorn, 
which he calls Fred have both wide and narrow scope at the same time. 
Another possible problem with quantifying-in concerns example 
(57), repeated here, where a non-restrictive modifier applies to a 
term inside a relative clause. 
(57) The man who loves Mary, whö*is pretty, resigned. 
If Mary, who Is pretty is given wide scope, as would appear necessary 
to get a valid interpretation of the sentence, then we would be 
quantifying into a relative clause, a practice argued against by 
Rodman (1972). 15 
In summary, the Bartsch-Rodman analysis of non-restrictive 
modifiers. is inadequate on a number of points. First, non- 
restrictive , assertions are suspiciously translated as 
logical 
conjuncts of the main clause, even when. that clause is a command or a 
question. Second, the parenthetical flavour of non-restrictive 
assertions is not reflected in any way. And third, the analysis 
appears to force the use of quantifying-in, already suspicious, 'in 
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ways that are arbitrary and perhaps-. independently ruled. out.. I 
believe the problem, lies in the analysis of . non-restrictive 
modification-itself. 
4.5 A new approach to non-restrictive modification 
What follows is a defence of the 'subroutine' analysis of-, non- 
restrictive modification. Let us intuitively examine what happens 
during non-restrictive modification. While, a sentence,, is. being 
uttered, - certain terms are introduced and evaluated immediately. 
'Evaluation', in Bartsch 1979, would mean the assignment of an entity 
constant. In any case, the terms involved will be those which can be 
tied to anaphoric pronouns in later sentences. Once a term, say 
John, - is evaluated, a speaker can pause : in the stream of the main 
sentence, -=take a psychological step down to a new level, assert 
something parenthetical about the referent of the term, and then 
return to top level to continue the main sentence. This is 
represented diagrammatically in (71) to (73). 
(71) Top level: John, , loves Mary. 
-"=. Parenthetical s who is handsome- 
(72) -Top level: John, loves Mary, 
---- Parenthetical: who is pretty. 
(73) Top level: The boy who hates Mary, s _,. -, walks. 
Parenthetical: who is-ill 
The whos in (71) and (72) are coreferential with John and Mary 
respectively, but the who in (73) is potentially ambiguous between 
being coreferential with Mary or with the boy who hates Mary. It is 
even possible to have two or more parenthetical levels. 
ill. (74) John, is 
who took Mary, , to the dance 
who hates him 
The successive parenthetical levels point out the relation of non- 




is as if a speaker were putting the superordinate sentence on hold 
and calling a computer subroutine as he steps down to a parenthetical 
level. Subroutines may themselves call subroutines, subject to 
limitations of memory and attention. When the subroutines are 
finished, they pass control back up through successive levels to the 
top. Non-restrictive modification is therefore akin to more obvious 
interruptions as in (75) and (76). In these examples, it is even 
more plain that the superordinate sentence is put on temporary hold 
while the subroutine outputs a separate sentence. 
(75) John--he's very handsome-said that he would rather die 
than move to Slobovia. 
(76) Then I told Bill-he was the tallest one in the room--to 
put the box on the top shelf. 
The difference is that the digressions coded as non-restrictive 
modifiers are syntactically blended into the host sentence by way of 
relative pronouns. 
Two key semantic features of computer subroutines are (1) that 
they are finished as soon as control is passed back to the calling 
level, and (2) that they may have their own independent .. -'outputs'.., 
Within ' natural language, a subroutine view of non-restrictive 
modifiers would allow incidental assertions to be made in the course 
of uttering a superordinate sentence; these assertions would then be, 
added immediately on completion to the discourse pool. -, Control would,, 
then pass back up to the superordinate sentence (be it a question, 
command, hope, performative naming act or assertion),, whose semantic 
structure would continue to be built up as if the non-restrictive 
interruption had never occurred. This results in the translation of 
the superordinate sentence being-uncluttered, freed from trying to 
carry non-restrictive assertions to the top as conjuncts. It also, 
avoids any logical conjunction of - assertionswith other 
kinds of 
speech act. The following framework can accommodate these 
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Let us define the discourse pool to be the set of speech acts 
performed by speakers during a conversation. We shall be concerned 
only with assertions here. Assertions are normally added one by one 
to the discourse pool during the course of the conversation. Let us 
assume that a pragmatic, mechanism (i. e. one not explicit in 
linguistic or logical form) marks speech acts for speaker, time, 
place, etc. Only the speaker marking will be of interest in what 
follows. If John asserts 0, then we shall represent this entry to 
the discourse pool as the pair <John, 0>. 
Let XPP(xa) be the translation of anaphoric he, she or it. An 
individual constant is assigned to xa from the context; in non- 
restrictive modification, the assigned individual' will be 'that- one 
referred to by the modified term. The new subroutine rule for non- 
restrictive term modifiers is shown as R30. ' 
R30: If acP then (a) EP (PRED U ADJVL) T/T 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XP(vP); subroutine(XPP(xa)(ýa')) 
The translation in R30 would be read in the following way. First, 
AP("P) is the- translation of the non-restrictive modifier in the 
'calling' or superordinate sentence. Second, the clause 
subroutine(XPP(xa)(Aa, )) indicates that a 'subroutine call is made to 
evaluate the formula XPP(xa)(ýa, ). ' The semicolon, - inspired by 
similar syntax in computer programming languages, merely serves as a 
separator. The presence of the translation'of an 'anaphoric pronoun 
APP(X) in R30 reflects the close link between non-restrictive 
modification and discourse anaphora (and sentences like (75) and 
(76)). Within the calling program, the translation )P(vP) ensures 
that the effect of the non-restrictive modification is nil; the 
original translation of the modified term is preserved. Compare the 
effect of the new analysis in (77) with the old one in (47). 
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(77) ((JohnT, (((hell, (beIV/PRED, handsome ADJ)IV, 
R2}t, Rd REL, R28)T/T, R30)T, R29' swimlV)t, R1 
Realisation: John, who is handsome, swims. 
Translations 
1. JohnT XPP(j) Proper name 
2. ((hel, (be, handsome))) REL 
Xxl[handsome'(xl)] -See previous examples 
3. (((he,, (be, handsome))))r/T 
XP(vP); subroutine( XPP(xa)( Xx1[handsome'(x1)] )) 
From 2 by R30 
Si. XPP(xa)( Xxi(handsome'(xl)]) 
S2. handsome'(x )a Lambda conversion 
S3. handsome'(j) Anaphoric resolution 
S4. Return 
4. (John, (((hel, (be, handsome)))))r 
AP(VP) (w1PP(j)) From 1,3 by R29 
5. XPP(j) Lambda conversion. 
6. swim1V = swim' Basic 
w 
7. ((John, (((he,, (be, handsome))))), swim) XPP(j) ( swim' 
From 5,6 by Rl 
8. swim' (j) . Lambda conversion 
In (77), step 3 illustrates the new translation for non-restrictive 
modifiers. This translation interrupts the main sentence` with a 
subroutine call, which is shown in steps S1 to S4. The subroutine 
then returns control to the calling sentence, `, which continues ' as if 
the subroutine interruption- had never occurred. Step S3 shows the 
resolution of the anaphoric pronoun linking the non-restrictive 
clause to the main clause. The assertion handsome'(j) is added to 
the discourse pool immediately-on completion, just like swim'(j). --If 
sentence (77) . were uttered by Bill, then the state of the 
discourse 
pool, would -, be as in-(78). 
(78) Discourse pool: - <Bill, handsome' (j )). - 
<Bill, swim'(j)i 
In short, the effect of uttering (77) is to add two assertions to the 
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discourse pool, 
sentences. .. 
much -as,, if - the - speaker had uttered two separate 
This way of doing things has two immediate advantages. First, 
it better captures the parenthetical nature of- non-restrictive 
assertions. Sentences-like that in S3 could, if necessary, be marked 
somehow as less prominent than sentences entering the discourse pool 
in the normal way. 
3.. 6Second, 
the assertion expressed by the non- 
restrictive modifier does not encumber the translation of. the rest of 
the sentence. This not only makes the listing of derivations much 
easier, but it reflects the intuition that any appropriate term, no 
matter how deeply embedded in structure, can be non-restrictively 
modified without difficulty. The speaker can, at almost any point, 
step temporarily into another dimension (i. e. pass control to a 
subroutine), deliver a pithy assertion, and return with no damage 
done. Of course, multiply embedded and long digressions will tax the 
human 
memory severely. 
Note that non-restrictive. assertions are no longer. translated as 
logical conjuncts of the main clause--they are separate speech acts 
smuggled into the stream of a.. host sentence, and their translations 
are added-to the discourse pool separately. The formulation of non- 
_:... sestrictiveFcore ference in terms of discourse anaphora reflects 
the 
separateness of the speech acts involved and is consistent with the 
fact that all and only those terms which can be antecedents of 
anaphoric pronouns in discourse can be-non-restrictively modified. A 
sentence like (. 77) is, therefore, not a stylistic variation of a 
conjunction but rather a way of performing two separate. speech acts 
at the same time,, one slipped in as a subroutine of the other. The 
two resulting assertions are only conjoined in the weak sense-that 
any two, consecutive, (and compatible) assertions in a person's 
discourse. might be said to be-, conjoined. This-avoids the problem of 
translating non-restrictive modifiers within questions and.. commands: 
as the calling question or. command . enters the discourse pool 
separately from any non-restrictive assertions,, there is no problem 
of trying to logically conjoin questions (or commands) with 
assertions. There is certainly no question of quantifying over such 
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conjunctions, as in the Rodman analysis, for here the coreference is 
represented anaphorically. 
It is interesting to note that a number of previous observers 
have resorted to pronouns when paraphrasing sentences containing 
non-restrictive modifiers. For instance, Cresswell '(1973: 158-159) 
suggests that who in a non-restrictive relative clause is derived 
from and he. We shall see in later chapters that anaphoric pronouns 
have been similarly employed in handling non-restrictive modifiers at 
higher levels. 
The new solution avoids the old conjunction problems, matches 
intuitions about processing and allows simpler derivations. The 
biggest payoff, however, is in giving correct readings for non- 
restrictive modifiers which are'-deeply embedded and for those in 
opaque contexts, with no recourse to a quantifying-in transformation. 
Example (79)'is the reanalysis of example (57), which fails, under-the 
Rodman-Bartsch type of analysis. As before, the non-restrictive 
modifier who Is ' pretty is read as applying to the term' Mary. 




prettyAýJ)IV, R2}t, Rl)REL, R28}T/T, 
R30}T, R29}IV, R3}t, R1}REL, 
R28)CN/2CN, R12)CN, R13}T, R4' resign1V}t, Rl 
Realisation: The man who loves Mary, who is pretty, resigned. 
Translation: 
1. MaryT 'AQQ(m) Proper name 
2. ((he2, (be, pretty))), -" Xx2[pretty'(x2) 
See previous' examples 
3. (((he2, (be, pretty))})T/T 
XP(vP); subroutine(XPP(xa) (%x2[pretty'(x2)]))"" 
From 2 by R30 
S1. XPP (xa} ( xx2 [pretty' (x2)1) 
S2. - pretty'(x2) Lambda conversion 




















S3. -pretty'(m) Anaphoric resolution 
S4. Return 
-4 , (be, pretty))))} (Mary, (((he xP(VP)'(XQQ(m))- T 2 
From 1, -3 by R29 
AQ[Q(m) ] Lambda"conversion 
loveTV love' Basic 
(love, (Mary, (((he2, (be, pretty))) )))1, '> 
love'( XQQ(m)) From 5,6 by R3 
hel '' XPP(x1) Pronoun 
, (love, (Mary, (((he , (be, pre (he tty)))))))t 01110 l 2 
XPP(xl} (ý(love'(XQQ(m))]) From 7,8 by R1 
love'(*XQQ(m))(xl) Lambda conversion 
, m) love*(x First-order reduction 1 
, (be, pretty))))}))) ((he' ` (love, (Mary, (((he 2 REL 
XxI(love*(x1, m)] From 11 by R28 
(((he,, (love, (Mary, (((he2, (be, pretty))))))}}}CN/2CN 
XPXy[P(y) & Xx1[love*(xl, m)] (y)] From 12 by R12 
XPXy[P(y) & love*(y, m)] Lambda 'conversion 
manCN '4 man' Basic 
(man, (((he,, (love, (Mary, 
, (be, pretty)))))))))) (((he 2 CN 
XpXy[P(y) & -love *(y, m)] ( man') Fromm 14,715 by R13 
Xy(man' (y) & love *(y, m)]- Lambda -conversion 
theDET 4 XPXQVx[Az[P(z) H z-x] & Q(x) 
Basic 
(the, '(man, (((hel, '(love, (Mary, '- 
(((he2, '(be, pretty)}})}})))}}T 
XPXQVx[Az[P(z) <-> z-x] & Q(x}] 
('*xy[man'(y) &' love*(y, ' m)]) From 17,18 by R4 
XQVx[Az[Xy[man'(y) & lovex(y, T-'m)] (z) H z-x]'& Q(x}] 
Lambda conversion 
XQVx[Az[(man'(z) & love*(z, m)) H z-x] & Q(x}] 
Lambda conversion, 
22. resignIV " resign Basic 
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23. ((the, (man, (((hel, (love, (Mary, 
(((he2, (be, pretty))))))))))), resign}T ->, 
XQVx[Az[ (man' (z) & love; t(z, m)) 
H,, z-x] w&Q 
(x) ]( resign') 
From 21,22 by Rl 
24. Vx[Az[(man'(z) & love'(z, m)) H z=x] & resign'(x)] 
Lambda conversion 
If Bill utters sentence (79), then the state of the discourse pool 
will be as in (80). 
(80) Discourse, pool: 
Q 
<Bill, , pretty' 
(m )> 
, 
<Bill, Vx[Az[(man'(z) & 
love' (zm)) H z-x] & resign' (x) ]> 
Similarly, non-restrictive modifiers in opaque contexts no longer 
cause difficulties. If Sue utters (81), the state of the discourse 
pool, will be as in, (82); compare this to (63'). 
(81) John believes that Mary, who is pretty, loves Bill. 
(82) Discourse pools <Sue, pretty'(m)) 
<Sue, 'believe-that'(j, A[love; (m, b)])> 
A direct effect- Of '' this'" analysis is Ito assign " 'all' non= 
restrictive assertions to the speaker of the superordinate sentence. 
I shall argue that this is fundamentally correct and that exceptions 
can be explained within an overall strategy for assigning 
responsibility for 'utterances. Consider the following exchange 
between John and Bill. 
eýý_-ý-ý",. -ýt-... 
ý., at,. ̂  -ý ., 
(83) John: Mary, who is pretty, loves Roger. " --"I I- Ii 
(84)" Billi I don't believe that Mary, who is pretty, loves Roger. 
According to the present theory,, John's statement in_(83) conveys two 
assertions: (1) that Mary loves Roger and (2) that Mary is pretty. 
As John is the speaker, both assertiöns'are his`own. Although Bill's 
response, on the surface, may appear to be a denial of all that John 
has asserted, it is really a denial of "only half ý of it, namely 'the 
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proposition that Mary loves Roger. In (84) Bill actually asserts 
that Mary is pretty just as John does in (83). For Bill to counter 
both'of John's assertions, something like (85) is needed. 
(85) I don't believe that Mary is pretty and that Mary loves Roger. 
The effect is"perhaps more easily demonstrated with simple negation. 
If John utters (83), then Bill's response (84a) denies that Mary 
loves Roger but not that Mary is pretty. 
(84a) It is not the case that Mary, who is pretty, loves Roger. 
If, as in the Rodman-Bartsch analysis, (83) translated as the 
conjunction in (83'), then (84a) would translate incorrectly as 
(84a' ). 
I 
(83') pretty'(m) & love*(m, r) 
(84a') 1(pretty'(m) & love z(m, r)) 
Parallel problems will arise with necessarily, it must be the case that, 
and other modal adverbials such as it ought to be the case that. The 
present subroutine analysis, which views the non-restrictive modifier 
as a-separate_isolated speech act, faces none of these problems. The 
correct translation(s) in (84a") falls out automatically. 
(84a'' ) a. pretty' (m ) 
b. -11ove*(m, r) 
Examples like (86) are especially clear cases where the embedded 
non-restrictive assertion belongs to the speaker rather than to the 
believer mentioned in the sentence. II .-I 
(86) The judge believes that Smuthers, who is guilty, is innocent. 
The claims that non-restrictive assertions are always analysed as 
having 'highest scope' and that they are always assigned to the 
speaker of. the sentence have, however, -been disputed.,, Hach°(1968: 95) 
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claims that the following example is ambiguous with Was. 
(87) I dreamt that Rebecca, who is a friend of mine 
Was 
from college, was on the phone. 
Bach appears to claim that who Is a friend of. mine, and one, reading " of 
who was a friend of mine imply real-world existence of Rebecca, 
requiring the non-restrictive assertion to appear outside the scope 
of dream as, in (88). . The other reading with, was is apparentlyto be 
analysed as (89), where: the non-restrictive clause is within the 
scope of dream, making Rebecca a dream entity only. 
(88) (I dreamt that Rebecca was/is on the phone) and 
(Rebecca was/is a friend (if mine from'college) 
(89) I dream ((Rebecca was a friend of mine from college) and 
_. - . (Rebecca was on the phone)) 
However, the use of naming expressions in transparent contexts, e. g. 
outside the scope of believe, wish, dream, etc., does not necessarily 
imply real-world existence. Hamlet, Santa Claus, they Cyclops 
Polyphemus, Puff the Magic Dragon and any other fictional characters 
exist in-a-broad, sense-, and-. itmakes sense, to, talk, about them.,. I , may 
therefore utter (90) expressing an independent assertion about a 
dream entity Rebecca just-as I.. can-, say,. (91) to express an assertion 
about the fictional entity , Hamlet. 
(90) Rebecca was a friend of mine from college. 
(91) Hamlet was indecisive. - 
Present, tense: is not necessarily, more like, to convey real-world 
existence as (92); shows. ý 
(92) I often dream that Rebecca, who is a friend of mine 
from college, is constantly on the phone. 
I therefore claim that (92) is properly analysed with a separate 
parenthetical non-restrictive assertion as in (92'). The question of 
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the, real-world existence of Rebecca cannot be tied to syntactic 
scope. 
(92') a. I often dream that Rebecca is constantly on the phone. 
b. Rebecca is a friend of mine from college. 
A similar example was suggested to me by Barry Richards, who has 
a young son named Thomas. 
(93) Thomas believes that, santa Claus, -who has a, white beard, -- 
drives an eight-reindeer sleigh. 
one's first reaction is to seek a translation something like (93'). 
(93') Thomas believes ((Santa Claus has a white beard) and 
(Santa Claus drives an eight-reindeer sleigh)) 
My analysis would produce two assertions as in (9311 ), with the 
second belonging to-the speaker of the sentence. 
(93") a. Thomas believes Santa drives an eight-reindeer sleigh. 
b. Santa Claus has a white beard. 
The basic argument'for"(93') is that the proposition that, Santa Claus 
has a' white beard is probably part of the belief of ; Thomas rather 
than part of the belief of the speaker. However, it is perfectly 
possible for an informed adult to'utter (94) without`-any commitment 
to Santa Claus's real existence. 
(94) Santa Claus has a white beard. 
a ,. 
In fact, any charitable interpretation of an adult uttering (94) will 
take him to be stating something about an'entity which exists only in 
a fictional world, or in this case, in Thomas's belief world. An 
interesting development of just such a treatment of 'opacity' appears 
ry_, 
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in Sbadbolt 1983. 
Thompson (1971: 86-87) also provides some examples which she 
claims are ambiguous for responsibility. 
(95) Harold says that his girlfriend, who is a little bit crazy, 
wants to go to Hanoi. 
(96) The claims agent said that the paint job, which should have 
been done long ago, would cost $150. 
She claims-that the ambiguities can be cleared up with added clauses 
as in the following: 
.:, (97) . 
Harold says that his girlfriend, .. who 





think she's too rational to, try 
(9e, ) The claims agent said that the paint 
been done. long ago, would cost, $150, 
. that now is when it should be done. 
is a little bit crazy, 
it. 
job, which should have 
but. he. odoesn'. 
t . 
know 
one problem with these observations is that both involve the verb 
say, which , may . 
tend to- become quotational. Quotation involves a 
change of speaker for the, purposes,. of assigning responsibility- for 
assertions. In a sentence like (99), the non-restrictive assertion 
is rightly assigned to Harold,, who is the person being quoted. 
(99) Harold said, 'My, girlfriend,, 
ywho 
is, a little bit crazy, 
wants to go . 
to Hanoi',. 
While something of. the quotationalpower of say impinges on. (95I 
maintain that strictly speaking, the, non-restrictive assertion, is 
correctly assigned not to Harold, but tothe speaker., of, the-sentence.. 
17 For me (97) is, 
_strictly 
speaking, contradictory. 
A- final- consideration `ssupporting my 'claims "is that there are 
recognised and general ways by which a speaker can avoid being held 
responsible for any descriptions or assertions` he ostensibly makes. 
The first type is trivial, and merely illustrates the speaker making 
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an assertion that someone 'else is responsible' for the contained 
description or assertion. 
(100) Nixon, who claims that he is not aacrook, 
Jaccording to X 
X says/claims/believes 
supposedly 
we are meant to believe 
we are told 
had to be'jpardoned. "' 
(101) Thomas said that Santa Claus, who hei, believes wears, a 
white beard, drives an eight-reindeer sleigh. 
These 'kinds of non-restrictive assertion are of course correctly 
assigned to the speaker, but they consist of assertions about the 
claims and`beliefs of other parties or contain hedges separating the 
speaker from responsibility for the claims-, For" instance, the non- 
restrictive assertion}in (101) is roughly 'he'(Thomas) believes that 
Santa Claus wears a white beard', and it is assigned correctly to the 
speaker of the sentence. 
A much more subtle technique for escaping responsibility for the 
truth of a non-restrictive assertion is to deliver it facetiously, 
insincerely or quotationally. A quotational tone of voice can make a 
big difference between (102) and (103). 
(102) Nixon, who is not`a crook, was pardoned., - 
(103) Nixon, 'who is not a crook', was pardoned. 
Given a straight reading, (102) commits the speaker to the belief 
that Nixon is `not -a crook. ' (103 ) 'on' the' other hand, " illustrates' -1a 
quotational delivery, 4and the speaker may even try to imitate Nixon's 
own voice and delivery over the quoted section. In effect, the use 
of Nixon's voice to deliver an- assertion A 'is' the same as saying 
'Nixon says A". In general, a facetious, affected or otherwise 
abnormal delivery can simply, signal that the speaker does not intend 
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to be held personally responsible for what he is saying. 
This mechanism shows up in a number of non-restrictive 
constructions. If Algernon, is- in the habit of referring to his 
(unique) spouse as 'my beautiful wife!,, his associates might secretly 
whisper (104). 
(104) Algernon's 'beautiful' wife is rather plain.. P 
similarly, a speaker can use someone else's referring description of 
an entity while not believing it himself. This is most helpfully 
signalled quotationally, but examples can be very subtle. Unmarked 
quotational descriptions can be used for comic effect as-in the pig, 
referring to a man, 'in (106). 
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(105) a. The judge condemned 'the murderer' to-20-years. 
b: Then 'a pervert' came along and asked for money., 
(106) The other man was lying on the stone floor, covered- 
with a coarse brown coat. 
"Get up, pig! ""growled the first. "Don't sleep when I 
am hungry. " 
"It's all one, master, " said the pig, in a submissive 
-- -= manner, and not without cheerfulness; "I can wake when 
I will, I can sleep when I will. It's all the same. " 
(Dickens, Little Dorrit) 
Similar examples occur with, non-restrictive modifiers at the 
proposition and property levels; - they will be discussed in later 
chapters. 
Again the referring descriptions can actually be ascribed 
overtly to someone else. 
(107) The judge condemned the man whom X calls a 
murderer to 20 years. 
Just as the X in (107) could be anybody, the quoted descriptions in 
(105) could presumably 'belong to, almost anyone. 
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The use of facetious, insincere, ironic and quotational delivery 
is not limited to non-restrictive assertions but rather is a general 
way to avoid responsibility for any apparent assertion. I might, on 
some occasion, utter (108), but I would do so in such a way that no 
one would take 'me seriously. I would not really be asserting 
anything. 
(108) Hitler was ä splendid chap. } 
In conclusion, the new theory of - non-restrictive - modification is an 
improvement on the - Rodman-Bartsch., analysis., - Old., problems 
in 
conjunction and ., quantification are . -avoided, and 
arbitrary 
quantifying-in- is eschewed.. Derivations are, -simplified, - and 
the 
parenthetical nature of non-restrictive modifiers is,. mirrored in 
their subroutine derivations. Generally, any non-restrictive 
assertions are assigned to the speaker, and any apparent exceptions 
to this are explained by quotation and other pragmatic means for 




Armed with analyses of' restrictive and non-restrictive 
modification, we can now look at some appositive constructions. 
Delacruz (1976) offers an analysis for MG, but his rules and data are 
limited td only one variety of restrictive appositive. Chierchia 
(19821342,345,347) also offers a single appositive rule, but he 
seems to have in mind only one variety of non-restrictive appositive. 
I shall examine both solutions and attempt: to expand the fragment. 
Appositives present a thorny problem for any linguistic theory, and 
the following treatment cannot be exhaustive. The subject properly 
deserves a whole thesis. 
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4.6.1 A review of appositive varieties 
Traditional grammarians have identified a bewildering wealth of 
constructions as appositives. Quirk et al. 1972: 620ff list a range 
of examples, some of which, the 'weak' appositives, involve 
constituents of higher type 
.. 
and will be treated in later chapters. 
of individual-level examples, the following varieties are widely 
recognised and appear amenable to a MG analysis. 
(109) a. The boy Bob runs. proper name, restrictive 
b. My friend Peter walks. 
(110) John, the plumber resigned. definite, restrictive 
(111) a. John,,, the plumber, resigned. definite, non-restrictive 
b. The boss, the woman l love, fired me. 
(112) a. That crook Nixon got off easy. definite, epithetical, 
non-restrictive 
b. The traitor Philby escaped. 
c. My friend Peter cheats. 
Care must betaken to_distinguish proper name, restrictive appositive 
readings as in (109) from the epithetical non-restrictive 
appositives _In--(112-)_because-the-superficial strings-are-ambiguous. - 
Whereas appositive constructions are traditionally taken to be 
paired, with each half called, an appositive, this terminology is not 
helpful in the present grammar. Instead, I shall use 'appositive' to 
designate only, the modifying constituents, which are italicised in 
the examples above. A traditional, variety of appositive which is not 
considered an appositive, at all for the present purposes is shown in 
(113); Quirk et al. call these ' attribution' appositives. These have 
already been handled above as non-restrictive PREDs and ADJVLs. 
(113) a. John, a plumber,. resigned. 
b. John, tired of running, stopped. 
C., Mary, out, of breath, fainted. 
d. The general, very angry, ordered a retreat. 
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I shall proceed to examine the remaining, examples by variety. 
4.6.1.1 Proper name, restrictive appositives 
Delacruz's (1976: 187,191) rule for appositives generates and 
interprets only proper name, restrictive appositives such as the boy 
John in (109a). The intended reading for this string is the one 
where John restrictively pins down which boy is intended. His rule 
19 is as follows (with Bennett's simplification added). 
(114) If aE BT and QE BCN then 
F21(a, ß) E PT provided that whenever 
a° is of the form he, F21(a, ß) - a; 
otherwise F- '(a, Q) - the -ßa. ' 21 
(114') If'aE BT and }ßE BCN and a, j8-,, 
translate into a', ß, respectively, then F21(a, ' ß) 
translates into a' if a is of the form hen; 
otherwise F21 (a, /3) translates into 
XPVy[Ax[(Q'(x) & XPXzP(%x1(z=x1])(Aa')(x)) H x-y] & P(y)] 
Delacruz's rule, limited as it is to basic CNs and basic, non-indexed 
variable, Ts (i. e. proper names),. can only-produce examples -like 
(115) .-.. 
(115) F21(horseCN, Canonero-T )_ the horse CanoneroT 
Semantically, the name Canonero functions centrally to specify just 
which 'horse `. is being referred to; it is, - in essence, a restrictive 
modifier on -horse. Looked at in this light, 7 the translation in 
(114')- becomes more, 'comprehensible. ' The original translation of 
(115), shown ý in (116), 'contains '. 1 PX zP (%x1 [ z-xi ]), which 'is- simply 
the-translation of the be of identity. A simplified version of. the 
translation for the horse Canonero is " shown in (117). 
(116) XPVy[Ax[(horse'(x) & XPXzP(Alxi[z1x11) 
( XPP(c) )(x)) H x«y] & P{y)] 
(117) XPVy[Ax[(horse '(x) & be'(AXPP(c))(x)) H x-y] & P(y}] 
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The translations t, , in., (116), and (117) also have a definite article 
translation XQXPVy[Ax[Q(x) ,, <-> x--y] & P(y)] built into them; if 
that is factored out we get (118). 
(ýý8) Xz[horse'(z) & be'(ý), PP(c))(z)] 
This is an example of' the classic conjunction analysis for, aý 
restrictive modifier. -"It"-isas if the horse Canonero were `translated 
as the [horse such that it is Canonero]'. The be of identity 
effectively 'demotes' the term Canonero into an IV be Canonero, the 
translation of which"is intersected with the set of horses. ' 
It is quite possible, as Delacruz (1976: 191) himself realises, 
to generate, a- CN of - the forms horse Canonero and then-, allow the, 
definite article to map this CN into the term the horse Canonero in 
the usual way. A rule like the following would be needed. 
(119) If aC BT and ße Pte, ' then. 
FX( (x, ß) E PCN, where FX(a, ß) -ßa. 
Translation: Xx[ß'(x) & XPXyP( Xz[y=z])(ýa' )(x)] 
While formally-neater, this solution has the apparent disadvantage of 
allowing a and every to apply to the resulting CN. 
(120) a. every horse Canonero 
b. a river Thames 
These terms-are semantically coherent but-syntactically-odd, at least 
with the intended reading. To ensure the presence of the, definite 
article, Delacruz hard-wires it into the syntax 'and, semantic-rules. 
This` illustrates the problems, of -idiosyncrasy which bedevil any 
formal analysis of appositives. One must constantly choose between 
limiting the rules to exclude examples as in (120) or generalising 
them to generate apparently related terms as in (121). 
.ý. 
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(121) a. That horse Canonero 
b. This river Thames 
c. My horse Canonero 
To emphasise the similarity between these appositives and other forms 
of restrictive modification I shall pursue, -. the course of 
generalisation. 
20 The following rule allows one to build up the term 
the boy Bob much as the grammar. already generates the red barn. 
R31. If aE BT then (a) E PCN/2CN 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPXx[P{x) &X PXyP{"Xz[y=z])("a')(x)] 
Examples are quite straightforwardly analysed in this way, but the 
rule overgenerates. 
(122) ((theDET'.. (horseCN, (CanoneroT)CN, 2CN, 
R31)CN, R13)T, R4' run1V), t, Rl 
Realisation: The horse Canonero runs. 
Translation: 
1. CanoneroT APP{c) Proper name 
2. (Canonero)CN, 2CN 
XPXx[P(x) &__XPXyP{Xz[y=z])(XPP(C))(X)] 
From 1 by R31 
3.1Pax[P(x) & x-c] Lambda conversion 
4. horseCN horse' Basic 
5. (horse, (Canonero)}CN XPXX[P(x) & X-C](" horse') 
From 3,4 by R13 
6. Ax[horse'(x) & x=c] Lambda conversion 
7. theDET XPXQVy[Az[P(z) E4 z'y]& Q(y)] 
Basic 
e. (the, (horse, (Canonero)))-A 
T, 
... XPXQVy[Az[P(z) -> z-y]& Q(y)J Ax[horse'(x) & x-c]) 
From 6,7 by R4 
9. XQVy[Az[(horse '(z) & z'c) H z=y] & Q(y)] 
Lambda conversion 
10. runIV =ý run' Basic 
Beesley -127- Adjectives 
11. ((the, (horse, (Canonero))), run}t 
XQVy[Az[(horse '(z) & z-c) z-y]& Q(y)]( run') -- 
From 9,10 by R1 , 
12. Vy[Az[(horse'(z) & z=c) H z-y]& run'(y)] 
Lambda conversion 
4.6.1.2 Definite, restrictive appositives. 
Definite, restrictive appositives feature a definite term acting 
as a restrictive modifier on a proper name as in (110), reprinted 
here for convenience. 
ý_ ý_, . 
(110) , John the plumber resigned. 
The plumber specifies which John, of the set of people named 'John', 
resigned. John the plumber is, for instance, a different person from 
John the butcher. While such obviously restrictive constructions have 
much in common with examples like the horse Canonero, the differences 
are significant. First, the most obvious paraphrase of sentences 
like (110) would appear to be 'the unique John such that he is the 
plumber resigned'. Equally good or better, however, despite the 
definite article in (110) is the paraphrase the unique John such 
that he is a plumber resigned' (see, e. g. McKinnon 1979: 47-56, -, 75-77, 
140). Second, whichever, analysis is . chosen, the PTQ analysis of 
proper names is inadequate. Montague's simple fragment assumes the 
uniqueness of proper names in the model. In the real world, however, 
we have whole sets of Johns, Nigels, Sams, etc. and appositives are 
just one way of narrowing down the choices. It becomes obvious that 
John must be treated basically as a special kind of common noun-it 
denotes that set of individuals called 'John'. Any proper name 
t-a 
referring expression like John must therefore be translated as a 
disguised definite description, as if it bore the definite article: 
the John. For a similar conclusion from slightly different points of 
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view, see Barwise &. Cooper (1981: 174) and Seppanen (1971: 322-326). 
There are at least two syntactic arguments for this treatment. 
First, there are certain constructions even in English where 
determiners mark proper names. : 'i" 
(123) The Nigel whom I know is blond. 
(124)""The Smiths have invited us to dinner. 
(125) Are' you the Noam Chomsky? 
(126) Every Nigel in Scotland attended the Nigel Conference. 
(127) The blond Nigel came in yesterday. 
Any complete fragment must therefore, be able to generate definite and 
quantified proper names. ` Second, other-languages provide-support for 
the idea that the bare proper names in English might carry a 
suppressed definite article. Arnauld & Lancelot (1660: 91) cite Greek 
and Italian as 
, 
languages which occasionally mark proper names with 
the definite article; Barwise & Cooper (1981: 174) similarly cite 
German, and Spanish. The practice is even more common in Portuguese. 
Most interesting in this regard are the Iberian languages Gallego and 
Catalan, where such marking is actually'required, even for vocatives. 
A Catalan speaker calling Mary must yell La Marls! 
Let us tentatively assign proper names to the category t/7e, 
abbreviated PROP, and specify that any PROP can operate as a common 
noun. 
R32. If aC PPROP then (a) E PCN. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: ä'` 
Proper names cannot simply be assigned to CN, except perhaps in a 
language like Catalan, because of their idiosyncratic syntax. For 
instance, the simple PROP Fred could be convertible into a term 
without an explicit. article. R33 achieves this. 
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R33. If aE PPROP then (a) E PT 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPVy[Ax[at'(x) H x-y] & P(y)] 
0., 
However, R33 will not constrain determiners from applying to Fred 
just as they apply to man. The following change to R4 is necessary. 
R4. If aE PDET and QE PCN then (a, Q) E PT 
Realisation: (yDET' (BPROP)CN)T >b 
else a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( 13') 
This rule forms terms in the usual way but suppresses the realisation 
of the definite article with simple CNS derived, without 
modification, from proper nouns. 
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Let us- compare the difference between the old and the new 
analysis for examples like (128). 
(128) Nigel sings. 
With the former analysis of Nigel as XPP(n), the syntactic structure 
is (129) and the translation (129'). 
(129) (NigelT? singly) 
(129') sing'(n) 
With a full 'definite' analysis, the derivation is shown in (130). A 
simpler derivation using R33 is also possible. 
,. 
(130) ((theDET' (Nigel 
PROP 
)CN, 
R32)T, R4' singIV)t, RI 
Realisation: Nigel sings. 
Translation: 
1. , NigelT -* Nigel, Basic 
2. (Nigel) 
CN 
Nigel' From 1 by R32 
3. theDET XPXQVy[Ax[P(x] H x-y]& Q(y)] 
Basic 
Beesley -130- Adjectives 
4, " (the, (Nigel))T . XP XQVy[Ax[P(x) H x-y]& Q(y)] (, Nigel') 
From 2,3 by R4 
5. XQVy[Ax[Nigel'(x) H x-y] & Q(y)] Lambda conversion 
6. sing =_> sing' Basic 
7. ((the, (Nigel)), sing}t 
XQVy[Ax[Nigel'(x) H x-y] & Q(y)] (sing') 
From 5,6 by R1 
8. Vy[Ax[Nigel'(x) H x-y] & singl(y)] Lambda conversion 
In short, (130) reads roughly that 'there is a unique individual 
named Nigel and he sings'. The definite analysis thus translates 
proper names as basic predicates of individuals, and a derived term 
like Nigel denotes different, people in different situations, just as 
the man does. 
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The PTQ analysis, besides being inadequate to 
account for constructions like the Nigel such that / know him, could 
only be expanded by treating John, 'Mary, Bill, Sue, etc. as thousands 
of ways ambiguous. 
The treatment of proper names as predicates allows restrictive 
relative clauses modifying proper names to be handled quite easily. 
(131) (theDET' ((NigelpROP)CN, 
R32'- 
_ 1T IV t, Rl REL, 
R28CN/2CN, - R12 CN, R13 T, R4 
Realisation: the Nigel who sings 
Translation: XQVz[Ax[(Nigel '(x) & sing'(x)) H x-z] & Q(Z)] 
It is only a very small step to restrictive appositives. Taking the 
view that Nigel the butcher is to be paraphrased as the unique Nigel 
such that he is a butcher', the following rules are needed. 
R34. If aE PCN then (the, a) E PPROP/PROP' 
ý,; - Realisation:, the ^a 
Translation: XPXy[P(y) & a'(y)] 
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R35. If aE PPROP%PROP and ße BPROP then (a, ß) E PPROP* 
Realisation: ß^a 
4 Translation: a( ß") 
These rules are used to generate and, translate. examples like Nigel 
23 the butcher. 
(132) (theDET' ((NigelPROP9 (the, butcherCN)PROP/PROP, 
R34)PROP, R35)CN, R32}T, R4 
Realisation: Nigel-the butcher 
Translation: 
1. butcherCN -> butcher' Basic 
2. (the, butcher) 
PROP/PROP => 
XPXy[P(y) & butcher'(y)] 
From 1 by R34 
3. NigelPROP Nigel' Basic 
4. (Nigel, (the, butcher)) 
PROP 
XPly[P(y) & butcher'(y)] ( Nigel') From 2,3 by R35 
5. Xy[Nigel'(y) & butcher'(y)] Lambda conversion 
6. theDET = XPXQVz[Ax[P(x) E-> x-z] & Q(z)] 
Basic 
7. (the, (Nigel, _(the, 
butcher)})T -> 1PXQVz[Ax[P(x} E-ý 
x-z] & Q(z)] ( Xy[Nigel'(y) & butcher'(y)]) 
From 5,6 by R4 
8. XQVz[Ax[(Nigel '(x) & butcher'(x)) H x-z] & Q(z)] 
Lambda conversion 
Although proper-name terms must in the end be treated as definite 
expressions, the Russellian translation makes examples just that, much 
harder to list and read. The PTQ convention is quite adequate for 
most cases and-will be used whenever possible in succeeding examples, 
purely for the sake of simplicity. 
4.6.1.3 Definite, non-restrictive appositives 
Definite, non-restrictive appositives, as in (111), feature a 
definite term modifying another specific term. 
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(111) a. John, the plumber, resigned. 
b. The boss, the woman I love, fired me. 
In (lila ), for instance, the plumber provides an incidental 
characterisation, perhaps an alternate naming expression, for John. 
R36 makes non-restrictive term modifiers out of terms. 
R36. If ac PT then (a) E PT/T* 
Realisation: a 
Translation: A P(4P); 
subroutine(XPP(xa)(A[XQXyIQ(^Xzl[yI-zl])(Aa' )] )) 
For simplicity, example (133) uses the PTQ translation of John. 
(133) ((JohnT, ((theDET' plumberCN}T, 
R4)T/T, R36)T, R29' resignIV)t, R1 
Realisation: John, the plumber, resigned. 
Translation: 
1. JohnT > 1PP(j} Proper name 
2. (the, plumber)T XPVy[Ax[plumber'(x) H x-y] & P(y)] 
See previous examples 
3. ((the,, plumber))T/T + XP(VP); 
subroutine(%PP{xa}([1QXy1Q() 1z1[Yl°zl]} 
- (XPVY[Ax[Plumber'(x) H x-y] & P(y)])])) 
From 2 by R36 
Si. , XPP(xa)("[7QXY1Q(^Xzl[Yl°Zl]) 
( XPVy[Ax[Plumber'(x) E4 x-y] & P(y)])]) 
S2. XPP(xa}( [lyVy[Az[butcher'(z H z1 y1] & Y°Y1]]) 
Lambda conversion-,,, 
S3. Vyl[Azl[butcher'(zl) H zl-yl]"& xa Yi] 
Lambda conversion 
S4., Vyl[Az1(butcher' (zl )H z1-y1] & j-y l] 
Anaphoric resolution 
S5. Return" 
4. (John, ((the, plumber)))T xP(P)(-xPP(j)) 
From 1,3 by R29 
5.1PP(j) Lambda conversion 
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6. resignIV " resign' Basic 
7. ((John, ((the, plumber))), "resign)t XPP(j) (resign') 
From 5,6 by R1 
8. resign'(j) Lambda conversion 
If Sue is the speaker, the discourse pool will look like (134). 
(134) Discourse pool: <Sue, resign'(j)> 
<Sue, Vy1[Az1(plumber'(z1) H zl-yl] & j-yl]i 
The same rules will, generate-, and interpret terms like the plumber. 
John though idiosyncrasies can be troublesome. 
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4.6.1.4 Definite, epithetical, non-restrictive appositives 
The final class of appositives prepose epithetically to terms 
and modify those terms non-restrictively, as in (112), ' reprinted 
here. 
(112) a. That crook Nixon got off easy. 
b. The traitor Philby escaped. 
c. My friend Peter cheats. 
These --appositives " look- superficially identical to the restrictive 
appositive constructions in Section 4.6.1.1, but the intended 
readings here are much different. In a restrictive example like the 
boy Bob, where Bob is the appositive modifier, the proper name 
specifies which boy is intended. In that crook Nixon, where that crook 
is the appositive modifier, Nixon does not specify which crook is 
involved; rather crook' is attributed of Nixon parenthetically. The 
orthographical strings in isolation are ambiguous. In short, the 
intended non-restrictive reading of an example like (112a) should be 
something like the two assertions in (135). 
(135), a. 
b. 
Nixon got off easy. 
Nixon is a crook. 
Chierchia (1982: 343,345) appears to believe that his rule for 
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appositives' handles the 'same phenomena as Delacruz's restrictive 
rule, but his translation and discussion (1982: 347, remark IV) shows 
clearly that he has the epithetical, non-restrictive` reading in 
mind. 
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once again with this class we find idiosyncrasies plaguing the 
analysis. These non-restrictive appositives appear to, require 
definite determiners, or at least 'specific' determiners in the sense 
of Bartsch (see Section 442). 
(136) *Every bastard Jones resigned. 
(137) *Any fool Algernon escaped. 
This appears to be a reflection of the fact that only non-vacuous 
terms can be non-restrictively modified. The following rules allow 
an approximate analysis, 
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and (138) shows a typical derivation. 
R37. If ac PCN then (the/this/that, a) e PT/2T'- 
Realisation: the/this/that ^ a' 
Translation: AP( v P); subroutine(XPP(xa)(. a, )) 
R38. If ac PT/2T and Q'c PT then (a, Q) E PT. 
Realisations. ^ 
Translation: 
(138) (((that, bastardCM)T/2T, R37' SmithT)T, R38' resign=V)t. R, 
Realisations That bastard Smith resigned. 
= Translation: 
1. --SmithT -> APP(S)' Proper name 
2. bastardcN bastard' Basic 
3. (that, bastard) 
T/2T => 
XP(VP)s subroutine( XPP(xa}(bastard')) From 2 by R37 
)(bastard') S1. XPP(x- 
a 
S2. bastard'(xa) Lambda conversion 
S3. bastard-I(s) Anaphoric resolution 
S4. Return 
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4. ((that, bastard), Smith) 
T 
xP("P)(AxPP(s)) 
From 1, - 3 by R38 
5. APP(s) Lambda conversion 
6. resignIV resign' Basic 
7. (((that, bastard), Smith), resign) t -> 
APP(s) (Aresign') From 5,6 by R1 
8. resign'(s) Lambda conversion 
I 
If (138) is uttered by Algernon, then the state of the discourse pool 
will be (139). 
(139) Discourse pool: <Algernon, bastard'(s)> 
<Algernon, resign' (s )> 
As desired, the state of the discourse model after Algernon asserts 
(140) on the epithetical reading is (141). 
(140) John believes that that thief Smith is honest. 
(141) a. <Algernon, believe-that'(j, [honest'(s)])> 
b. <Algernon, thief'(s)> 
The choice. of determiner in such non-restrictive examples is a bit 
usually most__appropriate, --having--a--certain----- -- 
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emotional (usually pejorative) force even by itself as in (142). 
(142) That George is disgusting. 
This often has a force somewhat like the said' or the 
aforementioned', emphasising that a referring expression has already 
been used in the discourse. 
(143) Mr Smith, a thief, entered the room unseen. Then this 
thief Smith opened the safe. 
For some reason, the seems more appropriate in non-restrictive, 
epithetical appositives with surnames rather than with first names. 
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(144). a. ý The explorer Biggles set off on, a new adventure. 
b. The traitor Philby was sent off to Russia. 
(145) "a. ? The coward Richard was sent home. 
b., ? The traitor- Nigel. defected. . 
Though the present account of appositives is' incomplete, it 
accommodates several constructions in a MG for the first time. The 
present framework, based on a generalised theory of restrictive and 




The, new subroutine. analysisýprovides asuperior means to,, capture 
intuitions, about non-restrictive modification,,, while avoiding, the 
drawbacks of previous analyses. In particular, linguistic 
subroutines are naturally parenthetical, are separate speech acts and 
can occur, inside, questions, and, other non-assertions. In addition, 
the subroutine analysis functions correctly in opaque contexts, and 
under operations -such as sentence negation-, 
So far the 
. non- 
restrictive fragment has been limited to. adjectivals. and appositives 
at., the individual level.. The, same machinery will, be adapted, to 
handle. parallel_, examp]ýes.: at 
_the . -proposition 
and property levels... --- 
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Chapter 5. The proposition level in Montague grammar 
5.0 introduction 
There are numerous constructions, the simplest being like those 
in (1), where adjectives modify nominalised sentences. To deal with 
these and similar proposition-level constructions, it will be 
necessary to provide an analysis for terms of the form that-t. 
(1) a. That John Is 111 is unfortunate. 
b. It is strange that Mary left. 
c. It is true that Bill cheats. 
There are basically two approaches. The first treats proposition- 
level terms like individual-level terms: they are both assigned to 
category T. This general path is followed by Cresswell (1973: 165- 
166), Thomason (1976: 79-80; 1980), Klein (1979a: 44,54), Cresswell & 
von Stechow (1982: 14), Chierchia (1982) and Turner (1983), whom I 
shall refer to collectively as the 'levellers'. The second approach, 
adopted by Delacruz (1976), Bennett (1975: 175-189) and Bartsch 
(1978: 26; 1979: 49), is to distinguish proposition-level terms both 
syntactically and semantically, assigning them to a new category, say 
__.. _. __, _T' _or 
T. bar, - --: I. -shall ca-11--this -group-the-'stackers'; The-choice-19- 
a real one; -involving issues of ontology in the semantics and 
constraint within the syntax. 
-For practical and theoretical reasons,,. the following account 
sticks to the traditional MG stacking approach. One advantage is 
that this allows the discussion to continue without any major 
revision of, the semantics. one disadvantage is that the following 
account suffers from some well-known inadequacies in explaining 
belief sentences and related constructions. From a syntactic point 
of view, it will be, shown that the newer levelling 'solutions cause as 
many problems as they solve. When individual-level terms like John 
and proposition-level terms like that John. is !! 1 are not distinguished 
by syntactic category (or by type) then the grammar will need some 
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other mechanism, such as lexical features, to tell them apart. 
The nominalisation debate is currently'very healthy; with some 
researchers- (e. g. ` "Ben-Chorin 1983) proposing interesting, but 
radically new semantic solutions which effectively change the game 
rules. -This chapter will proceed to show that the traditional 
stacking solution cannot be discarded out of hand and will then 
provide a grammar to account for a wide variety of 
, 
syntactic 
structures at proposition level. As any grammar, regardless of the 
semantics it adopts, will eventually have to deal with these 
syntactic structures, I should hope that the following account will 
be a significant-contribution to the nominalisation debate. 
5.1 The debate on nominalisation 
5.1.1 Levellers 
Syntactically, -the levellers can point'to the gross structural 
similarity of proposition-level terms to individual-level terms. 
That, for instance, is taken to be a determiner-like word which forms 
terms from sentences much as the forms terms from common nouns. 
(2) that John loves MaryT 
thatT/ John loves Mary, 
-- -" - __ 
(3) the manT 
--the , CN manCN 
Pairs like (4) to (6) are cited to show that proposition-level terms 
fit in familiar term slots. 
(4) (The man 
is obvious/odd/strange/etc. 
That John loves Mary 
(5) The man 
bothers/annoys/pleases Sue. 
That John loves Mary 
the man 
(6) Bill-knows/believes/suspects 
that John loves Mary. 
Semantically, the levellers can simply include propositions in'the 
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domain of the model. Propositions are therefore treated like 
entities in much the same way that Nixon, the Empire State Building, 
hedgehogs and toothbrushes are entities. 
One variation on the levelling approach is to define a levelling 
function fl whose domain includes propositions and whose range is 
included in the domain of the model. That is, for any proposition p, 
fl(p) denotes a corresponding entity in the domain of the model. For 
all x where x is an individual like j (for John) or m (for Mary), 
fl(x) - X. Function application is then redefined as follows; 
Q a(ß )-Qa JJ (f 
l 
More simply, functions apply to their 
LEVELLED arguments, which are always basic entities in the domain of 
the model. This approach is well presented in Chierchia 1982. The 
term that John sings would be translated as XPP(*[singl(j)]), the set 
of all properties of (the entity corresponding, to), the, proposition 
[sing'(j)]. This translation is of the same type as the translation 
of an individual-level term like -John, which is APP(j). 
1 
Proposition-level terms are then manipulated by the syntax rules in 
the usual way. 
One defence of this treatment is the prima facie superiority of 
a unified treatment of terms over a multiform one. Levelling also 
-ý---allows-words like- odd-andýstrenge to be given 'a single trans] do in 
sentences like (4); believe and know in example (6) can also be 
analysed as normal, TVs. This appears toý capture some, linguistic 
generalisations. By translating that John sings as app([sing'(j)]) 
the levelling approach can then treat is true as a normal IV, leading 
to translations like'(7'). Thus the proposition-level sentence (7) 
is generated and translated parallel to the individual-level sentence 
(8). 
(7) That John sings is true. 
A (7') true*( [sing' (j) ]) 
(8) John is tall. 
(8') tall'(j) 
._ 
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5.1.2 Stackers 
The alternative to levelling, here called stacking, is to take 
propositions at'face value-as being not basic entities, which are of 
type <e>, but complex constituents of type cs, t>. Because P is of 
type cs, ce, t » and ranges over properties of individual entities, the 
set of properties of *the entity j is APP(j). Similarly, let us 
define R to be a variable of type <s, <<s, t>, t> ; i. e. it ranges over 
properties of propositions. Then a proposition-level term that John 
sings translates as the set of properties of a proposition, viz 
A 
)RR( [sing'(j)]}. These proposition-level terms are distinguished 
from Ts by type, and they are traditionally assigned to a-category 
T-bar or T'. 
The consequences of stacking are immediate and severe. For one, 
a T' cannot combine with an IV; the types and categories do not 
match. In fact, none of the previously defined rules for 
manipulating individual-level Ts will work for a T'. Consider the 
simplified tree in (9). 
(9) John is oddt 
JohnZ be od\V 
belt//PREO odder 
The levelling analysis allows the IV be odd to combine with the term 
that John sings as well, as in (10). 
(10)-That John sings is odd- - 
that John sings 'be be oddly - 
that John sings T/t t 
For a stacker, however, a T' must combine with a proposition-level 
intransitive verb, call it IV', as in (11). He will also need 
proposition-level copulas, adjectives and nouns. All new combination 
rules will need to be defined. 
3. 'i 
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(11) That John sings is oddt 
that John singsT' - be oddIV, 
that T,, t 
John \ingst be/'/PRED'oddJ, 
One result of stacking is that many words including odd.. strange. 
unusual, ý weird, good, etc. will now have to be listed in two quite 
separate categories: i. e. the form strange will be lexically 
ambiguous between strangeADJ and strange )J, . 
There is no obvious way 
to relate these pairs, though Parsons (1979) has made an attempt to 
define a grammar with words of 'floating type'. 
For the same- reasons, the stacking analysis forces us to 
postulate two separate categories for transitive verbs like interest 
and believe. The interest that takes an individual-level term subject 
is interestT (where TV is an abbreviation for IV/T), and the one 
which takes a proposition-level term subject will have to be 
InterestIV"/T" Believe will have two versions distinguished by the 
category of the object term. 
(12) ° John interests T''Mary. 
(13) , That John is handsome interests IV'/T Mar'' 
'- - .. (14-)-- John-. believes 
(15) John believes that Mary Is pretty. lV/T, 
Levellers see such duplications as needless and unsupported by the 
facts of English. 
Admittedly, it -seems unattractive at first glance to have 
multiple readings, and - so ` multiple categories, for strange, odd, 
interest and believe; and this looks like a good argument against 
stacking. Some generalisation appears to be lost. Nevertheless, 
there are also strong arguments that levelling conflates too much, 
that helpful and significant grammatical distinctions are lost. 
Consider the case of interest, surprise, annoy and similar verbs, which 
seem to take either aT or a T' subject. The passive form of (12), 
which has aT subject John, is '(16), where the former subject turns 
up as'-the object of a PP-BY phrase. No PP-BY phrase is possible, 
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however, 
_in 
the passive counterpart of (13), which-has a T' subject. 
(16) Mary-is interested. by John. 
(17) *Mary is interested by that John is handsome. 
Also, a T' subject can be postposed to its IV' as in (18), with a 
dummy subject it placed at the front of the string. 
(18) It is strange that John is ill. 
Some IV's like seem and appear actually require'such postposition. 
(19) a. It seems that John is ill. 
b. *That John is ill seems. 
The rules which combine terms will therefore have to distinguish 
between individual-level and proposition-level constituents in one 
way or another. The distinction is basic in a stacking grammar, but 
a levelling grammar would have to resort-to features or reference to 
the internal construction of terms. 
Some forms, like believe, seem not to be the same verb at all 
when they apply to individual-level as opposed to proposition-level 
terms---as- in_ (14) and -. (15). - Thus in the semantics as well, it can be 
argued that there is a palpable difference between the believe : which 
relates two human entities and the believe; which relates an entity 
and a proposition. 
(14') believe*(j, m) 
(15') believe*(j, [pretty'(m)]) 
Indeed the sentence John believes Mary evokes explanatory paraphrases 
such as (20) and (21). 
(20) John believes the proposition asserted by Mary. 
(21) John believes something (everything? ) that Mary asserts. 
In fact, with quite a few verb forms which apparently take either aT 
or a T' subject or direct object, a good case can be made for 
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distinguishing separate readings. Consider the following pairs. 
(22) a. Peter denied the Saviour. 
b. Peter denied that he was a disciple. 
(23) a. James Implies that John was lazy. 
b. That Paul left implies that he is guilty. 
Some corroborating evidence-may come from other languages. French 
would translate the believe which takes a human object as croire (A) 
and the believe which takes a sentential object as croire (que). Even 
more dramatic, the translation of know requires two quite separate 
verbs: the know relation between a person and a fact is named savoir; 
A the know relation between two persons is named connaltre. 
(24) Je sais que Jean aime Marie. 
(25) Je connais Jean. 
A look at some other data in English shows that wordforms with 
double categorisation, like believe, know, odd and strenge, may be the 
exception rather than the rule. For instance, many predicative words 
combine exclusively with proposition-level terms. 











predicative words combine exclusively with 
terms. Under a stacking interpretation, the 
sentences are ruled out as ungrammatical because of 
levellers must appeal to selection restrictions of 
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(27) a. ? John is false. 
b. ? Mary, is a fact., 
c.. - ? That John is ill is green. 
Similarly,, most transitive verbs select T and T'. subjects and objects 
more carefully, than annoy and believe. 
(28) a. I believe 
John. 
that John-is mad. 
. *John. b. I think 
that John is mad. 
(29) a. Mary 
annoys Bill. _ ,.. That Mary is pregnant 
b. Mary 
*That Mary is pregnant 
kicked Bill. 
Every grammar appeals., to selection restrictions_at, some. point, and it 
is difficult to know where they stop and where -actual 
ungrammaticality starts. A leveller can hold that the, starred 
sentences in (28)_ and (29) merely violate selection restrictions. A 
more conservative stackercan. maintain that the type differences he 
proposes are linguistically significant in a way that selection 
restrictions are not. '- Compare sentences (30) and (31). 
(30) This. rock is intelligent. 
(31) ? This rock is true. 
Both stackers and levellers will agree that these sentences are odd, 
but for different reasons. For both levellers and stackers, (30) 
violates - 
the. selection. restriction which states,, -informally, 
that 
only humans,, higher animals and perhaps computers can be reasonably 
described as intelligent... . This is-, a simple, reflection of one's 
knowledge about the world. -However,., there is no. sense. in which 
(30) 
can be called ungrammatical. In contrast, stackers treat (31) as 
truly ungrammatical, for, the- type of this rock precludes,, any 
combination with a higher-level intransitive verb like, is, true. 
Levellers, on the other -hand,,. take (31) to illustrate simple 
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violation of selection restrictions just like (30); rocks, they can 
say, are just not the kinds of things which can reasonably, be 
described as true. 
There are significant differences, nonetheless, when we look at 
the negative versions of these sentences. 
(32) This rock is not intelligent. 
(33) a. ? This rock is not true. 
b. - ? This rock is false. 
Example (32) is not only grammatical but seems to 'make sense'. 
Rocks are indeed not intelligent, and it makes sense to say so. If we 
think of Intelligent' as a characteristic function, we would expect it 
to assign 0 to any rocks in the domain. The sentences in (33), 
however, are still decidedly odd. Rocks cannot reasonably be said to 
be true--but at the same time they cannot reasonably be said to be 
false or not true or probable or improbable, etc. That is, if true' 
is taken as a characteristic function, it seems very odd to assign 
either 1 or Q. to a rock. The intuition, for a stacker, is that, when 
speaking of truth or falsity, - rocks just don't get considered at all; 
they are entities on a very separate plane from propositions. The 
conclusion, for stackers, is that (31) and (33) are odd, indeed 
ungrammatical, not just because they violate our knowledge of the way 
the world is structured, but also because they violate our knowledge 
of the way that English is structured. In other words, stackers hold 
that English has grammaticalised the ontological difference between 
individual entities and propositions. 
In counterattack,. Chierchia-(1982: 333). has argued that MG-types, - 
being _so closely tied to syntactic categories, merely . 
duplicate 
selectional -information already provided in the syntax. For 
instance; - necessarily is a -sentence adverb, of - category t/t, and MG 
would give its type as <<s, t>, t>. Chierchia, as a leveller, would 
give its type as <e, t>, a one-place predicate of entities, where 
entities include propositions. This has the apparent disadvantage of 
allowing the translation of necessarily to apply to individual human 
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entities like j (for John) and m (for Mary), and selection 
restrictions would appear necessary to show why the sentence 
necessarily"(j) is odd. However, Chierchia argues that such 
restrictions already appear in the syntax; because necessarily is of 
category t/t, it can apply syntactically only to asentence, and 
therefore the translation of necessarily will always apply to"'the 
intension of the translation of a sentence, i. e. -to. an entity which 
is a proposition. I_1°1 11 
The arguments for the redundancy of type look much weaker when 
one looks wider in the grammar and discovers adjectives and nouns. 
The translation of necessarily, assuming levelling, will always apply 
to a proposition entity by virtue of its category t/t, but the 
related adjective 'necessary. (as in -the normal reading of necessary 
truth) will have no such syntactic restriction in Chierchia's system. 
There is nothing to prevent the generation of sentences like ? John is 
necessary, and only, selection restrictions can rule them out. 
Numerous other adjectives and nouns are closely related to sentence 
adverbs. Chierchia will be unable to coordinate their syntactic 
categories and their syntactic restrictions. 
>-- ý. - - (34)-possibly -- possible possibility 
probably probable probability 
certainly certain certainty 
The stacking analysis holds that necessarily and necessary will 
both be of type « s, t>, t> and will both be of some category t/nt. 
Nouns like possibility, lie, fact, untruth and belief can be assigned to 
their own distinguished t/nt category. The 'parenthetical' sentence 
adverbs strangely and oddly also correspond to the adjectives strange 
and odd which combine with proposition-level terms; these adjectives 
and adverbs are, for example, factive. And here we have come full 
circle. If there is a case for assigning both necessarily and 
necessary to categories t/nt to capture their syntactic and 
selectional restrictions, then the same holds for strangelyt/nt and 
stränget/nt. As a strange of category t/e is obviously needed for 
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sentences like., John is strange, we end up quite naturally with -a pair 
of stranges, the situation which the levellers want, to avoid in the 
first place. 
Finally, adopting the levelling analysis makes it' harder to 
formulate some useful meaning postulates. Let us assume that'we want 
to capture the factivity of interest IV,, T over 
its subject'term. That 
is, it is intuitively the case that if That John Is handsome Interests 
Sue is true, then John Is handsome is also true. A stacker can 
2 
appeal to a meaning postulate like M. P. A; where p is of type <s, t>. 
M. P.. A (stacking analysis) 
ApAyO(interest; (p, y) - true'(p)] 
However, if propositions are 'levelled' into entities, then the 
straightforward translation of M. P. A is M. P. 8. ' 
M. P. B (levelling-analysis) 
AxAyo[interest*(x, y) -ýº true'(x)] 
Unfortunately, M. P. _B,, as, 
it stands, will, support the intuitively bad 
conclusion that if John Interests Mary is true, then John is true 
'is 
also true. Just as the, syntax needs to , 
distinguish between 
individual-level terms and proposition-levelterms, so the semantics 
needs some way to distinguish between object-like entities (such as j 
for John) and entities which are prepositions. This is not 
impossible, of course, but it requires extra test clauses, as in M. P. 
C (see Chierchia 1982: 345), or perhaps the adoption of a multi-sorted 
logic. 
M. P. C (levelling analysis, compensated) 
AxAyD [ (interest 
*, (x, y) 
& proposition' (x )') 4 true' (x) ) 
In conclusion, stackers write grammars which inherently force a 
distinction between individual-level and proposition-level terms (and 
other categories) in the syntax and between individuals and 
propositions in the semantics. It has been shown that both types of 
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distinction are needed. When levellers reduce T's to Ts and treat 
propositions as entities, the old distinctions eventually have to be 
rescued by some means. For the present purposes, the stacking 
solution makes the necessary distinctions more naturally, requires 
fewer ad hoc restrictions, and generally gives more 'beautiful' 
results. It also allows the analysis, to proceed using the-classical 
MG semantics as defined by Bennett (1975) and Dowty at al. (1981) . 
Much remains to be said in the stacking/levelling debate. What 
follows. -in this and the succeeding chapters is a more detailed 
exposition of the stacking analysis than has previously been offered. 
5.2 The proposition-level grammar 
5.2.1 Categories 
The following rules and categories are to be added to the 
grammar defined in Chapters 3 and 4. All previously defined 
conventions for type definition, function application and rule 
notation remain the same. Wherever practical, category labels have 
been chosen to facilitate comparisons to the individual-level part of 
the grammar. In general, abbreviated names -for proposition-level 
categories are distinguished from analogous individual-level 
categories with a_, superscript bar -or-. -prime sign. 
Therefore, an . IV'" -- 






4 .. t% t 
fi 
t/t 
Abbreviation Basic Expressions 
IV' suffice, count 
CN' fact, lie, truth, untruth, fib, 
axiom, proposition, possibility, - 
scandal, state-of-affairs, situation, 
problem, plan, story 
true, false, necessary, possible; 
probable, likely, unlikely, certain, 
sure, definite3 
odd, strange, significant, tragic 
PNOM' (none) 
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t/6t happen, turn out, chance, so happen 
t/7t REL' (none) 
t/et truly, necessarily, possibly, probably 
t/9t oddly, strangely, unfortunately 
IV'/PP-TO matter, make sense, make a difference, 
occur 
(t/6t)/PP-TO seem,, appear . 
(t/6t)/T strike 
(t/3t)/PP-TO apparent, evident, obvious,, plain, 
well-known, clear, manifest, plausible 
(t/4t)/PP-TO (none) 
(t/4t )/PP-FOR useful, beneficial, pleasant, unpleasant, 
good, bad, helpful, instructive, convenient, 
inconvenient, fortunate, harmful, lucky, 
nice, unlucky,, unfortunate, profitable, 
dangerous 
t/IV' (none) 




t/4IV' PP-OF' (none) 
(t/IV')/t that. 
(t/2IV')/CN' the, a(n), every 
CN'/CN' (none) 
CN'/PP-OF assumption, belief, thought, idea,, 
notion, claim, presupposition, 
charge, presumption,. opinion, guess,. 
supposition, conjecture 
(CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO report, statement, allegation, proposal 
CN'/PP-OF' cause, result, consequence 
Let FRED' be a cover category including Pt/3t"U Pt/4t 'U Pt/Sts 
Let ADJ' be a cover category including Pt/3t U Pt/4t. 
Let ADV' be a cover category including Pt/et U Pt/9t. 
Let ADJVL' be a cover class including Pt/3t U Pt/4t U Pt/ 7t" 
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amuse, anger, annoy, amaze, . astonish, 
. 
disappoint, disconcert, disturb,, depress, 
encourage, excite, exhilarate, hearten, 






accept, acknowledge, anticipate, argue,., 
assume, believe, comprehend, - 
conceive, contest, deduce, deplore, 
doubt, fear, forget, grasp, guess,.. ignore, 
know, maintain, mind, notice, presume, 
presuppose, recognise, remember, regret, 
resent, suppose, surmise, understand 
charge, claim, conclude, conjecture, 
fancy,. figure, hope, suspect, think 
admit, allege, announce, assert, 
confess, confirm, deny, dictate, 
emphasise, hint, indicate, intimate, 
predict, proclaim, profess, promise, 
prove, repeat, report, say, scream, shout, 
sign, signal, suggest, whisper, yell 
tell, recount, relate 
advise, apprise, assure, convince, inform, 
persuade, promise, reassure, tell 
advise, apprise, convince, inform, 
reassure, tell 
afraid, frightened, aware, certain, 
confident, conscious, sure, suspicious 




angry, bitter, ecstatic, furious, 




Variables, of type <s, t> include p and q, supplemented by the 
subscripted pn and qn (where n ranges over natural numbers); these 
variables range over propositions. R and Rn are of type 
<s, <cs, t>, t » and range over properties of propositions. R and Rn 
are of type <s, « s, <cs, t>, t » , t>> and range over properties of 
properties of propositions. K, of type i<s, t>, <e, t>>, ranges over 
two-place relations between individuals and propositions. H, of type 
<e, ccs, t>, t>>, ranges over two-place relations between propositions 
and individuals. L,. of type <e, <<s, t>, <e, t> > >, ranges over three- 
place relations between individuals, propositions and individuals. 
M, of type <<s, t>, ce, ce, t » >, ranges over three-place relations 



















X RR(Pn ) 
ApXRR(p) 
XR1XRVP[Aq[RI(q) E- q-p] & R(P)] 
XR1XRVp[R1(p) & R(p)] 
XR1XRAP[Rl(P) - R(p)] 
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Meaning Postulates (incomplete list) 
M. P. PI Apo[a(p) -> VP] 
where ö translates any member of 
M. P. P2 APAPO[8(P, P) --'i 
VP] 
where 6 translates any4 member of PIV'/T or PIV-/2T 
Reduction Rules 
RR Pl. VKAyARO[S(y, R) -4 R{XP[K(Y, P)])) 
where S translates any5 member of PIV/T' or PIV/(t/IV') 
RR P2. VHApAPD[ö(p, P) --> P{XY[H(p, y)])] 
where S translates any member of PIV'/T or PIV-/2T 
RR P3. VLAyARAPO[6(y, R, P) -3 P(AXx[R(-Xq[L(y, q, x)])])] 
where S translates any member of P or 
P(IV/(t/2IV'))/PP-TO 
RR P4. VMAxAPARO[S(x, P, R) -4 RC Xp[P(Xy[M(x, y, p)])])] 
where S translates any member of P or P TV/(t/IV') TV/PP-OF' 
5.2.2 Illustrated categorial combination rules 
5.2.2.1 Proposition-level terms 
A proposition-level term, abbreviated T', is formed by one of 
the two following rules. T' is actually a cover category including 
(Pt/IV' U Pt/2IV' It is often necessary to distinguish the two 
subcategories in the syntax. 
R41. If aE B(t/IV' )/t and 
ßE Pt then (a, ß) E Pt/IV' 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R42. If aE P(t/2IV')/CN, and ßE PCN' then (a, ß) C Pt/2IV, ' 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( ß' 
That is of category (t/IV')/t and its translation is XpXRR(P) . The 
is of category (t/2IV')/CN', having the translation ), RlXRVp(dq[Rl(q) 




(35) (that(t/IV')/t' (JohnT, swimIV)t, Rl}t/IV', R41 
Realisations that John swims 
, Translation: 
1. (John, swim) t -> swim'(j) See previous examples 
2. that -°4 Xp1RR(p) Basic (t/IV')/t 
3. (that, (John, swim))t/1V, XpXRR(p}( [swim'(i)]) 
From 1,2 by R41 
4, )RR( [swim'(j)]} Lambda conversion 
(36) -[the(t/2iV. )/CN-', fact CN')t/21V*, R42 
Realisation: the fact 
, Translation: 
1. the(t/2IV')/CN, XR11RVp[Aq[R1{q) H q=p] & R(p)] 
Basic 
2. factCN, fact' Basic 
3. (the, fact)t/2IV, ~ 
XR1XRVp[Aq[R1(q) H q=p] & R(p) ]( fact') 
From 1,2 by R42 
4.. X RVp[Aq[fact'(q) H q=p] & R(p)] Lambda conversion 
._ 
Note_., that- a-T'.. _translates as the property set of , a-proposition; much 
as aT translates as the-property set of an individual. 
Within line 4 of example (36), we find the formula fact'(q). 
The explication of such predications at property level is a problem 
which will return-at various places in the coming chapters. One 
would like to be able to conclude that Qfact'(q) 
f't 1 iff 
q(w)(t) = 1. Similarly, Qfalse'(q)]w't =1 iff q(w)(t) =0 In other 
words, the sentence fact'(q) should always have the same truth value 
as the sentence 
Vq, 
and the sentence false'(q) should always have the 
same truth value as the sentence -1("q). These conclusions can be 
guaranteed by meaning postulates such as the following. 
M. P. P3. ApO(ö(p) H p] 
where 8 translates fact, true. truth 
F 
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, 
M. P. P4.: -APO[Ö(P) H -1("p)] 
where ö, translates false, lie, untruth, fib 
H. P. P5. Ap0I8(P) H <>(VP)] 
where ö translates` possible, possibly, possibility 
M. P. P6. ApOI8(P) H 13(vp)] 
where 0 translates necessary, necessarily`" 
The alternative method is to give complex interpretations to 
individual lexical items, which is. to treat, them as semantic 
constants. In PTQ, for instance, necessarily is defined as a sentence 
adverb of category t/t, and it can apply to any sentence, produced by 
the rules of the grammar. Similarly, be is defined as a copula 
mapping Ts into IVs. A possible PTQ-generated sentence is shown in 
(37). 
(37) Necessarily John is Johnt 
necessarilyt/t 
/ 
John is John t 




In PTQ, the translation of John is IXPP(Aj). In spite of 
the fact 
that be applies to John, to form the IV be John, the translation of 
- "-. ý. r. _ _, _ ,_ 
be 
_John 
is_ not be'( XPP( j)). This is because Montague specifically - 
designates that be is a, semantic constant and has the translation 
XPXyP(% z[ y- z]). This allows the whole sentence John Is John to 
translate, as, j=j rather , than, as 
be' (%pp(^j))(^ j) . Necessarily 
applies to the sentence John Is John in the usual way but the 
translation of the result is not necess, arily'((, [j-j]). Again this is 
because Montague designates that necessarily has the translation 
Xp0[Vp]j, this allows the translation of the whole sentence to be 
13[j-j]. If necessarily and be can receive their own tailor-made 
constant translation in the lexicon, there is nothing inherent in the 
grammar to stop us translating words, like true, truth and fact as 
ip[Vp]. Under such definitions, line 4 of (36) would come out as 
)RVp[Aq[vq H q-p] & R(p)], and there would be no need for M. P. P3. 
Semantic constants result in many desirable entailments arising as 
logical consequences rather than through the restraints imposed on 
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possible worlds by meaning postulates. The question of how to divide 
the labour recurs constantly. 
Many nouns at proposition level are intuitively or even 
morphologically related to verbs naming transitive relations, and 
these nouns display a kind of valence. One way to explicate such 
relationships is to treat the nouns as semantic constants, giving 
them explicit complex `translations in the lexicon. Belief, for 
instance, is a noun which can have its subject believer specified in 
a PP-OF'phrase. The category of belief is therefore CN'/PP-OF, and its 
translation can be 'given in terms of believe as 
XPXpP( Xy[believe *, (y, p) ]}. Rule R43 is needed for example (38). 
R43. if ac PCN' /PP-OF and ,8E PPP-OF then (a, ß) E PCN' ' 
Realisation: ((y 8 (CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO' PP-TO)CN'/PP-OF' 
QPP-OF )CN' ynßn6 
else a^ß 
A 
Translation: a' ( . B' ) 
(38) (theft/2IV')/CN'. ' (beliefCN'/PPOF' (of PP-OF/T' 
JohnT)PP-0F, 
R25)CN', R43}t/2IV', R42 
Realisation: the belief of John 
-. Translation:, 
1. ofPP-OF/T )P[VP] Basic 
2. JohnT * APP(j) Proper name 
3. (of, John) 
PP-OF 





4. APP(j) Lambda conversion 
A 5. beliefCN'/PP-oF Pape( Xy[believel(y, p)]) 
Basic 
6. (belief, (of, John) )CN, =v 
XPXpP(Xy[believe *(y, p) ]) (A XPP (j)) From 4,5 . 
by R43 
7. lp[believe*(j, p)] Lambda conversion 
8. the(t, 2IV, )/CN, 
XR1XRVP[A9[R1(9) H q-p] & R(P)] 
Basic 
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9. (the, (belief, - (of, John)}}t, 2iV, -ý 
A 
XR1XRVp[Aq[R1(q) H q-p] & R(p)] ( lp[believex(j, p)]) 
I From 7,8 by R42 
] 10. XRVp(Aq[believe*(j, q) H q-p] & R(p) 
Lambda conversion 
Given the complex translation for belief, the translation of the belief 
of John is the property set of that unique proposition such that John 
believes it. R44 is the relation-reducing rule which allows belief to 
appear without a PP-OF phrase and to receive the reading equivalent 
to that for 'belief of someone'. 
R446 If aE PCN'/PP-OF then (a) E PCN' 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation:. a'( APVz[P(z)]) 





, /PP-OF) , R44)t/2IV', R42 
Realisation: the belief 
Translation: - XRVp[Aq[Vz[believe*'(z, q)] E-> q-p] & R(p)] 
If one chooses to give such nouns explicit complex translations, 
relating them- lexically to two-place verbs, the following list 
provides some sample lexical entries. 
-t -. 
(40) belief, /PP-OF 1PXpP(*ly[believe*(y, p)]) 
thoughtCN'/PP-OF XPXPP{AXy[think (Y. P)]) 
claimCN, /PP-OF .XPX 
pP (AX y [claim*(y, P) ]) 
presuppositionCN'/PP-OF XPXpP(%y[presuppose*(y, p)]) 
supposition CN'/PP-OF XPXPPt^XY[suPPose*(Y. P)7) 
assumptionCN'/PP-OF XPXpP(*Xy(assume*(Y. P)]) 
guess CN /PP-OF XPXpP(Xy[guess*(Y, P)]) 
_.., _. _ ..... _ 
Such definitions must be tailor-made for each word, allowing for 
lexical limitations and expansions of meaning.. The alternative, of 
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course, is to explicate such nouns in terms of meaning postulates. 
Nouns related to three-place verbs, such as report, allegation, 
statement and proposal, are of category (CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO and are 
handled with the following rules. 
R45. if acP and ,BeP (CN'/PP-OF )/PP-TO PP-TO 
then (a, Q} E C'/PP-OF' 
Realisation: a 1-1,8 
Translation: a'("ß') 
R46. If aE P(CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO then (a) E. PCN'/PP-OF' 
Realisation: a 
Translations a'( XPVz[P(z)]) 
If treated as semantic, constants, such nouns will have basic 
translations as shown in. (41). 
(41) allegation( ' CN' /PP OF )/PP-TO _0 
XPXQXPP( XYIQ( Xz[allege*(z, P, Y)])]) ., 
report (CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO 
XPXQXpP(^Xy[Q("lz[report*(z, p, y)]) ]) 
statement 
XPXQXpP{. Xy[Q( Xz[state *(z, p, y)]))) 
announcement(CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO - 
XPXQ1pP(Xy[Q(Xz[announce*(z, p, y)]) ]) 
proclamation( CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO 
XPXQXpP(AXyIQ(^). z[proclaim ' (z, p, y)]) ]), 
proposal (CNI/PP-Or)/PP-TO --> 
1PXQXpP( XY[Q( Xz[Propose'(z, p y)]]]) 
Here 'too one. must be careful in proposing such' translation. one 
reading of proposal, - for instance, has become solidly tied to 
marriage. ' Again the relations between these nouns and three-place 
verbs could be explicated with meaning postulates. The rules and 
translations described so far allow the generation and translation of 
the terms in (42). 
6 
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(42) a. the belief of John 
b. the belief 
c. the report of John to Bill 
d. the report of John 
e. the report to Bill 
f. the report 
The nouns cause, result-and consequence are of category CN'/PP- 
OF'; they map PP-OF ', phrases, which are based - on proposition-level 
terms, into proposition-level common nouns. Terms like the cause and 
the result of the problem are generated and translated by the following 
rules. 
R47. If a E_BPP-OF'/(t/2IV") and ßE Pt/2IV' 
then (a, ß) E PPP-OFD. 
Realisation: a r-1.8 
Translation: a'( ß") 
R48. If -aE PCN. /PP_OF" and ßE PPP_OF' then (a, 
ß) E PCN' 
Realisation: a f"1,8 
A 
Translation: a, ( ß') 
R49. If aE PCN'/PP-OF' then (a) E PCN'" 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: a'( XRVq[R(q)]) 
If such nouns are treated as semantic constants, their translation 
might be as in (43). I assume the semantics of CAUSE defined in 
Janssen 1978.7 
(43) cause CN-/PP-OP' 
XR ApR(Xq[CAUSE(vp, vq)]) 
consequenceCN'/PP-OP' )R XpR(*Xq[CAUSE(vq, 
VP)]) 
result CN' /PP-OP' 
)R XpR (A Xq[ CAUSE(vq, vP) ]) 
once again, the causality involved, in -a sentence like 
The plan 
caused the disaster could be explicated by meaning-postulates rather 
than in the logical form. From a syntactic point of view, - and for 
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the purposes- of this discussion, the choice is open. In what 
follows, other suggested translations for semantic constants will 
continue to be provided from time to time, with the understanding 
that they are to be taken with a grain of salt. 
5.2.2.2 IV' and sentence formation 
5.2.2.2.1 Copula of identity 
To, form sentences, proposition-level IV's are joined with 
proposition-level T's. One simple way to form an IV' is with the 
proposition-level be of category IV'/T', which maps proposition- 
level terms into proposition-level intransitive verbs. 
R50. If a6 BIV, /T, and 
ß6 PT' then (a, ß) E PIVý. 
Realisation: a r. 8 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R51. If aE PT, and ßE PIV, then (a, ý8} c Pt 
Realisation: a r. 8 
A 
Translation: a' ( $' ) 




/T,, -(that (t/IV')/t' 
{JohnT, swim IV}t, Rl}t/IV,, R41 IV,, R50 t, R51 
Realisation: The fact is that John swims. 
Translation: 
1. (that, (John, swim))t/IV, XRR(A[swim'(j)]) 
seeprevious examples 
A 
2. beIV, /T, -> 
XRXpR( Aq[paq]) Basic. .. 
3. {be,. {that, (John, swim))) IV, 
AAA 
XRXpR( Xq[p-q]) ( XRR( [swim'(j)])) From 1,2 by R50 
4. -lp[p - [swi'(j)]] Lambda conversion 
5. -{the, fact)t/2IV, r X RVpI[Aq[fact'(q) H q-p1] & R(pl)] 
See previous examples 
6. ((the, fact), (be, (that, (John, swim))))t 
XRVp1[Aq[fact'(q) H q-p1] & R(p1)] (AXp[p - 
A[swim'(j)]]) 
From 4, "5 by R51 
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7. Vpl[Aq[fact'(q) H q-pl] & pl - ý[swim'(j)J) 
Lambda conversion 







(that(t/IV')/t' (Mar'T' singly)t, 
Rl)t/IV', -R41)IV', R5O)t, R51 
Realisation: The belief of John is that Mary sings. 
Translation: Vp[Aq[believe*(j, q) H q-p] &p- A[sing'(m)]] 
5.2.2.2.2 Copula of predication 
5.2.2.2.2.1 Basic ADJ's and PNOM's 
The copula of predication, beIV'/PRED" makes IV's out of 
various members of PRED', which is a cover category for (Pt/3t U 




If aE BIV' /PRED and ,BC PPRED' then (a, ß) E PIV , 
Realisation: ar -"R 
Translation: '- 
R53. If aE PCN, then (a(n), a) E PPNOM'' 
Realisation: a(n) ^a 
Translation: a' 
Adjectives like falset/3t and oddt/4t are basic -PRED's in this 
fragment, and they can appear in predicate position without any 
recourse,. to dummy noun deletion or . any- other 
transformation. 
Delacruz (1976) follows Montague's precedent for adjective analysis 
even-at proposition level, so all his proposition-level adjectives 
are basic members of the category CN'/CN'. The arguments against 
this approach are the same as those used to support my analyses at 
the individual level (see Chapters 2 and 3) and will not be repeated 
here. 
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Realisation: The proposition is false. 
Translation: Vp(Aq(proposition I(q) H q-p] & false'(p)] 
Predicate nominals of category t/5t (or PNOM') are constructed by 
adding, apparent indefinite articles to CN's. 
_ 
The following example 
assumes that factCN I 
translates as fact ". 
(47) ((that(t/IV')/t' (John 
T' swimlV)t, Rl)t/IV', R41' 
(beIV'/PRED" (a, factCN')PNOM', 
R53)IV', R52)t, R51 
Realisation: That John swims is a fact. 
A 
Translation: fact'( [swim'(j)]) 
If fact translates as CN' P[ P]. then the translation 
in (47) would 
be swim'(j) (see Section 5.2.2.1). 
5.2.2.2.2.2 -Adjectives taking PP-TO complements 
Berman (1973a: 221-222; see also Postal 1971: 45) identifies a 
small class of adjectives, including clear, unbelievable, Inconceivable, 
Important and obvious, which optionally take PP-TO complements and 
combine with proposition-lever terms. 
8 
(48) That: John is" ill is clear (to Mary). 
The status of these adjectives as proposition-level operators is 
fairly uncontroversial, but the treatment of the prepositional phrase 
is more difficult. If obvious is translated as a one-place predicate 
of propositions, the translation of (48) would be something like 
(49), with to Mary acting as some kind of sentence adverbial. 
(49) to-Mary' (* [obvious, ( ̂  [ill' (j) ]) ]) 
That would leave obvious'(p), for any proposition p, as something 
which could be evaluated as it is in any world, including the real 
one. The problem here is that the obviousness of a proposition is 
relative to psychological states, much like knowledge and belief. 
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This points to letting the PP-TO phrase supply an individual argument 
for obvious, which translates as a two-place relation between 
individuals and propositions. This approach is especially attractive 
given examples like (50a) 'and (51a), which have closely related 
paraphrases based on two-place verbs. 
(50) a. It is unbelievable to John that Mary cheats. 
b. John cannot believe that Mary cheats. 
(51) a. It is conceivable to Mary that John cheats. 
b. Mary can conceive that John cheats. 
I have therefore assigned this class to the category (t/3t)/PP-TO. 
One way to show the relationship of these adjectives to verbs is to 
give them explicit translations in terms of the two-place relations 
which translate the verbs. 
(52) apparent XPXpP( Xy[appear*(y, p))) 
clear XPXpP( Xy[clearx(y, p))) 
conceivable XPXpOP( Xy[conceive *(y, p)]) 
evident XPXpP(ýXy[evident*(y, p)]) 
The following rules are generalised to handle basic two-place 
adjectives like cleat, derived two-place adjectives and other similar 
derived operators to be discussed later. 
>, _.. R54.. If a6 P(t/nt)/PP-TO and /3 C 'PPP-TO then, (a: ßßj c Pt/nt 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,6)). 
Realisation: a^ ýB 
A Translation: a'( 
R55. If ac P(t/nt)/PP-TO then (a) e Pt/nt 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,6)). 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'( XPVz[P(z)]) 
Using these rules, it is possible to handle-examples such as (53) and 
(54). 





That Bill cheats is clear to John. 
A 
clear* (j, [cheat'(D)]) 
That Bill cheats is obvious. 
A 
Vz [ obvious x (z, [cheat' (b) ]) ] 
As with many other examples in the fragment, (54') shows that the 
hole left by a missing optional argument is filled with a bound 
variable. This is much the same as the treatment of bare passives as 
in (55). 
(55) John is loved. 
(55') Vz[love*(z, j)] 
of course, this solution for a bare obvious has all the drawbacks 
already noted for a bare past participle such as loved (see Chapter 3 
note 16). First, the logical form, involving a quantifier, is 
somewhat divorced from the syntactic form. Second, the translation 
with an existential quantifier often appears too weak; when we claim 
that a proposition is clear, we often mean that it is clear to, or 
believed by, some significant number of people-one will hardly 
suffice. In discourse, the bare adjectives clear and obvious are 
often applied to propositions as a form of social coercion; that is, 
to assert that p is obvious is often pragmatically equivalent to 
everyone (and, therefore, you) should believe p. These are general 
problems also noted by Bach (1980: 333-334), and their investigation, 
which would lead far away from adjectives, cannot be pursued here. 
5.2.2.2.2.3 Adjectives taking PP-FOR complements 
Whereas the PP-TO complements of adjectives like obvious 
optionally supply subjects of two-place relations, the PP-FOR 
complements of adjectives like beneficial and Inconvenient generally 
appear to supply direct objects of two-place relations. compare the 
following pairs. 
(56) a. That Mary is coming is inconvenient for John. 
b. That-Mary is coming inconveniences John. 
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(57) a. It is beneficial for Mary that John is rich. 
b. It benefits Mary that John is rich. 
I have proposed the category (t/4t)/PP-FOR for these adjectives; but 
the membership is debatable, and individual lexical items can behave 
idiosyncratically. One possible way to handle this class is to give 
explicit translations to individual entries as in (58). All the 




XPXpP( Xy[harm*(p, y)J) 




XPXpP( Xy[help*(p, y)J} 
-. fortunate, XPXpP( Xy[benefit*(p, y)]) 




XP1pP( Xy[harm*(p, y)]) 
helpful XPXpP( Xy[helpx(p, y)]) 
, 
-inconvenient XPXpP{A Xy[inconvenience (p, y)]) 
lucky XPXpP( Xyfbenefit*l(p, y)]) 
pleasant ; -_ 
A 
XPXpP( Ay[please. (p, y)]) 
profitable XPXpP( Xy[profit*(p, y)]) 
unfortunate 
A 
XPXpP( Xy[harm*(p, y)]} 
unlucky - 1PXpP(ly[harm*(p, y)]) 
unpleasant XPXpP(AXy[displease*(p, y)]) 
useful 
A 
XPXpP( Xy[benefit, (p, y))) 
However, given the idiosyncratic nature of-, these adjectives, - the 
harmfulness or-benefit reflected in the translations above is better 
shown through meaning postulates. For instance 
A 
APAp[8(P)(p) - P( lx[harm*(p, x)]}] ." 
where 6 translates bad, harmful, Inconvenient 
APAp[a(P)(p) - P(A Xx[benefit*(p, x)]}] ", 
where ýö translates beneficial, convenient, fortunate, 
good, helpful, useful 
Whether explicit defin itions or meaning postulates are used, the 
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following' rules will effecth the'' necessary syntactic and semantic 
combinations. 
R56. If aE 'P(t/4t )/PP-FOR and ,ßE PPP-FOR 
then (a, G3) C Pt/4t. 
Realisation: a 1.8 
A 
Translation: a'( Q' ) 
R57. 
, 






Translation: W( XPVz[P(z)]) 
As will be seen below, derived members of P(t/4t)/PP-FOR such as 
disappointing can be formed from disappoint, and other verbs of category 
IV'/T. For now we can handle examples-such as (59). 
(59)" {{the(t/2IV')/CN'' situationCNý}t/2IV, R42' 
,..... 




R23)t/4t, R56)IV', R52)t, R51 
Realisation: The situation is bad for Mary. 
Translation: a. (semantic constant approach) 
Vp[Aq[situation'(q) Hq=p] & harm*(p, m)] 
1. " b. (relying on meaning postulates) 
VP[Aq[situation '(q) H q=p] & bad*(p, m)] 
Rule R57 allows the PP-FOR complement to be omitted syntactically) 
semantically the effect is to fill. the direct object slot with an 
existentially quantified variable. 
5.2.2.2.2.4 Individual-level adjectives with t IV' complements 
There are two classes of individual-level adjectives in the 
fragment "which take that-t 'complements. The first is of category 
ADJ/(t/IV') and includes the adjectives in (60): 4 This class was 
recognised by Lees (1963: 22,81-82). 
(60) afraid, aware, certain, confident, conscious, 
sure, suspicious 
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Afraid is historically related to the archaic verb affray ('frighten') 
A 
and might be translated as XR XzR( kq[frighten (q, z)]) or perhaps 
XRXzR(Akq[fear*(z, q)]). Similarly, suspicious is related to suspect 
and could translate as XR kzR(Xq[suspect, (z, q)]). The other words 
seem to be loosely related to know, believe, realise or assert (perhaps 
assert forcefully) . In this case, there is little doubt that it is 
better in the end to let an adjective like certain translate as the 
two-place relation certain', and force any intuitive consequences with 
meaning postulates. -R58 handles these basic examples -. 
and some 
derived ones tobe presented later. 
R58. If acP n(t/IV, ) and 
ßEP 
/ t/IV' 
then (a, ß) e PADJ (where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: a r. 8 
Translation: a'( 81) 
Assuming, for purposes of exposition, that afraid does translate in 







(beIV/PRED' . i11ADJ)IV, 
R2 t' Rl)t/IV', R41}ADJ, R58 IV,, R2 t, Rl 
Realisation: John is afraid that Mary is ill. '' 
'Translation: 
-[that, (Mary, (be, ''ill)}}t/IV, ' XRR(A[ill'(m)]) 
See previous examples 
2. afraid )/(t/IV') XRXzR( Aq[fear*(z, q)]) 
Basic 
- ýr 3. (afraid, (that, (Mary, (be, ill)}}) - ADJ 
XRXzR( Xq[fear*(z, q)]) ( XRR( [ill'(m)]) ) 
From 1,2 by R58 
4. Xz[fear*(z, A[ill'(m)])] Lambda conversion 
5+. belt//PRED 
. 
XP[ P] Basic 
v 





(be, (afraid, (that, (Mary, (be, ill))))) IV 
XP( P] ( AXz[fear*(z, A[ill'(m)] )] ) From 4,5 by R2 
lz[fear*(z, (ill'(m)])] Lambda conversion 
JohnT '+ XPP(j) ` Proper name - 
(John, (be, (afraid, (that, (Mary, (be, ill)))))) 
XPP(j) (Aaz[fear*(z, A[ill'(m)])]) From 7,8 by R1 
A 
fear*(j, [ill'(m)]) Lambda conversion 
of course, another reading of afraid conveys sorrow or regret-rather 
than actual fear. - 
The lexical rule R59 allows some of these adjectives to appear 









(62) (Bill , (be , (afraid T IV/PRED ADJ/(t/IV')}ADJ, 
R59)IV, R24, Rl 
Realisation: Bill is afraid. 
-. Translation: Vq[fear (b; q)] 
Another treatment for a bare afraid, perhaps involving a separate 
yes 
reading, is simply to classify it as a basic ADJ with the translation 
afraid'. The sentence John is afraid would then translate as 
afraid'(j). This would be an especially appropriate solution for a 
reading in which a person is afraid without there being anything 
actually frightening him. 
A second class of adjective, of category ADJ/2(t/IV') is 
syntactically, similar to the class just discussed, but presents very 
different problems for interpretation. 
41 
(63) angry, bitter, ecstatic, furious, glad, grateful, happy, 
sad, sorry, thankful, proud 
, 'These adjectives 
take t/IV' complements as in (64). 
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(64) John is glad that Mary is well. 
Such adjectives have been noticed by Lees (1963: 81), Quirk et a!. 
(1972: 824) and Silva & Thompson (1977: 111). Both Silva & Thompson 
and Jespersen (1940: Pt. V, p. 259) suggest that such sentences are 
properly read with since or because as in (64'). 
(64') John is glad BECAUSE Mary is well. 
Before resorting to because or cause in translating these sentences, 
it would be well to examine the less drastic alternatives. If glad 
Y ry 
simply translates as a two-place relation glad', we would get 
derivations and readings like the following. 
(65) John is glad that Mary is wellt 
John T 
be glad tha Mary is well1V 
belt/ PES glad that Mary is well 
glad J/(t/IV') 
that Mary is wellt/IV' 
(65') gladt(j, [well'(m)] ) 
This analysis treats glad' like believe': or think' as two-place 
relations between an individual and a proposition. Two considerations 
argue strongly against this treatment. First, glad and the other 
ADJ/2(t/IV') examples appear to be solidly related to one-place 
rather than to: two-place predicates. G/ed' intuitively takes a single 
argument as in (66'). If,. glad' were a two-place relation as in 
(65'), then (66) would need to translate as something like (66"). 
= (66) John is glad. 
j66') glad' (j ) 
(66") Vp[glad*(j. p)] 
The second consideration is that there exist recognisable two-place 
relations based on the adjectives in question. 
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Happy is non-morphologically related to the verbs cheer (up) or 
please, and thankful is close in meaning to grateful. In addition, all 
ADJ/2(t/IV') forms join with make to form two-place relations: 
make-sad'. make-glad', make-happy', etc. 
(68) That Mary is well makes John glad/angry/sad/bitter. 
Make-glad' or gladden' could paraphrase as 'cause to be happy', or, 
like the generative semanticists, 'cause to become happy' (Dowty 
1976). In any case, the existence of gladden' and make-glad' make it 
very difficult to see glad' as other than a one-place predicate. For 
these reasons I. have chosen to analyse this small class of adjectives 
in terms of the CAUSE relation. 
9 The members of the ADJ/2(t/IV') 
class will receive translations as in (69). 
. (69) angry 
ARXzR(^Xq[CAUSE(Vq, angry'(z))]) 
bitter XRX zR (%q[CAUSE('q, bitter' (z)) ]) 
glad XRXzR(Xq[CAUSE(Vq, glad'(z))]) 
The examples in this class all exemplify human emotions or perhaps 
reactions. If they constitute a distinguishable subclass ADJe of 
ADJ, we can lexically derive the ADJ/2(t/IV') class from them. 
R (lexical). If ac PADJe then (a) E BA0J/2(t/IV' 
Realisations a 
Translation: XRXzR (%q[CAUSE(vq, a' (z)) j) 
Yet another possibility, that of defining this class of adjectives in 
terms of make-ADJ readings, will be discussed in Section 
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5.2.2.2.3.1. Accepting the present translations shown in (69) and 
using R58, (70) shows a sample derivation. 
(70) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED, (gladADJ/(t/IV')' 
(that(t/IV')/t' (MaryT, (belt//PRED' 
we11ADJ)IV, R2)t, Rl)t/IV', 
R41)ADJ, R58)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: John is glad that Mary is well. 
Translation: CAUSE(well' (m ), glad'(j) ) 
5.2.2.2.3 Verbal IV's 
5.2.2.2.3.1 The IV' T and IV' 
2T 
transitive verbs 
The IV'/T and IVY/2T classes of transitive verb map individual- 
level terms into proposition-level IV's; basic members include 
Interest, surprise, bother and annoy. These verbs all appear to have 
corresponding twins of category TV, and their syntax is very similar. 
(71) a. John bothers Mary. 
b. That John cheats bothers Mary. 
R60 is much like R3. 
R60. If aE PIV, /nT and 
ßc PT then (a, Q) E PIV' 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: ((make, 8ADJ) IV'/T' 
RT) 




Examples are straightforward. 




Realisation: That John swims bothers Mary. 
w 
Translation: bother, '( [swim'(j)], m) 
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Derived IV'/Ts are formed with make, which is of category 
(IV'/T)/ADJ. 
R61. If ac -P( iV'/T)/ADJ and 
ßE PýJ then (a, ß) E PIV/T' 
Realisation: ar -', B - 
A 
Translation: a(ßt) 
This allows the generation of IV'/Ts like make sad, which are 
discontinuously realised around their T direct objects as in make 
Mary sad. 
(73) ((that(t/IV')/t' (John,, (beiV/FRED' 
T 
i11ADJ)IV, 
R2)t, Rl)t/IV', R41' 
((make(IV'/T)/ADJ' sadADJ)IV'/T, R61' 
MaryT)IV', 
R60)t, R51 
. Realisations That John 
is ill makes Mary sad. 
Translation: 
1. make(IV'/T), ADJ '=' make' Basic 
2. sadADJ sad' Basic 
3. (make, sad)IV'/T '> make'( sad') From 1,2 by R61 
4. MaryT = XPP(m) Proper name 
5. ((make, sad), Mary)IV, make'("sad')(*Xpp(m)) 
From 3; ~ 4 by R60 
6. (that, , 
(John, (be, ill))}t/IV' XRR(m[ill'(j)]) 
See previous examples 
7. ((that, (John, (be, ill))), ((make, sad), Mary)) t 
XRR( [ill'(j)])( [make'( sad' )( XPP(m) )] ) 
From 5,6 by R51 
8. make'(sad' )( XPP(m) )(A[ill'(j )]) Lambda conversion 
M. P. P7 allows this result to be expressed in terms of CAUSE. 
M. P. P7. APAPApO[make '(P)(P)(p) CAUSE('p, P(P))] 
Using this meaning postulate, we can derive CAUSE(ill' (j ), sad' (m) ) 
from line 8 of example (73). Of course, by treating make( IV'/T)/ADJ 
as a semantic constant, giving it the translation XPXPXp[CAUSE(Vp, 
Beesley - LIA Adjectives 
P(P))], we can get the same'result and dispense with M. P. P7. 
This-suggests another analysis for the ADJ/(t/IV') adjectives 
like 'glad and sad discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.2.4. If basic glad, 
sad and the other examples translate as one-place predicates and 
belong to a distinguishable subcategory ADJe of ADJ, then the 
following is'a lexical rule relating them to ADJ/2(t/IV')s. 
R (lexical). If a , e'PADJe then (a) C BADJ/2(t/IV' ). 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XRXzR("Xq[make'("a' )("XPP(z))(q)]) 
The CAUSE relationship intuitively recognised in sentences like (74) 
would then be explicable by way of M. P. P7. 
<74) John is glad that Mary is well. -° 
For basic causative IV'/Ts like sadden and aledden. one could 
translate them directly as sadden' and gladden', indirectly 
XPXp{make'{'4sad')(P)(p)]' and XPXp[make'(Aglad')(P)(p)], or 
less directly in terms of CAUSE. The first alternative 
illustrated in example (75). ý - 
(75), ((that(t/IV')/t' (John 
T; 
(beIV/PRED' illADJ) 




Realisation: That John is ill saddens Mary. 




We can then supplement the analysis with meaning postulates like 
those in (76) or (77)'. ' 
(76) APApO[sadden "(P)(p) -ý make'('*sad')(P)(p)] 
APApO(gladden'(P)(p) -> make '(ýglad')(P)(p)] 
(77), APApO[sadden'(P)(p) -3 CAUSE( 
v p, PC sad, ))]] 
APApO[ gladden' (P) (p) -3 CAUSE( vp, P {glad')) ]] 
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The grammar leaves the choices open. 
Verbs of category IV/T, such as amuse, but not- those of 
category IV'/2T, -such as delight, also form adjectivals with an -Ing 
suffix. Both IV'/Ts and, IV'/2Ts form passives. ", 11 
R62 (lexical). If ac PIV'/T then (a, ING) E P(t/4t)/(t/nIV) 
(where n ranges over the set (2,5); t/2IV is PP-TO and 
t/5IV is PP-FOR). 
Realisation: all, -where-all is a with the main verb 
in the -ing -form 
Translation: a' 
R63. If, a'E BIV, /nT then '(a, 'PASS) ,E PADJ/(t/IV' ) 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: a '' , where all is a with the main verb in 
the past participle form 
Translation: -XRXxRA Xp[a'( 
A 
XPP(x))(p)]) 
R64. If aE BIV'/nT then (a, PASS) E PADJ/PP-BY' 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: all, where all is a with the main verb in 
the past participle form, - 
Translation: XRXxR( Xp[a'(%PP(x))(p)]) 
R65. If aE PADJ/PP-BY" an, .8E PPP-BY' then (a, ß)-E Pte 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( 'B') 
R66. If aC BPP-BY'/(t/2iV, ) and 
ßc Pt/21V, then (a, Q) C PPP-BY'' 
a^ß Realisation: 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R67. If aE PADJ/PP-BY' then (a) E PADJ 
. Realisation: a 
Translation: a'( XRVq[R(q)]) 
Beesley -i-ýq-, Adjectives 
As at individual level (compare R20 and R62), present 
participles, of transitive verbs take PP-TO or PP-FOR phrases 
idiosyncratically. Thus while (interestlV, /T, 
ING) would appear to 
be most naturally categorised as a (t/4t)/PP-TO, (borelV, /T' ING) 
is 
more comfortably classified as a (t/4t)/PP-FOR. Semantically there 
is no difference between the two, constructions as PP-TO and PP-FOR 
phrases translate with the same type.. 
(78) a., -- That John is in gaol is interesting 
to me. 
b: That Mary`has°been'arrested again is boring for me. 
The syntactic alternation in PP 'complements is also noted in some 
basic members of (t/4t )/PP-FOR such as beneficial, helpful and 
Instructive. They are capable, with varying degrees of acceptability, 
of taking PP-TO complements as well. 




(80) This situation is instructive for us 
t0 us, 
This being the case, we might well include such adjectives as"basic 
members of B( t/4t)/PP_, which 
has so, far , been left empty. 
Other candidates for Bit/4th/pp_To include adjectives like 
delightful and bothersome, which, are idiosyncratically related to the 
IV/2Ts delight and bother. The only other two members of IV'/2T listed 
are bug and chuff. The existence of forms like delightful and 
bothersome, plus the newness of the slang words bug and chuff, 
accounts for the separateness of the IV'/2T class and their 
resistance to taking adjectival ING forms. 
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An example of present participle formation for an IV'/T verb 
Interest is shown in (82). 





R2)t, R1)t/IV', R41' 
(beIV'/PRED,, ((interestIV'/T, ING)(t/4t)/PP-TO, R62' 
(topp-TO/T' Bil1T}PP-TO, 
R10)t/4t, R54)IV', R52? t, R51 
Realisation: That John is ill is interesting to Bill. 
Translation: 
1. interestlV, /T 
# interest' Basic 
2. (interest, ING)(t/4t)/PP-TO interest' 
From 1 by R62 
3. (to, Bill)Pp_TO XPP(b) See previous examples 
4. ((interest, ING), (to, Bill))t, 4t -> interest'( XPP(b)) 
From 2,3 by R54 
5. belV'/PRED' XR[YR] Basic 
6. (be, ((interest, ING), (to, Bill))) IV, 
XR[vR] (A(interest'(AXPP(b))]) From 4,5 by R52 
7. 
A 
interest'( XPP(b)) Lambda conversion 
8. (that, (John, (be, ill)))t/IV, 7=> XRR(A[ill'(j)]) 
See previous examples 
9. ((that, (John, (be, ill))), (be, (( interest, ING), 
(to, Bill)}})t XRR(A[ill'(j)]) ("[interest'(AAPP(b))]) 
From 7,8 by R51 
10. interest'(A)PP(b))([ill'(j)]) Lambda conversion 
11. AXPP(b) (AXy[interest*(A[ill'(j)], y)]) 
First-order reduction 
12. interest*( (ill'(j)], b) Lambda conversion 
The constituent (interest IV'/T ' ING)(t/4t)/PP-TO can be 'bumped' 
to a t/4t by the relation-reducing rule R55, allowing the proper 
generation and translation of sentences with patientless present 
participles such as That John is Ill Is Interesting (see Section 
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5.2'. 2.2.2.2). 
The passives of basic IV'/T verbs behave as individual-level 
ADJS. As the propositional subject of an IV'/T like bother can 
hardly be called an agent, I shall adopt the terms bare and lull, 
rather than agentless. and agentive, when speaking of these passive 
examples. Full -passives'of IV'/T verbs come in both `a by and a by- 
less form. As the translation of the "passive verb is the same in 
both cases, the difference is purely syntactic. 
(83) Full passive, by-form 






CNI)t/2IV', R42)PP-BY', R66)ADJ, R65)IV, R2)t, Rl 
"Realisation: John is astonished by the'fact. 
Translation: Vp[Aq[fact'(q) H q-p] & astonish*(p, j)] 
The translation of (83) is, of course, the same as that for the 
sentence the fact astonished John. By-less passives are very similar 
but simply apply 'to a proposition-level term, in particular a t/IV', 
rather than to a prepositional phrase based on a t/2IV' term. 
(84) Full passive, "by=less förna'T 





singly)t, Rl)t/IV', R41)ADJ, R58)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: John is astonished that Bill sings. 
A 
Translation: astonish*( [sing'(b)], j) 
The ` translation of (84) is equivalent to that for the sentence that 
Bill sings astonishes John. The bare passive analysis simply fills the 
missing argument 'slot with a quantified variable, as with agentless 
passives at the individual level. 
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(85) Bare passive 
(Bi11T' (belt//PRED' ((astonishlV,, T, 
PASS) ADJ/PP-BY', R64)ADJ, R67)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: John was astonished. 
Translation: Vp[astonish*(p,, j)] 
There are, understandably, "many similarities between passives of TVs 
(i. e. of IV/Ts) and passives of IV'/T verbs. One difference is the 
existence of a by-less passive for the IV'/T class. Another 
difference is that ~-able forms, which are closely related to 
passives, can be 'generated from TVs' but not at all easily from 
IV'/Ts. Such IV'/T -able forms would make perfect' sense, but it 
seems that, on the whole, English speakers have not exploited them. 
(86) ? John is astonishable that Mary swims. 
(86, ', ) *[astonish*( [swim'(m)], j)] 
5.2.2.2.3.2 Other verbal IV's 
The fragment contains a°"number of examples of verbal IV's, 
including some questionable basic ones like suffice. 
(87) That John survivedsuffices., 
(e7 ") 
. suffice, 
( [survive' (j) ]) 
Some more solid examples include IV'/PP-TOs like matter and make- 
sense. Sentences like (88) and (89) can be generated and translated 
with the rules'R54 and R55 defined in Section 5.2.2.2.2.2. 
(88) That John survived matters to Mary. 
A 
(88') matter(, (survive'(])], m) 
, 
(89) That John survived matters. 
A 
(89') Vz[matter*( [survive' (7 )], Z)] 
Much more common are proposition-level predicates which require the 
subject term to be postposed, with a dummy it being placed at the 
beginning of, the sentence. Such predicates, like happen, are 




If a E- Pt, IV; and- 
PE Pt/6t then (a, ß) E Pt. 
Realisation: It r ", G ̂ a 
A 
13' ) Translation: ' a, ( 




Realisation: It happens that John is ill. 
Translation: 
1. happent/6t --> happen' Basic 
2. . -(that, (John, 
(be, ill)))t/IV' `c>, ). RR( [ill'(j)]) 
See previous examples 
-3. ((that, (John,, (be, ill))), -happen)t 
AA 
XRR( [ill'(j)]) ( happen') From 1,2 by R68 
A 
4. happen'( [ill'(j)]) Lambda conversion 
Note that the regular subject-predicate realisation for t/6ts is 
blocked. 




R68 also specifies that the subject of a t/6t must be a t/IV' rather 
than a t/2IV'; this blocks the production of ungrammatical sentences 
like those in (92). 
(92) *It happens the fact. 
may be 
turns out 
Seem and appear are of category (t/6t)/PP-To and are manipulated by 
R54 and R55 to generate sentences like (93) and (94). The object 
specified in the PP-TO phrase is optionally omissible. 
(93) It seems to John that Mary is ill. 
(94) It appears that John is angry. 
The transitive verb strike, of category (t/6t)/T, is much like an 
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IV'/T except that the resulting intransitive verb requires 
postposition ofthe subject. 
R69. If aE B(t/6t)/T and ßE PT then (a, ß) E Pt/6t. 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ßt) 
(95) It strikes me that John hates Mary. 
(96) *That John hates Mary strikes me. 
Finally, it is possible for any IV' formed thus far to act like a 
t/6t, causing the postposition of a t/IV' subject. The easiest way 
to allow this is to provide a rule to bump any IVY into a t/6t, but 
not vice-versa. Neither the realisation nor the translation is 
affected. 
R70. If aE PIV, then (a) E Pt/6t. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a' 
(97) should be compared to (82). 





R2)t, Rl)t/IV', R41' 
({beIV'/PRED" ((interestlV'/T, ING)(t/4t)/PP-TO, 
R62' 
(toPP-TO/T' Bi11T)PP-TO, 
R10)t/4t, R54)IV', R52)t/6t, R70) t, R68 
Realisation: It is interesting to Bill that John is ill. 
Translation: interest*, ( [ill' (j) ], b) 
5.2.2.2.4 Individual-level IVs involving T' objects 
The fragment contains two classes of verb, of categories IV/T' 
and IV/(t/IV'), which map proposition-level terms into individual- 
level IVs. Examples of the IV/T' class, which take either that-t or 
the-CN' terms, include believe and assert; examples of the IV/(t/IV' ) 
class, which take only that-t terms, include claim and conclude. These 
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are essentially transitive verbs which take higher-level objects. 
Semantically, belief and similar notions like assertion will be 
represented as relations between individuals and propositions as in 
PTQ. However, Montague (PTQs250) and Bennett (1975: 10-11) fail to 
treat that-t constructions as any kind of constituent] they instead 
have basic verbs like believe-that and assert-that of category IV/t, 
which apply to sentences. The following treatment uses the same 
analysis of proposition-level terms used so far and is 'based largely 
on the analysis in Delacruz (1976: 189). The following rules are 
needed. 
R71. IfcxE PIV/T', and 8c PT ' 
then (a, ß) ¬P1,,. 
Realisations {{y (IV/T 
. 
)/PPTO 8PP-TO}IV/T', ßt/2IV'' 
y^a^b 
else a^ß 
, Translation: a'( ß') 
R72. If aE PIV/(t/IV') and ßE Pt/IV' then (a, ß) E PIV. 
Realisation: a r". 8 
A: 
Translation: a'( ß') 
(98) (MaryT, (believe, 
V/T', 
(that(t/IV')/t' 
(JohnT, swim lV)t R1}t/IV', R41)IV, R71}t, RI 
Realisation: Mary believes that John swims. 
Translation: 
1. (that, (John, swim)) XRR( [swim'(j)]) 
See previous examples 
2. believelV/T, -0 believe' Basic 
3. (believe, (that, (John, swim))} IV 
AA 
believe'( XRR( [swim' (j) ])) From 1,2 by R71 
4. MaryT -> XPP(m) -, Proper name 
. "5. (Mary, (believe, (that, (John, swim))))t -> 
AAA 
XPP(m) ( [believe'( XRR( [swim'(j)]))]) 
From 3,4 by Rl 
AA 
6. ' believe, ( XRR( [swim' (j) ]))(m) Lambda conversion 
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7. mXR. R( [swim'(j)]) (*ap[believel(m, p)]} First-order reduction 
w 
8. believe*(m, [swim'(j)]) Lambda conversion 
A similar derivation is given to a sentence like (99), where the 
direct object is of the form the-CN'. 
(99) Mary believed the lie. 
The IV/(t/IV') class, on the other hand, can apply to proposition- 
level terms only of the form that-t. 
(100) (JohnT, (hopeIV/(t/IV')S (that(t/IV')/t' 
(MaryT, survive1V)t, R1)t/IV', R41)IV, R72)t, R1 
Realisation: John hopes that Mary survived. 
a Translation: hope*(j, [survive'(m)]) 
Ungrammatical examples like those in (101) are not generated by the 
rules of the grammar. 




A number of modal sentence adjectives, or adjectivals, are 
syntactically or lexically related to verbs of category IV/T'. These 
include passives (agentive and agentless) and -able forms. Many of 
these in turn underly modal sentence adverbs, which will be discussed 
in Chapter 6.. 
The rules for IV/T' and IV/(t/IV') passive formation, both 
agentive and agentless, are much like those for other varieties of 
transitive verb. 
R73. If ac (P IV/T' 
U PIV/(t/IV, 
)) then (a, PASS) E Pit/3tß/PP-BY' 
Realisation: a'', where a'' is a with the main verb in the 
past participle form 
Translation: XPApP( Xy[a'(AXRR(p))(y)l) 
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R74. if ac P(t/3t)/PP-BY and QC PPP-BY then (a,. Q) E Pt/3t. 
Realisation: a^Q 
A 
Translation: a'( Q') 
R75. If_a E P(t/3t)/PP-BY then (a) e Pt/3t. 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: W( XPVz(P(z)I) 
The resulting passives such as believed and believed by John act like 
basic t/3t adjectives such as true and false. 
(102) That Mary is ill is true. 
Jfalse. 
ibelieved. 
believed by John. 
(103) ((the(t/2IV, )/CN,, 
factCN, )t/2IV, 
R42' 
(be, , ,, " 
((believe 
,, PASS) 3t' IV /PRED IV/T (t/ )/PP-BY, R73' 
(byPP-BY/T' JohnT)PP-BY, 
R16}t/3t, R74}IV', R52)t, R51 
Realisation: The fact is believed by John. 
Translation: Vpl[Aq[fact'(q) H q-p1] & believe*(j, p1)] 
(104) ((that(t/IV')/t' (JohnT, cheat1V)t, R1}t/IV', R41' 
'((belV'/PRED,, ((believe, V, TPASS)(t/3t)/PP-BY, 
R73)t/3t,, R75}IV', R52}t/6t, R70}t, R68 
Realisation: It is believed that John cheats. 
Translation: Vy[believe *(y, [cheat' (j) ]) ] 
= This account does not, unfortunately, rule out the generation of 
sentences like those in (105), which feature passive adjectives 
formed from IV/(t/IV') verbs. 




That is, these verbs which require t/IV' (that-t) complements also 
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require t/IV'. _subjects when 
they are mapped into adjectivals. This 
suggests that the restriction may be selectional rather than 
categorial, in which case the rules are more restricting than they 
need be. The line between selection restrictions and syntactic, 
restrictions maybe truly fuzzy here. 
-Able forms based on IV/T' and', IV/(t/IV') verbs, such as 
believable, deducible and claimable vary somewhat in naturalness and 
acceptability. 
(106) a. It is 
b. It is 
c. It is 
d. It is 
Despite the uneasii 
making -able forms 
suggests that the 
productive. 
believable that John steals. 
believable by John that Bill fixes races. 
deducible by Mary that-Jane is guilty: 
supposable by Richard that-Roger eats frogs. 
less of some of these forms, the possibility of 
out of derived IV/T's, to be discussed below, 
rule needs to be syntactic and potentially 
R76. " If a E-(PIV/T' U PIV/(t/IV') 
then (a, ABLE) 6 P(t/3t)/PP-BY' 
Realisation: a"; where' a'' is 'a with theýmain 
verb in the--able form 
Translation: APXpOP("*lz[a'(. 1RR(p))(z)]) 









(beIV/PRED' guiltyADJ)IV, : 
R2)t, R1)t/IV', R41)t, R68 
Realisation: It is deducible by Bill that Dick is guilty. 
Translation: O(deduce*(b, (guilty. ' (d)])] 
Beesley -icy- Adjectives 
(108) ((that(t/IV')/t' (JohnT, cheatIV)t, 
R1)t/IV', R41' 
((beIV'/PREI', ((believe1V/T,, 
ABLE)(t/3t)/PP-BY, R76)t/3t, R75)IV', 
R52)t/6t, R70)t, R68 
Realisation: It is believable that John cheats. 
Translation: OVy[believe*(y, "[cheat'(y)])] 
5.2.2.2.5 Three-place verbs 
5.2.2.2.5.1 The (IV/T')/PP-TO class" 
The (IV/T' )/PP-TO class, including admit, announce, promise, say 
and "repeat, have an indirect object introduced with a' PP-TO phrase. 
They are much like the TV/PP-TO verb "give, ' except that the direct 
objects'are higher-level T's. 
(109) John gave the book to Mary. 
(110) John announced the fact, to Mary. 
When the direct object is a that-t `term, it normally gets postposed 
to the-PP-TO, as do heavy t/2IV's. 
(111) John announced to Mary that Bill was alive. 
(112) John announced to Mary the result which they 
had been expecting. 
The following rules are similar to those for the give verbs (compare 
R7). 
R77. If aC B(IV/T')/PP-To and QE PPP-TO then (a, C) E"PIV/T' 
Realisation: "a^ 19 
A 




then (a) E PIV/T' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'( XPVz[P(z)]) 
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(113) (John T; 
((announce(IV/T, )/PP--TO, (topp-TO/T, 




T survive IV)t, -R1)t/IV', -R41}IV; R71]t, -Rl- 
Realisation: John announced to Bill that Sue survived. 
Translation: announce*(j, [survive'(s)], b) 
The indirect object, slot can be, filled with an existentially- 
quantified variable by R78, resulting in 'sentences and translations 
as in (114). 
(114) John announced that Sue survived. 
(114') Vy[announce*(j, ^[survive'(s)], y)3 
The IV/T's generated from R77 and R78 are subject to', the previously 
defined IV/T' rules for passive, allowing the generation and' 
translation of sentences like (115). - 
(115) 'It was announced-(to Bill) (by John) that Sue survived: 
The interplay of combinational and relation-reducing rules allows the 
indirect object to Bill and the agent by John to be independently 
omissible. 
Like basic-. members of -IV/T', _derived 
members- can, sometimes 
awkwardly, take an -able form, and these are also interpretable with 
the rules already described. - 
(116) It is confessable (to Father Dominic) (by John) 
that he sinned. 
The verbs tell, recount and relate are assigned to 
B(IV/(t/2IV'))/PP-TO as they seem to prefer the-CN' subjects and 
complements. ' 
(117) John told the story to Bill. 
(118) ? John told that Sue survived to Bill. 
to Bill that Sue survived. 
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(119) The fact was told to Bill (by John). 
(120) ? That Mary survived was told to Hill (by John). 
Semantically, these verbs are like the (IV/T')/PP-TO verbs above, but 
their syntax is slightly more restricted. 
R79. If aE P(IV/(t/ZIV'))/PP-TO and 
ßc PPP_TO then (a, E PIV/(t/2IV')' 
Realisation: a"ß 
A 
Translation: a, ( , B' ) 
5.2.2.2.5.2 The TV/(t/IV') class 
There is another class of three-place verbs involving 
proposition-level terms which differ in syntax from the (IV/T')/PP-TO 
class. These are the TV/(t/IV')s, which include advise, assure, 
apprise, convince, Inform, persuade, reassure and another reading of 
promise and tell. These verbs are similar to the TV/T (or TTV) class, 
which includes allow and 'refuse at individual level. The difference 
is the TV/(t/IV') class apply to a higher-level T' object. 
(121) TTV (i. e. TV/T) example 
John refused Bill the money. 
(122)- TV/(t/IV ') ' example 
John assured Bill that Mary was well. 
The following rule is much like R9. 








3TV/(t/IV') and ßE Pt/IV' then (a, ß) E PT. 
a^ß 





Rl)t/IV', 'R41)TV, R80' Bi11T)IV, R3]t, Rl 
Mary informed Bill that John swims. 
inform* 
,, 
(m, b, ý[swim'(j)]) 
F. 
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Passives are derived from the derived TVs, in the usual way. 




T, _swim iV)t,, 
R1}t/IV', R41)TV, R8o' 
PASS) 
(t/5e)/PP-BY, 
R14}t/5e, R15)IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation: Bill was told that John swims. 
Translation: Vx[tell*(x, b, *[swim'(j)])] 
(125) Bill was told by Mary that John swims. 
(125') tell*(m, b, *[swim'(j)]) 
TellR, 
V, 
(t/IV') could be given the translation 
XRXPXy[tell ' (P)(R)(y) ], which would give "the translations of (124) 
and (125) in terms of the same tell' relation which translates 
tell(IV/(t/2IV'))/PP-TO' A similar solution suggests itself for 
promiseI i. e. promiseW/(t/IV') XRXPAy[promiseR(P)(R)(y)]. 
This treatment is directly parallel to that given to 'Dative' verbs 
like give in section 3.2 (see especially R8). 
5.2.2.2.5.3 The TV/PP-OFD class 
_, 
Many of the words in the TV/(t/IV') class, including inform, 
convince and tell, have twins in the TV/PP-OF' class. Semantically the 
two classes are identical. 
R81. If a E-BW/PP-OF' and QE PPP-OF' then (a, ß) E PN. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( Q') 
(126) (JohnT, ((inform/PP-CF', {ofPP-OF'/(t/2IV')' 
(the(t/2IV')/CN" factCN, )t/2IV', 
R42)PP-OF', R47)TV, R8l' 
8i11T}IV, 
R3)t, R1 
Realisation: John informed Bill of the fact. 
Translation: Vp[Aq[fact'(q) H q-p] & inform*(j, b, p)] 
The difference, of course, is that TV/PP-OF' verbs take prepositional 
phrase complements based on t/ iv, terms. The derived TVs such as 
2 
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-inform- of 
the fact can be passivised in the usual way, resulting in 
sentences like (127). 
(127) Bill was informed of the fact (by John). 
For TVs derived from 'the TV/(t/IV') and the TV/PP-OF' classes, the 
rule combining TVs with Ts to form IVs must be augmented'to allow the 
derived TVs to be realised 'discontinuously. The Rule R3 must now 
appear in this form: 
R3. If aE Pý and QE PT then (a, ß} E PIV" 
Realisation: ((T 
TTV' 
oT)TV, ßT}IV y^ß^o 
'8}^ DTV' PP-TO TV' '8T}IV 'Y 
ß0 0' 
((yTV/ADJ' aADJ)TV' QT)IV yQa 
(Cy 
TV/(t/IVI), 
öt/IV, }T. QT) 
IV 
ý' y^Q^ß 
((yTV/PP-OF'' ÖPP-OF')TV' QT)IV Y^Q^6 
else a^ß 
Translation: a'( Q') 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the rules which form the basic 
syntactic- structures at the proposition level. These rules are in 
many cases analogous to those at individual level, but their richness 
and characteristic restrictions provide a number of challenges for 
any levelling analysis. Chapter 6 continues the discussion of the 
proposition level by looking more closely at adjectives and other 
adjectivals. 
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Chapter 6. Adjectivals, adverbs and appositives at proposition level 
6.0 Introduction 
The proposition-level fragment illustrates a wealth of 
adjectival constructions, both basic and derived. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine their combination with'sentence adverbs, their 
behaviour as attributive modifiers of cN's, and their ability to 
modify non-restrictively. Finally, there is an analysis of 
appositives at proposition level. 
6.1 Adjectivals 
6.1.1 Proposition-level ADJVL's 
At the proposition level, ADJVL' is a cover category including 
(pt/3t U Pt/4t U Pt/7t)' The t/7t or REL' class has not been 
introduced yet; it consists of proposition-level relative clauses 
formed by abstracting a propositional variable out of a sentence. 
The following simplified rule will serve for the examples used 
herein. The notation in this rule is explained in Section 4.3.1. 
R82. If ac Pt and a is of the form {... itn... } 
then (a) E- FREU, . 
Realisation: THAT ^ {... litn'... } 
Translation: >pn(a'] 
A REL' translates as a one-place predicate of propositions, as in 
example (1). 
(1) ((JohnT, (believelV/T" itl(t/2IV'))IV, R71)t, Rl}REL', R82 
Realisation: that John believes 
Translation: 
1. itl(t/2IV') XRR(p1) Pronoun 
2. believelV/T, believe' Basic 
3. (believe, it1)IV '' believe'( XRR(p1)) 
From 1,2 by R71 
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4. JohnT 4 XPP(j) Proper name 
AA 
5. (John, (believe, it1}}t = XPP(j) ( [believe'( ), RR(p1})]) 
From 3,4byRl 
6. believe'(AXRR(p1))(j) Lambda conversion 
7. XRR(p1)(AXq[believe*(j, q)]) First-order reduction 
8. believeý, (j, p1) Lambda conversion 
9. ((John, (believe, itl))}REL, ). p1(believeK(j, pi)] 
From 8 by R82 
The class of ADJVL's now includes examples-from various sources. 
(2) a. basic t/3t 
b. ' derived t/3t. 
c. basic t/4t 
d. derived t/4t 
e. REL' 
true, false 
-clear (to Bill), believed 
(by John), 
announced (by John) (to Bill) 
odd, strange 
, 
interesting (to John), 
beneficial (for John) 
that John believes 
The key feature of ADJVL's is that they can be mapped into 
attributive modifiers of CN's. 
(3) a. a true statement, a false claim 
b. a (widely) believed proposition, a proposition believed 
by John, a clear idea, an idea clear to Mary, 
the announced opinion, the opinion announced (by John) 
(to Bill) 
c. an odd claim, a strange statement 
d. an interesting idea, an idea interesting to Mary, 
a proposal beneficial for John 
e. the proposition that John believes 
R83 creates attributive modifiers out of ADJVL's and R84 orders them 
relative 'to the CN's they modify. As at the individual level, 
attributive modifiers , with complements, such as prepositional 
phrases, need tobe postposed to the common nouns they modify. 
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R83. If 
_a 
C PADS then (at)-- E. PCN'/CN" 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XRXp[R(p) & at' (p )] 
R84. If a E'PCN , ICN' and 
ße PCN I 
then (a, ß) c P.,. 
Realisations . 
8r-1 a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^ß 
A' 
Translation: a'( ß') 
Semantically, attributive modification results in a conjunction 
analysis, just as at individual level. 















Realisation: The proposition believed by John is false. 
Translation: 
1. ((believe, PASS), (by, John)}t, 3t Xq[believe*. (j, q)] 
-: See previous examples 
2: --({(believe, PASS), (by, John)))CN'/CN' => 
XRXp[R(p) & Xq[believe*(j, q)](p)] From 1 by R83 
3. XRXp[R(p) & believe*(j, p)] Lambda conversion 
4. propositionCN, + proposition' Basic 
5. (proposition, (((believe, PASS), (by, John))))CN' 
XRXp[R(p) & believe*(j, p)] (^ proposition') 
From 3,4 by R84 
6. Ap(proposition'(p) & believe*(j, p)] Lambda conversion 
7. the(t12IV)/CN, 1R11RVP(Aq[RI{q) H q-p] & R(P)J 
Basic 
8. (the, (proposition, (((believe, PASS), (by, John)))))t/2IV, ' 
XR11RVp[Aq[RI(q) E-> q'p] & R(P) ] 
A 
( ), p[proposition'(p) & believe*(j, p)]) From 6,7 by R42 
ý,, ""ý .< 
 .-.. t. 
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9. XRVp[Aq[(proposition '(q) & believe*(j, q)) H q-p]-& R(p)] 
Lambda conversion 
10. (be, false)IVY- _=> false' See previous examples 
11. ((the, (proposition, (((believe, PASS), (by, John))))), 
(be, false)) 
t -41 
ARVp[Aq[(proposition '(q) & 
believe*(j, q)) H q-p] & R(p)] ( false') 
From 9, lO °by R51 
12. Vp[Aq[(proposition '(q) & believel(j, q)) H q-p] & false'(p)] 
Lambda conversion 
Other examples are all worked along the same lines. The proposition 
that John believes has the same translation (barring tense and aspect 
as usual) as the proposition believed by John. Adjectivals with 
argument slots filled by existentially quantified variables pose no 
difficulty. The following rather lengthy derivation is included to 
demonstrate the complex interaction of passive formation and 
relation-reduction in a derived attributive modifier. 
(5) (the (t/2IV, )/CN' , ,, 
(((((whisper(IV/T' 
)/PP-TO) IV/T' , R78' 
PASS}(t/3t)/PP-BY, 
R73)t/3t, R75)CN'/CN', R83' 
((proposal(CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO)CN'/PP-OF, 
R46)CN, 
R44)CN', R84)t/2IV',. R42 
Realisation: the whispered proposal 
Translations 
1. whisper(IV/T')/PP-TO -0 whisper' Basic 
2. (whisper)IV/T" = whisper'( XPVz[P(z)]) 
From 1 by R78 
3. ((whisper), PASS) (t/3t ), PP-BY 
ý XPXpP( Xy[whisper' ( XPVz[P(z)])( XRR(p))(y)] } 
From 2 by R73 
4. (((whisper), PASS)}t/3t 
XPXpP(*J, y[whisper' ( XPVz[P(z) ])(A). RR(P))(y)]) (' XQVxi[Q(xi) ]) 
From 3 by R75 
5. Xp[Vx1(whisper' (^), PVz[P(z) ])(AXRR(p))(x1)] ] 
Lambda conversion 
Beesley -113 - Adjectives 
6. Xp[Vxl[ XPVz[P(z)l( XY[ XRR(p)( Xq[whisper, ',, (x 
First-order reduction 
7. `Ap[Vx1[Vz[whisper*(xl, p, z)]]] -Lambda conversion 
8. ((((whisper), PASS))), CN'/CN' 
- ARXq[R(q) &-Ap(Vx1[Vz[whisper*(x11p, z)]]](q)] 
From 7 by R83 
"9. XRaq[R(q) & Vx1Vz[whisper*, (xl, q, z)]]-- Lambda conversion 
10. proposal(, CN, /PP-OF)/PP-TO --> ý_ 
XPXQXpP( ). x[Q( Xz1[propose*(z1, p, x)]) ]) 
Basic 
U. (proposal)CN,, PP-OF 
A XPXQXPP( Xx[Q( Xzl[propose. (zl, P, x)])]) ( APVx2[P(x2)]) 
From 10 by R46 
12. XQXp[_Vx2[Q(ýkz1[propose*(z1, p, x2)])]] 
Lambda conversion 
13. ((proposal))CN' l 
1QXP[VX2[Q(az1[propose*, (-, z , X2)])]] (AXPVyl[P(Y1)l) 
From 12 by R44 
14. Xp[Vx2[Vy1[propose*(yl, p, x2)]]] Lambda conversion 
15. (((((whisper), 'PASS))), ((proposal)))CN; 
XRlq[R(q) & Vx1Vz[whisper*(xl, q, z)]] 
(Axp[Vx2[VY1[Propose*(y1. p, x2)]]]) From 9,14 by R84 
16. Xq[Vx2[VY1[Propose*(yl, q, x2)]] & Vx1Vz[whisper*(xl, q, z)]] 
'-Lambda conversion 
17. the(t/2IV')/C. X R1XRVp[Ag1[R1(q1} H gIwpl & R(P)] 
Basic 
18. '(the, (((((whisper), PASS))), ((proposal))))t, 2IV' 
XR1XRVP[Agl[Rl(ql) H (11-p] & Rip)) 
(Alq[Vx2[VY1[Propose*(Yl, q, x2)]] & 
Vx1Vz[whisper*(x1, q, z)]]) From 16,17 by R42 
19. XRVp[Aq1[Vx2[VY1[Propose*(Yl, gl, x2)]] & 




6.1.2 Individual-level ADJVLs 
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- *-:  
At individual level, ADJVL is a cover category for (P 3U 
e t/ 
6 U Pt P 5 The category therefore includes basic ADJs like tall, e / t/ e 
red - and good; participles such as walking and loved (by Mary) and 
relative clauses (RELs) such as that Mary loves. A number of new 
individual-level ADJVLs are generated by the grammar in Chapter S. 
These include the ADJs derived from ADJ/(t/IV')s like aware and from 
ADJ/2(t/IV' )s like glad. 
(6) Mary is tall. 
aware that John is ill. 
glad that John is ill. 
Passives of-basic IV'/T verbs like annoy also fill such ADJ slots. 
l 
(7) John' is skilful. $t °r 
annoyed (by the decision). 
annoyed that Mary won. 
Finally, derived TVs such as advise that John Is 111 and convince that 
S 
Bill cheats can be passivised in the usual way to form t/ e 
participles. 
(8) Sue was advised that John was ill (by Mary). 
convinced that Bill cheats (by John). 
The new ADJVLS, of whatever subclass, modify attributively as 
expected. 
(9) a. The (woman [aware that John is ill]]"is Sue. 
b. The-[man [annoyed (by the situation)]] was John. 
c. Several [gamblers [assured that Coe would win 
°°-(by Bill)]] were angry. 
d. A [woman [convinced that all husbands cheat]] bombed 
the Hens Club. 
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For examples of derivations involving attributive modification of CNs 
- 
-- - -. -see Section ' 3. Z: 
6.2 Sentence adverbs- 
6.2.0 Introduction 
4 
Much of the work in linguistics dedicated to proposition-level 
operators, i. e. anything which translates with type has 
been concerned with sentence adverbs, of which there are many 
varieties. It. is not my intent to deal with sentence adverbs as a 
whole but rather with four subclasses of sentence adverb which are 
especially relevant to adjectives. These are the 'modal', 
'parenthetical', 'temporal' and 'hedge' adverbs. I shall show. how 
sentence adverbs enter into constructions directly with adjectives 
and examine some classes of adjectives which have traditionally been 
transformed from source strings containing sentence adverbs. The 
analysis offered, in this chapter avoids syntactic transformations and 
meshes naturally with the grammar posited so far., 
6.2.1 Modal adverbs 
Modal sentence adverbs are typically, described as comments or 
qualifications on the truth value of a sentence. 
2 Most of them are 
morphologically, and semantically related to modal adjectives in the 
8 
t/3t class. I, have assigned the modal adverbs to the category t/ t, 
which is included in the cover category ADV". 





























probably probable = 
[really] _-- , 











There areýmany ways that the class can be divided, and there is much 
room for disagreement on which words belong at all. The class ranges 
from strong-claims about the truth of a sentence (clearly, obviously, 
unquestionably) to qualified 'endorsements (apparently, arguably) to the 
wishy-washy (possibly, probably, supposedly, conceivably). Actually, In 
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fact, Indeed and -really, which have no -corresponding t/3t adjectives, 
may be better classified as some kind of conjunctive adverb (see e. g. 
Bellert 1977: 348-349; Quirk et al. 19721520). 
It is tempting to derive modal adverbs from the' corresponding 
adjectives by grammatical. rule, as, for example, in Jacobson 1971, 
but the gaps in the paradigm suggest that a lexical rule is the 
strongest interpretation possible. 
R85 (lexical). if ac Pt/3t then (a, LY) C Bt/8tß 
Realisation: a^ ly 
Translation: a" 
As this is a lexical rule, the possibility exists that any pair 
including a t/3t adjective and a morphologically related t/8t adverb 
can differ in meaning. - However, many such pairs do.: intuitively share 
the same reading. If such, a rule operates, at least to allow people 
to derive or decipher new vocabulary, then it is quite easy. in the 
present - , 
grammrar -, to , show a, , common reading - for different- .; 
but 
intuitively related sentences. The following rule for combining 
sentence adverbs with sentences will be needed. 
R86. If ae PADV' and ßE Pt then (a, ß)E P. 
Realisation:, ß^a if a has a complement 
else a^ß 
Translation: a'( ß') 
Let us assume that possiblyt18t is lexically related to possible t/3t 
by R85 and so has the same translation possible'. 
(11) (possiblyt/et, (John T, swimIV}t, R1 t, R86 
Realisations. Possibly John swims. 
Translation: 
1. possiblyt/et possible' Basic 
2. (John, swim)t swim'(j) See previous examples 
3. (possibly, (John, swim))t possible'(ý[swim'(j)l) 
From 1,2 by R86 
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The related adjective-based sentence has the same translation. 
(12) ((that(t/IV')/t' (JohnT, swimlV)t, R1)t/IV', R41' 
(beIV'/PRED"' Possiblet/3t)IV', R52)t, R51 
Realisation: That John swims is possible. 
A 
Translation: possible'( [swim'(j)]) 
The sentence It Is possible that John swims has a similar derivation 
and an identical reading. 
We might propose yet another lexical rule forming CN's, from t/3t 
adjectives, including possible, probable and certain, 
R (lexical). If ac Pt/3t then a-ty EB, ' 
Translation: a' 
,ý 
This rule would allow us to relate possibility to possible and, assign it 
the same translation possible'. However, given -the idiosyncrasy of 
the noun formations, it is far easier in this case just to treat 
possibility,. for example, as a semantic constant by overtly giving it 








R53)IV', R52}t/6t, R70}t, R68 
Realisation: It is a possibility that John swims. 
Translations 
1. (that, (John, swim))t/IV, 1RR( A [swim'(j)]) 
See previous examples 
2. beIV, /PRED" "")R[vR] , 
Basic 
3. possibilityCN, 11114 possible' Basic 
4. (a, possibility) PNOM' 
. possible' From 3, byR53 
5. (be, ja, possibility)) IV, 
+ 1R["R] (possible') 
From 2,4 by R52 
6. possible' Lambda conversion 
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7. ((be, (a, possibility))) t/6t possible' 
From 6 by R70,, 
e. ((that, (John, swim)), ((be, (a, possibility)))) 
XRR( [swim'(j)])( w possible'). From 1,6 by R68 
9. possible'( [swim'(j)]) Lambda conversion 
The translations of the t/et adverbs can vary a great deal. Some, 
like * necessarily, possibly, probably, certainly and definitely are 
straightforwardly related to the simple t/3t adjectives necessary, 
possible, probable, certain, etc. and preserve the same readings. Truly 
does not seem to have quite the same force as true, and may need to 
be handled separately as some kind of emphasiser (Bolinger 1972: 95). 
The adjective likelyt/3t does not have an 
, -ly 
adverb correlate, 
probably for morphological reasons.. 
Apparently, evidently, obviously and others are morphologically 
related to (t/3t)/PP-TO adjectives like apparent, evident and obvious. 
These bare adjectives, when bumped into t/its, have the readings 
A Iý 
XpVx[apparent '(x, XRR(p) )], XpVx(evident'(x, XRR(p) )] and 
A 
XpVx[obvious '(x, XRR(p))] respectively (see section. 5.2.2.2.2.2), 
and the related adverbs share these same readings. 




R2}t, R1)t, R86 
Realisation: Obviously, John is ill. 
Translation: 
it obviously t/8t '* ApVx[obvious'(x, 
AIRR(p))] 
Basic 
2. (John, (be, ill)) t ill-(j) See previous examples 
3. (obviously, (John, (be, ill)}}t _>  
XpVx[obvious '(x, AXRR(p) )] (A[ill'(j )] ). 
- ,k 
From 1,2 by R86 
4. Vx[obvious'(x, AXRR([ill'(j)]})] Lambda conversion 
AAA 
5. Vx[ ARR( [ill'(j)]} ( lq[obvious*(x, q)])] 
Pirst-order reduction 
A 
6. Vx[obvious*(x, [ill'(j)])] Lambda conversion 
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7. ((be, (a, possibility)})t, 6t 
, possible' 
From 6 by R70. 
0., ((that, (John, swim)), ((be, (a, possibility)))) t -> 
1RR([swim'(j)])(possible') From 1,6 by R68 
w 
9.1 possible'( [swim'(j)]) Lambda conversion 
The translations' of the t/8t adverbs can vary a great deal. Some, 
like necessarily, possibly, probably, certainly and definitely are 
straightforwardly related to the simple t/3t adjectives necessary, 
possible, probable, certain, etc. and preserve the same readings. Truly 
does not seem to have quite the same force as true, and may need to 
be handled separately as some kind of emphasiser (Bolinger 1972: 95). 
The adjective llkelyt/3t does not have an -ly adverb correlate, 
probably for morphological reasons.. 
Apparently, 'evidently, obviously and others are morphologically 
related to (t/3t)/PP-TO adjectives like apparent, evident and obvious. 
These bare adjectives, when bumped into -t/its, have the readings 
AA 
ApVx[apparent'(x, XRR(p))], XpVx[evident'(x, ARR(p) )] and 
A 
XpVx[obvious' (x, XRR(p)) ] respectively (see Section. 5.2.2.2.2.2), 
and the related adverbs share these same readings. 
(14) (obviously 
tý8t . _(JohnT-- 
(beIV/FRED' 
illy }IV, 
R2 t, Rl}t, R86 
Realisations Obviously, John'is ill. 
Translation: 
1. obviously t/et -> XpVx[obvious'(x, 
m1RR(p))} 
Basic 
2. (John, (be, ill)) t ill-(j) See previous examples 
3. (obviously, (John, (be, ill))) t,,,., 
XpVx(obvious'(x, AXRR(p))] (A[ill'(j)]) 
From 1,2 by R86 
4. Vx(obvious'(x, "ARR(A[ill'(j)]))] Lambda conversion 
AAA 
5. Vx[ XRR( [ill'(j)]} ( Aq(obvious*(x, q)]}] 
First-order reduction 
A 
6. Vx(obvious*(x, (ill'(j)])] Ada conversion 
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Recognising obvious, - and- therefore obviously, as being translated in 
terms of a two-place relation offers a way out of a problem noted by 
McConnell-Ginet (1982: 177-178). She shows that obviously, unlike 
necessarily and possibly, cannot be translated as a simple function on 
the intension of its complement sentence. If p1 and p2 are both 
logically true, and so denote the same set of possible worlds, then 
obviously'(pl) should always have the same truth value as 
obviously'(p2), which it often does not. Translating obviously as 
A XpVx[obvious'(x, ), RR(p))] allows the 'truth of obviously'(pl) and 
obviously'(p2) to vary -according to the individuals over which 
quantification operates. 
For some reason, a derived t/3t like obvious to Mary does not 
readily form an adverb like obviously to Mary, though-'it would make 
perfectly good sense. 
(15) a. ' It is obvious to Mary that John is ill. 
b. *Obviously to Mary, John is ill. 
Subcategories may be appealed to in, order to rule out such 
adverbialisations, but the adverb-formation rule is lexical anyway, 
and such exceptions are expected. 
The, remaining t/3t forms in (10) which are morphologically 
related to modal sentence adverbs are passives or -ible/-able forms of 
IV/T' verbs. Some t/8ts are related to bare -able forms and can be 
assigned the same translations. 





arguably ApOVx[argue'(x, AiRR(p) )] 
A 
conceivably XpOVx[conceive'(x, ). RR(p) )] 
presumably XpOVx[presume' (x, XRR(p) )] 
understandably XpOVx[understand'(x, XRR(p) )] 
Adjectives ° like arguable by Mary are already "shaky,, - and any attempt 
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to adverbialise them results in ungrammaticality: *arguably by Mary. 
Other such adverbs are related to bare IV/T' passives, as has 
frequently been noted (Bach 1968: 102-103= Bartsch 1972a: 158j 
1975: 182,184-185; Bennett 1976: 135; Keenan & Faltz 1978: 236-237, 
309). 
4 IV/T' passives are discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.4. 
(17) ADJ' = ADV' -- Common translation 
A 
alleged allegedly XpVx[allege'(x, XRR(p))] 
A 
purported « purportedly . XpVx[purport'(x,, XRR(p) )] 
reported reportedly XpVx[report'(x, AXRR(p))], 
supposed supposedly XpVx[suppose'(x, --")RR(p))] 
Keenan & Faltz (1978: 213) actually propose a syntax rule generating 
these attributive adjectives from verbs of category IV/T', but the 
many gaps in the pattern suggest that a lexical rule is the strongest 
possible interpretation. we cannot speak of a 'thought criminal, for 
instance, as a person thought to be a criminal. Denied, asserted, 
hoped, grasped and argued criminals are extremely awkward 
constructions if not completely bad. Said and (afore) mentioned are 
reserved for careful legalistic -language. All in all one must 
conclude that such adverbs, with their complex translations, belong 
in the lexicon. 
A striking feature of modal adverbs is that none has an overall 
negative effect. Adverbialisations of inherently negative notions 
like doubt, denial and questioning require a negative morpheme to 
make it acceptable. Latinate throwbacks begin to emerge. 













Xp-l OVx[ contest " (x, ' XRR(p]) J 
kp-1 OVx[deny' (x, A )PR[P)) ) 
Xp'1 OVx[dispute'(x, "ARR(p) )] 
ý Xp-1 OVxtdoubt l (x, '*XRR(P]) ) 
,., Xp'l OVx[mistake'(x, IRRfp] )7' 
Xp1 OVx[question'(x, )-RR(pj )] 
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Like the -able derivatives, the passive group and the negative group 
resist PP-BY phrases. 
(19) a. *Allegedly by John, Mary is a thief. 
b. *Undoubtedly by Mary, John eats toads. 
.N 
6.2.2 Parenthetical adverbs 
A second group of sentence ''adverbs are of category t/9t and 
include unfortunately, oddly, strangely and 'many other factive examples 
related to adjectives of category t/4t, which are themselves factive. 
I shall argue that these adverbs should properly be analysed as non- 
restrictive modifiers of the sentences with which they combine, and 
so I have called this class the 'parenthetical' adverbs. The 
following list is gleaned from several sources, most of which accept 
the separateness of this class regardless of the formal analysis 
5 
recommended. 
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luckily.::, lucky 
mercifully- -y "-unerciful 
naturally natural 



















long history behind the distinction between. modal. and 
parenthetical . adverbs. 
It has been noted,. for example,, that there 
are no modal adverbs with negative force, although the adjective 
counterparts produce perfectly grammatical sentences (see Section 
6.2.1 and Schreiber 1971: 94-95, Bellert 1977: 343). 
(21) a. Not clearly, John will resign. 
*Unclearly, 
b. It is fnot'clear . that-John will resign. 
unclear 
(22) a. *Not possibly, Mary will resign. 
1*Impossibly. 
b. It is not possible that John will resign. 
1impossible 
The apparent exceptions, like undoubtedly and unquestionably, are 
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negative inform; but it is doubt or question which is negated, 
making the net effect positive. In practice' then; it seems 
impossible to negate a modal (t/8t) adverb independently of negating 
the entire sentence it modifies. Parenthetical adverbs, on the other 
hand, can be negated freely. A' parenthetical adverb and the sentence 
it modifies can be negated separately. 
(23) a. Oddly, 
fBillwashed 
the dishes. 
Bill did not wash the dishes. 
b. It is odd that Bill washed the dishes. 
did not wash 
(24) a. Not oddly, 
[Mary 
scrubbed the floor. 
Mary did not scrub the floor. 
b. It is not odd that Mary scrubbed the floor. 
did not scrub 
(25) Fortunately, John escaped. 
Unfortunately, John did not escape. 
(26) Unexpectedly, Max did not hit Bill with a flounder. 
Not unexpectedly, Max hit Bill with a flounder. 
The two adverb classes also behave differently in questions, 
hypothetical sentences and belief sentences. Modal adverbs, can 
appear within questions while parentheticals- cannot' (Schreiber 
1971: 88,90; Quirk et a). 1972: 517; pace Bellert 1977: 344). 
(27) Modal adverbs ,ý 





b., Is it`the case that apparently Richard is the best candidate? 
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(28) Parenthetical adverbs 






be ? *Is it the case that strangely Richard is the best candidate? 
The same observations are made for hypothetical sentences (Schreiber 
1971: 89; Bellert 1977: 345), though intuitions often clash over 
examples like (29). 











hated his mother. 
Within belief,, contexts and similar, opaque constructions, modal 
adverbs , have, - the - same force as their corresponding, - adjectives. 
However, in-the same syntactic environments, - a parenthetical adverb 
is, odd, if not- ungrammatical, while its corresponding, adjective is 
perfectly acceptable. 
6 
(30) a. John"believes. that possiblyt/et Mary escaped. 
b.. John"believes. that it is possible that Mary escaped. 
(31) a. ? John believes that unfortunatelyt/9t Mary surrendered. 
b. John believes that it is unfortunate that Mary surrendered. 
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Zn= "explaining " these - facts, ' Schreiber (1971: 88) and -Bartsch 
(1975: 185) have "claimed that a`-parenthetical sentence adverb 
presupposes that the sentence it modifies"- is true. - Kiparsky« & 
Kiparsky'(1970: 147) also see factivity in terms, of presupposition. 
This view of factivity has been criticised by Wilson (1972), -Bellert 
(1977: 342)-and °Delacruz'(1976), who argue in, favour of entailments 
rather than presuppositions; 
Whatever the differences in approach, it must at least be said 
that parenthetical adverbs are factive. if Unfortunately, 0 is true, 
then 0 is also true. This is not sufficient, unfortunately, to 
explain the 'syntactic differences between parenthetical and modal 
adverbs. `Some modal 'adverbs like definitely, Indeed, in fact, and 
necessarily are also factive. Another consideration is that embedded 
sentences which, by entailment or presupposition, must be true still 
resist parenthetical adverbs. " 
(32) ? John knows that unfortunately Mary escaped. 
The more likely factor is this: a parenthetical adverb most 
naturally applies to a sentence which is being directly asserted by 
the speaker. Thus-such adverbs "are -inappropriate for modifying 
questions, commands and hypothetical sentences, and-they are felt to 
be odd when applying to sentences in opaque contexts. The challenge 
is" now to formalise these adverbs and -show how 'the theory explains 
the syntactic facts. it, has already been proposed that sentential 
adjectives 'be analysed-as predicates of propositions-as'in (33). 
(33) It is possible that ., Mary -escaped. 
A 
(33') possible'( [escape'(m)]) 
Modal sentence adverbs have been translated exactly like their 
: ', corresponding adjectives as in (34). 
(34) Possibly Mary escaped. 
(341) possible'(. [escape'(m)] ) 
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This paraphrase- relation and the identical translations are well 
accepted (Schreiber 1971: 85,89). The'simple form of the translation 
in -(33') or -(34'j shows why modal- adverbs `cannot be' negated 
separately from the modified sentences" to negate the adverb', the 
main predicate, is-,, to negate the whole sentence. The single 
translation" is' also supported by the identical behaviour of 
equivalently translated adjective- and adverb-based sentences in 
questions, hypotheticals and opaque contexts. There is-no reason why 
a sentence 'of, tthe, form- possibly'(m[escape'(m)]) should, not 'be 
questioned, believed or treated as hypothetical. ' 
In the case of adjectives of category t/4t, these too have been 
translated as predicates of propositions, just like the modal 
adjectives. 
(35) It is strange that Mary escaped. 
A (35') strange'( (escape'(m)]) 
These parenthetical (t/4t)' adjectives are exceptional 'in their all 
being factive, but they behave- syntactically like the modal group. 
All the 'same observations on negation, questions, hypothetical 
sentences and opaque contexts apply. 
The big, problem 'to be explained is'why' sentences modified by 
parenthetical adverbs behave differently. - Unlike 'modal adverbs, 
these parenthetical adverbs can be independently -negated: - Unlike 
sentences with modal adverbs, and those based on either modal or 
parenthetical adjectives, sentences with parenthetical adverbs resist 
being questioned, -made hypothetical or put in opaque contexts. There 
is thus ample reason to suggest that a sentence like (36)', based on a 
parenthetical adverb strangely, does not translate in the same way as 
sentence (35), which is based on the corresponding parenthetical 
adjective strange. 
(36) Strangely, Mary escaped. 
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I shall argue that 'parenthetical--adverbs are different from 
modal adverbs, and from all proposition-level adjectives in that 
they are properly translated as non-restrictive modifiers of 
sentences. Not- only. will this difference go some way toward 
explaining the syntactic behaviour of parenthetical adverbs, but it 
also accords with the intuitions of several investigators. Schreiber 
(1971: 89-91), for instance, postulates that- sentences with 
parenthetical adverbs are properly derived by transformation from two 
conjoined sentences, one of them based on the corresponding 
adjective. He further postulates that these conjoined sentences are 
derived transformationally from sentences with relative clauses. He 
provides the following examples. 
(37) Agnew loves Orientals, which is ironic. 6> 
Agnew loves Orientals, and it is ironic that he does. P 
Ironically, Agnew loves Orientals. 
(38) Reagan admires radical students, which is fortunate. ) 
Reagan admires radical students, and it is fortunate 
that he does. 
Reagan admires radical students, fortunately. 
Schreiber does not postulate such conjunction sources for modal 
adverbs. Gellert (1977: 342) similarly argues that two propositions 
underlie any sentence with a parenthetical adverb. In a more logical 
framework, Bartsch (1975: 185) translates sentences with parenthetical 
adverbs with logical conjunction as in (39). 
(39) Regrettably, John left. 
(39') leave' (j) & regrettable'( (leave' (j) ]) 
At the same time, Bartsch translates sentences based on proposition- 
level adjectives-without such a conjunction, as in (40'). 
(40) It is regrettable that John left. 
(40') regrettable'( (leave'(j)]) 
Two points are worth noting in these proposals. First, the most 
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basic sentences in the transformational analysis proposed by 
Schreiber (see (37) and (38)) have relative clauses which are 
obviously non-restrictive. Second, the conjunction sources or 
translations postulated by Schreiber and Bartsch are characteristic 
paraphrases and analyses of non-restrictive modifiers. I propose to 
outline my own analysis of parenthetical adverbs as non-restrictive 
modifiers and then show why Bartsch's conjunction account is not 
quite adequate. 
Let us assume the following lexical rule to relate parenthetical 
(t/9t) adverbs to (t/4t) adjectives. Let pa be an anaphoric variable 
of type <s, ti, which is resolved during a derivation. 
R87 (lexical). If aC Pt, 4t then (a, LY) E Pt/9t. 
Realisation: all, where all is a with the main adjectival in 
the -ly form 
Translation: a p[ p] j subroutine (a' (p )) 
a 
If we take strangely as a typical t/9t based on the t/4t strange, its 
reading, by R87, will be Ap( p]; subroutine (strange'(pa)). The 
following is a sample derivation. 




Realisation: Strangely, John left. 
Translation: 
1. (John, leave) 
t 
leave'(j) See previous examples 
2. strangelyt/9t ' Ap(VP]j subroutine (strange'(Pa)) 
Basic 
Si. _ strange' (pa) 
S2. 
-, 
strange'( [leave'(j)]) Anaphoric resolution 
S3. Return 
3. (strangely, (John, leave)) 
t -+ )gyp[ 
p] "[leave' (j )] ) 
From 1,2 by R86 
4. leave'(j) Lama conversion 
If Sue utters (41), she makes the, assertions in (42) and (43 ). 
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(42) strange'(leave'(j)) 
(-43 j leave' (] ) 
The effect, therefore, of applying a parenthetical adverb like 
strangely to any sentence is to assert the sentence and also to assert 
that the intension of the sentence is strange. Note that in example 
(41) the sentence leave'(j) follows logically from the 
translation(s). (Note that now the notion of logical consequence 
must be defined to operate over the accumulated assertions added to 
the discourse pool. ) This is different from what happens with the 
adjective construction in (44). 
(44) It is strange that John left. 
A (441) strange'( [leave'(j)]) 
In (441), the sentence leave'(j) is not directly asserted; rather 
because strange' is factive, leave'(j) is an analytic consequence by 
way of M. P. P1 (see Section 5.2.1). 
As we saw above, parenthetical adverbs apply happily only to 
those sentences which" are asserted directly by the speaker. Such 
adverbs in questions, hypothetical sentences and sentences in opaque 
contexts are therefore uneasy. These facts are entirely consistent 
with the proposed non-restrictive analysis, which inherently involves 
assertion of the modified sentence. Also, the fact that 
parenthetical adverbs can be negated independently from the modified 
sentence is explained by the same analysis: there are two clauses 
subject to negation. 
Other facts about parenthetical adverbs are consistent with 
non-restrictiveness and not with Bartsch's conjunction translation. 
First, parenthetical adverbs can be uttered quotationally, removing 
the speaker from responsibility for that portion of the utterance. 
(45) 'Unfortunately', Lee was caught by'his supervisor, and 
was forced to do some work. 
In (45), we- get the impression that someone other than the speaker, 
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probably Lee, ''- found, doing the forced work unfortunate. A non- 
restrictive analysis also reflects the subordinate or parenthetical 
flavour of the second clause. Finally, the conjunction analysis 
offers no help in explaining why a sentence like (46) is often felt 
to be odd. 
(46) ? John believes that unfortunately, Mary escaped. 
The conjunction analysis would result in a translation like (46' 
which is logically coherent. 
(46') believe*(j, [escape'(m) & unfortunate'( [escape'(m)])]) 
However, if (46) has a valid reading at all it is not (46') but (47), 
where unfortunately forms no part of John's belief but is someone 
else's, probably the speaker's, parenthetical comment on the object 
of John's belief. 
(47) a. believe*, (j, [escape'(m)]) 
b. unfortunate'( [escape'(m)]) 
This translation- is coherent, and it falls out naturally in the 
present, analysis, 'but it can still seem odd.. for: pragmatic reasons. 
The translation in-(47) will normally commit the speaker to the truth 
of escape' (m) because of the factivity of unfortunate'. But the 
speaker is also asserting that John believes that Mary escaped, an 
assertion which invites the implication that the speaker does not 
himself share that belief. The conflict between factive entailment 
and invited implication is enough to make such sentences odd. Much 
better are examples using know, which is itself factive. 
(48) John knows that unfortunately, Mary escaped. 
0 
Because such a sentence commits the speaker to the truth of 
escape'(m), it is much easier for him to insert a parenthetical 
comment on that fact by means of a parenthetical adverb. Such 
sentences are not, therefore, formally ungrammatical according to the 
IV 
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present grammar. - - 
As with modal adverbs, the translations of parenthetical adverbs 
reflect the diversity of the adjectives to which they are related. 
Simple t/4t adjectives like odd and strange are related to sentence 
adverbs by rule R87. 
(49) oddt/4t odd' 
oddly t/9t ip[Vp] j subroutine(odd' (pa) ) 
Present participles of IV'/T verbs such as amaze, have more complex 
translation, but the effect of adverbialisation is the same. 
(50) amazingt4t -> XpVx[amaze '(p, AXPP(x))] 
amazinglyt/9t --> 1P[ 
P], 
subroutine( ApVx[amaze '(p, XPP(x))](Pa)) 
other similar examples are also based on two-place relations and can 
occasionally take PP-FOR phrases expressing the 'direct object'. 
(51) a. Fortunately for Bill, the fine was waived. 
b. Unfortunately for Mary, 
the Judge imposed, the maximum sentence. 
c. Annoyingly for Roger, 
it rained during the outdoor ' concert. 
Given the complex readings already defended for derived t/4t 
adjectives such as fortunate, R87 can again accommodate such 
adverbialisations. The derivation of t/9t adverbs like fortunately for 
Bill 
t/9t 
from derived adjectives like fortunate for Blllt/4t requires 
that rule R87 be somewhat productive. 
? 
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(52) (((unfortunate(t/4t )/PP-FOR' 
(forPP-FOR/T' 





Realisation: Unfortunately for Sue, Mary left. 
Translation: a., unfortunate*'( A (leave' (m) ], s) 
b. leave'(m), 
6.2.3- Temporal adverbials. 
The semantics of temporal adverbs is is subject of much current 
debate, and the interplay of time adverbials with tense presents 
challenging. - problems -(outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
Syntactically, most if not all temporal adverbials can be assigned to 
category t/8t,,; and their semantics,, ignoring tense, is reasonably 
tractable. Here, I. shall be interested in, temporal adverbiale mainly 
insofar as they interact with adjectives. 
The simplest examples such as formerly, presently, and in the future 
appear _in examples . such as., 
(53 ). .. - _ 
(53) a. Formerly, John was rich. 
b. Presently, John isyrich. 
--c-. ---Inýthe ---future; - John will be rich. 
Assuming that formerly translates as formerly', and similarly for the 
other examples,.; interpretations. - like those below will serve the 
present purposes., 
Qformerly I(p)]] -1 at, <w, t> iff there 
is. an interval t'ct such that p<w, t'> - 1. 
Q presently' (p)] -1 at <w, t> iff 
p<w, t> - 1, 
Q in-the-future'(p)D - 1-at <w, t> iff there 
is an interval t' such that t<t' and p<w, t'> - 1. 
Many other temporal - adverbials - are similar to these. In-the-past is 
equivalent . to ; formerly. Recently will intuitively be translated and 
interpreted much like formerly, with an added requirement that the 
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pastness not -be remote. Soon and one reading-- of -momentarily are- - 
non-remote versions of In-the-future. We can postulate other similar 
interpretations for more complicated adverbials. 
Q potentially '(p)lJ -1 at <w, t). iff there 
is an interval t' such that t<t' and there is a possible 
world w' such that p<w', t') - 1. 
Qprospectively I(p)]] -1 at <w, t> iff there 
is an interval t' such that t<t' and there is an entity 
x such that *[expect*(x, A[p<w, t', ])]<w, t) - 1. 
Such translations are only suggestions, and the details are in no way 
central to the present concerns. It is sufficient in dealing with 
examples involving adjectives with temporal adverbs to translate an 
adverb like formerly t/st as 
formerly' and to assume that some 
convenient semantics will be available to interpret formulas of the 
form ý formerly' (p). 
_ýSome 
more troublesome adverbs indicate frequencies over set 
periods (Quirk et a/. 1972: 489; Bellert 1977: 34). 
(54) hourly, daily, nightly, weekly, fortnightly, monthly, 
`" - `- - bi-monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually, yearly, 
bi-annually 
Stump (1981: 225-226)° has offered the following semantics for such 
frequency adverbs. Let f' be a frequency operator (like hourly' or 
daily') and let 1 be a designated period (like hour or day). Frequency 
adverbs are then translated and interpreted as operators on 
propositions. 
Q f' (p) lI -1 at <w, t> iff vp is true in w 
at nonoverlapping subintervals of t distributed throughout 
t at periods of a specified length 1. 
Thus Daily, John walks In the park will be true at <w, t> iff John walks 
In the park is true in w at nonoverlapping subintervals of t 
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distributed throught at periods of one day. 
Variant frequency adverbs have a similar semantics, but the 
period 1 and the details of the distribution through t vary with 
context (Quirk et al. 1972: 489-4901 Nilsen 1972: 143). 
(55) rarely, infrequently, irregularly, intermittently, 
sporadically; sometimes; occasionally, periodically, 
regularly,, often, frequently, usually, normally, 
ordinarily, generally, commonly, habitually, customarily, 
constantly, repeatedly, recurrently, continuously, 
continually, ` invariably, incessantly 
Again I shall merely translate any temporal adverbial a as a,, a 






The word 'hedge'. is used here to refer to a large and varied 
collection of adverbials which specify or narrow the context or point 
of view from which the truth-of a sentence is evaluated. 
9 Generally 
the effect of hedges is to pin down vague predicates by stating, 
directly or indirectly, the, relevant criteria- for their application 
or the relevant domain of application. 
Hedges include adverbiale which overtly supply comparison 
classes (56) and some which overtly supply criteria of application 
(57). -A third' type, as in (58) ;" supplies a new context or point of 
view which in turn can specify a comparison class or criterion. 
(56) a. Compared to basketball players, John is short. 
b. For a jockey, John is tall. 
(57) a. As far as programming is concerned, Mary is brilliant. 
b. At chess, Mary is poor. 
--_w 
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(58)-. a. _ From Andropov's point of view, Poland 
is a free country. 
b. From Reagan's point of view, 
Poland is an oppressed country. 
With the vaguest predicates like good' and skilful'. hedges are often 
essential for useful communication. 
(59) As far as chess. is concerned 










Even within' the same "orthographical sentence, two different hedges 
can designate different criteria for the application of the same 
predicate, such as well in (61). 
., - "S ýr -`(61) 'Physically, John is well, but emotionally, he's not'well. 
In, order to accommodate hedges and their contextual effects, the MG 
semantic model needs to be expanded to include contexts as well as 
worlds and times. This addition, " though significant, is fairly easily 
formalised, and the following sections show how it is done. 
6.2.4.1 Adding contexts to the model 
Following Klein (1979a: 24-29; 1980) and Kamp (1975), we can 
postulate a set C of contexts as basic entities in the model. 
10 
For 
any formula 0, the semantic value of (D is now evaluated relative not 
only to a world and a time, but also relative to a context: 
Tom 
c, w, t 
(I leave out indices for the interpretation and the 
value assignment to variables in the interest of simplicity. ) When 
only world and time indices were relevant, as in PTQ, we could 
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characterise the-: intension of an expression a as AwXt Q ajj 
w, t, or, 
in the object language, as W. In MG, semantic functions apply 
uniformly to intensional arguments. This -allows functions such as 
formerly' and possibly' to influence the time and world indices at 
which the modified expression will be evaluated. Such functions need 
to 'know' the intension of their argument. -' 
Just as formerly', needsaccess to time indices and possibly', needs 
access to world indices, so hedges need-access to context indices. 
To allow hedges toýdo their work, they must apply not just to 
intensional arguments, which are functions from worlds and times to 
extensions, - but to a . 
new kind of'-object which is a function from 
contexts, worlds and times to extensions. These new objects are 
called CHARACTERS, and the character of a, that is acXwlt Q ajjc, w, t' 
is represented by Klein as 
na 
in the object language. For every 
type T, the character of T is of type <k, t>. If ß is a character, 
then 
Uß 
is an extension; thus 
Uf 
a a. Now instead of applying 
uniformly to intensional arguments, as in PTQ, functions in the 
semantics will apply to character-type arguments. To avoid recasting 
the rules and examples given to far, I shall not adopt the character 
notation signs 
n 
and but will instead redefine "' and 
v; 4a should 
now be read as the character of a, and if fl denotes a character, 
VEB 
denotes an extension. Whenever T is a type, cs, T> is now the 
character of T. 
Klein (1980a: ll) defines a context-dependent interpretation to 
be much like a MG interpretation for an intensional language. For 
example, where the function F assigns meanings to non-logical 
constants, and DT is the set of possible denotations of type T, and 
CON is a non-logical constant of type 7, then FCON is a function in 
the set DTC .; QaDc, w, t 
is the extension of a at a context c, a 
world w and a time t. Furthermore, 
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If 0 and 41 are formulas, then 
Q1ýD 
c, w, t- 
1 -if. Q0]] c, w; -0 t 
Q-1ýD c, w, t -0 if 101 c, w, t 1 
QOvIF D -1if QED -tor [ ]J -1 c, w, t c, w, t c, w, t 
ýý-v. 0if QXDc'wIt - QYr1 0 cowot - 
An obvious addition, to Klein's outline interpretation is the rule in 
(63), which simply requires that, contexts, along with worlds and 
times, distribute over conjuncts.. 
(63). Q', & 'Dc, 
wft-, ý 
1. iff 903c, 
w, t - 
[IFICOw't -1 
Klein argues that 'degree' adjectives like tall are partial functions 
from subsets of the universe U to (0,1). That is, tall divides a set 
into a positive extension, a negative'extension and an extension gap 
(including those entities which are neither tall nor not-tall). 
(64) tall .: ----- ------t---__. _---------I ------ I 0? 1 
negative extension positive 
extension gap extension 
one thing that contexts do is to determine just which set of entities 
a predicate like tall is carving up--that is, contexts can specify 
relevant subdomains. 
If John, is 5 '6" tall, -then John is tall may be true in a context 
which specifies dwarves as the comparison class, but false in a 
context which-specifies basketball players as the comparison class. 
Formally, Klein defines a function U from C to subsets of the 
universe; thus for any cEC, U(c) c U. Intuitively, U(c) is 
simply the relevant comparison class at context C. It can also be 
thought of more generally as the (sub)domain of the model which is 
relevant for interpreting an utterance or a part of an utterance. 
For instance, (65) may be true in a context where everyone quantifies 
over a domain which is contextually restricted to the ten children at 
a birthday party. 
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(65) Everyone had a good time on Thursday. 
We will return to the use of contexts to delimit the domains of 
quantifiers in Chapter 7. 
In interpreting one-dimensional (linear) vague adjectives like 
tall. we can now require that the extension of the predicate be 
'focussed' on the set U(c), and so the truth value of a sentence of 
the form John Is tall can vary according to context. For notational 
convenience, c[X] is defined to be that context c' just like c except 
that U(c') - X. For a pygmy is a hedge which overtly supplies the 
relevant comparison class pygmy'. 
(66) Whenever p is of type <s, t>, ccC, w c W, tET, 
Ffor-a-pygmy (c)(w)(t)(p) - p(c[pygmy' ])(w)(t)" 
In general, we can state that 
(67) Whenever p is of type <s, t>, cEC, weW, tET 
and h is a hedge supplying the comparison class X, 
Fh (c)(w)(t)(p) - P(c[X])(w)(t)" 
When a hedge -supplies a-context, which then indirectly specifies a 
comparison class by way of function U, then the following rule 
applies. 
(68) Whenever p is of type-<s, t>, ccc, wcW, tCT 
and h is a hedge supplying the new context c', 
Fh (c)(w)(t)(p) - p(c')(w)(t). 
For example, the hedge In Slobovia effectively designates a new 
(Slobovian) context c'. This c' can in turn specify a comparison 
class by way of the function U. A sentence like (69) translates as 
(691). 
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where c' is the designated Slobovian context 
(and so U(c') is the relevant comparison class). 
Using these tools, a number of 'adjective modifiers can be 
semantically characterised. The following semantics for very is 
adapted from Klein (1980a: 26); TA is <e, t>, the type of adjectives 
like tall. 
(70) Whenever ccC, wcW, tET and 
z is-of type <s, TA>, 
Fvery (c)(w)(t)(z) s. Z(c[X])(w)(t) 
where. X - (u: z(c)(w)(t)(u) a 1). 
More simply, the predicate very fall at '<`c, w, t> is focussed on the set 
tall' t <c, w, t> . The comparison class for " very tall is therefore the 
set 'tall'. Something will be very tall iff it is tall for a tall 
thing. 
Klein's proposals for comparison classes are less helpful when 
we move from one-dimensional adjectives like tell to multi-dimensional 
adjectives like' clever and skilful. If we agree, in some context, that 
the, only relevant criterion for cleverness is the, ability to learn 
foreign-languages, 
.. 
then varying comparison classes can, capture the 
vagueness in ascribing cleverness. However, criteria themselves 




(71) As far as learning foreign. languages is concerned, 
Mary, is clever. 
(72) At mathematics, Mary is not clever. 
Such'' criterion hedges can be handled analogously to comparison- 
class` hedges. ' 'Let üs` propose, by fiat, ' that' K-- is' a' function from 
contexts to criteria. . -K is therefore analogous to U, which is a 
function from contexts to subsets of the domain (comparison classes). 
Beesley -. ZZi- Adjectives 
Thus-for all, c E C, K(c) denotes the relevant criterion or criteria 
to be used in applying multi-dimensional (non-linear) vague 
predicates like good' and skilful'. Let c<K>, where K is a criterion, 
be the context c' just like c except that K(cl) - K. (Recall that 
c[x] is the context c' just like c except that U(c') - X. ) Nothing 
in the rules prevents both criteria and comparison classes being 
affected simultaneously 'by context. This will in fact be necessary 
to assign a truth value to any sentence like (73). 
-,, 
(73) John is, good. 
If'(73) is evaluated at <c, w, t>, K(c) might denote the criterion of 
playing the violin. U(c) would then denote the comparison class of 
violinists against which John's goodness qua violin player could be 
judged. If that class is rather large, then the standards for 
judgement would be relatively lax and (73) would have a better chance 
of being true. 
A different context for , the same sentence could be supplied 
overtly by a hedge as in (74). 
'(74) '"In Mary's opinion, John is bad. 
If in-: Mary's opinion, supplies the new context c' , ((c') might again 
denote the criterion of violin, playing,, but U(c')-might now denote a 
very. select few. violin, players. of high professionalism. Against such 
stiffer standards, John is more likely. to be considered bad, or at 
least not, good, as a violin, player. Given the two contexts just 
described, (73, ) , and (74) could both,. be true. - Contexts obviously 
provide a rich source, for qualification, shading, of meaning, and, 
inevitably, misunderstanding and disagreement. 
., When.. hedges, specify(or. strongly suggest) criteria directly, 
thus bypassing the need for the function K, we need a slightly 
different approach. The rule in (75) is analogous to that in (67, ). 
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(75) Whenever p is of type <s, t>, ceC, w CW, 
tCT and h is a hedge supplying the criterion K, 
Fh (c)(w)(t)(P) ° P(c<K>)(w)(t). 
Typical criterion-supplying hedges are shown in (76). 
'(76) a. Botanically, a' 'tomatö is a fruit. 
b. Culinarily, a tomato is a vegetable. 
Paraphrases of botanically include botanically speaking, from a botanical 
point of view, ', and In a 'botanical context or In a botanical sense. 
Similar paraphrases are available for culinarily. " The effect of 
botanically in (76a) is to ' specify that the predicate fruit' is to have 
its botanical definition, i. e. 'the product of a 'pollinated flower'. 
Under such a definition, tomatoes are indeed fruits, and (76a) is 
true. In culinary or most common usages, however, the predicate 
fruit' is reserved for' sweet fleshy plant products, and does not 
include tomatoes. Vegetable', in common usage, covers tomatoes,,, peas 
and pumpkins, which are . all,. 
botanically speaking, fruits. 
Similar effects are noted 'in the following pairs of sentences, 
which can all be simultaneously true. 
(77) a. Technically speaking,. a spider is not an insect. 
-b. Commonly speaking, a spider is an insect. 
(78) a. From a medical point of, view, the thigh is not 
part of the leg. 
b. To the man on the street, the leg includes the thigh. 
(79)., a. _ 
By American standards, John is legally drunk. 
b. By British standards, John is not legally drunk. 
In some discourse environments, vaguer hedges are often sufficient to 
signal the intentions of the speaker. 
Beesley, -ßz3 - Adjectives 
(80) theoretically, hypothetically, (in)formally, outwardly, 
superficially, officially, by definition, nominally, 
essentially, fundamentally, basically, ideally, rightly, 
properly, correctly 
The class tends to blend into what I have called 'modal' notions such 
as actually, really,, apparently, and ostensibly. There is no necessary 
distinction among these classes at the level of syntax and logical 
form. The details of how various of these adverbials interact with 
11 
semantic indices will no doubt be a matter'for continuing research. 
, 
Some of , 
the vaguest hedges of all, include in some, respects, In e 
sense,,,, in a real sense, in a way and from one point of view. As noted 
by Kamp (1975: 151), in practice such hedges can be stretched so far 
that it is difficult to establish. that a sentence of the, form (81) is 
false. 
1 (81) In a 'sense, John is' good. ' 
(81) translates as something like (82), , 
then_,. it is indeed 
difficult to imagine, any, person who, is so, incredibly bad that there 
is not trat 
least, 
-one, context 
in. which he can. be called good. -- 
(82) Vc f good' (]) B c, w, t 
On the, other,, hand, a hearer can respond to an utterance of (81) by 
asking What sense Is that? or What sense are you referring to? Thus 
even with such apparently. vague hedges, the hearer assumes that the 
speaker intends his utterance to be interpreted according to some 
specific 'criterion or criteria. The relationship between 'contexts 
and the speaker's intention will be explored in the following 
sections. 
6: 2.4.2 Problems in contextual distribution 
I_ shall not enter the involved debate over the,, ontological 
status of contexts or their internal composition. I shall simply 
accept contexts as basic and stipulate that contexts can specify,, by 
way of . 
functions 
. 
like K and U, the criteria and comparison, classes 
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needed to narrow, the. application. of vague predicates. 
Having said this, there is good reason to fear that the notion 
of a contextual index is not as 'straightforward as it first appears. 
Consider a sentence like (83). 
(83) 
,,,, 
Bill,,, is clever and Mary. is clever. 
It is intuitively the case that the two clovers in (83) can be 
interpreted relative to different contexts. 
12 
Thus Bill's cleverness 
could be in sewing while Mary's cleverness is in cooking. Yet if 
contexts are like worlds and times, they will distribute over 
conjuncts according to the rule in (84). 
(84) 90 &, 41 cow, t -1 iff 
Q0Dc, 
w, t - 
QIPDc, 
w, t - 1. 
That is, sentence (83) will be evaluated at some context <c, w, t>, and 
as it is a' conjoined sentence, each of the conjuncts will then be 
evaluated at <c, w, t),. Unfortunately, this would appear to force the 
two predicates. 
-clever', 
to:. be evaluated. at the same context, c, which 
forces them, to be, evaluated, relative to the same- criterion K(c) and 
the-same comparison class U(c). This-would rule out the possibility 
of the two clevers being evaluated relative to different criteria. 
The same problems occur within sentences. if someone asks !s 
John tall?, (85) can intuitively be a true response-, 
(85) Well,. John is tall and short. 
Such'a response could well mean 'he's tall compared to' men but short 
compared to basketball players'. Again, if contexts distribute over 
conjuncts, this would appear to force tall' and short' in (85) to be 
evaluated at the same context, ' relative-to the same comparison class, 
making the sentence necessarily ä contradiction. 
Another difficulty arises with 'attributive constructions. In 
Chapter 2I defended the conjunction analysis for attributive degree 
and evaluative adjectives, arguing that head nouns-cannot necessarily 
be -taken to provide relevant comparison classes and criteria of 
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application. There are, for. example, examples like (86) and (87). 
(86) You'll recognise John easily; he is a tall basketball player. 
(87) John is a good actor; he always pays his rent on time. 
The point is that tell. basketball player may well mean 'tall for a man 
and, a basketball--player' rather than 'tall for a-basketball player'. 
Similarly, good actor may, mean-. 'good at paying his rent and an actor' 
rather than 'good qua actor'. 
Equally. true isethe observation that attributively modified head 
nouns often do suggest the comparison classes or criteria needed for 
evaluation. That is, big flea usually does mean 'big for a flea' and 
bad actor usually does mean 'bad qua actor'. Immediately one runs 
into challenges such as (88). 4. - ., -. .z 
(88) John is a tall man, but he is a short basketball player. 
If, (88) is uttered at <c, w, t>, then the context c will, -. distribute 
over the two. conjuncts, forcing both tall' and short' to be evaluated 
relative to the same comparison class U(c). Clearly something needs 
to. be done to, allow different contexts, - and, thereby,. different 
comparison ý. classes to apply, for the evaluation of two conjoined 
clauses. 
Within the present analysis, it is possible, but not desirable, 
to wire-in the comparison classes and criteria suggested in the head 
noun of. an attributive ADJ-CN - construction. - If one retains 
the 
conjunction -analysis, augmented with contexts, 
the default, reading 
a... m .. ' for ý big . 
flea could be shown as (89). 
(89) [Xx[big'(x) & flea'(x)j]c', 
w, t 
where U(c')'- flea' 
Representing good - actor as, good qua actor' is somewhat trickier, as 
even , acting criteria vary according - to_ context. Let- 
Qua, be a 
A 
function from properties and contexts to criteria. Qua( actor' )(c) 
therefore denotes a criterion of evaluation for actors qua actors at 
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c. The default reading for good actor could then be shown as (90). 
(90) QX x[ good' (x) & actor' (x) ]D , c , Wet 
where K(cl) - Qua( actor')(c') 
Unfortunately, the question of whether to adopt these default 
comparison classes and criteria is itself decided by context. 
Intuitively, context, overt or not, can override these syntactic 
suggestions. 
The first step in resolving such difficulties is to notice that 
vaguer hedges can occur with compatible, less vague, hedges within 
their scope. 
(9i) As a baseball player, [John is good at batting but 
he is bad at fielding]. 
As long as at batting and at fielding are criterion specifiers within 
the wider criterion of baseball playing, their restrictive presence 
within the, scope of as a baseball player is both coherent and useful., 
The behaviour of temporal adverbials is quite similar. As long-as-at 
3 p. m. and at 4 p. m., designate intervals within the wider interval 
yesterday afternoon there is no conflict in (92). 
(92) Yesterday afternoon, [John went shopping at 3 p. m. and 
and he went to the library at 4 p. m. ]. 
The conclusion, then, -. is that contexts and time -intervals do 
distribute over-conjuncts-within a sentence, but that this in no way 
precludes finer specification by other hedges or time adverbials on 
each of the conjuncts. The distributed context or time adverbial 
designated by the wide-scope adverbial becomes the-new base= index 
which is further specified by the narrower-scope adverbials. 
Now consider a sentence like (93) where finer time 
specifications on the conjoined sentences are not made explicit. 
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(93) Yesterday afternoon, [John went shopping, and he went 
to the library]. 
I find such a sentence totally unobjectionable and transparent in its 
most obvious reading. It simply states that within the interval 
yesterday afternoon, two things happened: (1) John went to the library, 
and (2) John went shopping. There is no requirement that these two 
activities be carried out at the same exact time; indeed that seems 
practically impossible for this example. One assumes naturally that 
at some interval t1, where tl is a subinterval of yesterday afternoon, 
John went shopping, and at some interval t2, where tl 0 t2 and t2 is 
a subinterval of yesterday afternoon, John went to the library. 
Hedges behave in exactly the same way. There are, intuitively, 
readings of (94) which are not at all contradictory. 
(94) As a baseball player, [John is good, and he is bad]. 
All that, is needed is that John be good by. one . criterion, say Kl, 
where, -K1 is a subcriterion of baseball playing, and that. John. be bad 
by criterion K2, where K1 KZ and K2 is a subcriterion of baseball 
playing. 
One possible way to approach these examples is to appeal twice 
to the vagueness of hedges like as a baseball player and of time 
adverbials like yesterday afternoon. I do not believe that this 
approach can be made to work. Let us look just' at the time 
adverbial, though the argument could equally well use the hedge. It 
could be argued that a sentence of the form yesterday afternoon, 0 is 
true at <c, w, t. % iff yesterday afternoon denotes t' (relative to 
(c, w, t>) and there exists some interval t, such that t' is a 
subinterval of t' and 0 is true at <cw, t '' >. Less formally, this 
is to argue that the sentence is true if 4) is true at any particular 
time within the broad constraining interval of yesterday afternoon. 
In a sentence of the form yesterday afternoon, CO and I] the semantics 
just explained, would. force, 0 and * tobe true at exactly the same 
subinterval of yesterday afternoon. To cover the:.,, cases,. such as 
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example (93) where the conjoined sentences can intuitively be true at 
different subintervals of yesterday afternoon, one could appeal twice 
to the vagueness of the time adverbial by splitting the sentence into 
yesterday afternoon, 0 and yesterday afternoon, V. Then each of these 
sentences could be evaluated separately, allowing 0 and P to be true 
at different subintervals of yesterday afternoon. Clearly such an 
approach is not kosher--it requires that the function denoted by a 
time adverbial know not only the semantic value of its argument but 
also' its internal structure. ' Knowledge of this internal structure 
will be necessary for those cases where semantic-interpretation is to 
be delayed and the time- adverbial is to distribute- vaguely over 
conjuncts. 
6.2.4.3 Resolving contextual dilemmas 
6.2.4.3.1 Separating contexts and environments 
The workable solution to contextual dilemmas first requires' a 
distinction between -what, I shall call 'environments, and contexts. 
Contexts are the elements of C; and they function as 'indices (like 
worlds and times) in the manner which has already been defined.,, I 
would prefer to substitute a , term like 'sense' or, 'delineation' or 
'point of view' for 'context', but this usage has already been 
established by Kamp (1975) and Klein (1979a, 1980a). By 
'environment' I refer to the wider and pretheoretical notion of the 
context of utterance or discourse environment, which includes a time, 
a place, 'interlocutors, their respective and shared knowledge, some 
record of the immediate discourse, etc. Kamp (1975; 150) appears to 
have this notion of environment in mind when he writes of the 
setting in which an utterance is made'. I emphasise here that what 
,. 
I 
have called 'environment' and what Kamp has called 'the setting in 
which an utterance is made' Is often called 'context' by linguists, 
and there is great danger of confusing this notion with the formal 
contexts (elements of C). 
This is in no way to say that environments and contexts are not 
interrelated. In particular, given an environment a hearer can often 
tell what context is intended by the speaker. In Kamp's terms, a 
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context is often 'manifest' through the 'setting in which an 
utterance is made'. Thus after talking about chess for an hour, 
hearers in such a chess-oriented environment, hearing (95), should be 
fairly safe in interpreting it relative to a context where the 
criterion is ability to play chess. 
(95) Algernon is very good. 
When the environment is not rich enough to determine a context, 
hedges are required for successful communication. The sensitive 
speaker will always be weighing the environment, including his 
estimation of his hearers' knowledge, to judge how much overt 
hedging, if any, is appropriate. We can then say that sincere 
speakers use hedges to compensate for inadequate environments; and 
hedges function to specify or modify contexts, thus helping to ensure- 
that the speaker's intended meaning is successfully transmitted. 
It is thus quite possible in any given environment for words to 
be used according to different contexts. For example, this happens 
whenever two speakers disagree, knowingly or not, on the meaning or 
denotation of a predicate. Consider an environment in which a layman 
and an entomologist are discussing spiders. In this environment the 
layman may assert (96a) and the entomologist (96b)-both can be 
simultaneously correct. 
(96) a. A spider is an insect. 
b. A spider is not an insect. 
This is so because the layman can intend his use of insect to include 
spiders, and the expert can equally well intend his use of insect to 
exclude them. This difference in the speakers' intentions iS 
formalised by means of the difference in contexts. of course, this 
means that the same speaker could also utter both (96a) and (96b) 
truthfully, providing that he intends Insect to be interpreted 
according to the appropriate common or entomological context in each 
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The key point in this discussion is that meaning must be 
explained at least partly in terms of what the speaker intends to 
mean. This is the lesson, taken to its extreme, by Humpty Dumpty. 
'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in a 
_.,. rather scornful 
tone, it means just what I choose it 
to mean, -neither more nor-less'. 
While the environment of an utterance might conceivably be viewed 
omnisciently and objectively, contexts are ultimately subjective and 
psychological. 
In conclusion, when we say that an utterance is to be evaluated 
relative to a context, a world, and a time interval, it is a formal 
context, i. e. an element of C, which is at stake. Contexts are the 
formal representation of the intentions of; the_speaker with regard to 
interpretation, and an utterance must ultimately be interpreted 
relative to the context intended by its utterer. This context is 
often obvious to the hearer from the environment, but environments 
must not be -confused with contexts. Hedges are a. means the , 
speaker 
has to make his intentions more explicit. 
6.2.4.3.2 Hidden hedges 
Kamp (1975: 150) points out that a context can be manifest either 
non-verbally through an environment or through various verbal 
expressions. 
Exclusive preoccupation with shape, for example, can be 
evident to both speaker and audience either because they 
have been discussing shape and nothing but shape all 
along (think of a session about shape during a conference 
on industrial design); or because the previous sentence 
was But let us now concentrate exclusively on shape; or 
because the' sentence itself contains the qualifying 
phrase with regard to shape. 
This is true but rather. idealised. That is, it, is not necessarily 
evident at all in real discourse what-context applies., Let us assume 
that-the Individual Mary is well known"within a certain. club. if a 
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speaker in this club should suddenly rouse himself in-the midst of a 
silent conclave and utter, out of the blue, the sentence (97), then 
it is highly likely that the hearers will be unable to determine its 
truth value. 
1 (97) Mary is wonderful. 
This does not mean, however, that the sentence does not have a truth 
value. The typical hearer will assume that it does, and he will be 
actively searching his memory to find a previous discourse or event 
that will make sense of the utterance. If that fails, the hearers 
can ask overt questions of the utterer as in (98). 
(98) a. in what sense? 
b. What do you mean by 'wonderful'? 
c. Can you define your terms? 
d. What is your criterion for wonderfulness? 
If these questions are answered satisfactorily, then the hearers can 
decide whether they agree. 
A more helpful speaker in the environment described would have 
uttered something more explicit, as in (99). 






Mary is wonderful. 
From the formal point of view, where we can again idealise and play 
the omniscient observer, how are we then to translate and interpret 
an apparently vague utterance of (97)? Ibelieve the solution is to 
analyse the utterance as if the appropriate hedge (the one according 
with the intentions of the speaker) were present. Formally, then, 
vague sentences will always be interpreted as if they had hidden or 
understood hedges. In real discourse, careful hearers are engaged in 
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a constant game to discover the hidden hedges intended by speakers. 
If a single sentence can be interpreted in the light of a hidden 
hedge, then a different hidden hedge can apply to each of the 
conjuncts of a compound sentence. Lakoff (1972: 210) cites (100) as 
such an example. 
(100) Nixon is a murderer and he's not a murderer. 
It is conceivably true that a person is a murderer, according to some 
criterion, but that he is not a murderer according to another 
criterion. In the present analysis, this would mean that the speaker 
intended murderer to be interpreted two different ways, according to 
different criteria. By postulating different hidden or understood 
hedges on the two clauses in (100), an apparent contradiction can be 
avoided (see also Klein 1980a: 8). 
As shown in Section 6.2.4.2 above, wide scope hedges can contain 
compatible, more specific, hedges within their scope. 
(101) For a baseball player, John is good at batting but 
he is bad at fielding. 
The context c named by the hedge for a baseball player distributes 
over the conjuncts o f the modified sentence in the usual way. The 
hedges at batting and at fielding then further specify this distributed 
context c, avoiding the contradiction. In a similar sentence like 
(102), contradiction can be avoided simply by assuming a hidden or 
assumed hedge on each of the conjuncts. 
(102) As a baseball player, [John is good and he is bad]: `" 
If assumed hedges on isolated simple sentences are accepted, 
- 
then 
there is no reason (or principled way) to exclude them on conjoined 
or embedded sentences. Finally, returning to Lakoff's example (100), 
the entire sentence can be assumed to have a broad, or even neutral, 
hedge which designates a broad or neutral context c. This context c 
will be distributed over the conjuncts Nixon is a murderer and he is 
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not a murderer. Assumed hedges on each of these conjuncts can then 
further modify c, saving the sentence from contradiction. 
Hidden hedges also resolve problems with vague adjectives in 
attributive. position as-in (103). 
(103), John, is a tall basketball player. 
I have argued that tall basketball player translates with a simple 
conjunction analysis as in (104). 
(104) Ay[tall'(y) & basketball-player'(y)]. 
Whether tall translates as 'tall for a basketball player' or, 'tall. for 
a, man' or 'tall for a CN', where CN could conceivably be just about 
anything, has so far been relegated vaguely to context. With the 
acceptance of hidden or assumed hedges, we can'now simply accept that 
sentence (103), like any other sentence, is subject to assumed hedges 
which specify the comparison class needed to pin down a predicate 




(105) John is, a tall man, but he is a. short basketball player. 
The. most natural, reading of this sentence assumes a-hedge like for a 
man' pinning down tall and a hedge like 'for a basketball player' 
pinning down short. These' hedges narrow the wide or neutral context. 
assumed to apply to the sentence as a whole. 
Understood hedges not only fill a-need in the'present, analysis 
but can help illustrate how people adjust their interpretations of 
other people's utterances. Reasonable communicators often minimise 
disagreement by seeking out their interlocutor's contexts, 
accommodating to them and even deferring to them in responses. 
Everyone does this to some extent, and the best communicators are 
constantly aware that no two peopleI really speak the same language. 
Beesley -. 23y - Adjectives 
Every'act of understanding is ultimately an act of translation. 
One major strategy of accommodation is to assume that other 
people do not utter contradictions. If Algernon tells me that 'Nixon 
is a murderer and he is not a murderer', I naturally assume that 
Algernon 
. 
intends murderer to be applied according to different 
criteria--I assume that there are understood hedges on the two 
conjoined clauses. Similarly, if tall and short threaten to 
contradict in 'John is ,a tall man but a short basketball player', 
appropriate hedges are assumed again. Another strategy of 
accommodation is simply to ask questions about the speakers intent. 
When faced with a vague sentence such as 'Mary is, clever', a hearer 
can also explicitly ask In what sense? or How do you mean? These 
are simple requests for the speaker to make his context, his intended 
senses, more explicit in hedges. 
'In conclusion,, assumed hedges are both necessary and useful in 
interpreting utterances. They allow utterances to be interpreted 
relative to the speaker's intentions, and they rescue many 
intuitively coherent assertions which superficially appear to be 
contradictions. Finally, 
hidden hedges allow contexts to be treated 
as indices parallel to possible worlds and intervals of time. 
" 
6.3 Sentence adverbs and one-place predicates 
6.3.1 Combinations of ADV's with one-place predicates 
6.3.1.1 Proposition-level predicates 
Sentence adverbs combine not only with whole sentences in the 
syntax, but also with members of Pt/nt, where n ranges over the set 
(1,3,4,5,6). Let us take obviously' as 
'a. 
paradigm example of'an ADV'. 
(106)-, t/t (IV') 
That John sings [obviously [bothers Mary]]. 
(107) t/3t (ADJ') 
That John cheats is (obviously [possible]]. 
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(108) 't/4t (ADJ, ' ) ..,,. 
That Mary cheats is [obviously [unfortunate]]. 
(109)-t/ 
St (PNOM' ) 
The report is-[obviously [a lie]]. 
(110) t/6t 
It [obviously [appears to Sue]] that Mary is a spy. 
Similar constructions are possible with derived members of the 
designated t/nt'categories. 
The rule to allow such constructions is R88, which 'bumps' 
sentence adverbs Into modifiers of one-place predicates of 
propositions. - Rule R89 then combines these bumped adverbs with the 
appropriate structures. The new categories (t/nt)/(t/nt), where n 
ranges over the set (1,3,4,5,6), must be added, to the syntax. 
R88. If a -E PADV' then (a) E P(t/nt)/(t/nt) 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5,6)). 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XRXq[a'( [R(q)])] 
R89. If a ý6 P(t/nt)/(tint) and .8E Pt/nt then-(a, 
ß) E Pt/nt 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5,6)). 
Realisation: ß^a if a has a complement 
else a^ß 
Translation: a'( ß') 
Let us assume that possibly translates as lip[ O[ý'p] ]. The following 
example is straightforward. 
(111) '((that(t/IV. )/t, 
(JohnT, (beIV/PRED, illy)IV, i)t, 
R1)t/IV", R41' 
(beIV'/PRED, ' ((Possiblyt/8t)(t/3t)/(t/3t), 
R88' 
true t/3t}t/3t, R89)IVI, R52)t, -R51 
Realisation: That John is ill is possibly true. " 
Translation: 
1. possiblyt/et XP[ O[vpl) Basic 
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2. (possibly)(t/3t)/(t/3t) XRXq[XP[1O[vP]](ý[R(g)1)7 
From 1 by R88 
3. °'XRXq(O[R(q)]] Lambda conversion 
4; truet13t -> true' Basic 
5. ((possibly), true) t/3t 
XRXq[ O[R(q)]]( true') 
From 3,4 by R89 
6. lq[ O[true'(q)]] Lambda conversion 
`7. belV'/PRED' XR[VR]'` Basic 
8. (be, -((possibly) ,` true)) IVr-=4 XR[vR] (xq(O (true' (q) ]]) 
From 6,7 by R52 
9. Xq(O [true' (q) ]] Lambda conversion 
10. 
y(that, 
(John, (be, ill))),, 
1 ,= 
_IRR([ill'(j)]) 
See previous examples 
11. ((that, (John, (be, ill))), (be, ((possibly), true))) t Q> 
1RR( [ill'(j)]) ( Xq(O[true'(q)]]) From 9,10 by R51 
A 
12. O [true' ( [ill. ' (j) ]) ] Lambda conversion 
p[ p],. then line 12 would If true't, 3t were translated directly as 
read O[ill' (j) ]. ` If possibly were translated simply as possibly' 
rather . than- as "' kp[O(Vp)], then line 12 would read 
possibly'(ý[true'(A[ill'(j)])])'. -" These variations do not bear on the 
gist of the analysis. 
Two ADJVL' classes, Pt, 3t and Pt/4t,, are among those which can 
be modified by bumped sentence adverbs. After such modification, 
they can still become attributive modifiers of'cN's,, and the correct 
readings fall out automatically. 








R83' proposition CN'}CN' R84)t/2IV', ýR42}IV, R71)t, R1 
Realisation: John believes the possibly true proposition. 
Translation: Vp[Aq[(proposition'(p) & O[true'(p)]) 
H q-p). & believe*(j, p)] 
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6.3.1.2 Individual-level predicates 
Sentence adverbs also directly modify many one-place predicates 
of individuals. The rules and examples are parallel to those in 
Section 6.3.1.1. The categories IV/IV, (t/4e)/(t/4e) and 
(t/5e)/(t/5e) must be added to the syntax. 
R90 . If ac PADV' then (a) cPnn (t/e)/(t/e) 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5) 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPXy[a'(ý[P(y)])] 
Taking formerlyt/8t as a paradigm sentence adverb, the rules allow the 
generation of structures like the following. 
-(113): - t/e (IV) 
John [[formerly] smoked] 
ly[formerly'(-[smoke'(y)])](j) 
(114) t/3e (ADJ). _ 
John was [[formerly] brave]. = 
ay[ formerly' ( [brave' (y) ]) ] (j ) 
(115) t/5e (PART) 
John was [[formerly] [loved by Mary]] 
Xy[formerly'( [love*(m, y)])](j ) 
Bare common nouns cannot combine directly with sentence adverbs as in 
"obviously boy, but PNOMs (t/4es) can. 
(116) John was [[formerly] [a student]] 
ly[formerly'(ý[student '(y)])](j) 
Such modified PNOMs are also eligible, by the normal rules, to be 
made into non-restrictive appositives (see e. g. Quirk et a/. 
1972: 635). 
(117) John, formerly a student, is now a businessman. 
(118) Mary, presently a politician, was once a researcher. 
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Once, as in (118), appears to be a basic (t/ne)/(t/ne), where n 
ranges over the set (1,3,4,5), with the approximate reading 
1PXy[formerly'(ý[P(y)])]. Always and never are similar with the 
readings XPXy[always'(ý[P(y)])] and XPly[never'(*[P(y)])] 
respectively. One reading of ever is equivalent to that for always, 
but it appears to be limited, in modern English, to category 
(t/3e)/(t/3e) as--in- the ever popular princess. 
Generally speaking, almost any ADV' can be bumped by rule R90 
into a modifier of one-place predicates. These include temporal, 
modal and parenthetical examples. 
(119) John is frequently/obviously/fortunately drunk. 
Examples of hedges directly, modifying vague adjectives are very 
common (see e. g. Quirk et a!. 1972: 280,822). 
(120) John is, [tall [for a pygmy]] but, -[short, [for a man]]. 
'(121) Mary is [good [from=Bill's point of view]] but 
[bad [from Sue's point of view]). 




adjectives . All the adverbs, -save widely, 
are hedges. 
Abortion is a matter that is morally problematic, 
pastorally delicate, legislatively thorny, 
'constitutionally' ý insecure, ' ecumenically' divisive, 
medically, normless, humanly anguishing, racially 
provocative, journalistically absurd, personally biased, 
and widely performed. (Richard McCormick, quoted by 
Teter Steinfels .M 
in 'Abortion, 
, 
Religion and the 
Constitution', Sunstone, vol. 7 no. 3) 
There are a number , of 'complications: --ly, adverbs with 
prepositional-phrase' complements, 'such as - 'unfortunately for John, 
cannot be bumped into one-place predicate modifiers. 
(122) *Mary is [[unfortunately for John] ill]. 
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Such adverbials. are exceptional. in any case, and they appear only 
sentence. initially, or medially or finally with strong pauses. 
(123) a. - Unfortunately for John, Mary left. 
b. Mary, unfortunately for John, left. 
c. Mary left, unfortunately for John. 
Adverbials in -wise. 'those formed with of ' and many other complex 
hedge adverbials must be postposed when bumped into one-place 
predicate modifiers. This appears to be another manifestation of the 
English tendency to postpose modifiers with 'complements'.. 
(124); a. John is [good [at chess]]. 
b. Bill is [irresponsible [money-wise]]. 
a. - Sue 
is [strong. [from an emotional point of view]]. 
ADNLs. modified by bumped sentence adverbs. can still function as 
attributive modifiers of CNs. The correct translations fall out 
automatically using the, regular., rules. 
(125) 
: 




R11)CN/2CN, R12' sailorCN)CN, R13)T, R4 
Realisatiön: the formerly drunk sailor 
Translation:, 1QVy[Ax[(sailor '(x) & 
A formerly'( (drunk'(x)])), -3 x-y] & Q(y)] 
Similar' examples occur commonly and have been noted by a number of 
authors (see e. g. Quirk et al. ' 1972: 280). 
(126) Modal: the [possibly drunk] sailor ' 
(127) Parenthetical: the (unfortunately very ill] student 
(128) Temporal: the [frequently drunk]'supervisor' 
(129) Hedge: the [legally blind] pensioner 
Parenthetical adverbs .. modifying adjectivals, are slightly more 
difficult than', the others; some.. informants. maintain that 
constructions like , strangely drunk sailor are ambiguous. ,. 
The first 
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reading can be paraphrased as '[the sailor such that he is drunk] and 
[it is. strange that he is drunk]'; the second reading is roughly the 
sailor such that it is strange that he is drunk'. The two readings 
are represented below, but only the non-restrictive reading (130) is. 
accommodated by the present rules. 
(130) ), x[sailor'(x)' & drunk'(x)]; subroutine( strange I (p a)) 
(where pa will be resolved as [drunk'(xa)]) 
(131) ). x[strange'("[drunk'(x)]) & sailor'(x)] 
Given the somewhat unusual non-restrictive reading for parenthetical 
sentence adverbs, this ambiguity is not unexpected. R91 accommodates 
this-,, restrictive' reading. 
13 
R91. If aE Pt/4t then (a) c B(t/ne)/(t/ne) 
(where n ranges over the set (3,5)). 
Realisation: a,,, where all is a with the main adjectival 
in the -ly form 
w 
Translation: XPXy[a'(p [P(y)] )] 
 ", 
6.3.2,. Attributive_modifiers related. to, sentence adverbs 
6.3.2.0 "-Introduction " 
All four classes of sentence adverb discussed in Section 6.2 are 
idiosyncratically related to small, classes of basic attributive 
adjectives. There is a long history of linguistic analyses which 
tried to show, a transformational relationship between attributive 
adjectives like possible and sentence adverbs like possibly. 
14 For 
instance, a sentence like John Is a possible thief would be transformed 
from an underlying string more like John Is Npossibly a thief. In 
general, " ' frequent visitor would be paraphrased as someone who is 
frequently a visitor' or 'someone who visits frequently' i clear failure` 
would be paraphrased as` 'something which is clearly a failure'; and 
alleged criminal would be paraphrased as 'someone who is allegedly a 
criminal'. Little by little the shortcomings of transformations 
became clear, and in Chomsky 1970 and Jackendoff 1972 the move was 
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already away from such solutions. Berman 1973a: 155-156 decisively 
rejects the transformational approach for handling these . adverb- 
related adjectives, citing the idiosyncratic exceptions and meaning 
differences between the -proposed source and target strings. No 
transformational solutions will be proposed here.; - - 
There remain, of course, a large number of valid generalisations 
involving adjectives and sentence adverbs, and these require an 
explanation at some level. In a MG of the type pursued here, the 
most convenient way to avoid transformations and yet capture the old 
transformational insights is to treat attributive adjectives like 
possible, obvious and probable as basic CN/CNs and give them complex 
translations involving proposition-level predicates. - Meaning 
postulates and customised' interpretation rules- are another- 
possibility, ' but the gist of the analysis is most easily conveyed 
with complex translations. 
6.3.2.1 Modal attributive adjectives 
A number of attributive adjectives have lexical links with modal 
adverbs, as in-the-, following examples. Similar data have been cited 
by many researchers including Quirk et al. (1972: 284-286,259-260) 
and Berman_(1973a: 145-154). -- - 
(132) a. John is obviously a thief. 
b. John is an obvious thief. 
(133) a. Mary is possibly a spy. 
b. Mary is a possible spy. 
This is not" to say that these pairs are necessarily -logically 
equivalent, but only° that they share some. -element of meaning which 
can be expressed either in an-adjective-, or in an adverb. The-easiest 
way to, handle such adjectives is to classify them as basic-members-of 
CN/CN and give them -basic complex translations r-as -- in -(134). --, The 
individual,: examples are cited with a possible headnoun which helps 
make the intended reading of the adjective clear. 
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Alternatively, one can appeal to meaning postulates such as 
APAx(possible'(P)(x) H O(P(x)]]. These CN/CN examples are often 
identical in form to t/3t adjectives and should not be confused with 
them. On the other hand, the lexical relationship between the two 
classes is obvious in the semantics. Some examples like obvious CNICN 
and clear CN/CN'also 
have homonyms which name one-place predicates of 
individuals r as in --(135 ); these , too must be ý carefully , distinguished.:,, 
(135)° a. A soldier should not make himself obvious. 
b. This glass is clear. 
Yý.: ma ys i`9 
example-=translations in (134) also do not rule outm the 
possibility of other readings for these CN/CN forms. Possible, for 
instance, -""as in -possible spy can , 
have ,a second reading 
kP kyjpossible' [FUT(P (y)) ]) ]. Thus 'possible spy might be 
paraphrased in two' ways, as` the "set of entities such that is is 
possible that they are spies' and as the set of entities such that 
it. is possible that they will be spies in the future'. The latter 
reading is somewhat related to that for potential spy. Some readings 
of probable, likely and unlikely may also involve future tense: e. g. 
probable kpky[probable'(ý[FUT(P(y) )] )], so probable failure CN/CN 
Xy[probable'((FUT(failure'(p))])]. The problem of tense in 
adjective readings will be taken up in the next section. 
Some latinate CN/CNs, and others lacking obvious t/3t homonyms, 
might be translated as shown below. 









XP1yOVx[believe*(x, [P(y) ] )] 
1PXyVx(obvious, '(x, [P(y)])] 
XPAyVx[claim , (x, [P(y)] )] 
A 
XP1yOVx[believe*(x, [P(y}] )] 
w 




However, in these examples the morphological evidence for such 
lexical solutions is very weak or does not exist at all. Rather than 
overtly translating plausible in terms of believe', it is safer to CN/CN 
translate it simply as plausible' and then appeal to a meaning 
postulate like (137). 
(137) AxAPO[plausible'(P)(x) -)OVy[believe (y, A[P(x)])]) 
This sufficiently captures the intuition that plausible has something 
to do with the possible existence of a believer without claiming that 
this is all that plausible means. The other examples can be handled 
similarly. 
Many modal CN/CNs are fairly productively related to IV/T' verbs 
by lexical... rule. 
R92 (lexical). ,". If aE (BIV/T' 'U BIV/(t, IV') ), then 
(a) E BCN/C. 
Realisations. a'' where a',,.,. is, the past participle form of a 
A Translation: - XPXyVz[a*(z, [P(y) ] )], 
From IV/T'... verbs .. such as belleve, : allege and assume we get the, 
following CN/CNs. 
(138) accepted,, acknowledged, admitted, alleged, assumed, 
believed,,. charged, claimed, confirmed, .. contested,. 
disputed, 
known, predicted, presumed, proclaimed, recognised, 
reported, supposed, suspected 
For example, the CU suspected spy will be translated as 
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)yVz[suspect*(z, [spy'(y)])], the set of individuals such that there 
exists someone who suspects them to be spies. Related examples which 
appear more basic than derived include those in (139). They cannot 
very happily be paraphrased or translated in terms of verbs like 
purport, repute or rumour. They are probably more safely explicated 
with meaning postulates. 
(139) purported XPXyVz[claim*(z, [P(y)])] 
reputed XPXyVz[say*(z, A[P(y)])] 
w 
rumoured APayVz[say*(z, [P(y)] )] 













A [ply)] )] 
A 
[p{Yl] )] 
A few -able forms are also lexically related to the' IV/T' class. 
(141) acceptable 1PXyOVx[accept (x, P 
believable XPXyOVx[believe*(x, ACp(y)] )] 
undoubtable XPX=y-1 OVx[doubt *(x, A[P(y)] )] 
undeniable 1PXy 1 OVx[deny *(x, A[P{y}] )] 
conceivable APXyOVx[conceive '(x, [P(y) 
unquestionable XPXy7IOVx[question*(x, A[P{y}] )] 





. -ýý" .. 
XPXY[Proclaimw, (Y. ` [P(Y)])]"' 
XPXY[profess*(y, ' I[P(Y)] )] 
Self-styled and sometimes admitted also have readings like those in 
(142). Again the possibility arises of handling such adjectives with 
a meaning postulate rather than with explicit translations: 
APAxD[ö(P)(x) -> claim*(x, A[P(x)])], where 0 translates self- 
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proclaimed, - professed, self-styled, 'or,, admitted . 
6.3.2.2 Parenthetical attributive adjectives 
Basic CN/CNs related to parenthetical adverbs or t/4t adjectives 
are not common. - The following' (b) sentences may have unstable 
readings roughly related to the corresponding (a) sentences. 
(143) a. It is odd that John is a candidate. 
b. John is an odd candidate. 
(144) a. Strangely, Bill was the choice. 
b. Bill was a strange choice. 
(145) a. It was unfortunate that Sue was a candidate. 
b. Sue was an unfortunate candidate. 
If necessary, we can postulate lexical-entries like the following, 
but the evidence for such readings is flimsy. _-- 
(146) oddCN, C 
XPXy[odd'(A[P(y)))] 
strangeCN/CN 'XPXy[strange'(ý[P(y)])] 
unfortunate CNI XPXyVz[harm*(ý[P(y) ], z)] 
such readings of these forms, if they occasionally occur, must be 
carefully distinguished from more common homonyms like oddADJ, 
strangeADJ, odd ADJ I and strange ADJI* 
6.3.2.3 Temporal attributive adjectives 
There are numerous basic CN/CN adjectives with temporal 
readings, and they have been much discussed in the literature. 
is 
Many 
of these adjectives provide ways to inject tense or tense-like 
notions into terms (Bach 1968: 104), and they are quite easy to 
accommodate in the present grammar. Let PAST, PRES and FUT be tense 
operators on sentences. The following examples can be defined in 
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Examples: former, old, past, erstwhile, quondam, whilom, 
then, ex- 
Translation: XPXy[PAST[P(y)]] 
Examples: present, current, actual 
Translation: XPXy[PRES[P(y)]] 
Examples: future, coming, -to-be 
Translation: XPly[FUT[P(y)]] 
such readings are approximate and must be considered subject to 
refinement. Future-related words like coming, forthcoming, -to-comer 
eventual, budding, imminent and -to-be will require variations on FUT, 
with attention to the remoteness of the future interval. Recent 
involves a limitation on PAST. Late, as in the late Mr Jones combines 
elements of pastness and death. Previous, prior, earlier, last, subsequent 
and next are time-related notions but will require a semantics of 
ordinals. before they-can. -be fully captured. Examples like former and 
then might be better translated, as APAy[formerly' (m[P(y)])] and 
XPAy(then'( [P(y)])] respectively, assuming that a semantics exists 
for formerly' and then'. The adjectives in (150) combine elements of 
modality and tense in their translations. 
(150) potential XPXyO[FUT[P(y}]] 
prospective_ APXyVx[expect *(x, ý[FUT[P(y)]] 
PotentlalCN/CN might also. ,.,. be translated > simply as 
XPXy[potentially'( [P(y)])], if a-, semantics for ° potentially' is 
available. 
Assuming that formerCN/CN translates as 
XPXy[formerly'( [P(y)])], the following example is typical. 
(151) ((theDET' (formerCN/CN' 
presidentCN)CN, R13)T, R4' swimIV}tI 
Realisation: The former president swims. 
Translation: Vy[Az[formerly* (*[president'(x)]) H x'y] & 
swim'(y)] 
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Frequency-related adjectives have one reading which- is easily 
handled. 









Other, similar examples are occasional, Infrequent and sporadic. These 
readings occur typically with predicate nominals. 
(153) (MaryT, (beIV/PRED, (a, (frequentCN/CN' 
guestCN)CN, R13)PNOM, R6}IV, R2)t, R1 
Realisation:. Mary is a frequent guest. 
Translation: iy[frequently'(A[guest'(y)])](m) 
Fixed-frequency adjectives which can occasionally take such readings 
include hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, annual, "etc. 
Similar adjectives based on duration rather than frequency 
include those in (154). 
(154) permanent XPXy[permanently'( [P(y)])] 
temporary XPXy[temporarily'(*[P(y)])] 
In an excellent article, Stump (1981) has investigated some more 
difficult readings 
, 
of frequency 'adjectives'. The first readings, 
which he terms 'adverbial', are illustrated, with suitable 
paraphrases in, (155) to (157). 
(155) a.. An occasional sailor strolled by. 
b. Occasionally, a sailor strolled by. 
(156) a. A periodic holiday raised spirits. 
b. Periodically, a holiday raised spirits. 
(157) a. Mary paid her friend a frequent visit. 
b. Frequently, Mary paid her friend a visit. 
Such adverbial examples occur mainly in indefinite terms, (with the 
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odd sailor and your occasional sailor being idiosyncratic exceptions). 
To generate these examples directly in a surfacy syntax, Stump found 
that- these frequency 'adjectives' must be treated as determinersi 
the required indefinite articles in the surface strings are added 
syncategorematically. - The following categorisations, translations 
and rules are consistent with Stump's approach. 
(158) periodicT//CN 
XPXQ[periodically'(ýVx[P(x) & Q(x)])} 
(and similarly for other T//CNs such as occasional, 
frequent, Infrequent, sporadic, etc. ) 
R93. If aE BT11CN and- .8 c- PCN" then (a, ß) ET 
Realisation: a(n) ^a^ß 
Translation: a' (ß ,) 
The derivation of the canonical'example"is shown in'(159). 
(159) ((occasionalT//CN' sailorCN)T, R93' stroll-byIV)t, R, 
Realisation: An occasional sailor strolled by. 
Translation: 
1. occasional XPXQ[occasionally'(mVx[P(x) & Q(}])] T//CN 
Basic. 
:° CN sailor' Basic'- sailor 
3. - (occasional, sailor }T 
XPXQ[occasionally'(^Vx[P(x) &'Q(x)])] sailor)'''- 
From 1, ` 2' by R93 
4. XQ[occasionally'( Vx[sailor'(x) & Q(x}])) 
Lambda conversion 
5. stroll-byIV stroll-by' Basic 
6. '-((occasional, ' sailor), stroll-by) t 
XQ[occasionally'(*Vx[sailor'(x) & Q(x)])] (stroll-by') 
From 4,5 by R1 
7. occasionally'( Vx[sailor'(x) & stroll-by'(x)]) 
Lambda conversion 
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There are complications to this approach (see Stump 1981: 227- 
231,246-250), but the broad outlines appear sound. It seems 
certain, in any case, that these adverbial adjectives' cannot be 
analysed as ADJs or as CN/CNs. They are, therefore, rather bizarre 
adjectives if they are adjectives at all, and they are not of 
immediate interest here. 
- on the other hand, a second class of adverbial adjectives 
discussed by Stump are indeed adjectival and cannot be so easily 
dismissed. They occur in sentences like (160) to (162), which Stump 
argues are generic. 
(160) An occasional cup of coffee helps keep John awake. 
, (161) A periodic checkup will keep you healthy. 
(162) An infrequent trip broke up Jack's dull routine. 
These sentences, on the 'generic' reading, cannot be paraphrased with 
wide-scope adverbials--e. g. (160) is not equivalent to (163)--and so 
a new analysis is required. 
(163) Occasionally a. -cup of coffee helps keep John awake. 
Stump adopts the analysis of generic sentences introduced by 
Carlson (for a recent explication see Carlson 1982). This assumes 
that the domain of the model includes not only objects, like John and 
Fido, but also 'kinds' like man and dog. In a generic sentence like 
(164), Stump and Carlson argue that the subject dogs denotes a kind 
entity (let us call it xk), and that the translation of the term is 
app(xa). 
(164) Dogs are mammals. 
Sentence (164) therefore translates as an ascription of mammalhood to 
the entity xä as in (164'). 
(164') maaunal' (xä ) 
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'Habitual' sentences like John is tall are translated in the familiar 
way as tall'(j). Generic and habitual sentences are therefore of the 
same ilk--they translate as assertions that an individual (i. e. an 
object or a kind) satisfies some predicate. Carlson holds that along 
with objects and kinds we need to consider impermanent 'stages' (or 
'manifestations') of those objects and kinds. For instance, if we 
utter John Is sad referring to John's emotional state at a certain 
time and place, we do not mean to ascribe sad' of John in the same 
way that we ascribe tall' of him. Height is something which is 
characteristic or habitual of John while his emotional state is 
transitory or accidental. Carlson therefore argues that John Is sad 
is an ascription of sadness to some stage of John, the impermanent 
manifestation of John at the relevant time and place. If xj is the 
stage of John when he was sad, then John Is sad translates as sad(x) 
rather than as sad'(j). The stage xj is said to 'realise' j, and this 
is represented formally as Re(xý, j). 
The concept of stages is also used for explaining bare plurals 
in episodic, rather than generic, sentences. (165), for example, is 
not a generic statement about the kind dog (which we designated xä) 
but a report about something which realises the kind dog--that is, 
some specific group of dogs. 
(165) Dogs chewed my newspaper this morning. 
Thus (sets of) objects can realise kinds just as stages realise 
objects. 
Returning to the troublesome adverbial adjectives, stump argues 
that just as the term dogs in sentence (164) refers to a generic 
individual, so does the term an occasional cup of coffee in (160). In 
particular, an occasional cup of coffee is said to refer to that 
object which (1) is realised occasionally and (2) is such that each 
of its realisations is incidental with a cup of coffee. The set of 
all individuals realised occasionally is named in (166). In these 
examples, an object variable is represented as x0, a stage variable 
as x and a kind variable as x. An individual (object or kind) 
sk 
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variable will have no superscript. 
(166) Xx[occasionally'(Vxs(Re(xs, x)])] 
In practice, the quality of occasional realisation will be required 
only during some interval including the now interval at which a 
sentence is evaluated. The translation is thus altered as in (167). 
Let i be an, `interval of time. 
(167) Xx[Vi[nowci & AT(i, occasionally'(AVxs[Re(xs, x)]))]] 
The second requirement that each stage be incidental with a cup of 
coffee is coded similarly. (168) names the set of individuals such 
that each of their realisations is a cup of coffee. 
(168) XxAx3Ai(AT(i', Re(xs, x) --> Vz[cup-of-coffee'(z) & Re(xs, z)])] 
For convenience, being incidental with a property can be abbreviated 
as a two-place relation In*, which abbreviates (169). In*(P)(x) is 
true at <w, t> iff in w, for every stage x3 and at any interval t', if 
xs realises the individual denoted by x then there is some individual 
z having the property denoted by P such that xs realises z. 
(169) XPXxAx3Ai[AT(i, Re(x3, x) -3 Vz[P(z) & Re(xs, z)])] 
At last we can translate the term an occasional cup of coffee as 
(170). 
(170) XPP(tx [Axo[Re(x , xk) H [Vi[nowci & AT(i, 
occasionally'("Vxs[Re(xs, x°)]))] & In*(Acup-of-coffee')(x°)]]]) 
The sentence (160), reprinted here, will then receive the translation'` 
in (160'). 
0 
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x(160) An occasional cup of coffee helps 
(160') helps-keep-John-awake'(Lxk(Axo(P 
H [Vi[nowci & AT(i, occasionally' 
& In*(Acup-of-coffee')(x°)]]]) 
keep John awake. 
.e (xo xk ) 
(ýVxs(Re(xs, x )] 
Various indications support the conclusion that this use of 
occasional is an adjective. Unlike the 'adverbial' usage 
characterised earlier, where indefinite articles are added in 
syncategorematically, the 'generic' occasional can appear with 
various determiners. 
(171) An occasional cup of coffee helps keep John awake. 
The 
John's 
Also, the generic frequency adjectives can stack (Stump 1971: 250). 
(172) An occasional weekly inspection can be useful for 
detecting fire hazards. 
The generic occasional is therefore treated as a CN/CN and is given 
the translation in-(173). 
(173) XPXx [Vi[nowci & AT(i, occasionally, (ýVxs[Re(xs, 
x )]))] 
& In*(P)(x )] 
The relevant readings of periodic, dally, weekly, frequent, etc. have the 
same translation except that the appropriately related adverbial 
operator replaces occasionally'. 
If such an analysis is accepted, the present rules will 
effortlessly generate generic common nouns of the form occasional cup 
of coffee, daily newspaper, weekly article and the like. Unfortunately, 
Carlson, in recent lectures, has cast some doubt on his ontology of 
kinds, objects and stages, and Stump's analysis cannot be considered 
the final word. However, the outlines of the analysis appear sound, 
awaiting only a more stable formal ontology. Stump's heroic 
avoidance of transformations, even in the face of such involved 
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readings, isetruly commendable. 
6.3.2.4 Hedging attributive adjectives 
When predicates are realised as nouns, hedges can appear as 
basic CN/CN adjectives modifying those nouns. Compare the hedges in 
(174) with the adjectives in (175). 
(174) Biologically, 
Agriculturally, 










As 'expected, vague nouns like., success and failure go especially well 
= with adjectival--(or adverbial) hedges because success and failure can 
be judged by so many different criteria and standards. 










As with other adjectives related to-- sentence -adverbials,, hedge 
adjectives are basic_CN/CNs, and can be -given readings 
in terms of-the, 
same predicates as the related adverbials. 
-. c)- 
















x(177) Voting is a, legal right. 
political 
moral 







(179) This proposal makes financial sense. 
political 
economic 
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1PXy[morally'( [P(y)] )] 
A 
1PXy[politically'( [P(y)])) 
It'=is --important not to confuse these hedge- adjectives with 
homomorphic"adjectives of other categories. Moral, for instance, also 
names a one-place predicate of individuals as in John Is moral and in 
one reading of , moral philosopher. The other reading of moral 
philosopher- (roughly, 'philosopher of morals') in effect uses the word 
moral to specify a certain kind of philosopher. Such kinds are 
typically a closed class, and combinations like moral philosopher 
often appear as compound words, rather than as apparent ADJ-CN 
combinations, in other languages. All signs point to treating this 
latter reading of moral philosopher as a basic lexical unit. The 
hedge adjective moralCN/CN evokes the paraphrase morally or from a 
moral point of view. Example (181) shows how hedge adjectives naming 
different criteria can function within'the'same'sentence. ' 
1e N__ 
(181) ((JohnT, {(a, (physicalCN/CNadultCN)CN, R13)PNOM, 
R6}T/T, R30 T, R29' 
{beIV/PRED'+ (an, (emotionalCN/CN' 
child CN)CN, R13}PNOM, R6 IV' R2 t, R1 
Realisations John, a physical adult,, is an emotional child. 
Translation: a.., emotionally' (. A [child' (j) ]) 
A 
b. - physically'( (adult'(j)]) 
6.3.3 
adverbs 
An argument--for- adjective, classification using sentence 
-, The-. -fact that sentence adverbs. can be bumped into modifiers of 
one-place predicates, including ADJs,; indirectly" provides a strong 
argument-for the present<analysis of individual-level adjectives. -To 
, -review, -slightly, 
I -, have argued-that, some adjectives are of, category 
ADJ (t/3e) and translate as basic one-place predicates: these include 
traditional predicative examples such as metallic, carnivorous and 
blue-eyed; measure adjectives such as . tall - and 
big; and evaluative 
adjectives such as good, bad and skilful. other adjectives, 
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especially those related to sentence adverbials, have been classed as 
basic attributive modifiers of category CN/CN and include Former. 
possible, obvious, and, probable. - 
In contrast, the Montague-Parsons analysis tries to treat all 
adjectives as basic CN/CNs. Siegel defends the one-place predicate 
status of many adjectives, as I have, but concludes that 'relative' 
(i. e. vague) adjectives such as good, bad, skilful and awful must be 
treated as basic attributive CN/CNs. Sentence adverbs provide a 
strong test of these diverging positions. 
I have shown that 'bumped sentence adverbs, such as formerly. 
often combine with certain PREDs'and'ADJVLs within a sentence rather 
than with the sentence as a whole. This is particularly obvious when 
an ADJVL is functioning as an attributive adjective. The truth 
conditions of-(182) differ markedly from. those of (183)., 
(182) ((the , {{{{formerly 8} DET t/ t ADJ/ADJ, R90' rich 
}2 lawyer }j, smoke ) Rll CN/ CN, R12' CN CN, R13 T, R4' IV t,, Rl 
Realisation: The formerly rich lawyer smoked. 
Translation: Vy[Ax[(formerly'( [rich'(x)]) & 
lawyer' (x)) H xxy) & smoke' (y) ) 





R4' smokeIV)t,.. R1)t, R86.. .. v . 
Realisation: Formerly, the rich lawyer smoked. 
_to"_s_x., 
Translation: formerly'( [Vy[Äx[(rich'(x) & 
lawyer'(x)) H x'. y] & smoke'(y)]]) 
In ' (183), formerly modifies the entire sentence. In (182), on, the 
other hand, formerly rt rich is aý 'syntactic . constituent, and 
the 
formerness applies only to -rich', not, to lawyer',, and certainly : not to 
the whole sentence., Because attributive constructions with basically 
predicative adjectives have -a-conjunction analysis, =-a CN like formerly 
rich lawyer translates easily-and correctly- as ý (184) .- 
(184) Xx[formerly'(*[rich'(x)]) & lawyer'(x)] 
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I have'also postulated basic attributive adjectives like lorm erCN/CN' 
which has the translation XPXy[ formerly, (^[P(y) ])]. The grammar 






Realisation: former rich lawyer 





Realisation: rich former lawyer 
Translation: Az(rich'(z) & formerly'( [lawyer'(z)))) 
Again°the conjunction analysis allows the correct translation in each 
case. 
The Montague-Parsons analysis cannot handle all such 
constructions. Let us assume that lawyer is a CN and that rich and 
former are both basic CN/CNs. Montague will give 
. 
the translation of 
former rich lawyer as (187). 
(187) former'( [rich'( lawyer')]) 
As rich is an intersective adjective, Montague's meaning postulates 
(see Section 1.1.2) will enforce the analytic consequence that a rich 
lawyer is both a. lawyer and rich: e. g. if rich, ('lawyer')(j) then 
lawyer' (j) and rich' (j) . 
16 Former could be given a translation much 
like my own, leading to a satisfactory analysis. Rich former lawyer 
is also reasonably explicable by way of meaning postulates. However, 
formerly rich lawyer will cause problems. If the structure of this 
phrase is [[formerly rich] lawyer], then rules will have to be 
defined-'to combine sentence adverbs with CN/CNs to form new CN/CNs. 
This will lead to gross ungrammaticalities such as the following. 
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(188) a. *the [obviously mere] boy 
b. *the [formerly alleged] thief 
c. *the [probably former] magistrate 
Equally odd are the rules necessary if formerly rich lawyer is analysed 
as [formerly [rich lawyer]]. This would require a rule to combine 
sentence adverbs with common nouns, leading to other 
ungrammaticalities. 
(189) a. *the [obviously lawyer] 
,-b. *the [formerly thief] 
The correct reading formerly rich lawyer translates formerly as an 
operator only on the clause containing rich', as in (184). 
Unfortunately, in a classical MG, the separate clause rich'(j) (or, 
A 
better, rich'( entity')(j)_see note 16) never appears in the syntax 
but arises only by way of meaning postulates. So aside from the 
syntactic-barriers just described, the traditional MG analysis of 
adjectives would appear to force formerly and other sentence adverbs 
in a-, CN, like . 
formerly rich lawyer to be described as functions 
depending not on the intensions of their arguments but on selected 
analytic consequences of the sentence as a whole. This amounts to an 
abandonment of compositionality and an invitation to chaos. 
The present analysis, which handles formerly rich lawyer and 
similar examples without difficulty, also provides an indirect test 
for adjective classification. Recall that R90 bumps an ADV' into an 
ADJ/ADJ as in (190). 





Such a derived ADJ as formerly rich can then be bumped into a derived 
CN/2CN by R12. The key point here is that an ADJ can combine with a 
bumped ADV', but this combination must occur before an ADJ is bumped 
into a CN/2CN. There is no rule similar to R90 which allows the 
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combination of an ADV' and a CN/nCN. Thus a derivation like (191) is 
impossible. 
(191) ((formerly (rich)) lawyer) 
CN 
(formerly (rich))CN/ZCN lawyerCN 
(formerly) Y) (CN/2CN)/(CN/ZCN)(rich)ZCN 
formerlyt/et rich 
CN/ 
There is good semantic as well as syntactic justification for this. 
The translation of (rich)12 is XPXy[P(y) & richl(y)]. The 
formerly in formerly rich lawyer intuitively modifies only the clause 
richl(y), so it could apply properly to XPXy[P(y) & richl(y)] only 
if it could reach inside its argument and attach magically to the 
correct conjunct. The lack of a rule for combining sentence adverbs 
with CN/nCNs is therefore not an accidental but a necessary omission. 
This analysis inherently predicts that any string of the form 
[(sentence-adverb CN/CN] CN] will be ungrammatical, and so no basic 
CN/CN can ever be modified by a sentence adverb. Basic CN/CNs in the 
present analysis include former, possible, mere and alleged. As 
predicted, the following constructions are ungrammatical. 
(192) a. *the [obviously former] lawyer 
b. *a (formerly possible] thief 
c. *a [presently mere] boy 
d. *the [fortunately alleged] murderer 
These basic' CN/CNs are the same adjectives which cannot appear 
normally in predicate position, Again the 
rules of the present grammar provide no way to generate the sentences 
in (193), because beIV/PREP maps only genuine one-place predicates, 
including ADJs, into IVs. 
(193) a. *The lawyer is former. 
b. *The thief is possible. 
c. *The boy is mere. 
d. *The murderer is alleged. 
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The distinctions among adjectives which Montague relegated to the 
meaning postulates are therefore shown to be vital for producing 
grammatical strings in the syntax. 
A corollary of the grammaticality predictions just explained is 
that any grammatical string of the rough form [[sentence-adverb 
adjective] CN] must involve an adjective of the category ADJ rather 
than a CN/CN. Numerous adjective surface forms have both an ADJ and 
a CN/CN reading. Obvious is one of these: obviousCN/CN is a basic 
CN/CN and translates in terms of a two-place relation (call it 
obvious2' XP), yVz[obvious2' (z, A EP(Y)1)1- ObviousA translates as 
a basic one-place predicate obvious'. When the basic ADJ obvious is 
bumped into a CN/2CN by R12, its reading is then XPXy[P(y) & 
obviousl(y)]. Thus the CN obvious lawyer, on the basic CN/CN reading, 
will translate as XPXyVz[obvious'(z, 
*[lawyer'(y)])]--the set of all 
entities such that it is obvious to someone that they are lawyers. 
On the derived CN/2CN (basic ADJ) reading, the same string will 
translate as Xy[obvious'(y) & lawyer '(y)]--the set of lawyers who 
are obvious (stick out or are conspicuous). Clear also has an ADJ and 
a basic CN/CN reading. Other potentially ambiguous structures 
include strings like the following. 
(194) moral philosopher, plastic surgeon, fuzzy logician, 
abnormal psychologist, criminal lawyer, old bookseller, 
theatrical remover, English teacher, provincial magistrate, 
sanitary engineer, romantic poet, dramatic critic, 
artistic manager, literary critic 
When strings like obvious lawyer and moral philosopher occur with 
sentence adverbs, as in !! formerly obvious) lawyer] or ([obviously 
moral] philosopher], the ADJ reading of obvious and moral is forced 
to preserve grammaticality. 
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(195) a. The formerly obvious lawyer made himself 
less conspicuous. 
b. The obviously moral philosopher lost his job. 
c. The previously fuzzy logician got a shave. 
d. The occasionally abnormal psychologist needed help. 
e. John is an obviously criminal lawyer. 
The sentence adverb test works because the bumped ADV's can be 
of category ADJ/ADJ but not of category (CN/CN)/(CN/CN) or of 
category CN/CN. The ADJ/ADJ is, figuratively, looking for an ADJ to 
modify and so forces an ADJ reading of any potentially ambiguous 
adjective form that follows. Basic ADJ/ADJs like very, somewhat and 
a bit have long been known to have the same effect in disambiguating 
strings such as moral philosopher; they too are looking for an ADJ for 
modify. 
(196) Jane is a very moral philosopher. 
(197) The somewhat abnormal psychologist was closely watched. 
The disambiguating power of basic and derived ADJ/ADJs can be used to 
humorous effect. (198) is an exchange in the play On the Razzle by 
Tom Stoppard (quoted in Newsweek, 20 October 1981). 
(198) A: Personal servant, is he? 
B: Yes, a bit. 
A similar exchange using an ADV' bumped into an ADJ/ADJ is shown in 
(199). 
(199) At Is Bill an abnormal psychologist? 
B: Well, occasionally abnormal. 
As an overall test for ADJs, the bumped sentence adverbs provide an 
even more, consistent test than very. Some ADJs like pregnant, virgin 
and carnivorous and also superlatives such as perfect and flawless 
resist modification by very simply because they lack vagueness. Very 
pregnant, very virgin, very flawless, etc. take on secondary readings, but 
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sentence adverbs, bumped into ADJ/ADJs, can apply to any ADJ in its 
literal sense. 
(200) The obviously pregnant princess continued her engagements. 
(201) My previously carnivorous friend became a vegetarian. 
The surface form very also has the disadvantage of having ADJ'/ADJ' 
and other related readings which confuse the picture. The truth of a 
sentence, for example, can be 'very obvious', and a very obvious thief 
can be a member of 'the set of individuals such that it is very 
obvious that they are thieves'. 
(202) It is very obvious that John is ill. 
(203) John is a very obvious thief. 
Siegel (1976a; 1979) and others (see Section 2.1.2.1) claim that 
degree adjectives (tall, short, high, low, fat, thin, etc. ) are a subtype 
of ADJ. The same position has been adopted herein. Given the long 
history of degree adjectives being translated as basic semantic 
attributives, this is a bold claim. If the sentence adverb test is 
valid and this ADJ analysis is correct, then degree adjectives should 
appear freely with sentence adverbs; and indeed they do. 
(204) a. The [obviously tall] ballerina was rejected. 
b. The [previously fat] capitalist lost 20 pounds. 
c. The [philosophically lightweight] lecturer was 
laughed at. 
In the case of evaluative adjectives, however, Siegel claims that 
good, bad, skilful, etc. are 'doublets', having both a relative CN/CN 
reading and an absolute ADJ reading. When good thief has the reading 
'good qua thief' or 'good as a thief', Siegel calls this a relative 
reading and analyses good 
relative reading of good 
absolute reading, good 
-thief'(y)] and supposedly 
'morally or 'absolutely' go 
as a basic CN/CN. Her translation for the 
thief is therefore good' (Athief I). On the 
thief is translated as Xy[good'(y) & 
denotes the set of thieves who are also 
od. Robin Hood, who robs from the rich and 
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gives to the poor, could conceivably be called a good thief in this 
absolute sense. 
I have argued at length in Chapter 2 against this double 
classification of evaluative adjectives. I have claimed that all 
evaluative adjectives are basic ADJs and translate as one-place 
predicates, however vague. Furthermore, I have claimed that 
evaluative adjectives should receive a conjunction analysis when they 
attributively modify a common noun. Vagueness has been explained 
herein as an effect of context rather than as an effect caused by an 
adjective applying to the intension of its CN argument. In the 
present analysis, Siegel's claimed absolute reading of good, i. e. 
'morally good', is taken to be a simple case of the vague predicate 
good' being applied relative to moral criteria rather than relative 
to some other criteria. 
As shown in examples like obvious lawyer and fuzzy logician, the 
presence of a sentence adverb forces an ADJ (absolute) reading of the 
first constituent. If, as Siegel argues, evaluative adjectives are 
doublets with both a CN/CN and an ADJ reading, then an evaluative 
adjective modified grammatically by a bumped sentence adverb should 
have only its ADJ reading, i. e. the 'absolute' reading. None of the 
following examples should allow a CN/CN ('relative') reading. 
(205) Robin Hood is an [obviously good] thief. 
(206) Sue is a [choreographically beautiful] dancer. 
`(207) John is an [occasionally bad] monk. 
The test is decisively against Siegel. An obviously good thief can 
still be 'good qua thief' rather than morally good. A 
choreographically beautiful dancer need not be absolutely beautiful 
but rather 'beautiful qua dancer'-that is, beautiful relative to 
choreographic criteria. An occasionally bad monk can still be 'bad 
qua, monk'. 
In this as well as in other syntactic tests, evaluative 
adjectives like good consistently act like ADJs rather than like 
basic CN/CNs. A gross syntactic and logical ambiguity in evaluative 
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adjectives as proposed by Siegel is neither necessary nor tenable. 
Evaluative adjectives are simply ADJs which are exceptionally vague. 
6.4 Appositives and non-restrictive relative clauses at proposition 
level 
6.4.1 Proposition-level non-restrictive relative clauses 
Non-restrictive modification at the proposition level has 
already been used to translate the parenthetical adverbs in section 
6.2.2. Translations like the following were illustrated and 
defended. 
(208) Sadly, Max failed. 
(208') a. fail' (m) 
b. sad'( (fail'(m)]) 
Non-restrictive relative clauses also appear at proposition level; 
example (209) appears equivalent to (208). 
(209) Max failed, which is sad. 
(210) John wants to retire, which worries sue. 
Such relative clauses, whose syntactic antecedents are whole 
sentences, have been noted by many researchers (Chomsky 1965: 217; 
Vendler 1968: 35,90,91; Quirk et al. 1972: 519-520,648,872-873; 
Jackendoff 1977: 63). There seems little doubt that a non-restrictive 
analysis is called for. The sentences modified are clearly asserted 
by the speaker, and the relative clauses have a parenthetical feel to 
them. In addition, there is a noticeable tendency for researchers to 
paraphrase the relative which as 'and that' or 'and this', reflecting 
the anaphoric element in non-restrictive modification (see, for 
example, Quirk et a1.1972: 764-765; Seuren 1969: 189; Thompson 
1971: 88; Jacobs & Rosenbaum 1968: 262). 
Proposition-level restrictive relative clauses have already been 
generated by way of R82. Rule R94 is very similar and produces non- 
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restrictive relative clauses. 
R94. If aE Pt and a is of the form 
(... itn... ) then (a) e Pt/9t' 
Realisation: which ^ (... litnl... ) 
Translation: Xp[vp]; subroutine(Pn[a' 7(Pa) ) 
Examples are straightforward. 




(beIV'/PRED" oddADJ')IV', R52)t, 
R51)t/9t, R94)t, R86 
Realisation: John is iii, which is odd. 
Translation: a. ill'(j) 
A 
b. odd'( (ill'(j)]) 
Adjectives 
A pragmatic restriction on the relative clauses modifying 
assertions is that they be based on factive predicates. Contrast the 
naturalness of the factive examples in (212) with the unacceptability 









John-is ill, which is funny. 
Mary left, which was sad. 
Sue died, which was (un)fortunate. 
Bob is a thief, which is regrettable. 
? John is ill, which is possible. 
? Mary left, which is probable. 
? Sue died, which is false. 
? Bob is a thief, which is unlikely. 
The explanation of this restriction is not difficult. To utter a 
sentence like (213a) is effectively to assert the two sentences in 
(213a' ). 
(213a') a. ill' (j ) 
A 
b. possible, ( [ill' (j) ]) 
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It is pragmatically and, in some cases, logically inconsistent to 
assert that ill'(j) is true and also assert (even parenthetically) 
that ill'(j) is possible, false, probable, etc. Factive predicates 
do not have this problem--it is perfectly coherent to assert ill'(j) 
and also funny'( [ill'(j)]) as in (212a). However, factivity is not 
the whole answer as the factive example true shows. 
(214) ? John is ill, which is true. 
Though <214) may simply owe its oddness to redundancy, a more likely 
basis for the restriction lies in the distinction between t/3t 
(modal) and t/4t (parenthetical) adjectivals. Relative clauses based 
on modal adjectivals, which intuitively qualify the truth value of a 
proposition, cannot appear happily as non-restrictive modifiers of 
assertions. To assert something is to say that its truth value is 1, 
and pragmatically there seems to be little room to comment further on 
that truth value. 
Belief sentences illustrate that these restrictions are 
pragmatic or semantic rather than syntactic. The sentence John is 
ill, which is false would have the structure shown in (215). 






IV', R52)t, R51)t/9t, R94)t, R86 
An utterance of this sentence conveys a pair of incompatible 
assertions. Yet precisely this syntactic structure is necessary when 
the same sentence is embedded, as when it occurs in the object of 
believe. The following example is perfectly acceptable. 




((JohnT, (beIV/PRED, ill ADJ) 
R2 t, Ri, 
((iti(t/21V'), (beIV'/PRED, ' falset/3t)IV', 
R52)t, R51)t/9t, R94)t, R86)t/IV', R41)IV, R71)t, Rl 
Realisation: Bill believes that John is ill, which is false. 
The rules will give the translation of this sentence correctly as 
believe. (b, ^[ill"(j)]) with false, (*[ill'(j)]) also asserted in a 
subroutine. As the speaker is no longer himself asserting that John 
Beesley -, 2 7- Adjectives 
is ill, it is perfectly consistent for him to assert both that Bill 
believes that John is ill and that it is false that John is ill. 
Syntactic structures such as (215) are therefore grammatical and 
useful. 
When a t/3t-based relative clause appearing in a string can 
potentially modify either a whole assertion or an embedded sentence, 
the hearer's natural reaction is to prefer the acceptable reading and 
assume that the relative clause modifies the embedded sentence. 
(217) Potentially ambiguous string: 
Mary believes that Bill is unfaithful, which is false. 
Syntactically possible but unacceptable reading: 
[Mary believes that Bill is unfaithful, ] which is false. 
Acceptable, and therefore preferred, reading: 
Mary believes that [[Bill is unfaithful, ] which is false. ] 
Non-restrictive relative clauses based on t/4ts are not only 
consistent with asserted sentences, but actually 'prefer' to modify 
them much as t/3t-based relative clauses 'prefer' to modify embedded 
sentences. Consider example (218) where which Is unfortunate could 
attach syntactically to either the whole asserted sentence Bill 
believes that John Is Ill or to the embedded sentence John Is fl/. 
(218) Bill believes that John is ill, which is unfortunate. 
In practice, the hearer naturally prefers the reading where the whole 
asserted sentence is modified. Similar restrictions were noted for 
parenthetical adverbials (also non-restrictive modifiers) in Section 
6.2.2. 
6.4.2 Proposition-level appositives 
Delacruz (1976: 187-188) provides a proposition-level apposition 
rule which is almost identical to his individual-level apposition 
rule (see section 4.6.1.1). In (219), some of the variables have been 
changed in keeping with the present usage. 
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(219) Delacruz's Proposition-Level Appositive Rules 
S 3.2 If aE PT' and CE BCN' 
then F22(C, a) E PT, provided 
that whenever a is of the form that X, where 
cE Pt, F22(C, a) - the Ca; 
otherwise F22(C, a) - a. 
T 3.2 If ae PT' and CE BCN,, and 
a, C translate into a', C', respectively, then 
F22(C" a) translates into a' if a is not 
of the form that 4), where 4) E Pt; 
otherwise F22(C, a) translates into 
1RVq[Ap((C'(p) & 
XRXg1R(Xp1Cql=pl])(wa')(p)) H p-q] & R(q)] 
These rules are used to derive and translate the proposition-level 
terms in the following sentences. 
(220) The fact that John is ill is significant. 
(221) Bill believes the lie that John is ill. 
These rules, like Delacruz's rules for individual-level appositives, 
handle only the restrictive reading. Thus the fact that John is ! ll in 
<220) is translated roughly as 'that fact such that it is "John is 
ill", and the lie that John is Ill is translated roughly as that lie 
such that it is "John is ill"'. Under these readings, (220) might be 
an appropriate answer to the question What fact is significant? and 
(221) might answer the question Which lie does Bill believe? Accepting 
these readings as valid, the rules can be transcribed into the 
present notation as R95. The rule looks simpler than Delacruz's 
because the present grammar has a useful syntactic distinction 
between T's of the form that-t (t/IV's) and all others (t/2IV's). 
R95. If ac Pt/IV' and ßE PCNI then (a, ß) E Pt/2IV,. 
Realisation: the r-'# ^a 
Translation: XRVq[Ap[(ß'(p) & 
XRXgIR('*Xp1[q1-pl])(Aa')(p)) H p-q] & R(q)] 
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T' cheat, V)t, 
Rl)t/IV', R41)t/2IV', R95)IV, R71)t, RI 
Realisation: Sue believes the lie that Bill cheats. 
Translations Vq[Ap[(lie'(p) &p- 
[cheat'(b)]) H p=q] & believe; (s, q)] 
Adjectives 
A much more likely reading of a propositional term like the lie 
that Bill cheats takes lie as a non-restrictive speaker's 
characterisation of the proposition. This reading is analogous to 
the non-restrictive reading of that bastard in (223) (see Section 
4,6.1.4). 
(223) Smith hates that bastard Jones. 
On the non-restrictive reading, (223) is roughly paraphrased as the 
two assertions 'Smith hates Jones' and 'Jones is a bastard'. 
Similarly, sentence (224) on the non-restrictive reading of lie could 
be paraphrased as in (225). 
(224) Mary believes the lie that Bill cheats. 
(225) a. 'Mary believes that Bill cheats' 
b. 'It is a lie that Bill cheats' 
Similar data are discussed semi-formally by Geach (1965: 453-455), who 
argues that (226) breaks down as (227a) and (227b), where (227b) is 
an assertion 'smuggled' into the main sentence. 
(226) Jim is aware of the fact that his wife is unfaithful. 
(227) a. Jim is convinced that his wife is unfaithful. 
b. Jim's wife is unfaithful. 
Such 'smuggled' assertions, which I have called 'parenthetical' or 
generally 'non-restrictive', can even appear in questions. 
f 
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(228) Is Jim aware of the fact that his wife is deceiving him? 
This is classic non-restrictive behaviour, and it can be captured by 
R96.17 
R96. If aE PAN, and ße Pt/IV' then (a, ß) E Pt/2IV,. 
Realisation: the ^ar -', O 
Translation: 8'; subroutine( al(p 
a) 
) 
If lie is taken as a non-restrictive appositive, the translation of 
(229) leaves the discourse pool with the two assertions in (229'). 
(229) John believes the lie that Mary cheats. 
(229') a. believe; (j, A[cheat'(m)]) 
A b. lie'( (cheat'(m)] ) 
In conclusion, both non-restrictive and restrictive appositives at 
proposition level can be easily accommodated in the grammar. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the rules to account for various 
adjectival constructions at the proposition level, including 
predicative adjectivals, basic and derived attributive adjectivals, 
adverbially modified adjectivals, and relative clauses. The rules 
also account for appositives and non-restrictive modification. 
Though the proposition-level presents many new problems, the rules 
and solutions offered are compatible with and parallel to those at 
the individual level. 
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Chapter 7. The property level in Montague grammar 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter includes categories and grammatical rules for 
structures at the property level, including to-marked infinitives, 
Tough adjectives and 'human propensity adjectives'. To-marked 
infinitive phrases are treated herein as property-level terms and are 
assigned the category t/IV '', which is included in the cover category 
T". They translate as the set of properties of a property: e. g. to 
swim -> 1 PP(ýswim'). 
1 
Here, as in Chapters 5 and 6, the 'stacking' 
hypothesis rather than the 'levelling' hypothesis is developed. In 
the levelling hypothesis, properties can be treated simply as 
individuals (entities of type e) in the domain, and to swim then 
becomes an individual-level T (rather than a property-level T'') with 
the translation XPP { swim'}. What the levelling hypothesis gains in 
generalisation and simplified types is paid for in a greater 
dependence on selection restrictions (see Chapter 5). For the 
present purposes, the stacking hypothesis has more beautiful results, 
and it does not require a wholesale revision of the traditional MG 
ontology and semantics. The question remains moot, and it is hoped 
that the following chapter, which reviews a wide range of data 
involving infinitives, will be a valuable source for the continuing 
debate on formal ontology and nominalisation. 
7.1 The property-level categories 
Abbreviations for property-level categories are distinguished 
with double bar or double prime markings. The following categories 
and rules are very similar to those at the individual and proposition 
levels. 
Category Abbreviation Basic expressions 
t/6IV IV $@ (none) 
t/71V CN '' task, feat, assignment, duty, 
burden, work, job, problem 
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t/8IV ADJ '' tough, easy, hard, difficult, 
useful, beneficial, delightful, 
pleasant, unpleasant, simple 
t/9IV kind, wise, stupid ... 
t/1OIV PNOM'' (none) 
t/11IV (none) 
t/12IV PART '' (none) 
Let PRED " be a cover category including 
Pt/8IV U Pt/9IV U Pt/loIV. 
Let ADJVL " be a cover category including Pt/SIV U Pt/12IV. 
t/IV" none 
t/2IV " it , it ,... #... it l 2 n 









IV/T " start, begin, undertake 
IV/(t/2IV '') do, perform, finish, accomplish 
IV/(t/IV") happen 
(IV/( t/IV"))/PP-TO seem, appear 
IV/2(t/IV '') want, expect, hope, intend, try, 
desire, decide, plan, agree, like 
(IV/2(t/IV'' ) )/T promise 
TV/(t/IV ") believe, know, acknowledge, guess, 
suppose, think, persuade, permit, 
allow, expect 
ADJ/(t/IV ") sure, likely, certain, unlikely 
apt 
ADJ/2(t/IV '') scared, frightened, afraid 
terrified 
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ADJ/3(t/IV" ) reluctant, willing, eager, happy, 
sad, anxious, hesitant, unwilling, 
ready, inclined, disinclined, 
determined, prepared, resolved, 
content, grateful, disposed, glad 
loath, sorry 
Let B be a variable of type <s, <<s, <<s, <e, t », t>>, t>>; i. e. it 
ranges over intensions of translations of property-level terms 
(T '' s). Itn, where n is a natural number, translates as A PP(Pn). All 
previously defined conventions for type definition, function 
application and rule notation remain the same. 
Semantic constants 





beIV/T XBXPB( XQ[Q-PJ) 
the(t/2IV, , )/CN, , 
XPIXPVP[AQ[PI(Q) H Q=P] & P(P) 7 
7.2 The property-level grammar 
7.2.0 Introduction 
The stacking analysis, which treats infinitives as property- 
level terms and Tough adjectives as property-level adjectives, has 
been suggested or pursued by several researchers. 
2 The present 
grammar expands the fragment and avoids some transformational 
solutions which have been proposed even within MG (e. g. Bennett 
1975: 176,178,1861 Partee 1976b: 66). 
7.2.1 Tough adjectives and related phenomena 
7.2.1.0 Recent analyses 
The analysis of Tough adjectives is one of the classic problems 
in linguistic theory. The simplest examples show Tough adjectives 
combining with to-marked infinitive phrases as in (1). 
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(1) a. [To make money] is difficult. 
b. It is tough [to write a thesis]. 
However, Berman (1973a: 235-242,317; 1973b: 36) and Berman & Szamosi 
(1972: 320-325) cite examples like the following to argue that all 
Tough adjectives have sentential complements of the form for T to IV 
in the syntax. 
(2) a. (For Mary to leave] would be tough for John. 
b. It is difficult for John [for Mary to leave]. 
This amounts to a claim that Tough adjectives are just a variant of 
the (t/ 4 t)/PP-FOR sentential adjectives discussed in Section 
5.2.2.2.2.3. That is, (2b) could be paraphrased roughly as (3), and 
a Tough adjective like difficult would eventually translate as a 
relation between propositions and individuals as in (3'). 
(3) It is difficult for John that Mary is leaving. 
(3') difficult*( (leave'(m)], j) 
Against this, Bresnan (1971) and Lasnik & Fiengo (1974) have 
argued persuasively that the examples in (2) above do not involve 
genuine Tough adjectives at all. They claim that Tough adjectives 
always have infinitive complements in the syntax. 
When reexamined in the light of a MG, where syntax and semantics 
bear their respective burdens, these claims are not totally 
incompatible. Here it will be argued that genuine Tough 
constructions involve the syntactic combination of an adjectival and 
an infinitive, as argued by Bresnan and by Lasnik & Fiengo. However, 
the translations of Tough constructions will be expressed in terms of 
two-place relations between propositions and individuals, just like 
basic (t/4t)/PP-FOR adjectives and IV'/T participles. Thus Berman 
and Szamosi are somewhat vindicated semantically--the difference is 
that the present account captures the semantic intuitions by 
appealing to lexical relations between words rather than by appealing 
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to syntactic transformations from deeper structures. 
7.2.1.1 Relationships to (t/4t)/PP-FOR adjectives 
Genuine Tough adjectives (ADJ '' s) are lexically related to 
(t/4t)/PP-FOR adjectives and are translated in terms of the same 
semantic relations. However, Tough adjectives have become 
grammaticalised and are set apart by their singular behaviour with 
infinitives. Most adjective forms which have a Tough reading, like 
dangerous, difficult and hard, are also capable of receiving (t/ 
4t)/PP- 
FOR readings, which complicates the data tremendously. In the 
present grammar, only a (t/4t)/PP-FOR adjective can fit grammatically 
in the syntactic environment occupied by dangerous in (4). 
(4) [For John to leave] is [dangerous for Mary]. 
There are two PP-FOR phrases in this sentence. For Mary, the 
immediate complement of the (t/4t)/PP-FOR adjective, supplies the 
EXPERIENCER Mary. The other PP-FOR phrase, for John, supplies the 
INFINITIVAL SUBJECT of the infinitive to leave and helps form a kind 
of t/IV', a FOR-TO clause. FOR-TO clauses are included in the cover 
class T'. The following rules are needed to allow the derivation in 
(5). 
R97. If aE B(t/IV" )/IV and 
8s PIV then (a, ß) E Pt/IV" 
Realisation: a r". 8 
A 
Translations a'( ß') 
R98. If ac Pt/IV " and 
RE PPP-FOR then (a, , 6) EP FOR-TOO 
Realisation: R^a 














R23}t/4t, R56}IV', R52}t, R51 
Realisation: For John to leave is dangerous for Mary. 
A 
Translations dangerous*( [leave'(j)], m) 
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Either, and sometimes both, of the PP-FOR phrases can be omitted in a 
sentence based on a (t/4t)/PP-FOR. 
(6) [For John to leave] is dangerous. 
(7) To leave is [dangerous for Mary]. 
The omission of the experiencer of a (t/4t)/PP-FOR, as in (6), is 
already allowed by the relation-reducing rule R57. The translation 
of (6) will be (6'), where the experiencer argument slot is filled 
with an existentially quantified variable. 
(6') Vz[dangerous *(m [leave' (j) ], z) ] 
(6) can therefore be roughly paraphrased as For John to leave is 
dangerous for someone'. Example (7) will need the new rule R99 to 
get its translation (7'). 
R99. If ac Pt/IV. 
, 




Translation: XRVzR( [a'( XPP(z))]) 
(ý') Vz [dangerous *(A [leave' (z) ], m) ] 
Roughly, (7) could be paraphrased as 'For someone to leave is 
dangerous for Mary'. When both R57 and R99 operate together, the 
result is a string like (8) with the translation (8'). 
(8) To leave is dangerous. 
A 
(81) VyVz[dangerous*( [leave'(y)], z)] 
To grasp the (t/4t)/PP-FOR reading of (8), imagine a case where a 
nurse is monitoring a critically ill patient. The nurse might be 
told. To leave Is dangerous, meaning roughly 'for someone (you) to 
leave is dangerous for someone (the patient)'. In conclusion, a 
sentence based on a (t/4t)/PP-FOR word and an infinitive can 
optionally specify the infinitival subject and the experiencer by 
means of PP-FOR phrases. Even when both are omitted, the subject and 
the experiencer* slots are filled with existentially quantified 
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variables and can be different. 
7.2.1.2 Genuine Tough adjectives 
The key semantic difference between (t/4t)/PP-FOR and Tough 
adjectives is that the latter require the infinitival subject and the 
experiencer to be identical. Also, a sentence like To leave Is 
dangerous, on the Tough reading, has a rule-like flavour-roughly 
'anyone who leaves is himself endangered by so doing'. This reading 
is shown in (9). 
(9) Az[dangerous*('[leave'(z)], z)] 
The key syntactic difference between the two classes is that Tough 
adjectives combine with property-level T"s rather than with 
proposition-level T's. It must be emphasised here that most of the 
traditionally identified Tough forms can also take (t/4t)/PP-FOR 
readings, so many examples are ambiguous. Easy, tough, difficult and 
other examples, on their genuine Tough readings, can have the 
necessary coreference of the experiencer and the infinitival subject 
wired-in by giving them explicit translations as in (10). 
(10) easyAw,, XPAz[easy*( A [P(z)], z)] 
(and similarly for tough, hard, difficult, etc. ) 
The following rules are necessary for examples like (11). 
RL00. If aE BIV''/PRED' , and 
8E PPRED then (a. ß) E PIV, ' . 
Realisation: a^ /9 
Translation: a'( ß ') 
8101. If aE PCNII then (a(n), a) E PPNOM''' 
Realisations a(n) ^a 
Translation: a, 
P102. If ac PT" and ßE PIVII then (a, ß) E Pt. 
. Realisation: a"ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
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R103. If aE PIV@0 then (a) E Pt/11IV. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a' 
R104. If aE Pt,, IV,, and 
ßE Pt/1lIV then (a, ß) E Pt. 
Realisation: it ^ß^a 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R105. If aE B(t/2IV ,, )/c ,, and 
ßE PCN 
then (a, ß) E Pt/2, V,,. 
Realisation: ar", O 
a Translation: a'( ß') 




R107. If aE PIV/T and ßC PTA then (a, 0) E PIV. 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ýB') 
(11) { (to(t/IV" )/IV' runIV)t/IV" , R97' 
(beIV' 
.' 
/PRED' ,, easyADJ") IV" , 8100 
}t, 
8102 
Realisation: To run is easy. 
Translation: Az[easy*( [P(z)], z)] 
R103 and R104 allow t/IV "s to be postposed as in (12). 
3 8101 
accommodates property-level predicate nominals as in (13). 
(12) It is easy to run. 
(13) To run is an activity. 
Tough adjectives can be productively derived from IV'/T verbs like 
annoy by R108. 
8108. If ac PIV'/T then (a, ING) E Pte-,. 
Realisation: a'", where a, ' is a with the main verb in 
the present participle (-Ing) form 
Translations XPAz[a*( [P(z)], z)] 
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The Tough reading of annoying translates into 
A 
XPAz[annoy*( [P(z)], z)], and example (14) is straightforward. 
(14) ((to(t/zv' 
')/IV' (washTV , FidoT) Iv, 
R3)t/IV '', R97' 
(be1V 
" /PRED'ý, annoying , I)IV ", 
R100) t, R102 
Realisation: To wash Fido is annoying. 
A 
Translation: Az[annoy*( [wash*(z, f)], z)] 
Finally, members of ADJVL '', basic or derived, can be bumped 
into attributive modifiers of CN '' s in a way which should now be 
familiar. 
R109. If ac 6 PIU) then (a) e PCN' ' /CN' ' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPXQ(P(Q) & a'(Q)] 
Rllo. if ae PCN "/CN" and .8 CP.., 
then (a, Q) E PCN, . 
Realisation: Or-' a if a has a complement 
else a^ßB 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
The following strings and translations can now be generated. 
(15) To knit is a boring activity. 
(151) activity, ( knit') & Az [bore *(A [knit' (z) ], z) ] 
(16) To eat is an easy job. 
AA 
(16') job'( eat') & Az[easy*( [eat'(z)], z)] 
In the simplest constructions, then, Tough adjectives behave much 
like ADDS and ADJ's. 
7.2.1.3 Tough 'movement' without movement 
Having accounted for Tough adjectives in sentences like (17) and 
(18), it remains to treat sentences like (19). 
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(17) To please John is easy. 
(18) It is easy to please John. 
(19) John is easy to please. 
Traditionally, of course, (19) is transformationally derived from 
(17) and/or (18) by some kind of Tough-movement or Tough-deletion. 
Partee and Bennett actually proposed transformational solution within 
MG, with all the usual difficulties. 
4 
The goal of this section is to provide rules for the generation 
and translation of Tough-'moved' sentences with no recourse to 
transformations. The surfacy constituent structure of (19) is 
roughly that in (20). 
(20) John is easy to pleaset 
John be easy to please 
( 
IV 
b/ easy to please IV/PRED ADJ 
easyADJ, ý 
to please t/IV " 
Assuming that surfacy structures are desirable, a rule must be 
defined to combine Tough adjectives (ADJ '' s) and infinitives 
(t/IV'' '' s) to form individual-level adjectives (ADJs). The 
infinitive, however, must be one with aT hole or gap, as shown in 
the following examples. 
(21) a. John is hard [to please ]. 
b. John is hard [to give presents to ]. 
c. John is boring [to argue about ]. 
One possible way to generate structures with such gaps is to use the 
slash-category notation of Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar. 
5 
In 
a similar approach more easily implemented in the present approach, 
Dowty (1978: 420) has suggested that Tough 'movement' in a MG be done 
by binding a free variable generated inside the infinitive phrase. 
The following rule will do the job. 
6 
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8111. If aE PJW I. and 
Qe Pt/IV" 
and 0 is of the form {... hen... }, then (a, /B) c Pte. 
Realisation: a^(... Ihent... } 
Translation: Xxn(Q' ( a, )] 





R3)t/IV '', R97)ADJ, 8111)IV, R2)t, Rl 
Realisation: John is easy to please. 
Translation: 
1. please ,- please' Basic 
2. he1T = XPP(x1) Pronoun 
3. (please, het)IV -* please'('4XPP(xl}) From 1,2 by R3 
4. to(t/IV"')/IV - AQXPP(Q} Basic 
5. (to, (please, he1))t/iv..,,. 
XQX PP(Q)(ý[please'(). PP(xl})]) From 3,4 by R97 
6. l PP(4(please'("XPP(xl})]) Lambda conversion 
7. easy  
XQAz[easy*([Q(z)], z)] Basic 
8. (easy, (to, (please, he 1))) -* ADJ 
ax 
1(XPP(A[please'("XPP(xl))]} ("XQAz[easy*(4[Q(z)], z)])] 
From 6,7 by Rlll 
9. XxI[Az[easy*(ý[please'(ýXPP(x1))(z)], z)]] 
Lambda conversion 
10. Xx1[Az[easy, ', (A [A 1PP {x1 }{A Xy[please *(z, y) ])) , z) ]] 
First-order reduction 
A 
11. Xxii Az[easy*( [please*(z, x1)], z)]] Lambda conversion 
12. beIV/PRED -> xP[VP] Basic 
13. (be, (easy, (to, (please, he1))))IV 
1P[vP] (A Xx1(Az[easy*(A [please*(z, x1) ], z) ll) 
From 11,12 by R2 
14. Xx1(Az[easy*(*[please*(z, x1)], z)]] Lambda conversion 
15. JohnT * XPP(j) Proper name 
16'. (John, (be, (easy, (to, (please, he 1 
)))))t -. > 
1PP(j)("Xxl(Az[easy("[pleasel(z, x1)]. z)] ]) 
From 14,15 by R1 
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17. Xxl[Az[easy ( [Please*(z, xl)], z)]](7) 
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Lambda conversion 
Finally, it must be noted that there are a number of 
restrictions on this variable binding, and these restrictions will be 
some of the same ones that plague the old movement transformations. 
For instance, while a direct object, indirect object or object of a 
preposition can in general be bound inside an infinitive, binding 
inside an embedded that-t clause (a tensed sentential term of 
category t/IV") is ungrammatical (Ross 1967: 420; Berman 1973b: 34-36, 
43; Peterson 1979a: 136-137). These examples are from Peterson. 
(23) That old car is hard [to imagine anyone trying to fix -l- 
(24) *That old car is hard [to imagine anyone trying to claim 
that Joe fixed ]. 
Berman (1973b: 38-39; 1973az25; see also Quirk et ei., 1972: 827; 
Lasnik & Fiengo 1974: 549-551; Ross 1967: 228) also notes that the 
'moved' term cannot be one which was previously 'displaced' by the 
Dative-movement, About-movement, Passive, or Raising-to-Object 
transformations. 
(25) a. John-is hard to give presents to 
b. *John is hard to give presents. 
(26) a. Mary is difficult to talk to about such things. 
b. ? *Mary is difficult to talk about such things to . 
(27) *John is unpleasant to be kicked by 
t 28) *John is difficult to believe to have made such a mistake. 
In the face of all this, Berman falls back on global rules to 
constrain Tough movement. 
In the present analysis, it is better to adapt the notion of 
'freezing' introduced in Culicover & Wexler 1977, which appears 
equivalent to the 'bonding' of Peterson 1979a: l37-138. They 
basically_ argue that that-t clauses are frozen, blocking Tough 
movement. 'Here we can postulate a frozen feature for certain 
:ý 
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constituents which act like any others save that they block binding 
of variables, or, equivalently, make variables invisible or 
inaccessible to rules like Rill. That, presently of category 
(t/IV')/t, would then be assigned to category (t/IV')[+frozen]/t with 
the result that any term of the form that-t is frozen. The passive 
by is now of category PP-BY[+frozen]/T, and the TTV category, which 
is the lexical alternative to Dative 'shift', will also freeze its 
results. 
7 
The same solution should apply easily to any 
interpretation of About-movement in a MG. There is, unfortunately, 
no room here to expand on freezing, but it appears quite promising. 
Freezing restrictions are very similar to the binding restrictions in 
relative clauses proposed by Rodman (1976). 
A few classic problems with Tough 'movement' disappear in the 
present analysis. Postal (1971: 29) notes that 'moved' terms have to 
be 'definite' in some sense. Everyone, for instance, is not 
'definite', and (30) cannot be interpreted as a Tough-'moved' version 
of (29) 
(29) It is hard to please everyone. 
(30) Everyone is hard to please.. 
Some researchers, like Lasnik & Fiengo (1974: 544-546) have argued 
against a movement account precisely because of such restrictions. 
Partee (1977b: 300-301) clings to a movement transformation but adds 
the constraint that only a free variable can be moved. In a binding 
account, nothing is moved, and these problems never arise. 
A similar problem is faced by Berman (1973b: 35-36, see also 
Perlmutter & Soames 1979: 247-250); because she treats Tough 
adjectives as if they were (t/4t)/PP-FOR adjectives, Berman has to 
explain why that school in (31a) cannot be Tough moved as in (31b). 
(31) a. It is [difficult for John] [for his children 
to go to that school]. 
b. *That school is [difficult for John] [for his children 
to go to ]. 
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She has to propose a constraint blocking Tough movement from 
infinitives when a prepositional phrase designating the subject of 
the infinitive is present. This constraint is ugly in its power and 
arbitrariness. It is also totally unnecessary in the present account 
because the difficult in (31a) is not an example of Tough at all but is 
rather a (t/4t)/PP-FOR. 
Another Tough movement that Berman is obliged to rule out is the 
raising of the subject of the infinitive. Your letter, the subject of 
the infinitive to be under this bed in (32a), cannot be raised as in 
(32b). 
(32) a. It is impossible [for your letter to be under this bed]. 
b. *Your letter is impossible [(for) to be under this bed]. 
Once again, (32a), and any other sentence with a PP-FOR phrase 
designating either an experiencer or an infinitival subject, is not a 
Tough sentence at all. 
`. Perhaps the most confusing fact of all about Tough adjectives is 
that they can appear with one, but never two, FoR-marked 
prepositional phrases. The sentences in (33) are capable of 
receiving Tough readings. 
(33) a. To assassinate Ortcutt is dangerous for Fred. 
b. It is dangerous for Fred to assassinate Ortcutt. 
c. Ortcutt is dangerous for Fred to assassinate. 
The Tough reading of (33a) and (33b) is that where Fred is, 
intuitively, both the subject of to assassinate and the experiencer of 
dangerous. Such coreference is a key feature of Toughness. (33a) is 
also capable of a (t/4t)/PP-FOR reading where Fred is the experiencer 
of the danger while the subject of the infinitive is left wide open. 
(33b) has two (t/4t)/PP-FOR readings: one where, again, Fred is the 
experiencer of the danger (with the infinitival subject open); and 
the other reading where Fred is the infinitival subject and the 
Beesley -Z G$'- Adjectives 
experiencer of the danger is left open. 
For those holding that Tough adjectives are the same as two- 
place sentence adjectives ((t/4t)/PP-FORs), the problem is to decide 
whether for Fred in (33c) is the subject of to assassinate or the 
experiencer of dangerous. Berman (1973b: 36), having argued that 
terms (like Ortcutt in (33c)) cannot be Tough-moved out of an overt 
FOR-TO clause, concludes that for Fred must designate the experiencer 
of the danger. This also appears to be the intention of Bennett 
(1975: 160-163,167). Gazdar (1979: 16) , on the other hand, makes 
for 
Fred the subject of the infinitive. 
There are three problems with these solutions. First, the basic 
problem is that they are based on an incorrect analysis which holds 
that Tough adjectives combine with FOR-TO clauses rather than with 
infinitives, and that they can have experiencers designated in a PP- 
FOR phrase. Second, if for Fred in (33c) is the experiencer of 
-dangerous, then the subject of to assassinate could be anyone; and if 
for Fred names the infinitival subject, the experiencer could be 
anyone. However, (33c) is a Tough-'moved' sentence, and therefore 
dangerous must have a Tough reading. This means that the infinitival 
subject and the experiencer must be identical: in this case, John. 
Finally, the earlier analyses fail to explain how all the sentences 
in (34) or (35) can have the same reading. 
(34) a. John is easy for Mary to please. 
b. For Mary, John is easy to please. 
c. John is easy to please, for Mary. 
'Unmoved' Tough sentences display the same phenomenon. 
(35) a. To please John is easy, for Mary. 
b. For Mary, to please John is easy. 
c. It is easy for Mary to please John. 
d. It is easy to please John, for Mary. 
e. For Mary, it'is easy to please John. 
These examples strongly suggest that a prepositional phrase like for 
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Mary which appears : in' genuine Tough sentences is not an argument 
designator at all but rather a sentence adverbial; this conclusion 
was also reached by Lasnik & Fiengo (1974: 549,563). In other words, 
for Mary in Tough examples like (35) names neither the infinitival 
subject nor the experiencer. In the present analysis, these 
adverbials are further examples of hedges which limit the domain of 
application for a quantifier. The effect is best seen in the 
following examples. 
(36) For Frenchmen, it is difficult to travel abroad. 
(37) For Englishmen, it is easy to travel abroad. 
Both (36) . and °(37) can be true at the same time-the difference 
is 
that-the rule about the, ease or difficulty of travel is made relative 
to- different subsets of the domains°= Frenchmen and Englishmen 
=respectively. If (37) is uttered at cc, w, t> then the modified 
sentence will be interpreted relative to the context, world and time 
as in (37') (see Section 6.2.4). 
(37' ) QAz[easy*( *[travel-abroad' (z) ], z) ] c[Englishmen], w, t 
Examples like (38), and, the Tough readings of the sentences in (33), 
are simply extreme. examples where the domain has been limited to a 
single individual. 
(38) For John(, ) to run a marathon is easy. 
These findings are quite compatible with the conclusions 
proposed earlier. The key Tough features are (A) the necessary 
coreference of the understood infinitival subject and the 
experiencer, and (B) the rule-like readings which require translation 
witha universal quantifier. The syntax of Tough adjectives allows 
no way for a PP-FOR phrase to designate either the infinitival 
subject or the experiencer--the presence of such an argument- 
designating prepositional phrase forces a (t/4t)/PP-POR reading. 
Consistent with Tough syntax, and semantics, hedges can delimit the 
domain over which. the universal quantifier. in their translations 
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operates. In a sentence like (33c), reprinted here, which 
illustrates Tough 'movement', only the Tough reading of dangerous is 
possible. ' 
(33c) Ortcutt is dangerous for Fred, to assassinate. 
It therefore makes no sense, and it causes a lot of confusion, to 
debate' whether for Fred in (33c) supplies the experiencer of 
dangerous or the infinitival subject of to assassinate. Syntactically, 
it does neither. Semantically, in a way, it does both] for the basic 
sentence translates as 
Xx1Az [dangerous *( ý( assassinate *(z, x1) ], z) ] (o ), where o is Ortcutt, 
and the hedge for Fred limits the subdomain of quantification to the 
set 'including only Fred, who then"becomes the only possible semantic 
subject of assassinate and the only' possible semantic object 
"of 
dangerous;. 
As the grammar implicitly predicts, ADJs like easy to please, 
which are derived from ADJ " s, conjoin-with other ADJs, appear with 
sentence 
 
adverbs, 'modify non-restrictively, and, perhaps, take 
modification by very. 
39) a. John is cheerful and easy to please.. 
b. John is obviously easy to please.. 
C. Mary, always difficult to, fool, spotted the lie. 
d. Bill found Sue very difficult to please. 
These -'ADJs can alsoI be bumped into CNI2CNs to modify common nouns 
attributively.., The complication is that the ADJ usually realised as 
. easy,, toy please must now,, be realised. discontinuously around the CN it 
modifies. 
8 
(40) John is an easy man to please.  ... 
Rules' R112 and Ril3 'allow 'the domain hedge (NOT an argument 
specifier') for women { to, be realised linearly between a Tough 
adjective and the infinitive as in (41), this adverbial must also be 
ordered after any noun being modified attributively as in (42). 
9 
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R112. If aE PADV, then (a) E PSII/AWO . 
Realisation: a 
Translations XPXQ(a"("[P(Q)])) 
R113. If aE PADJ"/ADJ'' and ßE PjkJ 
then (a, ß) E PADJý,. 
Realisations ß^a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^ß 
Translation: a'(ß1) 
(41) John is easy for women to tease. 
42) John is an easy man for women to tease . 
Rule R13 for 'ordering 'attributive adjectives relative to modified 
common nouns will need new realisation clauses to handle these cases 
and others to be discussed below. With suitable conventions for 
optional set members, some of these clauses might be conflated. 
R13. If aE PCN/nCN and RE PCN then (a, ß) E PCN 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: (U (ate 
J' ", 
(0ADV' 
AD J" ") @ .' 
t/IV'-)ADJ)CN/2CN' ýCN)CN a. ý a 
(((a 
ADJ"' 
ßt/IV' )ADJ)CN/2CN' yCN)CN a^y^ß 
{{{aCOD 7ADVI-TO)ADJ'CN/2CN' 8CN)CN -> ay 
ß^ ac if a has a syntactic complement 
else a"ß 
Translation: a'(maß') 
In conclusion, the present analysis holds that genuine Tough 
constructions are syntactically distinct from those involving FOR-TO 
clauses and PP-FOR complements. This dichotomy between Tough 
adjectives and their look-alike (t/4t)/PP-FOR lexical twins4-°° has 
already been' noticed by Bresnan ° 1971: 266 and ° Lasnik -&N, Fiengo 
1974: 549,560-564. Silva & Thompson (1977) have also discussed what 
I classify as (t/4t)/PP-FOR adjectives under the label 'Comment with 
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Experiencer-Class' without identifying them with the Tough class-10 
Oneyfinal - bit of -evidence for separating the Tough and the 
(t/4t)/PP-FOR classes is the existence of words which belong to only 
one -or the other of the classes. Lasnik & Fiengo (1974: 562) show 
that a breeze is a Tough predicate nominal which cannot appear 
grammatically in a typical (t/4t)/PP-FOR environment such as in 
(44). 11 --,.. 
(43) This house is [a breeze to paint ]. 
(44) *(For Mary to paint this house] is [a breeze for John]. 
Conversely, a tragedy-is a (t/4t)/PP-FOR predicate nominal which 
cannot have a Tough reading. 
(45) *Arms are a tragedy for Bill to sell 
(46) [For Bill to sell arms] is [a tragedy for Mary]. 
In a similar 'vein,, Berman -(1973b: 36; see also Silva & Thompson 
1977: 121) argues that, easy always requires coreference between the 
experiencer and the infinitival subject., In the present analysis, 
this would mean that easy has a Tough but not a (t/ 
4t)/PP-FOR 
reading. In fact, it is sometimes possible to get a (t/4t)/PP-FOR 
reading for easy, but the examples are somewhat shaky. 
(47) ? It is [easy for John] [for Mary to do all the work]. 
Much better are similar sentences, with on-marked rather than for- 
marked complements. 
(48) It is [easy on John] [for Mary to do all the work]. 
The possibility of on, complements for (t/4t)/PP-FOR readings, of easy, 
hard and tough appears to -be a, mechanism to compensate for the 
potentially confusing syntactic ambiguity, between Tough and 
(t/4t)/PP-FOR readings. 
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7.2.1.4 Tough-like adjectives 
A number of attributive adjectives are like Tough adjectives in 
the way they combine with infinitives having a-hole or gap. (49a) is 
from Vendler 1968: 105-106. (49b) is from Berman 1973a: 24. 
(49) a. This is an Improbable plan to follow . 
b. New York is a stupid place to live In . 
Other sentences on this pattern include the following. 
(50) a. John is an Impossible man to find . 
b. Bill is an unlikely candidate to choose . 
As Vendler-notes, the pattern is rather shaky and does not, extend -to 
intuitively similar sentences as-in (51). 
(51) a. *This is a possible problem to solve 
. b. ? This is an unnecessary tree/to cut 
C. ? Eucalyptus is an Improbable tree 
to grow in this climate. 
Note also that, the acceptability of. non-attributive-versions of., such 
constructions also varies. 
(52) a. John is timpossible to find ]. 
b. This problem is [possible to solve ]. 
C. *This plan is [improbable to follow 
d. *Bill is [unlikely to choose ]. (compare to (50b)). 
With such examples,. we seem to be on the slippery edge of 
grammaticality.. Berman (1973a) examines many such constructions 
under the label of 'Hard Nuts' (from This construction is a hard nut to 
crack) and concludes that they are highly idiosyncratic. 
Under the label of 'Complement object Deletion', Lasnik & Fiengo 
(1974) examine the adjectives in (53), which appear in sentences such 
as (54). 
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(53) pretty, delicious, fragrant, graceful, melodious, tasty, 
cacophonous, beautiful, slippery, pungent, scratchy, smooth, 
soft, hard, rough, bitter, sweet, sour 
(54) a. Mary is [pretty to look at ]. 
b. Mary is a pretty girl to look at . 
c. The cake is [delicious to eat ]. 
d. This is a dellclous cake to eat . 
Predicate nominals and productive Ilke-CN constructions that can 
function the same way include those in (55). 
(55) a hornet's nest, a pigsty, a marvel, a bastard, a nice guy, 
a tyrant, an angel, a prince, like tar, like cement, like glue 
(56) a. His style is [a marvel to behold ]. 
b. Mary is [a tyrant to work with ]. 
c. Bill is [a nice guy to be related to ]. 
d. This cake is [like cement to eat ]. 
These adjectives and predicate nominals thus appear; like Tough 
adjectives, to combine with infinitives having a, gap, and Lasnik. & 
Fiengo actually identify Tough deletion and Complement object 
deletion. 1" .- 
Despite the similarities, these constructions are not quite the 
same as Tough. Tough adjectives can have infinitive subjects, but 
'Complement Object' words cannot. 
(57) Tough 
a. Mary is. (easy to please ]. 
b. To please Mary is easy. 
C. It is easy to please Mary. 
(58) Complement object 
a. Mary is {pretty to look at ]. 
b. *To look at Mary is pretty. 
c. *It is pretty to look at Mary. (on the intended reading) 
0 
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Complement Object words also name one-place predicates of individuals 
in their own right, unlike Tough adjectives. 
(59) Complement Object words 
a. John is Can angel to work for ]. 
b. John is an angel. 
c. Mary is [pretty to look at ]. 
d. Mary is pretty. 
(60) Tough words 
a. John is (a bitch to argue with ]. (see note 11) 
b. *John is a bitch. (on the intended Tough reading) 
C. Mary is [hard to convince ]. 
d. *Mary is hard. (on the intended Tough reading) 
These facts suggest that-Complement object words should be translated 
differently from Tough words. 
: If we are to preserve the intuition that pretty basically names 'a 
one-place place predicate, the problem becomes' what to do with the 
infinitive in Mary ° is pretty, to -look -at. Semantically, the 'infinitive 
identifies the way- that Mary's beauty, is-being judged" or, more 
specifically, -identifies the relevant judging criterion. Thus Mary 
can, at the same time, be pretty to look at but ugly to listen to. 
Listening to Mary 'and-looking at Mary are two tests one can use for 
evaluating the truth of a potentially vague sentence like pretty'(m). 
According to the present analysis, such specifiers of criteria are 
adverbial hedges. 
Syntactically, hedges should be able to appear as sentence 
adverbials, and this is the case for the 'infinitives' in Complement 
Object constructions. Note how the gaps must here be filled with 
pronouns. 
(61) a. To look at her, Mary is pretty. 
b. To look at it, this surface is rough; but to feel it, 
this surface is smooth. 
More general hedges of this form are shown in (62). 
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(62) a. To listen to the Russians, Reagan is a menace. 
b. To judge from recent events, the enemy is demoralised. 
The easiest, but not necessarily the only, way to handle such hedges 
is to deny their infinitive status and treat them simply as hedges 
supplying judging criteria. Let c(P) be the context c' just like c 
except that the property of judgement is P. Example (61a) is true at 
<c, w, ti iff pretty'(m) is true at <c(Alook-at-Mary'), w, t),. That is, 
the relevant criterion for judging the prettiness of Mary is stated 
to be looking at her, rather than listening to her, or whatever. The 
following rule handles hedges of this variety. 
: "'Whenever c eC, wEW,, t CT, p is - of type <s, t> 
and h is a hedge supplying the judging property P, then 
`h(c)(w)(t)(p), - p(c(P))(w)(t),., . 
Let -us define the Complement Object (Co) words in (53) to be a 
subclass of=ADJ. -3 The, following- rules join-Cos with hedges supplying 
judgement, properties , (ADV'-TOs) in order to generate examples like 
Mary is pretty to' look ,. at. - Informally, we can state that ADV'-Tos are 
constituents of the form to-IV and that they supply the judging 
A 
property a, where a is the translation. of the IV. 
. ý, 
R114. if a c, Pco and /3 E PADV , -TO , "- 
and /3 is of the form (... he ... ) then (a, 
ß) E Pte. 
Realisations a^(... IhenI... ) 
Translation: Xxn(, ß'("(a'(xn)])] 
7.2.2 Individual-level PREDs involving full infinitives 
7.2.2.0 Introduction 
A number of individual-level PREDS are constructed from or 
combine with full infinitives. 'Full' infinitives are here taken to 
be those which have no gap and, so, no argument slot-abstracted out. 
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7.2.2.1 Human. propensity adjectives,. 
The t/9IV class contains the adjectives in (63), which have been 
called 'Human Propensity Adjectives ' (HPAs). 
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-. -(63), bold, brutal, careful, careless, childish, clever, clumsy, 
, _, courageous, crazy, disgraceful, criminal, crude, cruel, evil, 
-fair, foolish, generous, good-natured, greedy, honest, 
humble, inept, impious, irresponsible, irritating, lazy, 
magnanimous, nice, pious, polite, rude, savage, selfish, 
selfless, spiteful, stupid, sweet, treacherous, uncouth, 
understanding, thoughtful, thoughtless, vicious, vile 
HPAM, like Tough adjectives, can appear with infinitive subjects. 
(64) a. To escape is stupid/wise/clever. 
b: It 'is stupid/wise/clever- to escape. 
However, there, are many. differences between these two classes. For 
one. thing, ... HPAs., appear primarily to denote one-place predicates of 
individuals. rather than of, properties. 
(65) 
, a., John 
is stupid/wise/clever... 
b. John is a stupid/wise/clever boy. 
When adjectives 'which look like Tough adjectives apply to 
individuals, the readings. are.. not at - all Tough-like. Indeed, 
they 
appear to be different adjectives,. altogether. 
(66) Mary, is hard/difficult/easy. 
HPAS also appear happily in the following constructions with full 
(i. e. gap-less) infinitives, ' while Tough adjectives cannot (at least 
with genuine Tough readings). 
(67)... a. HPA:;. John was stupid/wise/clever to run away. 
b. Tough: *John was hard/easy/difficult to run away. 
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(68) a. HPA: It was stupid/wise/clever of John to marry Sue. 
b. Tough: *It was hard/easy/difficult of John to marry Sue. 
Finally, there is a striking difference in possible paraphrases; 
HPA-based sentences like To save money Is wise can be paraphrased as 
'to save money is to be wise'; whereas. a Tough-based sentence like to 
save money Is difficult does not paraphrase as to save money is to be 
difficult'. 
These facts appear to indicate that HPAs are indeed basically 
ADJs and that Tough adjectives are basically ADJ " s. The immediate 
syntactic and semantic problem is how to explain the appearance of 
HPAs with infinitives as in (69). 
(69) To escape, is foolish. 
If foolish is translated as a one-place predicate of individuals, with 
type ce, t>, then it cannot combine with aT '' such as to escape. One 
way to resolve the problem is to 'adopt Carlson's type-levelled 
ontology and argue that to 'escape is -really aT denoting the kind 
'escape' just like the term dogs in the sentence Dogs bark denotes 
the kind 'dog' (see Section 6.3.2.3 and Carlson 1982: 166). If the 
kind 'escape' is xe, then (69) would translate as (70). 
(70) foolish' (xe ) 
Carlson goes to special pains to argue that a sentence like (69) 
should not be translated with a universal quantifier as in (71). In 
particular, he (correctly) wishes to avoid labelling the sentence as 
false if there are only a few exceptions. 
(71) Az[escape'(z) -3 foolish'(z)] 
Unfortunately, if infinitives are translated uniformly as denoting 
kinds, Carlson's approach will be unsuitable for examples with Tough 
adjectives. To assert the sentence To escape is difficult does not 
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involve asserting anything about escapers being difficult. 
The following is a return to the analysis using universal 
quantification; I shall argue that the problems cited by Carlson can 
be avoided if one accepts the role of hedges, both overt and hidden, 
in contextually limiting the domain over which quantification 
operates. Quantification is suggested by the paraphrase relation 
between (72) and (73). 
(72) To save money is wise. 
(73) To save money is to be wise. 
Roughly, each of these sentences seems to be asserting that anyone 
who saves money is wise, a reading formalised with a universal 
quantifier as in (74). 
(74) Ay[save-money'(y) - wisel(y)] 
Intuitively, even a sentence like (75), which overtly uses the word 
everyone, is not falsified by the existence of a few exceptions in the 
world. 
(75) Everyone who saves money is wise. 
'Everyone' ranges only over those individuals who are relevant in the 
context. If exceptions, like Argentinians, are cited to a statement 
like (75), the speaker can justify his claim by saying that 
Argentinians do not count or that he was only thinking of Britons or 
Americans. 
A second observation supporting the quantificational approach is 
that overt hedges occur freely and naturally with HPA sentences. 
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(76) a. For Argentinians to save money is foolish. 
b. For Germans to save money is wise. 
c. For Britons, 
In the case of Canadians, to belch is rude. 
As a rule, 
Generally, 
d. As far as Vulgarians are concerned, 
In Slobovian society, to belch is polite. 
Among the Slobovians, 
The limited subdomain can be as small as one individual. 
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(77) a. For John, to escape is wise. 
b. In the case of John, to protest is foolish. 
c. As far as John is concerned, to give up now is cowardly. 
So far, all of the HPA examples discussed have been 
hypothetical, or at least vague as to whether or not the agent is 
properly ascribed the underlying HPA. To state (78) does not 
necessarily mean that there is anyone who is an escaper -or is 
stupid--it, merely asserts that IF there is- an escaper (in the 
contextually relevant domain, THEN he is also stupid. 
(78) To escape is stupid. 
(78') Az[escape' (z) -4 stupid' (z) ] 
Many examples, especially in the past tense, can be felt to 'refer' 
to actual events, thereby entailing that the HPA is properly ascribed 
to the responsible agent. 
(79) To close the meeting early last Friday was stupid. 
Such sentences, however, are best treated as vague as to event-hoods 
they can, for instance, still be questioned or followed with 
disclaimers. 
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(80) A: To close the meeting early last Friday was stupid. 
B: Well, did he do it? 
(81) For Bill to speak to Mary yesterday was unwise, so he 
didn't do it. 
The systematic absence of tense and aspect markers on infinitives 
makes it unattractive to see these sentences as ambiguous. Such 
examples as (79) and (80) also invite readings where the subject is a 
full or understood FOR-TO rather than just an infinitive (see note 
13). 
Unlike the examples just discussed, the HPA constructions in 
(82) and (83) definitely convey that the HPA applies to the named 
agent (Berman 1973a: 2321 Vendler 1968: 64). (Berman (1973a: 230) stars 
sentences like (82a), but I find them perfectly acceptable. ) 
(82) a. To escape was stupid of Mary. 
b. It was stupid of Mary to escape. 
(83) Mary was stupid to escape. 
Whereas an utterance of For Mary, to escape was stupid entails 
neither stupid'(m) nor escape'(m), an utterance of (82) or (83) 
intuitively conveys both stupid'(m) and escape'(m). It is therefore 
anomalous to follow such sentences with a disclaimer. 
(84) ? To escape was stupid of Mary, so she didn't. 
(85) ? It was stupid of Mary to escape, so she didn't. 
(86) ? Mary was stupid to escape, so she didn't. 
Of phrases differ from the hedging for phrases in earlier examples in 
that they cannot be moved about in the sentences they appear to form 
a constituent with the HPA. 
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(87) a. *of Mary to escape was stupid. 
b. *To escape, of Mary, was stupid. 
c. *To escape was stupid, of Mary. 
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Where for Jane is a domain-limiting hedge, the following 
sentences are odd or anomalous. 
(88) a. ? Mary was stupid for Jane to escape. 
b. ? For Jane, Mary was stupid to escape. 
c. ? Mary was stupid to escape for Jane. 
One possible syntactic analysis of (82a) is (89); the syntactic 
rigidity of the of-phrase suggests that it does form a constituent 
with the HPA (Berman 1973a: 233). 
(89) To escape was stupid of Maryt 
to escape be stupid oMary t/IV Ives 
beIV'/PRED 
, ýstupid of\ 
yt/9IV 
stupid-HPA of Mar'PP-OF 
Semantically, such a sentence conveys not only escape'(m) and 
stupid'(m) but intuitively ascribes stupidity to Mary because or by 
virtue of the fact that Mary escaped (Silva & Thompson 1977: 116). 
The following rules attempt to capture these intuitions about HPA- 
related constructions. 
8115. If ae PHPA then (a) e Pt/9IV* 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPAy[P(y) 
R116. If ac PHPA and ß6 PPP_OF then (a, 13) E Pt/9IV. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translations XQ[CAUSE(ßß(Q), ß(ßa, ))] 
(90) ((to(t/IV" )/IV' resign lV)t/IV" , R97' 
((be1V"/PREDI" 
(wiseHPA, (ofPP-OF/T' John 
T'PP-OF, 
R25)t/9IV, 8116}IV ", 8100)t/11IV, 8103)t, 8104 
Realisation: It was wise of John to resign. 
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Translation: 
1. wise wise' Basic 
2. (of, John) 
PP-OF -> 
XPP(j} See previous examples 
3: (wise, (of, John)}t/91v -> 
XQ[CAUSE(XPP(j)(Q), XPP(j)(Awise'))] From 1,2 by R116 
4. beIV"/PRED" X P["P] Basic 
5. (be, (wise, (of, John)}}IV 
" 
XP(P]('XQ[CAUSE(XPP(j}(Q), APP(j)(mwise'))]) 
From 3,4 by 8100 
6.1Q[CAUSE(Q(j), wise'(j))] Lambda conversion 
7. ((be, (wise, (of, John))))t/llIV XQ[CAUSE(Q{j), wise"(j))] 
From 6 by R103 
8. (to, ` resign)t1IV'', i4 XPP ( resign') See previous examples 
9. ((to, resign), ((be, (wise, (of, ' John)))}}t => 
XPP(Aresign')( XQ[CAUSE(Q(j), wise'(] ))] ) 
From 7,8 by R104 
10. CAUSE(resign'(j), wise'(j)) Lambda conversion 
In sentences such as Mary was stupid to escape. the phrase stupid to 
escape forms a complex ADJ. 15 
R117. If aC PEA and QE Pt/IV" " 
then (a, ß) E Pte. 
Realisation: aI r". 8 
Translations $"(%P). x[CAUSE(P(x), a"(x))]) 
(91) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED' (rude 
, A, 
(to(t/IV" 
)/IV' belch IV)t/IV ', R97)ADJ, 
R117)IV, R2}t, Ri 
Realisation: John was rude to belch. 
Translation: ly[CAUSE(belch'(y), rude'(y))](j) 
Adjectives like wise to escape appear in the usual ADJ constructions. 
(92) a. The [man wise to escape] was Bill. 
b. Bill thought John [foolish to escape]. 
c., John is obviously [brave to defy the state]. 
d. Sue is ungrateful and [foolish to protest]. 
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In conclusion, HPAs in their various constructions can be handled in 
the present grammar in an orderly and satisfying fashion. 
7.2.2.2 The ADJ/n(t/IV ") categories 
The ADJ/n(t/IV'") categories are divided here reflecting the 
different problems in their translations) syntactically they might be 
considered one category. The small ADJ/(t/IV '') class, including sure 
and likely, appear in sentences with infinitive complements. 
(93) a. John is sure to succeed. 
b. Bill is likely to fail. 
Such adjectives are lexically related to t/3t adjectives and can be 
defined in terms of the same predicates (Quirk et 81.1972: 955-956; 
Dowty'1978: 416). The translations of this class also involve future 
tense. 16 
(94) sureýJ/(t/IV' ") 
1BXz[sure '("[FUT[B("1PP(z))]] )J 
certain AwJ/( t/IV XBXz[certain'("[FUT[B( )PP(z))]])] "") 
likelyADJ/(t/IV'') XBXz[likely'("[FUT[B{"APP(z))J))] 
unlikelyADJ/(t/IV"') XBaz[-Ilikely "("[FCrr[B("XPP(z))]] 1J 
Rule R118 allows the generation of the ADJs in examples like (93b) 
and gives its translation as (93b'). 
Rile. If ae , PADJ/n(t/IV' 
,) and 
8c Pt/IV' then (a, 0) EP ADJ 
(where n ranges over the set"(1,2,3)). 
Realisation: a r"1,0 
Translation: ` a' ( maß' ) 
(93b') Az[likely'( [FUT[fail'(z)]])](b) 
This, of course, is different from the translation' of lt Is likely that 
Bill will fall, which is shown in' (95) . 
A 
(95) ' likely'( [FUT[fail'(b)]] ) 
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The ADJ/ 2(t/IV' ') class includes scared and frightened, which are 
lexically related to IV'/T verbs like scare and frighten. 





afraid , J/2(t/IV, ,) 
XBXy[scare*(ýCB(AXPP(y))], y)] 
XBXy[frighten*(ý[B("XPP(y)) ], y)] 
XBXy[terrifyl, ('4[B(^), PP(y))], y)] 
XBXy[frighten*(A[B()PP(y))], y)] 
The rules already defined will now generate sentences like (97) with 
translations like (97'). 17 
(97) John is frightened to jump. 
(97') Ay(frighten*("[jump'(Y)], y)](j) 
The ADJ/3(t/IV' ') class includes reluctant, eager, willing, 
unwilling, anxious, hesitant, ready and perhaps Inclined and disinclined. 
The semantics of such adjectives is problematic. One approach is to 
give them readings as in (98). This translates reluctance, for 
example, as a relation between an individual and a proposition. 
is 
(98) reluctant -> XB Xy[reluctant*(y, A[B("1PP(y))])] 
The other members of the class would be translated similarly. The 
grammar will now handle sentences such as (99). 
19 
(99) John is reluctant to leave. 
(99') Xy[reluctant*(y, "[leave'(y)])](j) 
7.2.2.3 The IV/n(t/IV'') classes 
7.2.2.3.1- The IV/(t/IV ") class 
Verbs which apply to infinitives are not of central concern 
here, but the following discussion in included for reasons of 
completeness. Happen and perhaps tend (Bresnan 1978: 25) are members 
of IV/(t/IV, and they can be translated in terms of one-place 
proposition-level predicates. 






XBXy[happen*( [B{ APP(y)) ] )] 
AA 
XBXy[tend*( [B( XPP(y)) ] )] 
With such translations and 8119, the grammar will now generate 
sentences like (101) and assign them translations like (101'). 
R119. If aE BIV/n(t/IV,, ) and 
RC Pt/IV. 
- 
then (a, ß) C PIV 
^ 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a, ('ßß) 
(101) John happened to arrive. 
(101') Xy[happen'(*[arrive'(y)])](j) 
Seem( 
IV/( t/IV" ))/pp-TO , 
and ,_ appear 
are very 
( IV/(t/, V, ))/PP-TO 
similar to happen,., but they are translated in terms of relations 
between. individuals and propositions, and their individual argument 
is optionally provided by a PP-TO phrase. 
The following, new syntax rule and translations are needed. 
seem(IV/(t/IVY 
))/PP-To XPXBXyP("az[seem*(z, "[B( XPP(y))J)J) 
appear (IV/(t/IV. (IV/(t/IV. -))/PP-TO 
XPXBXyP( Xz[appear*(z, ^[B('XPP(y)) ]) ]) 
R120. If aE B(IV/(t/IV" 
))/PP-To and QE PPP-TO 
then (a, , Q) E PIV/(t/IV" 
Realisation: a r. 8 
Translation: a, (ßß') 
R121. If Cl E_ B(IV/(t/IV"))/PP-TO then (a) cT IV/(t/IV 
Realisation: a 
A Translation: a"( XPVz[P(z)]) 
The grammar will now accommodate examples such as (102) and (103). 
(102) Mary seems to be well. 
(102') )yVz[seem*(z, [we11'(y)])](m) 
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7.2.2.3.2 The IV/2(t/IV'') and TV/(t/IV ") classes 
IV/2(t/IV' ') verbs like want and like can be translated on the 
following models. 
(104) want IV/2(t/IV") 
XBXy[want, (y, A[FUT(B(AXPP(y)} )] )] 
(and similarly for hope, Intend, decide, plan, 
expect, agree) 
(105) manag eIV/2(t/IV") 
-> XBk A y[manage*(y, [B{ aPP{y}}])] 
(and similarly for try, fall, like, hate) 
The translations shown in (104) are like those in Klein 1979a: 49-50 
except that infinitives are here treated as t/IV " terms. These 











R97)IV, R119)t, RI 
Bill hopes to escape. 
ly(hope*(y, FOT[escape'(y)])](b) 
These verbs bring up the old control problems and the persuade- 
promise debate. The following categories and rules follow Bach 1980 
in spirit, though the formalism and categories are adapted to the 
present analysis. 
(107) promise (IV/2(t/IV'. ))/T -> 
I I- XPXBXyP(Xz[promise *(y, A[FUT(B(AXPP(y)) )], z)J) 
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(108) a. persuade TV/(t/IVI I) 
XBXPXyP( kz[persuade*(y, z, [B( APP(z))])]) 
(and similarly for tell, force, ask, advise, convince 
permit allow) 
b. expect/(t/IV', ) 
) 
XBXPkyP(ýkz[expect*(y, 'CB(ýXQQ(z))])]j 
(and similarly for want, like) 
20 
R122. If aEP2 and ßEP ( IV/ ( t/IV" ) )/T T 




8123. If aE PTV/(t/IV' 
,) and 
QE Pt/IV' , 
then (a, ß) E P. 
Realisations a f-1,8 
Translations a'(ßß') 
These rules allow the generation of strings and translations such as 
the following. 
(109) John promised Bill to leave. 
(109') Xz[promise'(z, *[PUT(leave I(z))], b)](j) 
(110) John persuaded Bill to-leave. 
(110') Xz[persuade*(j, z, ý[leave'(z)])](b) 
Note in (110) that the TV persuade to leave is realised 
discontinuously around the direct object Bill. 
21 This TV can also be 
passivised as in (lila) and such passives can even be bumped into 
attributive modifiers as in (111b) by the usual rules. 
(111) a. Bill was [persuaded to go (by John)]. 
b. The [man [persuaded to leave]] was Bill. 
The lack of similar passive forms for sentence (112) tends to support 
the different syntactic analysis. 
(112) a. - *Bill was promised to'leave (by John). 
b. *The man promised to leave was Bill. 
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There is, however, plenty of room for disagreement over the 
analysis of such structures. Klein (1979a: 51-52) (see also Bartsch 
1978). has argued that there is no syntactic difference between 
promise and persuade and that their different control properties can 
be accommodated in the translations. Adapting Klein's notations to 
the present analysis, he effectively classes both persuade and 
promise in P(IV/(t/IV '' ))/T' leading to the following IV structures. 
(113) persuade John to leaveIV 








(114) promise John to leave 
V 
promise JohniV/(t/IV", 
) to leave " 
promse(IV/(t/IV'I))/T "JohnT 
Part of Klein's motivation for such an approach is his use of a 
strictly ordered phrase-structure grammar which eschews discontinuous 
constituents. The present analysis therefore starts with rather 
different assumptions about what syntax and syntactic evidence are. 
The presence of a regular TV passive as in the persuade example (111) 
and the lack of one in the promise example (112) is rather compelling 
evidence for someone working within a categorial grammar for English. 
The present approach to persuade, promise and similar verbs is 
defended at length in Bach 1980.22 
7.2.2.4 Subject to object 'raising, 
Sentences like (116) were once thought to be transformationally 
derived from sentences like (115) by raising Mary, the subject of the 
embedded sentence, to become the object of believe. 
(115) John believes that Mary is pregnant. 
(116) John believes Mary to be pregnant. 
Though a transformational approach has been suggested within MG 
(Delacruz 1976: 197), lexical rules allow the sentences to be 
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generated directly and related in the semantics. The lexical 
approach also provides a natural way to let the readings of (115) and 
(116) be different; in particular, Mary in (116) is usually held to 
be referentially transparent. 
23 
Besides believe, canonical examples of 
'subject-to-object raising' triggers include know, think, conceive, 
prove and allege. These forms are primarily basic, or in the case of 
prove and allege, derived IV/T's. Assuming that the raising triggers 
are of category TV/(t/IV''), the following lexical rule can be 
defined. 
R124 (lexical). If C1 E (BIV/T" U BIV/(t/IV')) 
then ((z) E BTV/(t/IV" ). 
Realisations a 
Translations ýBýPayP{"az[cri("ýxzt{"[B{"aQQ{z}}]})(y)]} 








Realisation: John believes Mary to be pregnant. 
Translation: Az[believe*(j, [pregnant'(z)])](m) 
The TV believe to be pregnant can be passivised in the usual way. 
24 
(118) a. Mary was believed to be pregnant (by John). 
b. The woman believed to be pregnant was Mary. 
7.2.3 Non-restrictive modifiers at the property level 
Just as at the individual and proposition levels, it is possible 
to have non-restrictive modifiers of IVs. Examples can be based on 
BPAs or Tough adjectives and IV-level common nouns. 
(119) a. Mary ran away, which is wise. 
b. John escaped, which is foolish. 
(120) a. John climbed Mt. Everest, which is difficult. 
b. Sue wrote a thesis, which is a tough task. 
c. Bill knitted a sweater, which is boring. 
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Some even more-transparent IV non-restrictives have a subject and an 
auxiliary do in the relative clause (example from Thompson 1971: 84). 
(121) Joe debated in high school, which Chuck did too. 
An oddity of these constructions is that the relative pronoun in the 
non-restrictive clause intuitively substitutes for an untensed 
infinitive or 'refers' to just the property named by the antecedent. 
(122) a. Algernon trusted Nixon, which is stupid. 
b. Algernon trusted Nixon; to trust Nixon is stupid. 
The looseness of the fit between the tensed IV and the untensed 
infinitive is handled naturally by treating the linkage between 
matrix sentence and the non-restrictive modifier as anaphoric. Other 
researchers discussing auch sentences have frequently resorted to 
'and this' and land that' paraphrases, common signs of non- 
restrictiveness (Thompson 1971: 84,88: Seuren 1969: 189). 
(123) Algernon trusted Nixon, and that is stupid. 
The anaphoric approach to non-restrictive modifiers has already been 
explained and defended at the individual and proposition levels. Let 
us assume that there is an anaphoric pronoun Pa which is assigned the 
value of a property just as xa is assigned the value of an individual 
(see Section 4.5) and pa is assigned the value of a proposition (see 
Sections 6.4 and 6.2.2). Let Pn , for all natural numbers n, be a set 
of properties. In the syntax, let it 
n, 
for all natural numbers n, be 
a set of property-level pronouns such that itn translates as 
kPP(Pn} . 
25 
R125. If ac Pt and a is of the form 
(... itn... ) then (a) e PIV/IV' 
Realisation: WHICH ̂  (.... litnj... } 
Translation: XQ[vQ]subroutine(XPn[a'](Pa)) 
Examples are straightforward. 
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(124) {JohnT, ((punchTV, Bi11T}IV, R3' 
((itl(t12IV, " )' 
(belt/"/PREDI" 
(stupidHPA)t/9IV, R115)IV '' , 8100}t, 
R102)IV/IV, 81251IV, Rll)t, R1 
Realisation: John punched Bill, which is stupid. 
Translation: a. punch*(j, b) 
b. Ay[punch*(y, b) -iý stupidl(y)] 
Similarly, the sentence John logs, which Is boring will translate as 
the two assertions jog(j) and Ay[boreI("[jog'(Y)], y)]. 
The 
analysis is completely parallel to that for non-restrictive modifiers 
at other levels. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has been a demonstration that the present grammar 
can accommodate infinitives and other property-level constructions. 
The syntactic analysis of Tough adjectives, largely inspired by 
Lasnik & Fiengo 1974, is provided with a semantics and is coordinated 
with the grammar at the individual and proposition levels. Tough- 
'moved' sentences are generated directly rather than with 
transformations. By appealing to the contexts, hedges, and 
discontinuous constituents motivated in earlier chapters, the 
analysis also accommodates Complement object adjectives (pretty to look 
at), Human Propensity Adjectives (foolish to run away) and other 
adjectives and verbs which take infinitival complements. 
N 
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Chapter 8. General conclusion 
8.1 Accomplishments 
The diversity of adjectives has long been appreciated by 
linguists (see e. g. Vendler 1968), but even very recent logical 
grammars (such as Keenan & Faitz 1978) have followed the early MG 
attempts to treat all adjectives as basic ad-common nouns. Following 
work by Kamp (1975), Klein (1980a) and especially Siegel (1976a), I 
have argued that many adjectives, including examples like metallic, 
red, pregnant and sick, and degree adjectives such as tall, short, big, 
fat, large and small, are properly analysed not as basic ad-common 
nouns but as one-place predicates of individuals. As such, these 
basic adjectives appear in predicate position much like predicate 
nominale, which also name one-place predicates. 
(1) a. John is a boy. 
b. John is tall/sick/fat. 
Going beyond Siegel (1976a, 1979), I have shown that evaluative 
adjectives such as good, bad, awful and wonderful should also be 
translated as one-place predicates. 
(2) Mary is good/bad/awful/wonderful. 
Syntactic arguments for such an analysis were presented in chapter 2 
and in Section 6.3.3. 
The translation of vague adjectives such as tall and good as 
one-place predicates requires an appeal to formal contexts (Section 
6.2.4). The dependence on context to supply comparison classes for 
degree adjectives has a long history, especially in the treatment of 
comparatives (Klein 1980a). When a sentence like (3) is translated 
simply as (3' ), the truth value of the sentence will depend on what 
comparison class is assigned by the context. 
(3) Mary is tall. 
(3') tall'(m) 
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That is, the truth of (3) will depend on what class of things Mary is 
being compared to, and that class can easily vary from context to 
context. 
Whereas 'one-dimensionally' vague predicates like tall' are 
easily accommodated with appeals to comparison classes, 'multi- 
dimensionally' vague predicates such as good' and bad' are more 
difficult and less well studied. The truth value of a sentence like 
(4) depends not only on what comparison class is assigned but on what 
counts as 'good' in the context. 
(4) Bill is good. 
(4') good'(b) 
To accommodate such multi-dimensional vagueness, I have appealed to 
contextually supplied 'criteria' of application as well as to 
comparison classes. The truth of (4) therefore depends as much on 
the criterion of goodness which applies as on the comparison class. 
Contexts are formally treated as indices like times and-possible 
worlds. Whereas in a PTQ-like semantics sentences are evaluated 
relative to worlds and times, in a context-dependent semantics all 
sentences must be evaluated relative to contexts as well as to worlds 
and times. 
(5) Qgood'(b)jj 
c, w, t 
Just as time adverbials affect the time index at which a sentence is 
evaluated and just as modal adverbials affect the possible world 
index, so adverbial 'hedges' affect the context index. 
(6) Time adverbials 
a. Yesterday, John left. 
b. At 5i00 a. m. on 10 May 1954, Rex was born. 
(7) Modal adverbials 
a. Possibly, John will survive the attack. 
b. Necessarily, Mary is Mary. 
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(8) Hedges 
a. Compared to pygmies, John is tall. 
b. As a basketball player, John is short. 
c. Botanically speaking, the tomato is a fruit. 
d. Culinarily speaking, the tomato is a vegetable. 
e. Musically, Bill is wonderful. 
f. Romantically, Bill is awful. 
This analysis is applied in parallel fashion to adjectives at the 
proposition and property levels, which involve higher-type nouns, 
infinitives and nominalised sentences (that-t phrases). 
(9) a. That proposition is true/false. 
b. That John deserted is unlikely. 
(10) a. The task is hard/difficult/tough. 
b. To swim upstream is hard/easy/difficult/tough. 
Instead of naming one-place predicates of individuals, adjectives 
like true name predicates of propositions, and adjectives like difficult 
name properties of properties. 
The analysis of many adjectives as one-place predicates is 
consistent with the existence of other adjectives which act, as 
Montague (EFL) proposed, as basic ad-common nouns. The examples in 
(11) are analysed as basic attributive modifiers of common nouns. 
(il) a. John is a future/former/present spy. 
b. Mary is a(n) possible/obvious/potential infiltrator. 
c.. This project was a financial/artistic/political failure. 
Such adjectives, with the same readings, cannot appear alone in 
predicate position. 
(12) a. *John is future/former/present. 
b. *Mary is possible/obvious/potential. 
c. *This project was financial/artistic/political. 
Basic ad-common nouns also resist being conjoined with adjectives 
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naming one-place predicates. 
(13) a. *John is tall and future. 
b. *John is a tall and future spy. 
(14) a. *Mary is potential and good. 
b. *Mary is a potential and good infiltrator. 
Adjectives 
As is obvious in the examples in (11), basic attributive adjectives 
are closely related to sentence adverbials, especially to time 
adverbials, modal adverbials and contextual hedges. 
Many adjectives which do not themselves translate as one-place 
predicates nevertheless combine with various complements to form 
derived 'adjectivals' which do name one-place predicates. Such 
adjectivals include various passive participles, present participles, 
-able forms, and others taking prepositional and nominalised 
complements. The derived individual-level adjectivals in (15) are 
shown in italics. 
(15) a. John is loved by Mary. 
b. Mary is lovable. 
c. Bill is hitting Roger. 
d. This book is interesting to Sam. 
e. That man is stupid to escape. 
f. Rasputin was hard to kill. 
g. John is easy to please. 
h. Sue is afraid that Bill will leave. 
i. Bill was convinced that Mary will succeed. 
In the face of this diversity, the need for a unifying feature is 
satisfied in the analysis by a productive 'bumping' rule (R12) which 
maps various adjectivals into attributive modifiers of common nouns. 
For example, redADJ is a basic adjective which names a one-place 
predicate of individuals, named red'. R12 maps taIIADJ into 
(tall 
ADJ)CNI2CN, a 
derived attributive modifier. R13 combines 
attributive modifiers, both basic and derived, with common nouns to 
help form sentences like (16). 
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R12. If aE PADS then (a) E PCN/2CN' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPXy[P(y) & a'(y)] 
R13. If aE PCN/nCN and .ßE PCN then (a, G) E PCN 






16 t/IV' ' 
)ADJ}CN/2CN" 'YCN)CN -> a r-1 Y r-) a rß 
({ (aADJ"' Qt/IV" )ADJ}CN/2CN' 7CN)CN ay r"Ifl 
(((aC0, 'yADV'-TO)ADJ}CN/2CN' 6CN}CN =a^b^ 'Y 
ß^a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^ ,ß 
Translation: a'(ßß') 
Adjectives 
(16) (JohnT, (beIV/PRED (a, ((ta11AJDJ)CN/2CN man CN)CN)PNOM)IV)t 
Realisation: John is a tall man. 
Translations tail'(j) & man'(j) 
Just like tall, the other adjectivals in (15) can also be mapped 
into attributive modifiers of common nouns using rules R12 and R13. 
Thus the grammar will generate and translate sentences like those in 
(17 ). For clarity, the attributive modifiers are shown in italics. 
(17) a. The man loved by Mary is John. 
b. Mary is a lovable woman. 
c. The boy hitting Roger is Bill. 
d. The book Interesting to Sam is obscene. 
e. John was a stupid man to escape . 
f. Rasputin was a hard man to kill. 
g. John is an easy person to please. 
h. The person afraid that Bill will leave is sue. 
i. Bill is a person convinced that Mary will succeed. 
Using the quite parallel rules (R83, R84, R109,8110) higher-level 
adjectivals can be 'bumped' into attributive modifiers of appropriate 
higher-level common nouns. 
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(18) a. The proposition is true. 
b. That John is stupid is a true proposition. 
(19) a. That job is difficult. 
b. To pick apples is a difficult job. 
It should be noted that derived attributive modifiers can appear 
linearly before, after and sometimes even around the common nouns 
which they modify. The use of a hierarchy-realisation grammar, which 
makes a rigorous distinction between constituent relations and the 
linear realisation of those constituents, highlights the unity of the 
attributive modifiers. That is, the fact that {red}CN/2CN combines 
with barnCN to be realised as the string red barn while (painted by 
Bill) 
CN, 2CN combines with barnCN to be realised as 
the string barn 
painted by Bill is an effect of morphological realisation rather than 
a difference in constituent structure. Similarly, R13 guarantees that 
(easy to please) CN, 2CN 
is realised discontinuously around manCN as 
easy man to please. In a grammar employing ordered phrase structure 
trees, which combine hierarchical constituency and linear order in a 
single representation, this unity in attributive modification is 
obscured. 
Another innovation in the thesis is the 'subroutine' analysis of 
non-restrictive modification. which is generalised to handle some 
adverbials, appositives and adjectivals and relative clauses at all 
levels of the grammar. In short, it is argued that the traditional 
conjunction analysis of non-restrictive modifiers leads to paradoxes 
and invalid readings in a grammar which respects compositionality. 
For example, if a sentence 0 translates as 0', then the sentence It 
is not the case that (D should translate as -10' . But if sentence (20) 
translates according to the conjunction analysis as (20'), then the 
negated sentence (21) should translate as (21'). 
(20) John, who is handsome, loves Mary. 
(20') love *(j , m) & handsome' (j ) 
(21) It is not the case that John, who is handsome, loves Mary. 
(21' ) -1 (love *(j , m) & handsome' (j) ) 
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Unfortunately, (21') is not a valid reading of (21) because the 
clause handsome'(j) is not properly negated. That is, sentence (21) 
still conveys the positive assertion that John is handsome. The 
subroutine analysis of (21) treats the non-restrictive clause as an 
independent assertion which is effectively delivered while the 
superordinate sentence is on hold. This is shown diagrammatically in 
(22). 
(22) It is not the case that John, loves Mary. 
who is handsome, 
Under the subroutine analysis, the speaker makes two separate 
assertions when he utters (22): these are handsome'(j) and 
'l(love ; (j, m)). This accords with intuition and avoids a great many 
difficulties in opaque contexts. 
Much of the work in Montague grammar has been an attempt to 
expand the fragment of English which can be accommodated. From a 
syntactic point of view, the present grammar is a significant 
demonstration of the viability and advantages of hierarchy- 
realisation grammars, which have been proposed, but often not very 
far developed, by linguists, logicians and even psychologists (see 
Section 0.2). 
8.2 Directions for further research 
As with any research project, the present investigation of 
adjectives raises as many questions as it answers. One issue, which 
is already a current topic of debate in the literature (see Chapter 
5), is the syntactic and semantic treatment of nominalisation. The 
human propensity, adjectives and Tough adjectives discussed in Chapter 
7,, and the varied adjectival and adverbial constructions presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 should be grist to, the mill for further 
investigations in formal or psychological ontology. A second course 
for further research is to computerise the present grammar. It is 
already too intricate to keep in the head' for any period of time, 
which makes testing and cross-checking of changes and additions very 
tedious. The realisation component needs to be made more explicit to 
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handle tense, cases, and other morphological markings. The 
complexity of this task makes a computer-assisted approach a 
necessity. A third topic, which has been skirted several times (see 
Chapter 7 note 18) is the treatment of subjunctive mood and putative 
should within a Montague grammar. As mood affects entailments, this 
topic has both a linguistic and logical appeal, and it promises to be 
just about the right size problem for a thesis. 
Another thesis-sized problem concerns the formal interaction of 
hedges and formal contexts, which has not been treated in detail 
herein. The problem is analogous to the interaction of time 
adverbials with time indices, but the challenges promise to be even 
more demanding. It is fairly satisfactory to appeal to points of 
time or time intervals which are formally given a linear (i. e. 
temporal) ordering. Some time adverbials, as in At 5: 00 a. m. on 10 
May 1954, Roger was born, specify a specific t' at which the 
sentence born'(r) must be true. Tenses can be analysed in terms of 
earlier and later orderings long the time line. 
However, contexts have been used to provide 'comparison classes' 
for degree adjectives like tall, 'criteria' for multi-dimensionally 
vague evaluative adjectives like good, and even 'properties of 
judgement' in sentences such as To look at lt, this surface is rough, 
but to feel lt, this surface Is smooth. The formal status of comparison 
classes, criteria, properties of judgement and the functions which 
derive them from context are far from obvious. Contexts have also 
been appealed to for limiting the universe of quantification for 
sentences like Everyone had a good time last Thursday and for those 
involving domain hedges as in For Frenchmen, to travel abroad is 
difficult. The mechanics of such limiting have not been worked out. 
Much formal work remains to be done here, but the success of the 
present analysis, where these notions are assumed, is itself an 
argument for investigating and answering these questions more 
satisfactorily. 
Perhaps the most profound question raised by this thesis is what 
happens when the semantics recognises and accommodates pervasive 
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vagueness in natural language (see Section 6.2.4). Contexts, as 
formal objects, are at least as problematic as possible worlds, and a 
dependence on them threatens even such fundamental notions as truth 
in a model and logical consequence. The problem is this: whereas time 
and world indices can be viewed objectively as part of the background 
environment of an utterance, contexts have been used to help capture 
the vagueness arising from the subjective, psychological intentions 
of speakers (see Section 6.2.4.3). For example, in a context- 
dependent semantics the truth value of a sentence like Mary Is good, 
which is based on the very vague predicate good', is partially 
dependent on what the speaker means by 'good'. If speakers have 
different ideas about what good means, that is, if they use the word 
with different intentions, then it will be impossible the say whether 
the sentence is intersubjectively true or true in the model. If it 
is ultimately impossible to agree exactly on what words mean, then 
intersubjective entailments cannot be defended either. 
This kind of vagueness is accepted as a matter of course by most 
people in the humanities. Textual commentary is often centered 
around what a speaker or writer intended to mean by his use of a word 
in a given text. In the real world, it is also common to find 
exchanges like the following, where speakers try to accommodate to 
each others use of words. 
(23) A: Is John a good man? 
B: That depends on what you mean by 'good'. 
If all predicates are potentially vague, and if only psychological 
intentions can ultimately make them precise, then nothing but a 
rather fluid and fallible social contract holds language together. 
That is, it may be wise and considerate to use words as much as 
possible like those around you, but it is only perverse and 
confusing, rather than incorrect or illogical, to use words any way 
you like. Because people cannot get into other people's heads, they 
may never be able to know for certain if they understand each other 
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and are using words in the same way. 
Linguists, being accustomed to dealing with historical meaning 
shifts and variations between dialects and idiolects, will not lose 
much sleep over this; from a linguistic perspective, people do seem 
to spend a lot of time accommodating or disagreeing with everyone 
else's use of words. From a logical perspective, however, such 
radical vagueness threatens fundamental notions of intersubjective 
truth and logical consequence. Radical vagueness suggests that 
idealisations about people knowing the same language, and knowing it 
perfectly, are chimeras. This topic is as dangerous as it is 
interesting, and it will no doubt continue to be a healthy topic of 
debate. 
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Appendix., Collected combination rules 
R1. If aE PT and GE PIV then (a, ß) C Pt. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translations a'('ß') 
R2. If aE BIV/FRED and ßE PPRED then (a, ß} E PIV. 
Realisation: a r-1.8 
Translation: a' (maß' ) 
R3. If aE PTV and ße PT then (a, ß} E PIV. 
Realisation: ((y TTV' 
8T)TV, ßT)IV 'y^ß^8 
(('/DTV' 8PP-TO)TV' ßT}IV y r'ß r' 8 
((yw/ BADJ}TV, ßT}IV y^ß^$ 
{ ITV/(t/IV' ), at/IVI)TV' ßT}IV y^ß^8 
{ ('YTv/PP-OF'' OPP-OF" )TV' QT}IV y^ß^6 
((yTV/(t/IV" $t/IV" }TV' QT)IV ^ß^ 
else a^ß 
w 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R4. If aE PDET and OE PCN then 
`a, 
ß) E PT. 
Realisation: (IDET'", (ÖPROP}CN)T ý' 8+ 
else a^ßB 
Translation: a, ( wj8' ) 
R5. If aC BIV/2T and ßc PT then (a, a) E PIV. 
Realisation: a^ ß8 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R6. Ifac PAN then (a(n), a) E PPNOM' 
Realisations a(n) ^a 
Translatione a- 
R7. If acP and QE PPp_TO then (a, 13) E PT. DTV 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a, ( . 
8, ) 







R9. If acP and QC PT then (a, Q) E PTV. TTV 
Realisation: a^Q 
Translation: a'('ß') 
R10. If aE BPP-TO/T and Qc PT then (a, Q) E PPP-T0" 
Realisation: a r. 8 
w 
Translations a'( Q') 
Rll. If ac P(t/ne)/(t/ne) and fl E Pt/ne then (a, Q) E Pt/ne 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5)). 
Realisations Q^a if a has a complement 
a^Q 
w 
Translation: a' ( 
R12. If ac PADS then (a) E PCN/2CNO 
Realisations a 
Translation: XPXy[P{y} & a'(y)] 
R13. If aC PCN/nCN and QC PCN then (a, j6) E PCN 






Qt/IV" }ADJ}CN/2CN' 'CN}CN a^y 
ý' ö^Q 
{(I 




{{{aCO' yADV'-TO}ADJ}CN/2CN' 6CN) CN -> 
a^a^y 
Q^a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^Q 
Translations a'( Q') 
R14. If ae PTV then (a, PASS) E P(t/5e)/PP_BY" 
Realisation: a '' , where a '' is a with the main verb 
in 
the past participle-form. 
Translation: X PXxP(way[a'("APP(x))(y)]) 
R15. If aE P(t/5e)/PP-BY then (a) E Pt/5e. 
Realisation: a 
Translations a'(wXPVz[P{z}]) 
R16. If aE BPP-BY/T and QE PT then (a, Q) EP PP-BY' 
Realisation: ar "', O 
w 
Translation: a' ( Q' ) 
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R17. If ac P(t/ne)/PP-BY and QEP PP-BY 
then (a, Q) E Pt/ n e 
(where n ranges over the set (3,5)). 
Realisations ýB ̂a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^ß 
Translation: a'("ß') 
R18. If aC BTV then (a, ABLE) E PADJ/PP-BY. 
Realisation: a '' where a '' is a with the main verb 
in the -able form 
Translation: XPXxO[P( Xy[a"("XPP(x))(y)])] 
R19. If aE PADJ/PP-BY then (a) E Pte 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'("XPVz[P(z)]) 
R20., (lexical). If aE BTV then 
(a, ING) E PADJ/(t/nIV) (where n ranges over 
- the set (2,5); t/2IV is PP-TO and t/5IV is PP-FOR). 
Realisation: a' where a' is a with the main verb 
in the present participle (-Ing) form 
Translation: XPXxP("Xy[a'("app(y))(x)]) 
R21. If aE PADJ/(t/nIV) then (a) EP ADJ 
(. (where n ranges over the set (2,5)). 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'("apVz[P(z)]) 
R22. If aE PJJ/ff and ßE PPp then (a, ß) E Pte 
Realisation: ar -1, G 
Translations a'( 
R23. If aE BPP-FOR/T and ßE PT then (a, Q) E PPP-FOR' 
Realisation: a''ß 
Translation: a' (4,0' ) 
R24. If aEP APP-FOR and 
ßE PPP-FOR then (a, ß) E Pj. 
Realisation: ar -1, O 
Translation: a'( JB') 
R25. If aE BPP-OF/Tand E PT' then (a, ß) E PPP_OF" 
Realisation: a^ ýB 
) Translation: a'( . 81 
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R26. If aC BUJ/PP_OF and QE PPP-DF then (a, ß) E Pte 
Realisation: a^ ßB 
Translation: a'( . B') 
R27. If ac PIV then (a, ING) E Pt/5e. 
Realisation: a-, where a' is a with the main verb in 
the present participle form 
Translation: a' [ignoring aspect and tense] 
R27X. If aE BW/A and ß6P then (a, ß) E PT. ADJ 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: as( ' J61 ) 
R28. If aC Pt and 'a is of the form (... hen... 
then (a) E PREL (where n is a natural number). 
Realisation: THAT r {... 1hen".. }t 
Translation:, Xx[a'] 
R29. If aE PT/T and ßc PT then (a, . B) E PT 
Realisation: 6r-', a, if a has a complement 
. a''ß if a is a simple adjective. and ß 
is a proper name 
else ((IDET' $CN)T' aT/T)T 1y^a^d 
Translation: a! ( 81) 
R30: " If ac P(PRED U ADS) 
then (a) 6 PT/T' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: X PC P]s subroutine(XPP(xa}(tea')) 
R31. If aC BT then (a) c PCN/2CN' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPX x[P{x} &X PXyP(^Xz[y-z])("a')(x)] 
R32. If aC PPROP then (a) E PM. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a' 
R33. If'a C PPROP then (a) E PT 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPVy[Ax[a'(x) H x-y] & P(y)] 
R34. If aE PCN then (the, a) C PPROP/PROP' 
Realisation: the ^a 
Translation: XPXy[P(y) & a'(y)] 
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R35. If aE PPROP/PROP and ßE BPROP then (a, ß) E PPROP* 
Realisation: ß^a 
Translation: a(Aß'). 
R36. If ac PT then (a) E PT/T* 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XP('9P)j 
subroutine(XPP(xa)(A[X Q XyIQ(AXzl[y1-zl])(Aa')])) 
R37. If aE PCN then (the/this/that, a) E PT/2T 
Realisation: the/this/that ^a 
Translation: XP( v P); subroutine(XPP(xa)(^a')) 
R38. If ac PT/2T and ßE PT then (a, ß) 6 PT 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: aI(^$') 
R39. If aE B(T/T)/PROP and ßE PPROP then (a, ß) E PT/T" 
Realisation: a r"'. 8 
Translation: a'(Aß') 
R40. If aE B(T/T)/T and ß E, PT then (a, ß)E PT/T* 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R41, If aE B(t/IV')/t and ße Pt then (a, ß) C Pt/IV, " 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'('ß') 
-- - -R42. If aE P(t/2IV' )/CN' and 
ßE PM 
' 
then (a, ß) E Pt/2IV'. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'('ß') 
R43. If a6 PCN'/PP-OF and ßE PPP-OF then (a, ß) E PCN'* 





Translation: a'( ß') 
R44. If aE PCN'/PP-OF then (a) c PCN'O 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: a'( XPVz[P(z)]) 
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R45. If aE P(CN /PP-OF)/PP-TO and 
Q6 PPP-TO 
then (a, Q) E PCN'/PP-OF" 
Realisation: a ^, B 
Translation: a'(Aß ') 
R46. If aE P(CN'/PP-OF)/PP-TO then (a) E PCN'/PP-OF' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'(AXPVz[P(z)]) 
R47. If aCB2 and PP-OF'/(t/ IV') 
/3 E Pt/21V, 
then (a, ß) E PPP-OF'. 
Realisation: a^Q 
Translation: a' ( ß' ) 
R48. If aE PCN'/PP-OF' and QE PPP-0F, then (a, C) E PCN'. 
Realisation: a^ ßB 
Translation: a' (AAB' ) 
R49. If ac PCN'/PP-OF' then (a) E PCN'O 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'("XRVq[R(q)]) 
R50. If aE HIV'/T' and ßE PT' then (a, ß) E PIV'" 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( Q') 
R51. If ac PT' and ßE PIV, then (a, ß) e Pt. 
Realisation: a r-1.8 . 
Translation: a'(Af8') 
R52. If aE BIV'/PRED' and /3 E PPRED' then (a, , B) C PIV,. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'(A/3') 
R53. If aE PCN' then (a(n), a) E PPNOM'6 
Realisation: a(n) ^a 
Translation: a' 
R54. If a6 P(t/nt)/PP-TO and 0 E PPP-TO then (a, Q) E Pt/nt 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,6)). 
Realisations a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( /3') 
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R55. If ac P(t/nt)/PP-TO then (a) C Pt/nt 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,6)). 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'( XPVz[P(z)j) 
R56. If aE P(t/4t)/PP-FOR and QE PPP-FOR then (a, ß} E Pt/4t. 
Realisation: a^Q 
Translation: a'(ßß') 
R57. If aE P(t/4t)/PP-FOR then (a) C Pt/4t. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'('XPVz[P(z)]) 
R58. If "a e PADJ/n(t/IV') and ßE Pt/IV' then (a, Q} 6 PADJ 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: ar 1j8 
Translation: a' (*ß' ) 
R59 (lexical). If ae PADJ/(t/IV') then (a) E PADJ. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'(*XRVq[R(q}]) 
R60. If aE PIV, /nT and 
ßE PT then (a, ß) E PIV' 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: ((make, 8 ADJ)IV'/T' 
ßT)IV' make ^Q^b 
else a^Q 
Translation: a, ( Q') 
R61. If aE P(IV'/T)/ADJ and ß6 PADJ then (a, ß} E PIV'/T* 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a' ( "ß' ) 
R62 (lexical). If ac PIV'/T then (a, ING) C (P(t/4t)/(t/nIV) 
(where n ranges over the set (2,5)1 t/Z IV is PP-TO and 
t/SIV is PP-FOR) 
Realisation: a'' , where a'' is a with the main verb 
in the -ing form 
Translation: a' 
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R63. If aC BIV, /nT then 
(a, PASS) C PADJ/(t/IV') 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: a '', where all is a with the main verb in 
the past participle form 
Translation: X RXxR(Aip[a'(AXPP(x))(p)]) 
R64. If aE BIV, /nT 
then (a, PASS) E PADJ/PP-BY' 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: a '', where all is a with the main verb in 
the past participle form 
Translation: A RaxR(AXp[a'('XPP(x))(p)]) 
R65. If ac PADJ/PP-BY' and ßE PPP-BY' then (a, 0) E Pte. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a' (AAB' ) 
R66. If aE BPP-BY'/(t/2IV-) and .BE Pt/2IV' 




R67, If aE PADJ/PP-BY' then (a) E Pte 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'(AXRVq[R(q)]) 
R68-. ----If--a E Pt/IV' and 0C Pt/6t then (a, ß} E Pt. 
Realisation: It r-' ,O^a 
Translation: a' ( AAB' ) 
R69. If aE B(t/6t)/T and QE PT then (a, ß) E Pt/6t" 
Realisation: a^ ýB 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R70. If aE PIV, then (a) C Pt/6t. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a' 
R71. If aE PIV/T' and /B E PT' then (a, ß) E PIV. 
Realisation: (('P(IV/T; )/PP-TO' aPP-TO)IV/T', 
Ot/2IV'} -0 
y^0^8 
else a^ ßB 
A 
Translation: a'( ýB') 
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R72. If aEP IV/(t/IV') and 
ßEP 
t/IV' 
then (a, ß) E P IV. 
Realisation: a r-1.8 
Translation: a'(Aß') 
R73. If aC (P 
IV/T' 
U PIV/(t/IV')) 
then (a, PASS) CP3 (t/ t)/PP-HY' 
Realisation: a,,, where a' is a with the main verb in the 
past participle form 
Translation: XPXpP(%y[a'(AXRR(p))(y)]} 
R74. If aC P(t/3t)/PP-BY and ßE PPP-BY then (a, ß} E Pt/3t. 
Realisation: 'a ^ß 
Translation: a'(Aß') 
R75. If aE P(t/3t )/PP-BY 
then (a) E Pt/3t. 
Realisations a 
Translation: a'(AXPVz[P(z}]) 
R76. If ae (P 
IV/T' 
U PIV/(t/IV, )) 
then (a, ABLE) E P(t/3t)/PP-BY' 
Realisation: a '', where all is a with the main 
verb in the -able form 
Translation: XPXpOP(%z[a'("XRR(p))(z))) 
R77. If aE B(IV/T, )/PP-To and 
ßE PPP_. then (a, ß} f PIV/T" 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R78. If aE B(IV/T' )/PP-TO 
then (a) e PIV/T' ' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a'(AXPVz[P{z)]) 
R79. If aE P(IV/(t/2IV'))/PP-TO and 
ßC PPP-TO then (a, ß} E PIV/(t/2IV' 
Realisation: a r1.8 
A 
Translations a'( ß') 
R80. If aC BTV/(t/IV') and ßE Pt/IV' then (a, ß) 6 PT. 
Realisations a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R81. If aEH 
' 




Realisation: arl, 8 
Translation: a'("ß') 
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R82. If aE Pt and a is of the form (... itn... ) 
then (a) E PREL' . 
Realisation: I 
Translation: Xpn[a'] 
R83. If aE PADS' then (a) E PCN, /CND . 
Realisation: a 
Translation: ARlp[R(p) & a'(p)] 
R84. If aE PCNI/CNI and ßc PCNI then (a, ß) E PCN, . 
Realisation: Or-' a if a has a syntactic complement 
else a^0 
A 
Translation: a, ( 19' ) 
R85 (lexical). If aE Pt/3t then (a, LY) E Bt/8t. 
Realisation: a^ ly 
Translation: a' 
R86. If aE PADV I and 
QEPt then (a, ß) E Pt . 
Realisation: Or" a if a has a complement 
else ar "fl 
Translation: 
R87 (lexical). If aE Pt/4t then (a, LY) E Pt/9t' 
Realisation: a '' , where a '' is a with the main adjectival in 
the -ly form 
XpC p]f subroutine (a'(pa)) Translation: 
R88. If aC P)kDVI, then (a) E P(t/nt)/(t/nt) 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5,6)). 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translations XRXq[a'( [R(q)])] 
R89. If aE P(t/nt)/(tnt) and fl E Pt/nt then (a, ß) E Pt/nt 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5,6)). 
Realisation: ß"a if a has a complement 
else a' ýB 
Translations a'( 
R90. If aCP DV' 
then (a) E P(t/ne)/(t/ne ) 
(where n ranges over the set (1,3,4,5} 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translations XPXy[a'( [P(y)] )] 
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R91. If aE Pt/4t then (a) E B(t/ne)/(t/ne) 
(where n ranges over the set (3,5)). 
Realisation: a '', where all is a with the main adjectival 
in the -! y form 
A 
Translation: XPXy[a'( [P(y)])] 
R92 (lexical). If aE (BIV/T' U BIV/(t/IV')) then (a) E BCN/CN 
Realisation: a '' where a '' is the past participle form of a. 
Translation: XPXyVz[a*(z, A[P(y)])] 
R93. If aC BT//CN and fl E PCN then (a, ß) E PT. 
Realisation: alnl r"1.8 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R94. If aE Pt and a is of the form 
(... itn... ) then (a) c Pt/9t' 
Realisation: which ^ (... litnI... ) 
Translation: Xp[ p]; subroutine(Xpn[a'j(pa)) 
R95. If ae Pt/IV' and ße PCN, then (a, , ß) e Pt/2IV' ' 
Realisation: the ^ß^a 
Translation: XRVq[Ap[(ß'(p) & 
XRXg1R(AXpl[ql-pl])(Aa')(p)) H p-q] & R(q)] 
R96. If aE PCN, and /i e Pt/IV' then (a, ß) E Pt/2IV'Realisation: 
the ^a^ß 
Translation: ß'; subroutine(a'(p a)) --- - 
R97. If aC B(t/IV" )/IV and 
ß6 PIV then (a, ß) E Pt/IV" . 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'(^ß') 
R98. If a6 Pt/IV'I and ßc PPP_FOR then (a, J3) E PFOR-TO' 
Realisation: ß^a 
AA 
Translation: XRR( [a'( iß')]) 
R99. If a6 Pt/IV " 
then (a) E PFOR-TO' 
Realisation: a 
AA 
Translation: XRVzR( [a'( APP(z))]) 
R100. If ac BIV''/PRED'' and ßE PPRED' ' 
then (a, ß) E PIV" . 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: W( ýB') 
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R101. if ac PCN' 
' 
then (a(n), a) E PPNOM''' 
Realisation: a(n) ^a 
Translation: a' 
R102. If aE PT'' and ßE PIV@I then (a, ß) E Pt. 
Realisation: a r". 8 
w 
Translation: a'( Q') 
R103. If aC PIV then (a) E Pt/11IV. 
Realisation: a 
Translation: a' 
8104. If aE Pt/IV', and iß e Pt/11IV then (a, ß) E Pt. 
Realisation: It ^ß^a 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R105. If aC B(t/2IV' 
' )/CN' ' and ,BE PCN, ' 
then (a, , ß} E Pt/2, V.,. 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'( . 81) 
R106. If ac PIV/(t/2IV,, 
) and 
ß6 Pt/2IV', then (a, ß) E PIV. 
Realisation: a^ß 
w 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R107. If aC PIV/T'' and ßE PT's then (a, ß) E PIV. 
Realisation: a r", 8 
w 
Translation: a"( ß') 
8108. If aC PIV'/T then (a, ING) E PADJ,,. 
Realisation: a'', where a, is a with the main verb 
in the present participle (-ing) form 
A 
Translation: XPAz[a*( [P(z)], z)] 
R109. If aE PADS, ' 
then (a) E PCN "/CNI" 
Realisation: a 
Translation: X PXQ[P(Q) & a'(Q)] 
R110. If aE PCN  /CN', and 
QE PCN, 
I 
then (a, ß} E PCN "' 
Realisation: ß''a if a has a complement 
else a^ ýB 
A 
Translation: a'( . B') 
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R111. If ac PA 
', and 
ßEP 
" DJ t/IV 
... ), then (a, #) E and 
ß is of the form (... he P . n ADJ 
Realisation: a" (... Ihe +... ) 
n A 
Translation: Xx [Q'( a')] 
n 
R112. If ae PADV, then (a) E PADJ' /ADJ'' . 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: XPXQ(a'( [P(Q)] )) 
R113. If aE PADJ"/ADJ" and Qc PJWJ, 
then (a, ß) E P11,. 
Realisation: ß^a if a has a syntactic complement 
else ar", S 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R114. If aE PCC and ßC PADV' 
_T0 
... } then (a, , Q) EP and Q is of the form (... he n ADJ 
Realisation: a^(... lhe j... } n A 
Translation: Xxn[Q'( [a'(xn)] )] 
R115. If aE PHPA then (a) E Pt/9IV' 
Realisation: a 
Translation: XPAy[P(y) -> a'(y)] 
R116. If aE PHPA and ßE PPP_OF then (a, ß} E Pt/9IV. 
Realisation: a ^, B 
Translation: XQ[CAUSE(ß(Q), #(Aa'))] 
. R117. If aEP then (a, ß} EP and ßEP t/IV- . ADJ HPA 
Realisation: a^# 
Translation: Q'(AXPXx[CAUSE(P(x), a'(x))]) 
R118. If aEP n and ßEP ,, 
then (a, ß) 
'' 
E PADJ 
ADJ/ ) (t/IV t/IV 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2,3)). 
Realisation: a^ ýB 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
8119. If aE BIV/ n(t/IV, ,) and 
ßE Pt/IV  
then (a, Q) E PIV 
(where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( 91) 
Beesley - 333 - Adjectives 
R120. If aE B(IV/(t/IV" ))/PP-TO and 
ße PPP-TO 
then (a, ß) E PIV/(t/IV " 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R121. If aE B(IV/(t/iv.. ))/PP-TO then (a) E PIV/(t/IV, ,) 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: a'( ). PVz[P(z}]) 
R122. If aE P(IV/2(t/IV") )/T and 
ßE PT 
then (a, ß) E PIV/2(t/iV" )' 
Realisation: a^ß 
Translation: a'(wß') 
8123. If aE PTV/(t/IV' ') and 
ßE Pt/IV, , 
then (a, ß) E PT. 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
P124 (lexical). If aE (BIV/T' U BIV/(t/IV') ) then (a) E BTV/(t/IV, ") . 
Realisation: a 
Translation: X BXPlyP(A), z[a'(AXRR{A[B(AXQQ(z))]})(y)]} 
R125. If aE Pt and a is of the form 
(... itn... ) then (a) E PIV/IV' 
Realisation: WHICH ^ (.... litnI... ) 
Translation: XQ[VQ]; subroutine(XPn[a'](Pa)) 
R126. If aE BIV', /T,, and 
ßE PT" then (a, ß) E PIV "" 
Realisation: ß^a 
Translation: a'(wß') 
8127. if ac (B IV/T'' 
U BIV/(t/21V") ) 
then (a, PASS) E P(t/12IV)/PP-BY. 
Realisation: a '' where a '' is a' with the main verb in 
the past participle form 
A 
Translation: XPXPP( Xz[a*(z, P)]) 
R128. If aE P(t/12IV)/PP-BY and ßE PPP-BY then (a, ß) 6 Pt/12IV. 
Realisation: a^ß 
A 
Translation: a'( ß') 
R129. If aEP 12 (t/ IV)/PP-BY then (a) E Pt/121V. 
Realisation: a 
A 
Translation: a'( XPVy[P(y)]) 
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Notes to Chapter 0 
1A full discussion of Bennett's simplification to the PTQ 
semantics is given in Appendix III of Dowty at a/. 1981. 
2I leave open the question of whether general ordering 
principles can obviate the need for specifying the order of 
realisation for each categorial combination rule (see e. g. J. M. 
Anderson 1976, Vennemann 1973, Vincent 1979). 
3Realisation 
rules, like translation rules, need not apply at 
the same time as the categorial combination rules. PTQ orders 
constituents immediately as it builds them from the bottom-up. 
Dahl's Operational grammar builds hierarchical trees from the 
bottom-up, but then codes ordered strings from them from the top- 
down. Schlesinger has argued that a psychologically real grammar 
must be able to order output strings from hierarchical trees top- 
down, bottom-up or both directions at the same time. 
4The desire to avoid the 'transformation' of quantifying-in, 
also called NP-lowering or Quantifier-lowering, is the major 
inspiration behind the 'Cooper-Store' (Cooper 1975: 145-200). Quite 
simply, Cooper doubts that there is the slightest evidence that 
syntactic quantifying-in really takes place. Similar views are held 
by Bartsch (1979), who denies that there is any syntactic difference 
between the narrow-scope and wide-scope readings of a woman in the 
string Every man loves a woman. As syntactic quantifying-in 
involves operations beyond simple concatenation of constituents, it 
is also a transformation for Gazdar (1979,1982) and is therefore not 
a valid operation in his grammars. 
Cooper retains semantic quantifying-in by generating and 
translating noun phrases in place by 'storing' their translations for 
later application at higher places in the derivation. I have no 
proof that such an approach is valid, necessary or unnecessary, but I 
shall generally assume that such machinery is not available. The 
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approach to non-restrictive modification in Chapter 4 
is in many ways an attempt to see how far one can get without 
quantifying-in of any kind. 
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Notes to Chapter 1 
1Other 
evaluative adjectives include execrable, terrible, awful, 
miserable, sorry, lousy, mediocre, average, OK, swell, wonderful, 
remarkable, marvelous, fantastic, and divine. 
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Notes to Chapter 2 
1For 
a related discussion see Klein 1980a: 13-16. 
2Similar 
examples are discussed in Parsons 1972: 132-133, Keenan 
& Faltz 1978: 318-319, and in most other works on the subject (Siegel 
1976a: 130-134; 1979: 247-248; McConnell-Ginet 1973: 89,133-134). 
3Similar 
claims have appeared in Chafe (1970: 195) and even in 
Bartsch (1972a), but the inadequacies of this approach have been 
widely exposed (see McConnell-Ginet 1973: 89; Damerau 1975: 3; Siegel 
1976a: 129; 1979: 243-244; Bierwisch 1969: 165-168). Determining the 
comparison class for derived lexical items, which have no dictionary 
codings, is one obvious problem. Chafe, Bierwisch and Bartsch 
appreciate that genericness and specificness can weight the choice of 
comparison class, and Bartsch (1972a: 165) and Sampson (1970: 257) 
point out further that proper name subjects like John give little 
clue as to what comparison class applies-so the context has the last 
say again. 
4McConnell-Ginet (1973: 90-91,133-134) proposes that the 
comparison class of basketball players can be chosen not only from 
the actual world but from a 'close' possible world. Therefore, if a 
sudden epidemic were to wipe out the taller basketball players, 
comparisons of height relative to basketball players could still be 
made based on the class of players as it existed before the epidemic. 
Unfortunately, defining what a 'close' possible world is and when one 
can appeal to it raises as many problems as it tries to solve. 
5See 
e. g. Nilsen 1972: 90; Vendler 1968: 21-22; Keenan & Faltz 
1978: 134,289. There have been many attempts by heroic 
transformationalists to derive evaluative adjectives from deep manner 
adverbs. Thus good boxer would actually be transformed from an 
underlying string containing box well, and bad ruler would be 
transformed from the underlying rule badly. Such proposals require 
brute transformations of the most unpopular kind and only paraphrase, 
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rather than analyse, the target strings. It also requires 
postulating the ungrammatical *monarch Justly to underly lust monarch 
and 'kings well to underly good king (see e. g. Levi 1976: 224; Vendler 
1968: 21-23; Breckle 1968: 21-23,29; G. Lakoff 1970a: 64-65; Dixon 
1977: 40-41; Bach 1968: 117). For critical comments on such an 
analysis see Bolinger 1967: 30, Chomsky 1970: 196-197, and McConnell- 
Ginet 1979: 149. 
6In the original PTQ semantics (without Bennett's 
simplification) the type of a CN/CN is <<s, <cs, e>, t>>, <<s, e>, t>>. 
7Without Bennett's simplification, the type of a one-place 
predicate is <<s, e>, t> rather than <e, t>. 
8Arguments for 'less abstract' analyses are found in Thomason 
1976, Klein 1979a: 11-14 and 1980a: 14-15, Keenan & Faltz 1978: 8,10- 
16,23 and McConnell-Ginet 1973 and 1982. 
9Extensive 
examinations of extent adverbs are found in Bolinger 
1972, Bäcklund 1973, and Quirk et a1.1972. On the resistance of 
non-predicative adjectives to very see Bolinger 1967: 18; 1972; 290; 
Quirk et al. 1972: 290; Bartning 1976: 9,18-19,105, and Siegel 
1979: 257. On the syntactic iteration of very (and perhaps quite, too 
and terribly) see Nilsen 1972: 113ff and Bäcklund 1973: 158. Damerau 
(1975: 2) argues that one use of very is to take a precise predicate, 
e. g. profitable, and yield a vague predicate, very profitable. Wheeler 
(1972: 331) argues that the possibility of extent modification is a 
sure sign of a two-place predicate. For the difficulty of 
distinguishing some extent adverbs from manner and sentence adverbs 
see Bolinger 1972: 23; Bäcklund 1973: 12-14,165ff, 277, and Zwicky 
1970. On the formal analysis see Montague EFL: 191; Wheeler 
1972: 325-326,329; G. Lakoff 1972: 195; Kamp 1975: 146-147; Keenan & 
Faltz 1978: 17-19. Klein proposes that extent adverbs are functions 
on characters and that they narrow comparison classes (see Section 
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6.2.4.1). 
The very different very in That was the very man I saw yesterday 
is discussed in Smith 1964: 39 and Bolinger 1967118-19. 
10The terms 'one-dimensional' and 'multi-dimensional' are 
borrowed from Kamp (1975: 141). Klein (1980a: 6ff) writes of 'gradual' 
or 'linear' vagueness instead of 'one-dimensional'; 'indeterminate' 
and 'non-linear' are used for 'multi-dimensional'. For similar 
distinctions see McConnell-Ginet 1973: 92-93,140; 1979: 136. 
0 
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Notes to Chapter 3 
1The 
work of slash categories could just as well be done with 
some kind of feature marking, which would be more familiar to 
linguists. However, the PTQ notations are more convenient for 
highlighting similarities between superficially different categories 
and for abbreviation in rules that treat multiple categories as if 
they were one. 
2In PTQ there is a single copula which maps terms into IVs. 
Predicate nominals are treated, rather suspiciously, as normal 
indefinite terms. The provision of a separate copula for mapping 
PREDs (including predicate nominals) into IVs follows work by Klein 
(1979a: 39-42), Siegel (1976a: 34-35,82), Bach (1968: 103; 1980: 308- 
309) and others. 
3The EXT category also includes not at all, not a bit, a bit, 
more-or-less, pretty, damn, bloody, relatively, slightly, and profoundly. 
4This 
rule represents a not completely satisfactory compromise 
between the typing function of PTQ and that of Bennett 1975. In PTQ, 
any slash category a/nß is assigned the type < <s, f(Q)>, f(a )> . Thus 
an IV (t/e) or a CN (t//e) has type « s, e>, t>, which means that they 
translate as functions mapping individual concepts (<s, e>) into truth 
values. 'Bennett's Simplification' (see Bennett 1975, Dowty et al. 
1981: Appendix III) bypasses individual concepts in favour of 
individuals; thus CNs and IVs are given the type <e, t>. To 
accomplish this, Bennett adopts t, IV, and CN (rather than t and e) 
as his basic syntactic categories, with the following type 
definition. 
f(t) - (t) 
f(IV) - <e, t> 
f(CN) - <e, t> 
f(a/le) - «s, f(Q)>, f(a)> 
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From the present perspective, Bennett's solution of making CN and IV 
basic categories is unattractive for several reasons. First, whereas 
PTQ highlights the syntactic relatedness of CNs and IVs by assigning 
them similar categories (differing only in the number of slashes), 
Bennett can show their relatedness only in the syntax. Second, if 
predicate nominals, relative clauses, many adjectives and many 
participles are also treated as one-place predicates of individuals 
(as in the present analysis) these classes too would have to be 
treated as basic, resulting in a profusion of basic categories in the 
syntax. Third, even if it is argued that only a finite number of new 
basic categories need be adopted, an appealing universal aspect of 
Montague's original formulation would be lost. That is, it is likely 
that Montague's original t and e could serve as the basic categories 
not only for English but for any human language. Adjectives, 
however, are not universal to human languages (Dixon 1977), and so 
including ADJ as a basic category cannot be motivated cross- 
linguistically. 
I hasten to add that there is no formal conflict of substance 
between Bennett Is solution and my own. Bennett avoids dealing with 
individual concepts by slightly augmenting his class of basic 
categories. I achieve the same end by slightly complicating the 
function which maps categories into types. The present grammar would 
function exactly the same if Bennett's solution had been adopted, and 
I suspect the choice in the end is one of taste. 
5 If the de re and de dicto readings of seek a unicorn and 
similar examples are to be differentiated by scope, then the 
application of these reduction rules must be restricted. 
6The issue of proper name translation is taken up again in 
Section 4.6.1.2. 
7Consistent 
with the assumptions of this thesis, the outputs of 
R3 could be given more precisely as y' Acc(ß) ^ö and a^ Acc(ß ), 
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where Acc(ß) indicates that ß is realised in the accusative case 
form (Staal 1967: 66; Dahl 1977a: 82; Partee 1979b: 65-66; Dowty 
1980: 9-10). Similar case markings could be added to all the 
realisation rules involving terms. A different proposal for case 
marking is put forward by Partee (1979b: 91), who suggests that one 
could generate case-marked terms bottom-up in the grammar; the T 
which combines with an IV to form a sentence would then be required 
to be a T[Nom] whereas the T which combines with a TV to form an IV 
would be a T[Acc]. 
The Staal-Dahl-Dowty proposal leaves case out of the 
hierarchical analysis and treats it as a morphological marking of the 
realisation rules, like gender and number agreement. it thereby 
allows the hierarchical analysis to be less language specific. 
8Accusative 
case could be specified for the direct and 
prepositional objects involved in these rules. See note 7. 
9The prepositional phrase to John is given the same 
interpretation as the term John. It would be possible to add 
prepositions syncategorematically; for instance a rule could state 
that for any term a, (to, a) is a prepositional phrase which has the 
same interpretation as a. Prepositions could also be added like 
case markings by realisation rules. 
10 
Discontinuous realisation of constituents in unordered trees 
is very easily expressed in the present formalism. For similar 
solutions to Dative 'movement', particle 'movement', VSO ordering and 
persuade sentences see Dowty 19783419; 1979b: 162; 1980: 9-103 S. R. 
Anderson 1976; S. R. Anderson & Chung 1977; Staal 1967: 13,34-35,791 
Schachter 1980: 269; Keenan & Faltz 1978: 212. 
Two features distinguish discontinuous realisation from the old 
transformational solutions. First, unordered trees have no basic or 
underlying order to begin with, so no actual 'movement' or reordering 
of constituents is involved (Dahl 1977a: 81,105; Stewart 1976: 157). 
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Second, transformations are mappings from trees to trees, and so the 
result of a transformation is not just a string but an ordered 
phrase-structure tree (or, equivalently, a labelled and bracketed 
string). In contrast, realisation rules take an unordered 
hierarchical tree and derive from it a linear output string; this 
string, be it orthographical or phonological, is not itself a tree 
and has no hierarchical organisation. 
The RWRAP ('Rightwrap') operation of Bach (1979b: 516) is very 
similar to discontinuous realisation, but it retains some features of 
an ordered phrase-structure analysis. It is, for instance, defined 
as an operation on strings rather than a rule for realising an 
unordered, hierarchical structure. 
11Two types of constraint need to be considered with regard to 
extent adverbs (members of B(t/3 e)/(t/ 
3 
e) or 
BEZ). First, some 
precise adjectives like perfect resist extent modification altogether, 
though very perfect is acceptable where some arbitrary standard of 
perfection applies, as with diamonds (Sapir 1944: 148; Damerau 
1975: 2). Second, most extent adverbs applying to adjectives block 
further modification by other extent adverbs: "quite extremely fat. 
The exceptions are very, quite, too and perhaps terribly, which can 
iterate: very very very very ill. But even these iterations must be 
homogeneous: 'very quite ill. In Beesley 1982 I suggested that extent 
adverbs be of category (t/4e)/(t/3e); this would allow only one 
extent adverb to apply to a given adjective. Adjectives like perfect 
and carnivorous could be assigned to t/4e from the beginning. 
(Predicate nominals and adjectives modified by sentence adverbials 
were then assigned to categories with yet more slashes. ) However, 
the proliferation of slash categories complicates the grammar, makes 
derivations hard to read and still fails to capture the 
idiosyncrasies. I am now more inclined to see the restrictions as 
pragmatic and not to be accommodated in the syntax. A great deal of 
work remains to be done in this area. 
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12Such 
a rule was also suggested to me independently by Theo 
Janssen. 
13Siegel's (1976a: 10-42; 1976b) attempt to analyse Russian LF 
adjectives as basic CN/CNs and SF adjectives as basic absolute 
(t///e) adjectives fails at several points. First, Siegel's 
syntactic dichotomy between CN/CN adjectives, which apply directly to 
nouns, and t///e adjectives, which reach attributive position by way 
of relative clause reduction, is a false one. No promotion rule like 
R12 is even considered. Second, Siegel is forced to the absurd 
conclusion that almost every adjective in Russian has both a basic 
CN/CN and a t///e reading--with no obvious semantic link between the 
two. Finally, the Russian data contradict her own analysis. Siegel 
goes to great lengths to defend the one-place predicate analysis of 
vague adjectives like tall, and insists the they be assigned to the 
t///e class. Unfortunately for Siegel, the Russian word for tall has 
both a SF (Siegel's t///e) and a LF (Siegel's CN/CN)--(see Babby 
1973: 359). 
14wasow (1977) lists a number of tests to separate passive form 
adjectives, which are lexically derived, from genuine passives, which 
are syntactically derived. His tests for adjective status are (1), 
ability to prenominally modify a common noun; (2), grammatical 
appearance after verbs subcategorised for adjective complements 
(acted, became, looked, remained, seemed, sounded); (3), 
compatibility with an un- prefix; and (4), compatibility with extent 
modifiers other than much. Tests 1 and 4 are not much good, even 
for fairly well accepted adjectives; i. e. some adjectives resist 
extent. modifiers in any case and others must be postposed attributive 
modifiers because they have syntactic complements. The other tests 
are more compelling. Although Dowty 1978: 422 offers a 'lexical' rule 
for deriving adjectives from transitive verbs, it is identical to R14 
except that the translation adds past tense: that is, where cx' 
translates a TV, Dowty's lexical passive is given the reading XxVy 
Past(a'( XpP(x))(y)]. Dowty uses this rule to explain the 'already 
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stolen' reading of this ambiguous sentence: The book was stolen at 
noon. More convincing lexically derived adjectives have more 
idiosyncratic readings. For instance, the lexical reading of closed 
in the closed window is simply 'not open'; a closed window may have 
been build closed, so there may not exist a someone who closed it. 
Similarly, a broken box may not have been broken by anyone; an elated 
woman may not have been elated by anyone. A man may be convinced, in 
the sense that he has an intractable or sure state of mind, without 
anyone having convinced him. Often these lexical passives can be 
replaced by other one-place adjectivals. Untouched might be 
replaced by virgin, uninhabited by empty, unsupported by without 
foundation, elated by happy, convinced by certain. In the present 
context, lexical passives are best treated as simple basic 
adjectives. The rules in the text are concerned only with syntactic 
passives. 
15The intransitive reading for changeable may not be a serious 
counterexample to formulating a productive rule for deriving -able 
adjectives from TVs. Assuming that the form changeable sometimes has 
the meaning 'capable of being changed', the intransitive reading 
'capable of changing' can be ascribed to a homonym lexically related 
to the intransitive verb change. The following lexical rule would 
appear to be somewhat useful, at least for the small class of basic 
ivs related to change, such as alter, adapt, modify, accommodate. 
if ac PIV then (a, ABLE) E P. 
Realisation: a^ -able 
Translation: XxO [ a' (x) ] 
This translation is only suggestive of the full meaning of 
changeable, which is more likely to mean 'prone to change' or 
'disposed to change' rather than just 'capable of changing'. 
16Dowty (1978: 408-411; 1979a: 300-301) provides only for 
agentless -able forms, but the extension to agentive forms is 
required for examples like This sonata Is playable by Perlemann. This 
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extension also reflects the parallelism of -able forms to passives, 
which are also derived from TVs. 
The Dowty translation of John Is lovable as 
X zO Vy[ love *(y, z) ] (j ), also adopted here, is intuitively not strong 
enough a reading. Conversely, to translate The property is undesirable 
as Vy[Ax[property'(x) H x-y] & -1 OVz[desire*, (z, y)]] is much too 
strong. Quite possibly these readings of lovable and undesirable are 
just basic adjectives and should be translated simply as lovable' and 
undesirable' respectively. If they are given translations in terms of 
love' or desire', different quantifiers or some kind of typically 
operator may be needed. 
The same problem arises with passives as well. Nigel Is loved 
often conveys more than just Vx[love*(x, n)]. For a frank discussion 
of the metaphysical weaknesses of such an analysis see Bach 
1980: 333-334. 
17Dowty (1979a: 223) actually translates make TV/ADJ as 
XPXPXxP( Xy[VQ[Q(x) CAUSE BECOME P(y)]]}. That is, to make John 
angry is to 'cause John to become angry'. Given a workable semantics 
for BECOME, this variation is a reasonable possibility. 
Janssen (1978: 219-220) defines a usable semantics for CAUSE 
within a modal logic. Assume a model A with a domain D, a set of 
time intervals T and a set of possible worlds W. Let g be an 
assignment of values to variables. For a proposition p and a world w 
e W, let f be a selection function such that f(p, w) E W. In 
particular, f(p, w) is that possible world most like w with the 
possible exception that p is the case. 
If 0, Ir e ME t 
then QCAUSE(O, +Y)DA, w, 
t, q 
.1 
iff EID & T, A'w, t, g -1 and Q-141] A, w', t, g - 1, 
where w' - f((A[- o] ), w). 
An example is in order. Let X be love*(m, j), which translates Mary 
loves John. Let Y' be happy' (j ), which translates John Is happy. Now 
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the sentence John, Is happy BECAUSE Mary loves hlml can be 
translated as CAUSE(love*(m, j), happy'(j)). Janssen's semantics says 
that this sentence will be true at a world w and a time t if and only 
if (1) both love *(m, j) and happy' (j) are true at <w, t> and also (2) 
in a world w' just like w except for the possible difference that 
love*(m, j) is false at <w', t>, then happy'(j) would also be false at 
<W', t>. 
18Examples 
such as catch the guard asleep and see the bathers 
nude, where the adjective names a 'concomitant state' of the direct 
object are what Live (1977) calls Type 1 pseudo-adjective 
appositives. Live's Type 2 pseudo-adjective appositives include the 
following examples, which convey a causitive relation between the 
action and the resulting state of the direct object. 
John beat the eggs stiff. 
Mary planed the wood smooth. 
Dowty (1979a: 220-221) provides the following rule for such 
constructions. 
526. If 86 PTV and aE PAW, then 
F26(8, a) E P., where F26(ß, a) c 8a. 
T26. F26(8, a) translates into: 
XPXxP(Xy[8'(x, AXPP(y)) CAUSE BECOME a'(y)]) 
The very similar Type 3 constructions, which involve 'empty causitive 
words' such as make and render, have already been handled in the 
text. 
Live's Type 4 constructions include the following, which are 
characterised by reflexives with apparently intransitive verbs. 
Phil slept himself sober. 
Mary drank herself sick. 
The sergeant yelled himself hoarse. 
Dowty (1979a: 221-222) provides the following rule, which also handles 
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examples such as John yelled Mary deaf. 
S27. If 6C PIV and aE PADJ, 
then F27(S, a) c PTV where F27 = Öa. 
T27. F27(Ö, a) translates into: 
XPXxP{ Xy[Ö'(x) CAUSE BECOME al(y)J) 
Type 5 pseudo-adjective appositives such as Mary held the reins loose 
are, as Live recognises, vaguely adverbial and will not be considered 
here. 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
1See 
Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 59-60; Jespersen 1933: 91,357; 
Bolinger 1972: 34; Quine 1960: 110; Lees 1963: 85ff; Smith 1964: 38ff; 
Chomsky 1966: 35-38; Bach 1968: 93ff; Vendler 1968: 13-14; Seuren 
1969: 104-119; Lytle 1974: 29-48; Bartning 1976: 12. 
2In 
a careful study of relative clauses in educated spoken 
English, Quirk (1957) found one non-restrictive relative clause, out 
of 174 in his corpus, introduced with that. subsequent tests showed 
that many informants would accept that-clauses as non-restrictives, 
but that given a choice, which-clauses were preferred in, all cases. 
Only which-clauses were accepted when the antecedent was a sentence 
or other non-nominal constituent. Quirk cites Tennyson (who disliked 
which) and Graham Green as writers who used a non-restrictive that. I 
have found the following examples in casual reading. 
(A) So the Norman childe, Cospetric, that was young and 
landless and fell brave and well-armoured, mounted 
his horse in Edinburgh Town and came North .. 
(L. G. Gibbon, A Scots Quair, 1932, p. 15) 
(B) Here he could give himself to excitement without the 
interference of the Church, that wanted to regulate even 
human emotions. (K. Seligmann, Magic, supernaturalism 
and religion, 1971, p. 258) 
Example (A) is in a variety of Scots, and it appears that non- 
restrictive that-clauses are quite common for Scots speakers. 
Indeed, in a large corpus study of colloquial Scottish English, Brown 
(1981: 7,9,28) found 'very few' wh-forms for nominal relative 
clauses. That was used for both restrictive and non-restrictive 
relative clauses, and the few examples of which-clauses that did 
occur usually involved non-nominal antecedents. Brown writes 
(1981: 10, see also pp. 37-40) 
In these circumstances which is always deictic and 
usually anaphoric. Its antecedent may be an NP as in 
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['Louise has got a car--which she never uses'], an entire 
proposition, as in ['they got another keyboard player 
frae the Paris--which really annoyed me'], or some 
portion of a proposition... 
The present analysis is at least broadly consistent with these 
observations in that all non-restrictive modifiers are claimed to be 
linked to their antecedents anaphorically. 
3For 
parallel examples from seventeenth-century grammars see 
Salmon 1969: 180. 
4The 
prepose/postpose mechanism has been recognised by most 
Iberian grammarians; see, for example, Bull 1950; Cuesta & Mendes da 
Luz 1961: 426-427; Alonso '1968: 47; Escarpanter 1974: 120-121. Bolinger 
(1972: 33-36) argues that this is a general process in languages and 
that it operates in English adverbials, where ordering is relatively 
free. See also Siegel 1976a: 123-124 and Quirk et el. 1972: 858-859. 
5In the case of subject modification, non-restrictive modifiers 
with complements can also appear before the whole term, in sentence- 
initial position. 
(A) Disguised as Clark Kent, Superman worked as a reporter. 
However, this is different from the preposition of a non-restrictive 
adjective such as clever in my clever wife, an adjective with a 
complement cannot appear between a determiner and a noun in English. 
(B) *The disguised as Clark Kent superhero fought crime. 
I shall ignore sentence-initial non-restrictive modifiers on subject 
terms. 
6 In real dialogue, which is full of performance quirks, a 
restrictive relative clause can be separated from the common noun it 
modifies by a pause, making it superficially resemble a non- 
restrictive relative clause. This happens commonly when the relative 
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clause is added as an afterthought. Imagine the following example 
uttered by a gangster. 
(A) The boss never killed any man [pause] who didn't ask for it. 
Examples (23) and (24) in the text are grammatical if they are' read 
with such performance pauses and the relative clauses are given a 
restrictive reading. 
7An 
exception to this is the 'stereotype' reading recognised by 
Bartsch 1979: 34-35,41.1 shall ignore it here. 
8Richards (1982) argues that all indefinite terms are translated 
with existential quantification and that subsequent reference to an 
indefinite term by an anaphoric pronoun is what makes such a term 
'specific'. This is potentially compatible with the present analysis 
because I shall argue that all non-restrictive modifiers are 
anaphorically linked to the terms they modify. In example (32) then, 
Richards can argue that it is the presence of the non-restrictive 
modifier, with its anaphoric pronoun, which causes a novel to be read 
specifically. By making specific/non-specific an effect of discourse 
anaphora, Richards avoids treating indefinite terms as fundamentally 
ambiguous. 
The present analysis works from the different assumption that 
indefinite terms are indeed ambiguous and that a uniform translation 
is to be avoided. Therefore, indefinite terms are either specific or 
non-specific to begin with, and only specific terms can be linked 
meaningfully to an anaphoric pronoun. This position is inspired by 
the way that many languages, including to some extent English, can or 
must distinguish specific and non-specific terms syntactically (see 
note 15). The difference in assumptions and intuitions is 
formidable, and I doubt that the two views can be fully reconciled. 
9A 
possible counter-example to Thorne's argument is the sentence 
The John who is frankly a bore ruined the party.. If the argument 
fails, it does not necessarily mean that non-restrictive modifiers 
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are not independent speech acts, but only that performative adverbs 
are not conclusive evidence either way (see Fairclough 1973: 527-528). 
10See 
Quine 1960: 110; Chomsky 1966: 36-37; Vendler 1967: 48; 
Jacobs & Rosenbaum 1968: 260-262; Montague EFL: 213; Thompson 1971; 
Aissen 1972; Rohrer 1973: 407-409; Cresswell 1973: 158-159; Bell 
1973: 171; Rodman 1972: 175; Bartsch 1979. 
11Arnauld 
& Lancelot (1660: 99; see also Salmon 1969: 180-183; 
Chomsky 1966: 33-37) present an analysis something like Ross's; they 
claim that when they utter (A), 'three judgments pass through my mind 
which are included in this proposition'. The three are listed in 
(B). 
(A) Invisible God created the visible world. 
(B) 1. God is invisible. 
2. He created the world. 
3. The world is visible. 
Of these three 'judgments', (B2) is called the principal one and the 
others are called subordinate. Much is made of the fact that these 
subordinate 'judgments' can be spelled out more obviously with 
relative clauses. Although (C) is given as an example without comma 
punctuation, the intention is obviously to treat the relative clauses 
as non-restrictive. 
(C) God WHO is invisible created the world WHICH is visible. 
The same example is taken up in the Port-Royal Logic, where this 
distinction between restrictive modification (' determination') and 
non-restrictive modification ('explication') is outlined more overtly 
(Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 115-116,59-60). 
(D) Alexander, who was the most generous of all kings, 
conquered Darius. 
Arnauld & Nicole claim that if they had asserted a 'compound' 
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sentence like (D), then 'we obviously would have asserted two things 
of Alexander--(l) that he was the most generous of kings, and (2) 
that he was the conquerer of Darius'. 
Ross's rejection of the conjunction analysis has been challenged 
by Thompson (1971: 85), who argues that all non-restrictive modifiers 
are transformed from conjoined sentences. In examples like the 
following, Thompson deletes the conjunctions transformationally, 
thereby allowing the second clause to be read as an assertion. The 
assertion is then transformed into a non-restrictive relative clause. 
(E) Tell your father that supper is ready and 
he is outside 
(F) Tell your father that supper is ready 
he is outside 
(G) Tell your father, who is outside, that supper is ready. 
Given present assumptions about transformations, Thompson's 
suggestion is totally unconvincing. 
McCawley (1978: 163-164) eventually derives non-restrictive 
modifiers from conjoined sentences but argues that the non- 
restrictive part is effectively a quite separate sentence. 
12For 
an overview of possible analyses in the TG paradigm see 
Stockwell of a/. 1973: 421-441. Those advocating the NP-S analysis for 
non-restrictives and the Nom-S analysis for restrictives include 
researchers of many theoretical persuasions: Rohrer 1973: 407-409; 
Lytle 1974: 23,29-48; Partee 1975: 229-231; Siegel 1976a: 132ff; 
1979: 246-247; Jackendoff 1977: 62-63,72-73,169-198; Peterson 
1979a: 106ff, " 159; McCawley 1978: 150-151; 1980: 184. Bartsch 
(1976b: 15-16) argues that the NP-S analysis should serve for both 
restrictive and non-restrictive modifiers, but then defines what is 
certainly an NP-S rule for non-restrictive modifiers and a Nom-S rule 
for restrictive modifiers (1979: 43-45). Partee 1976ba53-54 argues 
that a Montague semantics helps to decide the question of relative 
clause analysis, showing clearly that restrictive relative clauses 
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should attach to CNs. This has been challenged by Bach & Cooper 
(1978), who defend an NP-S analysis for restrictive relative clauses. 
As Partee (1979a: 279) herself and others (see von Stechow 1980; 
Gazdar 1981: 162,178 and works cited therein) have accepted the 
Bach-Cooper arguments, I shall explain briefly why I reject them. 
Bach & Cooper show that some languages always put restrictive 
relative clauses at the beginning or at the end of sentences; these 
relative clauses do not, therefore, necessarily appear contiguously 
with the nominals which the Nom-S analysis claims they modify. 
Appealing to a Gazdar-like grammar where 'extraposed' constituents 
are handled by passing gaps down trees, Bach & Cooper conclude that 
the alleged Nom-S combination is not a constituent, and that an NP-S 
analysis, for restrictive relative clauses, is just as easy to 
formalise as a Nom-S analysis. 
Bach & Cooper's arguments rest on three supports, all of which 
are at least questionable. First, the argument is based largely on 
examples gleaned from Hittite cuniform inscriptions, though more 
accessible languages like Hindi are also cited. Because any real 
data should be considered good data, this objection is the weakest of 
the three, but one cannot help taking these strange examples with a 
grain of salt (see also Cooper 1979). Second, Bach & Cooper are 
dedicated to a strict form of ordered phrase-structure grammar, 
trying at the same time to apply a Montague-style combinatorial 
semantics. Such grammars rule out all possibility of discontinuous 
constituents because constituents can be built only by simple 
concatenation. Bach & Cooper are forced to adopt semantic 
complexities which need not arise in a generalised categorial 
grammar, where syntactic orderings other than simple concatenation 
are allowed. A different theoretical perspective changes everything. 
In Daughter Dependency Grammar, for instance, Hindi relative clauses 
are cited triumphantly as firm evidence for the separation of the 
unordered constituent relations and the superficial linear relations 
defined by 'sequence rules' (Schachter 1980: 269-270). For those 
grammarians advocating an unordered dependency structure, the 
fact 
that restrictive relative clauses in Hindi are never realised 
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contiguously with the nominals they modify is no calamity. 
Third, and most serious, Bach & Cooper's NP--), NP S rule forces 
them to allow at least two distinct readings for every noun phrase. 
For example, every man must be allowed to translate as in PTQ (A) or 
with a dummy property R representing a hole to be filled by a 
subsequent relative clause (B). 
(A) XPAx[man'(x) - P(x)] 
(B) XPAx[(man'(x) & R(x)) - P(x)] 
If a discontinuous restrictive relative clause turns up, the R in (B) 
is abstracted out allowing the property denoted by the relative 
clause to be lambda-converted in. The 'correct' translation of every 
man is the one which happens to combine correctly with any 
subsequent relative clause or clauses. The obvious objection to this 
approach is that it requires a non-compositional semantics or the 
adoption of multiple determiners like every, each one having a 
distinct translation. I find this highly counterintuitive. Given 
the assumptions of this thesis, where discontinuous constituents are 
both allowed and desirable, the Bach-Cooper analysis is not 
compelling. 
13This 
rule is related to the traditional MG analyses of 
relative clauses (e. g. Rodman 1976). The GPSG approach to defining 
categories with gaps (Gazdar 1979: 16) is an appealing alternative, 
but I have not had time to adapt it to the present kind of categorial 
grammar. 
14See 
note 7. Also, there are, in fact, some cases where non- 
restrictive clauses appear to attach, to vacuous, but not 
stereotypical, indefinite NPs, but the effect is very different. 
(A) I have never seen a sea eagle, which are beautiful birds. 
If a sea eagle can be interpreted as referring somehow to a class, 
then the plural verb form in the non-restrictive clause could reflect 
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the plurality of the class, i. e. they are beautiful birds. Nigel 
Shadbolt suggested (B) to me as a similar example involving an 
anaphoric pronoun. 
(B) Napoleon was a Corsican. They are volatile people. 
15It is not possible here to do justice to the rich debate on 
the scope of operators and quantifying-in. For an overview of the 
basic problems in MG see Dowty et a/. 1981: 162-169,230-233. For 
general syntactic arguments against any syntactic form of 
quantifying-in transformation see Cooper 19751145-160; Bartsch 1979 
and Gazdar 1982. For a defence of quantifying-in for differentiating 
de re (transparent) and de dicto (opaque) readings see Klein 
1979a: 34-36,81,93-94,102-104. Bennett (1975: 49-60) argues that 
wide scope should be interpreted as 'definite' (or 'particular' or 
'specific') and narrow scope as 'indefinite' (or 'any-old' or 'non- 
specific'); for arguments against this distinction being 
semantically significant see Klein 1979a: 181-196. Bennett's 
distinction, let us call it specific/non-specific, is overtly 
expressed in the syntax of various languages (Dahl 1970; Givon 1973), 
and is very hard to explain away. For instance, indefinite French 
terms with restrictive relative clauses mark specificity by putting 
the relative clause main verb in the indicative mood and non- 
specificity by putting the verb in the subjunctive. 
(A) Jean cherche une femme qui est belle. 
(John seeks a woman who is-indic beautiful. ) 
'John seeks a (particular/specific) woman who is beautiful. ' 
(B) Jean cherche une femme qui soft belle. 
(John seeks a woman who is-subj beautiful). 
'John seeks a (any-old) woman who is beautiful. ' 
English has words like particular, specific, any-old and perhaps arbitrary 
and random for forcing certain readings, but on the surface 
indefinite terms are usually ambiguous or vague. One argument that 
this is a real ambiguity is that only a specific term may be 
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coherently questioned with which. If the speaker of (C) is looking 
for a particular dog, then (D) is a coherent response. If, however, 
the speaker of (C) is dog-shopping in general, (B) indicates a 
serious misunderstanding; something like (E) is more appropriate. 
(C) I'm looking for a dog. 
(D) Which dog are you looking for? 
(E) What kind of dog do you want? 
The specific/non-specific distinction must be carefully isolated from 
questions of reference and identifiability. Criticisms often center 
around the claim that 'having a particular entity in mind' is too 
psychological a notion to be representable in semantics. And 'having 
a particular entity in mind' is usually taken to mean something like 
being able to identify or refer to (in the logician's sense) the 
entity in the world. Specificity need not be such a rich notion. I 
may, for instance, say (F), with a specific reading, even if I do not 
know or cannot identify the bear involved in any way. 
(F) John seeks a particular bear. 
Indeed it could be the case that John himself is not able to identify 
the bear involved, but even so it is not just any old bear that he 
seeks. John might, for instance, be after the bear who kills his 
sheep, and he may not know he has killed the right one until after 
the sheep killing stops. He might never know exactly which bear it 
was. However, it makes sense to ask which bear it was even if the 
question cannot be answered more helpfully than the one who killed 
my sheep'. What is important when someone believes in or seeks a 
particular entity is that the believer or seeker also believes the 
entity to be POTENTIALLY identifiable, even if only by something like 
omniscient diety. 
Similarly, the specificity of a term does not entail real world 
existence. It is perfectly coherent to assert (G), with a specific 
reading, even if no unicorns exist in the real world. 
Beesley -3S-6- Adjectives 
(G) Jean cherche une licorne qui est blanche. 
(John seeks a unicorn which is-indic white. ) 
'John seeks a (particular) unicorn which is white. ' 
It might be argued that the particular unicorn that John is seeking 
has a fictional existence, and that would be an argument for 
Bennett's broad sense of existence. However, without a radical 
reinterpretation of the existential quantifier it is difficult to see 
" how Bennett's analysis can be helpful. Indeed it is far from obvious 
that quantifier scope has anything at all to do with the 
specific/non-specific distinction. Where the difference is overt in 
natural language, it always appears to be shown by some marker within 
the ambiguous term. For a sketch of a non-scope analysis see Bartsch 
1979: 26ff. 
16This 
also provides a possible way to distinguish restrictive 
and non-restrictive modifiers on indefinite terms. Under the Rodman 
analysis, sentence (A) translates as (B). The translation for 
Bartsch would be (C), where v1 is the constant corresponding to the 
entity 'referred to,. (B) and (C) are also the readings for a 
sentence like (A) where who was 111 is a restrictive modifier. 
(A) A man, who was ill, left. 
(B) Vy[man'(y) & ill'(y) & leave'(y)] 
(C) man' (vI) & ill' (v1) & leave' (v1) 
In contrast, the present analysis would yield (B) for the restrictive 
reading and (D) for the non-restrictive reading, where xa is an 
anaphoric variable assigned the value of the constant instantiating y 
in the previous clause. 
(D) <speaker, Vy[man'(y) & leave'(y)]> 
<speaker, ill'(xa)> 
If we adopt Bartsch's analysis of specific terms, where constants are 
introduced directly into the translation of specific indefinite 
articles, then the present analysis would yield (c) for the 
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restrictive reading and (E) for the non-restrictive. 
(E) <speaker, man'(vl) & leave I (v 
<speaker, ill' (v1)> 
By setting off ill'(v1) in a separate clause, reflecting its status 
as a separate speech act, (E) allows it to be separately tagged, 
given its own performative adverb, given its own emphasis or 
attenuation, or even its own quotational delivery (which effectively 
puts the words in someone else's mouth). 
17It 
must be granted that some have disagreed with my intuitions 
on this point, and such clashes of intuition are perhaps 
unresolvable. Ultimately I must say that the analysis reflects my own 
and others' intuitions satisfactorily. However, to accommodate 
Thompson's intuitions about (97), something equivalent to the 
Rodman-Bartsch conjunction analysis of non-restrictive modifiers 
would have to be allowed as an alternative (not a replacement) to the 
present subroutine view. The formal cost of this move would, I feel, 
be very dear. First, this conjunction analysis fails spectacularly 
for negation (see examples (83) to (84a")). Second, providing two 
alternative translations for non-restrictive modifiers threatens to 
violate the principle of compositionality. 
18Author 
Noel: Langley (Cage me a peacock, Penguin 1960) has 
special fun with quotational definite descriptions. Note the use of 
the pretty one, referring to a little girl, in the following passage. 
He [Sextus] reined up and leaned forward in his 
saddle. 
'Ho there, pretty one, ' he said gallantly. 
'Ho there, sojerl' the pretty one made reply, 
flashing a row of even white teeth. 'Nisorse. ' (PP. 24- 
25) 
In the next passage, the author uses Sextus's description 'lady of 
the town', still referring to the same little girl, but here he puts 
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it in upper case to signal its quotational status. 
'She's going to show us a short cut sir, ' Sextus 
explained, 'She's a lady of the town, I gather'. 
II 
'If you turn up 'ere, ' said the Lady of the Town 
conversationally, 'and parst them trees, there's a smorl 
road that gets you there a nour quicker'. 
066 
If this turns out to be a wild-goose chase, ' said 
the General to the Lady of the Town with beetling brows, 
'I'll smack your bottom for you! ' (p. 25) 
The game continues as the author picks up 'smorl road' and uses it in 
his omniscient description. 
As they advanced towards the smorl road, the Lady of the 
Town regaled Sextus with a bright and diverting 
commentary on the social life of Versalium. (p. 26) 
Yet another example is the author's quotational reference to the 
greatest and most just men in Rome in the following selection. 
'I have requested your presence here because you 
are--all of you--the greatest and most just men in Rome 
today, and it is only great and just men that can put to 
rights the terrible wrong that has been done the house of 
Collatinous. ' 
The greatest and most just men in Rome, feeling 
something was expected of them, made suitably inaudible 
noises of polite incredulity. (p. 147) 
19Janssen (1978: 220) has criticised the reference of (114') to 
the syntactic forms of the semantic arguments, arguing that any 
necessary distinctions between proper names and indexed pronouns 
should be enshrined in the syntax. I shall assume that Delacruz's 
reference to the form of arguments could be legitimately replaced 
with some kind of reference to syntactic features. Janssen also 
points out that the translation in (114') could be given more simply 
as APVy[Ax[(Q'(x) & a'(%z[x-z])) H x-y] & P(y)]; this is simply 
an alphabetic variation of Delacruz's translation after two 
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applications of lambda conversion. 
20Where 
constraints on grammatical over-generation are more 
important than semantic exposition, idiosyncratic rules for 
idiosyncratic data will be preferable. Those seeking to generate all 
and only the grammatical strings of English will 'therefore prefer 
Delacruz's original rule (114). However, from a processing point of 
view, it is unlikely that a human or computer parser will break down 
the horse Canonero any way other than lthelhorse, Canoneroll, with the 
being analysed as a normal definite article. Criteria for constraint 
and conventions for constraining categorial grammars are by no means 
obvious, and the whole question must be considered open. 
21The definite article associated with a proper name should not 
be thought of as deleted or 'doomed' (Postal 1970: 486-487) but rather 
as unrealised, much like a gene can be unexpressed. For similar 
ideas see the 'incomplete lexicalisation' of Bartsch & Vennemann 
1972: 42; the 'zero expression' of Dik 1980: 60,7o and the 'lexical 
hiatus' of Lytle 1971: 90-91. It is very common for researchers using 
categorial grammars to make a clear distinction between the 
unordered, immaterial and generally abstract level of combinatorial 
syntax and the ordered, phonological or graphic strings of speech and 
writing. See, for example, the genotype/phenotype distinction of 
Shaumyan 1965,1971,1977 (also Lytle 1971: 88-89; Sanders 1975a: 9-12; 
1975b: 400; 1980: 244; Dowty 1980: 11-12; Staal 1967: 68-69; Schlesinger 
1977: 17-19; Bartsch & Vennemann 1972: 18-42,76-77; Vincent 1979: 4-5; 
Gleason 1964: 77,81; L. H. Anderson 1971: 9; Dahl 1977a: 87-91; Chafe 
1970: 4-5,27-28; Keenan & Faltz 1978: 20,45,205; Boas 1975: 36-39). 
Usually the unordered level is considered to represent semantic or 
cognitive substance. For arguments that the 'words' in base 
structures should really be abstract morphemes, sememes or 
protoverbal elements which are given tangible shape by lexicalisation 
rules see Schlesinger 1977: 18; Bach 1968: 117-118; Sanders 1980: 243; 
Partee 1975: 214. 
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22Marrying 
a Bartsch-like analysis of definite descriptions with 
the present analysis of non-restrictive modifiers offers yet another 
alternative. Let the a translate as XPP(V ); 
subroutine(XQQ(xa)(ýa, )), where a is a CN and vn is an individual 
constant. If the person being referred to is the individual v2, then 
(the) Nigel sings will translate as the two assertions sing' (v2 ) and 
Nigel' (v2) . 
23A 
rule similar to R35, perhaps with just an alternative 
realisation clause, would accommodate appositive constructions like 
the poet John, where the stress is on poet. Just as John the butcher 
(stress on butcher) is a different John from John the poet (stress on 
poet), so the butcher John (stress on butcher) is a different John 
from the poet John (stress on poet). 
24Rule R36 will also allow us to generate terms like John, John 
and the plumber, the plumber, which are undeniably odd. However, 
reasonable pragmatic considerations should rule out such redundant 
non-restrictive modifiers. occasionally there is a genuine need to 
use a proper name appositive to a proper name. 
(A) Mark, Twain, Mr Samuel Clemmens, was a famous humourist. 
(B) Coco, M. Louis Lepage, was a famous French clown. 
25Chierchia's 
rule, which is meant to serve for appositives at 
both individual and propositional level, is as follows. 
S34. If a6 BT -(hen, they n) 
or a 
that 0, and ýB C PAN, then 
F20(a, 0) E PT where F20(a, the , ßa. 
T34. If aE PT and OE PCN then 
F20(a, ß) translates as 
XPVx(ß'(x) & a'=1QQ(X) & P(x)] 
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Thus F20(horseCN, CanoneroT) - the horse Canonero and translates as 
XPVx[horse'(x) & XPP(c)=XQQ(x) & P(x)]. Note that unlike in 
Delacruz's rule, where appositives are restrictive modifiers (i. e. 
they narrow the scope of the class within a definite description), 
Chierchia's rule translates appositives as logical conjuncts at the 
highest level, as with non-restrictive modifiers. Thus instead of 
Canonero acting restrictively to specify which horse is intended, 
horse acts non-restrictively to characterise what Canonero is. 
26The 
rule overgenerates. Constraints on the rule might be 
found given standard theories of definiteness, specificity or 
reference. There is, unfortunately, no room to pursue this issue 
here. 
27One is tempted to create a category T/PROP containing that, but 
the semantics of the result is far from obvious. That, on a proper 
name does not necessarily connote disapproval. Some emotional 
colouring appears to be involved, whatever it is. In Portuguese, 
where definite articles optionally mark proper names, the presence of 
the definite article usually connotes familiarity of the speaker with 
the referent, or even intimacy and esteem. 
28Some 
non-restrictive adjectives applied to proper names must 
also have some provision for definite marking. While Homeric 
epithets like Brave Ulysses have already been treated, the following 
constructions still need an account. 
(A) The beautiful Helen launched 1000 ships. 
(B) The traitorous Philby defected. 
(C) I dislike that dishonest Murphy. 
The similarity between the traitor Philby and the traitorous Philby is 
obvious, and a rule parallel to R37 should do. 
29A 
number of explicit markers of apposition have been discussed 
in the literature (Quirk et a!. 1972: 627ff; McKinnon 1979: 41ff). 
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The boss, namely Bill, retired. 
i. e. 
that' is to say 
in other words 
An HP, namely Joe Bloggs, was caught with pants down. 
Many people, 











Examples like (A) and (B) at least are fairly easily accommodated in 
the present framework. Namely appears to operate only on proper 
names; let us assign it to (T/T)/PROP and give it the translation 
XP[X P(VP); subroutine( XQQ(xa)(P))]. 
R39. If aE B(T/T)/PROP and ßE PPROP then 
(a, ß) E PT/T 
Realisations ar", O 
Translation: a'(. #') 
The translation in R39 assumes that names are predicates of 
individuals; in an appositive construction like namely John the 
speaker is simply supplying the conventional name, as an extra 
parenthetical bit of information, of the person referred to. Markers 
like i. e. and In other words appear to apply to terms; let us assign 
them to (T/T)/T and translate them as XQ(X P(vP)j subroutine(XPP(xa) 
AA ( [)PIXYP1( Xz(y-z])(Q)]))]" 
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R40. IfaE B(T/T 
)/T and 
Qe PT then 
(a, ß)e PT/T 
Realisations a ^'ß 
Translation: a'(ßß') 
Such rules-raise the question whether null members of (T/T)/T, rather 
than bumping rules, like R30, could function to produce non- 
restrictive appositives. The whole area is in need of more work. 
Appositives, and, especially 
 
those with apposition markers, are 
serious problems for a transformational theory: (see McKinnon 1979: 51 
for arguments), and a detailed treatment in a non-transformational MG 
could be very enlightening. 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
IAlternative 
translations for proper names are proposed in 
Chapter 4, but the details of such translations are 
not at issue here. In particular, the semantic type of the 
alternative translations is identical to that for Bennett Is proper 
names (and, indeed, for all other individual-level terms). 
2I 
assume, following Delacruz 1976: 189) 'Bennett 1975: 167,159) 
and Keenan & Faltz 1978: 71,233 that the predicate true' can be 
handled by a meaning postulate and read 'redundantly'. To assert 0 
Is true is intuitively equivalent to asserting 4), and this is 




adjectives which may eventually need to be added to the 
t/3t class include common, nice, peculiar, weird, crazy, ridiculous, 
absurd, typical, o. k., logical, fashionable, rare, just, proper, customary 
and scandalous. However, such adjectives combine most easily with 
FOR-To clauses (see Silva & Thompson 1977: 122) or sentences with a 
putative should, which will be discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
It is logical [FOR John TO leave]. 
It is just [that Mary should be imprisoned]. 
4This 
rule holds only for those propositions which translate a 
sentence in the indicative mood. See note 3. 
5If 
scope is used to separate 'propositional' beliefs from 
'non-propositional' beliefs, the operation of this meaning postulate 
will have to be restricted. The problems of belief sentences are 
peripheral to adjectives and cannot be pursued here. 
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6 The CN' report is translated in terms of the three-place 
relation report'. Thus in the sentence The report of John to Bill is 
that Mary Is ill, the 'subject' of report' is named by John, the 
'indirect object' by Bill, and the 'direct object' by that Mary Is 111. 
It might be thought that Max is also an argument in a term like the 
report of John to Bill, about Max, requiring that report' be a four-place 
relation. However, about Max describes the nature of the report 
rather than providing an argument. Similarly, we can speak of a 
book about Max or the story about Max, and there is no more 
justification for treating report' as a four-place relation than there 
is for treating book' and story' as two-place relations. 
7See Chapter 3 note 17. 
8lmportant, vital, essential, and imperative take PP-TO complements 
but combine most happily with sentences in the subjunctive mood or 
with a putative should. 
It is vital (to me) that Jane should be here. 
It is important (to me) that Bill leave the room. 
See note 3. 
9An 
even simpler approach would be to translate (A) not with 
CAUSE but with simple logical conjunction as in (A'). 
(A) John is glad that Mary is well. 
(A') glad'(j) & well'(m) 
Then pragmatics could sort out the causal relationship between the 
two states of affairs. A similar solution is usually proposed for 
capturing the causality often felt in sentence (B). 
(B) John shot Mary and she died. 
(B') shoot'(j, m) & diel(m) 
It is possible for (B) to be uttered without conveying or requiring 
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any causality, and so (B') can be argued to capture the truth 
conditions. That is, if it is true that John shot Mary and it is 
also true that Mary died (for whatever reason), then (B) is also 
true. This translation also allows and to be translated 
straightforwardly as logical conjunction. 
In the case of (A), however, I cannot conceive of a reading 
wherein causality is not a necessary factor in the truth conditions. 
That is, if it is the case that John is glad and it is also the case 
that Mary is well, this is not enough to justify the conclusion that 
John is glad that Mary is well. Also, there is no syntactic 
conjunction in the surface structure, and so inserting logical 
conjunction into the translation is just as strong a measure as 
inserting CAUSE. 
r 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
1 
The classification of IV'/T passives as ADJs reflects their 
ability to take modification by very, to appear after seem, and to 
otherwise act in an ADJ-like manner. TV passives, whether from basic 
or derived TVs, usually fail such tests. 
(A) IV'/T passives 
John seemed very annoyed (by the situation). 
(B) TV passives 
*Sue seemed very advised that John is ill (by Mary). 
As both ADJs and t/5e participles translate as type <e, t), the 
syntactic differences are' comparatively superficial. 
2In Schreiber 1971 and in Bellert 1977 these are called 'modal' 
adverbs. Quirk et al. (1972: 511) use the term 'Group 1. Attitudinal 
Disjuncts'. Nilsen (1972: 157) writes of 'affirmation adverbials', 
and Bartsch (1976: 19-22) refers to them as the 'K0' class. 
3One 
should take care in pursuing explanation via lexical rules. 
Not only do many modal adverbs lack corresponding adjectives, but 
some obvious candidates for modal adjectives, true and false, have no 
exact adverb equivalents. Nominalisation threatens to be even more 
idiosyncratic. 
4Although 
alleged thieves are certainly those in the set 
kxVy[allege*(y, m[thief '(x)])], many legalistic usages of the form 
alleged do not fit this pattern. The Times of 12 April 1982 reported 
a charge that a fox had been illegally trapped and then released 
alive to a pack of houndsl the report continued, 'the alleged 
incident took place on Ministry of Defence land'. The alleged 
incident cited is not 'something alleged to be an incident' but rather 
an incident alleged to have occurred'. Similarly, the alleged letters 
could be ' letters alleged to exist,, and an alleged payment could be 
a 'payment alleged to have been made'. 
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5Schreiber 
(1971) and Bellert (1977) call these 'Evaluative 
adverbs'; Quirk et al. (1972: 512) call them 'Group 2. Attitudinal 
disjuncts, type a'; Bartsch (1976: 23) treats them under the label 'K1 
class'. 
6 Quirk et al. (1972: 514-517) have, shown some syntactic 
differences between modal (t/3t) and parenthetical (t/4t) adjectives 
with regard to putative should. In short, a parenthetical adjective 
. can apply to a sentence with a putative should, but any modal 
adjective applying to the same sentence forces a deontic ('ought-to') 
reading for' should. 
Parenthetical adjective--can be putative 
it is unfortunate that John should leave. 
strange 
odd 
Modal adjective--cannot be putative 






possibility is to postulate adverbials of category 
(t/9t)/PP-FOR including (un)fortunately and annoyingly. As (un)fortunate 
and annoying are of category (t/4t)/PP-FOR, the relationship between 
adjective and adverb would have to be described by a new rule. 
8A few leftovers appear to indicate not so much frequency, but 
the limits or lack of limits on the time some sentence will be true. 
They answer the question How long? rather than How often? 
momentarily, temporarily, permanently, perpetually, forever 
Also in this class are the composite members for a minute, for a day, 
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for a month, etc. A curiosity of this class is that they resist 
being placed at the beginning of aýsentence, which suggests that they 
are of syntactic category Iv/IV. This may also be the case for a few 
frequency adverbs including rarely, often, never, always and seldom. 
9The term 'hedge' is used by G. Läkoff (1972) to refer to a wide 
class of qualifying expressions, many of which are not at all 
adverbial. What I have called hedges, Quirk et a/. (1972: 277,280, 
429-430) have called 'viewpoint' adverbs; some of their 'attitudinal 
disjuncts' (pp. 511-512) are also treated as hedges herein. 
Vennemann (1973: 15)'writes of 'limiting' adverbs (see also Bartsch & 
Vennemann 1972: 112-113)1 Bellert (1977: 347-348) calls them 'domain' 
adverbs; and Bartsch (1976: 58-59) calls themI 'adverbials limiting 
predication'. 
The Klein account of context and hedges was developed to 
capture adjectival vagueness, and it works very satisfactorily in the 
present analysis. There have, however, been other notable schemes 
for formally accommodating vagueness. For instance, Lewis (1976: 47) 
proposes that the index of evaluation for a sentence must contain a 
'delineation coordinate' to specify the value of vague predicates. 
The truth of a sentence like (A)ýwill then depend on the value of the 
delineation coordinate f" i. e. the truth-''of the sentence depends on 
what tall is taken 'to denote at the relevant index. 
(A) John is tall. 
McConnell-Ginet (1973: 115) informally employs 'delineations' which 
are written as a subscript 'd' on degree adjectives. `These 
delineations are taken to be contextual variables which fix 
extensions. 
(B) talld(j) 
The present approach to sentence 'meaning' being a function from 
contexts to traditional propositions is, ultimately, traced back to 
Stalnaker 1972. 
Beesley -37). - Adjectives 
11In his analysis of hedges, Lakoff (1972: 199-202) makes a 
distinction between four kinds of criteria: 'Definitional' (DEF) 
criteria provide a legalistic characterisation of what the members of 
a set must be; 'Primary' (PRIM) criteria combine definitional 
criteria and primary (intuitively essential but not legalistically 
necessary) criteria; 'Secondary' (SEC) criteria are significant but 
insufficient for a definition; and 'Characteristic' (CHAR) criteria 
are characteristic but 'incidental'. The hedge technically is claimed 
to specify that DEF criteria rather than PRIM criteria apply. For an 
example like fish', Lakoff formalises the technical notion of a fish 
as Itechnically, (fish')ý - DEF(flfish'HH) fl NEG(PRIM(f fish'H ), 
where f1fish'H1 is the 'vector' of fish', which includes various 
evidence like fins, gills, scales, shape, living in the sea, etc. 
Thus something which is 'technically a fish' must satisfy the 
definitional criteria for fishhood but must also lack some primary 
qualities-for instance, a fishy shape or scales. The hedge strictly 
speaking is held by Lakoff to require the satisfaction not only of 
DEF criteria but also of PRIM criteria. His example is Richard Nixon 
is technically a Quaker, but strictly speaking he Is not a Quaker. Lakoff 
seems to imply that Nixon lacks the pacifism and good works which are 
primary marks of Quakerism, though he may be on the Quaker membership 
rolls. The hedge loosely --speaking -specifies that SEC, rather 
than 
DEF, criteria apply, and regular picks out CHAR criteria while 
spurning all the others. 
Though cleverly laid out, such distinctions are limited in their 
usefulness and are resistant to proper formalisation. What counts as 
DEF, PRIM, SEC or CHAR criteria is itself subject to context or 
personal point of view, as Lakoff himself notes (pp.. 207-208). 
Expanding such a system to capture yet more hedges would appear to 
require yet more, distinctions of criteria, which places the whole 
approach in doubt. 
12Heny (1978: 207) has argued that criteria are always , 
held 
constant within a sentence, and that therefore the two Clevets in 
sentence (A) will always be evaluated relative to the same criterion. 
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(A) John is very clever and Bill is (only) rather clever. 
As Heny points out, sameness of criterion for clever is necessary for 
the conclusion that John is more clever than Bill. These intuitions 
do not match my own, though I concede that usually criteria do remain 
constant, throughout a sentence, and, ideally, throughout any coherent 
discourse. That is, I believe that two different criteria of 
cleverness can be read in (A)1 therefore, it is possible to believe 
(A) and yet deny that John is more or less clever than Bill because 
the two types of cleverness involved are incommensurable. Klein 
(1980a: 7-8) has also defended such intuitions against Heny's 
objections. 
13A 
similar ambiguity with a parenthetical adverb was claimed by 
Montague (EFL: 214) for the string the man such that that man 
fortunately loves Mary Is tell. One claimed reading is the non- 
restrictive 'the man such that that man loves Mary is tall, and it is 
fortunate that that man loves Mary'. The other, restrictive, reading 
is the man such that it is fortunate that that man loves Mary is 
tall'. The two readings are distinct and coherent. 
If desired, such restrictive readings can easily be accommodated 
by generalising R91 to - generate - restrictive IV/IVs as well as 
ADJ/ADJs and (t/5t)/(t/5t)s. The semantic types and translations 
would be exactly the same. 
14See Bach 1968: 102-103; Vendler 1968; Givon 1970028-829; 
Lakoff 1970a: 65f Jacobson 1971; Sussex 1974: 113,124-125; Bennett 
1975: 181; 1976: 157; Levi 1976: Chapter 7, especially pp. 230,242. 
15See Bolinger 1967: 4-5,18ff; Wheeler 1972: 318; Quirk et al. 
1972: 239,262,282-285; Berman 1973a: 154-155; Sussex 1974: l24-1251 
Levi 1976: 226-231. Jespersen's (1933: 78-79) theory of 'ranks' was an 
early recognition that adverbial (primarily 'tertiary') notions are 
injected into terms in the form of adjectives (usually 'secondaries') 
in order to satisfy the syntactic convention that adjectives modify 
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nouns-(which are fundamentally 'primaries'). 
16What 
rich' (j) means, when the adjective rich is a basic member 
of CN/CN is in fact undefined. More precisely, then, Montague could 
represent the entailments of John Is a rich lawyer as lawyer' (j) and 
A 
rich'( entity' )(j), where U is the universe of the model and Ax[x E 
UH entity' (x) ]. 
17Chierchia (1982: 342,345,347) provides a rule for 
appositives, which uses the conjunction analysis. Besides failing to 
distinguish between restrictive and non-restrictive appositives, 
Chierchia's rule will generate inappropriate logical conjunctions 
when appositives appear within questions and commands. The pitfalls 
of the conjunction analysis are discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
18In Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970), a very different view of such 
constructions is defended. They argue that 'factive' verbs 
presuppose the truth of their propositional term objects (the 
embedded sentences) because such verbs apply only to terms of the 
form the fact that-t in deep structure. A sentence with Ignore, a 
factive verb, will therefore have a derivation like that in (A), with 
the fact possibly deleted by-transformation at a later stage. 
(A) Bill ignored (the fact) that Mary was pregnant. 
Bill" ignored the fact that Mary was pregnant 
ignore the fact that Mary was pregnant 
Non-factive verbs, on the other hand, are held not to presuppose the 
truth of their propositional objects, and the Kiparskys claim that 
this is explained by the fact that such verbs never combine with 
terms of the form the fact that-t. 
Beesley -3 ýc- Adjectives 





the fact that Mary is pregnant. 
Although at least one attempt has been made to translate the 
Kiparskys' analysis into a MG (Wotschke 1972), the logico-linguistic 
community has, on the whole, been critical. The whole concept of 
semantic presupposition is suspect and has generally been recast in 
terms of entailment. Delacruz (1976: 179-185) has argued persuasively 
that selection restrictions, rather than gross grammatical 
differences, are responsible for the distinctions, a position which 
is consistent with the present arguments in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.4. 
Using the supposedly 'factive' example Ignore, Delacruz shows that by 
replacing fact with thought, sentence (D) no longer even entails the 
truth of the embedded sentence; the factivity in (C) is explained by 
'fact ascription'. 
(C) Bill ignored the fact that Mary was pregnant. 
(D) Bill ignored the thought that Mary was pregnant. 
Even worse examples, supposedly involving factives, can be 
constructed. 
(E) Bill ignored the lie 
took note of impossibility 






that Mary was pregnant. 
The non-restrictive appositive treatment in Section 6.4, more than 
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Delacruz's own account, better captures the observation that 'fact 
ascription' rather than presupposition is working in such examples. 
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Notes to Chapter 7 
The to of infinitives, like the that in that-t phrases, is added 
syncategorematically, as a result of combination rules, by Dowty 
(1980: 19; see also Dowty 1978: 416; Partee 1979b: 88; Cooper 1980: 26- 
27). Trees like the following are generated. 
persuade To go 
persuadeTV/IV goIV 
Earlier treatments in MG also avoid treating infinitives as a 
category by defining verbs like try-tolV//IV (ßs2501 Bennett 
1975: 10-11,160). 
try to go1V 
try-tolV//IV `go 
IV 
I find that such approaches, which effectively deny the term-hood of 
infinitives and that-t clauses, , 
divide structures counter- 
intuitively; also, they cannot be extended very easily to cover the 
cases when such terms function as the subject of a sentence as in (A) 
and (B). For similar views see Bartsch 1978: 18. 
(A) (That John is ill] is true. 
(B) (To swim] is difficult. 
2See Delacruz 1976: 190,196-197; Bennett 1975: 159ff, 175ff; 
1976: 120-123,145,158; Partee 1975: 261-262; 1977b: 283-284,289; 
Bartsch 1978: 26. 
3Bennett (1975: 162-163,176,184-1861 1976: 123,145) generates 
strings like It Is easy to please John with a similar rule. However, 
extraposed strings like It Is AOJ " to IV are considered basic, and 
strings such as To please John Is easy and John is easy to please are 
derived from them by syntactic transformations. 
v 
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4See Partee 1975: 261-262; 1976bs66; 1977bt298ff; 1979a: 306; 
1979b: 57j Bennett 1975: 160-163,167,184ff; 1976: 120-125,158. The 
problems include difficulty in specifying the transformation and 
wholesale changes in the scope of moved constituents. The presence 
of the constituent easy to please in the following sentences is also 
a challenge to any transformational analysis. 
John is jovial and easy to please. 
John strikes Bill as easy to please. 
John tries to be easy to please. 
Mary wants to marry an easy man to please., 
Who here is easy to please? 
For traditional deletion accounts of Tough see Ross 1967: 2311 Lasnik 
& Fiengo 1974. For movement analyses see Postal & Ross 19711 Berman 
1973b, Werth 1979. Jackendoff (1975), answering Lasnik & Piengo 
1974, argues that there is no syntactic evidence deciding between the 
movement or the deletion accounts. In Chomsky 1977, Tough movement 
is argued to be a kind of WH-movement. Sanders 1975a: 135, Peterson 
1979b: 169,181-183 and Hudson 1974: 4 work with unordered hierarchical 
trees and argue that Tough involves unordered raising across 






I have not 
e. g. Gazdar 
with gaps 
Dns but also 
to a categor 
yet had time 
1979: 16. The GPSG approach to defining 
is very appealing, not only for Tough 
for-relative clauses. - The adapting of gap 
ial grammar is an interesting possibility that 
to investigate. 
6Rule 8111 is a pattern for similar rules at the property and 
proposition levels. When property-level variables in a TO' are 
bound, the grammar will generate sentences like (A). 
(A) The assignment is difficult to do 
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Similarly, when proposition-level variables are bound, examples like 
(B) are possible. 
(B) The claim is hard to believe . 
That is, the category TTV, which was previously an abbreviation 
for TV/T (or, more basically, (IV/T)/T), will now abbreviate 
(IV[+frozen]/T)/T. It should be noted that the freezing of IV 
constituents like give John presents has nothing to do with any 
movement transformation or the 'fact that the TTY give is lexically 
related to a DTV (i. e. TV/PP-TO) give. Even the basic TTVS spare, 
allow and refuse, which have no DTV twins, freeze the IVs that they 
help create. ' I find (B) and (C) ungrammatical. 
4 
(A) Bill spared John the trouble. 
(B) *John is hard to [spare the trouble]. 
(C) *The trouble is easy to [spare Bill ]. 
The claim that easy to read is a discontinuous constituent in 
easy book to read goes back at least as far as Wells 1947: 104. 
9Rules R112 and 8113 are analogous to R90 and R11 at the 
individual level. 
10Silva & Thompson (1977) are generally concerned with examples 
involving adjectives and FOR TO clauses, and many of their 'Comment 
with Experiencer' examples, like Imperative, prefer FOR-TO clauses 
over those of the form that-t. 
(A) 1.. It is imperative for John [for Mary to visit him]. 
2. ? It is imperative for John (that'Mary visits him]. 
Such adjectives combine better with that-t clauses where the verb is 
in the subjunctive mood or where a putative should is involved. 
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(B) 1. It is imperative for John that Mary visit him. 
2. It is imperative for John that Mary should visit him. 
FOR-TO clauses appear to share the subjunctive feel, or the 
tenselessness, of such examples. Investigation of such phenomena 
will require a detailed theory of tense and mood and cannot be 
pursued here. See note 18. 
iiLasnik 
& Fiengo (1974: 568; see also Postal 1971: 27-28; Quirk 
et al. 1972: 955) have cited a number of predicate nominals which act 
like Tough adjectives. Most must carry indefinite articles. They 
have a strong flavour of slang. 





(also a delight, a drag, a real drag, a joy, a gas, a mother, 
a pain, a real, pain, a pain In the ass/neck, a pleasure, 
the shits (gratis Bob Fisher), the pits ) 






name 'Human Propensity Adjective' is borrowed from Dixon 
(1977: 34, '39-40). This class has been identified and discussed by 
many researchers, including Vendler 1963: 458: 1968: 63-64,103; Lees 
1963: 22 (AZ class), 82-83; Bolinger 1967: 2; Fraser 1970: 95-96; Lakoff 
1970a: 157; Berman 1973a: 228; Dik 1975: 99-104; Silva & Thompson 
1977: 110-116: -McConnell-Ginet 1982: 150. 
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13A 
sentence adverbial of the form for John can also have the 
reading 'in John's opinion' or 'from John's point of view', but this 
reading is not at issue here. Also, sentences like (A) also have a 
reading wherein for John to escape is"a FOR-TO clause. 
(A) For John to escape is wise. 
In such a reading, wisdom is ascribed to whoever has brought about 
the state of affairs of John escaping. This could be John himself, 
the military officer who chose John to escape, the guard who lets him 
escape, etc. Such readings are similar to those involving the 
'sentence adverbial' wisely. -, _ _, - 
The FOR-TO readings are especially easy to get in the sentences 
in (B). 
(B) 1. [For 25,000 people to run the marathon] was foolish. 
2. [For Ian Paisley to give the speech on religious tolerance] 
was insensitive. 
3. [For the platoon to shell the hospital] was criminal. 
On the FOR-TO clause reading of (Bi), foolishness is not ascribed of 
the 25,000 runners but probably of the organisers of the race who 
allowed, so many entrants to compete. similarly in (B2), 
insensitivity is ascribed of whoever chose or allowed Ian Paisley to 
give the speech. The soldiers in (B3) could be reasonably moral 
creatures following the orders of an officer who gave the orders for 
the shelling of the hospital. The officer would then be the person 
responsible for bringing about the shelling of the hospital, and so 
he would be the one labelled criminal. 
14See Berman 1973a: 233. Of-marked phrases occur only weakly 
together with for-phrases, the result resembling the sentences 
discussed in note 13. 
-Y 
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(A) ? For the platoon to fire on the hospital 
was criminal of the officer. 
Where the for-phrase is a domain-limiting hedge, the only possibly 
acceptable of-marked phrase is one where the object of the 
preposition is a pronoun coreferential with the object of the for- 
marked prepositional phrase (see McConnell-Girret 1982: 150j Dik 
19751104). ' 
(B) *For John to escape was stupid of Bill 
(C) ? For Johni to escape was stupid of him,. 
All in all these sentences seem odd, and (C) especially has the feel 
of a patching together of two structures. I shall henceforth ignore 
such examples. 
15Quirk 
et al. 1972: 826-827 and Berman 1973a: 232 have noted that 
some predicate'nominals also act like HPAs (their examples). 
He is Jsplendid to wait. 
a gentleman 
He is fa lever to make so much money. 
magician 
You are foolish 'to spend so much. 
1a fool 
tF., 
-You are wonderful to do this for me. 
an angel 






Not just any predicate nominal can fit in such a slot. 
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to make so much money. 
The admissible nouns, which Quirk calls 'degree nouns' are of course 
those which are active and can appear in progressive predications 
(Berman 1973as871_Bach 1968: 1171 Chomsky 1970s198-199). 









Adjectives of Class HPA are paradigm active predicates (IDik 1975: 99), 
and all that is necessary to handle these nominal constructions is to 
modify rule R117 slightly to take active nouns. Note that the of 
construction excludes even active nominals. 
It-is foolish of him to wait. ' 
*a fool 
16 In general, it appears justified to assume a future element 
when the verb in the infinitive is active. Thus John is certain to 
come will be translated much like John certainly will come. Stative 
infinitives, however, 'may not require the tense specification. That 
is, the sentence John is certain to know invites a paraphrase such as 
John certainly knows as" easily as John certainly will know. 
17Many IV'/T past participle forms such as annoyed, astonished, 
bored, disgusted, excited, puzzled, etc. can also take certain t/IV" 
complements: e. g. John, was disgusted to hear the news (Quirk et al. 
1972: 828-829). The* following lexical rule reflects the default 
readings 
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R (lexical). If aE BIV, /T then (a, PASS) EB /2(t/IV" 
Realisation: all where all is a in the past participle form 
Translation: XBly[a*( [Bf APP(y)) ], y)] 
The translation provided ý for John Is scared to jump comes out 
roughly equivalent to that for That John jumps scares John, and that 
translation threatens-to entail jump'(j), which is not intuitively 
justified for the infinitive sentence. The infinitive sentence is 
much closer in force to the FOR TO sentence For John to jump scares 
John; neither intuitively entails jump'(j). Unfortunately, a 
satisfactory analysis of FOR-TO and related constructions would 
require an excursus into mood and tense which is impossible here. 
See note 18.. - 
18This 
analysis is somewhat supported by the following examples, 
where reluctant combines with proposition-level terms. 
John is reluctant for Mary to leave. 
John is reluctant that Mary should leave. 
Mary is willing for John to depart. 
Mary is willing that John should depart. 
Examples like these are interesting because they involve tenseless 
FOR TO clauses and a t/IV' (i. e. a that-t clause) with a putative 
should, which may indicate subjunctive mood. For comments on such 
clauses see Vendler. 1968: 102; Levi 1976: 226= Quirk et 81.1972: 466, 
784,823-829; Lees 1963: 22; McConnell-Ginet' 1982: 150; Kiparsky & 
Kiparsky 1970: 169-171. Providing a semantics for putative should 
constructions would be a 
, 
good thesis topic; see Palmer 1979: 160-162; 
Coates 1980: 117-132 and the papers cited therein. 
19In 
examples such as (A), (B) and (C), happy and glad appear to 
have much the same force as willing, and sad is read much like 
reluctant. 
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(A) John is happy to, go. 
(B) Bill is glad to wash the dishes. 
(C) Mary is sad to go away. 
20The 
semantic distinction between expect and persuade was 
pointed out by Chomsky (1965: 22-23), who, lacking a semantic 
component, ' had to argue that I persuaded John to leave and I expected 
John to leave receive different structural (i. e. syntactic) analyses 
at some level. 
21To 
allow the-discontinuous realisation of TVs like persuade to 
leave and believe to be pregnant- around their direct object, the 
following new realisation clause needs to be added to R3. 
Realisation: ( (yTV/(t/IV' I) " Bt/IV. -)TV' -OT} IV 7 
rn 0 rn 8 
22Klein's 
account also differs from the present one in 
interpreting the promise which combines with an infinitive (A) in 
terms of a relation, call it promises*, which is a three-place 
relation between individuals, individuals, and propositions as in 
(B). (The details of the notation are adapted to match the ' present 
conventions. ) 
(A) John promised Bill to leave. 
(B) 1. Johns promised Bill that hei would leave. 
2. -Xz[promisel*(z, b, [leave*(z)])](j) 
There is a promise of category TV/(t/IV') in the present grammgar (see 
Section 5.2.2.2.5.2) which, if treated as basic, would translate like 
promisei in (B2). The present analysis also has a second verb 
promise of category (IV/T')/PP-TO (see Section 5.2.2.2.5.1) which, if 
treated as basic, translates as a three-place relation (let us 
designate it here as promise2*) between individuals, propositions and 
individuals as in (C). 
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(C) 1. Johni promised to Bill that hei 
would leave. 
2. promisee*(j, [leave'(j)], b) 
Such a translation reflects the intuition that Bill is a semantic 
indirect object, the person to whom a promise is made. If Bill is 
felt to be the semantic indirect object in (Bl) as well, as I believe 
it does, then promise should be translat ed not in terms of w/(t/IV') 
promise l as in (B2) but in terms of promise2: i. e. promise,, ,, +/TVI% 
-+ XRl. Ply[promise2' (P)(R)(y) ]. Such an analysis is directly 
parallel to that given to Dative examples such as give (see Section 
3.2, especially rules R7, R8, R9 and examples (6) and (7)). In 
example (A), Bill is again the semantic indirect objects he is the 
target of the promise rather than the individual or proposition being 
promised. Promise(IV/(t/IV's))/T is therefore translated 
in terms 
of promise2 * rather than in terms of promise 1* (see example (107) in 
the text). 
23Failure to distinguish these readings is a fault in the 
raising solution offered in Dowty 1978: 416. 
24Want, love, hate, like and prefer appear superficially to be of 
category TV/(t/IV'"). 
John wants Bill to be good. 
John prefers John to live abroad. 
However, derived constructions such as want to be good cannot be 
passivised as believe to be pregnant can (Bresnan 1979: 154-155 
Perlmutter & Soames 1979: 87-91). 
John believed Mary to be pregnant. 
Mary is believed (by John) to be pregnant. 
*Bill is wanted (by John) to be good. 
*John is preferred (by Mary) to live abroad. 
Excluding the lack of passive, the syntax and semantics of this small 
Beesley -397- Adjectives 
want class- appears identical, to the TV/(t/IV" ") class. These 
intuitions can be accommodated by assigning the want group to a 
separate category of the same type, say (IV/2T)/(t/IV''), and 
redefining R5 and R123 as follows: 
R5 (tentative). If a6 PIV/2T and ,Be PT then (a, $) E PIV" 
Realisation: ((ti(IV/2T)/(t/IV" ) ' 
at/IV") 
IV/2T' 'OT} mo 
y^ýB^8 
else a^Q 
Translation: a' (A, B' ) 
8123 (tentative ). If' aE P(IV/nT)/(t/IV" I) and /B 
E PT 
then (a, ß) E PIV/nT (where n ranges over the set (1,2)). 




25These itn pronouns at property level should not be confused 
with the similar itn pronouns at proposition level. 
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